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PART A 
1. INTRODUCTIONl 
Since 1973, Nebraska has had a "weighing" death penalty system. 
In this system, the sentencing court finds statutory aggravating and 
1. The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the Nebraska Legislature, 
which funded this research, and the Nebraska Commission on Law Enforcement 
and Criminal Justice, which administered our research grant. Our report to the 
commission is The Disposition of Nebraska Capital and Non·Capital Homicide 
Cases (1973·1999): A Legal and Empirical Analysis (2001), available at http:// 
www.state.ne.uslhome/crimecomlhomicidelhomicide.htm. 
We also acknowledge the assistance of the following people during the 
completion of this project: 
Research Director: Gary L. Young, Shareholder, Keating, O'Gara, Davis & 
Nedved, P.C., Lincoln Nebraska. While Mr. Young was actively involved in the 
drafting and preparation of the report to the Crime Commission, he did not take 
an active role in the drafting or preparation of this Article. 
Research Staff: Joel Bacon, Troy Kirk, Tracy Uecker, Justin Walker, Timothy 
Kraft, Abel Sisco, Jisella Veath, Tiffini Yeates, Richard Newell, Barbara Broffitt, 
Jessica J. Kriebs, Michael T. Muilenburg, Nathan S. Russell, Lisa Schomberg, 
Thomas A. Bednar, and Beau B. Brindley. 
Members of the Nebraska Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal 
Justice: Hon. Donald Stenberg, Nebraska Attorney General and Chairman; Hon. 
Mike Johanns, Governor, State of Nebraska; Harold Clarke, Director, Nebraska 
Department of Correctional Services; Col. Tom Nesbitt, Superintendent, 
Nebraska State Patrol; Phyllis Anstine, At Large Member; Scott B. Arnold, Hall 
County Board of Supervisors; Sheriff Ralph Black, Antelope County; Charles 
Brewster, At Large Member; Sheriff William Brueggemann, Cass County Sheriff; 
Chief Don Carey, Police Chief, Omaha Police Department; Stephen Exon, At 
Large Member; Gail Ferris, Merrick County Board of Supervisors; Chief Scot 
Ford, South Sioux City Police Chief; Prof. Susan Jacobs, University of Nebraska; 
Gary Lacey, Esq., County Attorney, Lancaster County; Kathy Moore, Voices for 
Children in Nebraska; Donald Overman, At Large Member; Vernon Pearson, At 
Large Member; James J. Riskowski, At Large Member; Major Brian Tuma, 
Nebraska State Patrol; Hon. Catherine A. Walters, Mayor, City of Cozad; and 
William G. White, At Large Member. 
Nebraska Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice: Allen C. 
Curtis, Executive Director and Barbara McCreight, Administrative Staff. 
Criminal Homicide Study Advisory Panel Membership: Hon. John Colburn, 
Former Lancaster County Deputy Attorney; Sam Cooper, Esq., Former Douglas 
County Deputy Attorney; Dan Werner, Esq., Thayer County Attorney; J. Kirk 
Brown, Esq., Assistant Attorney General; Scott Helvie, Esq., Lancaster County 
Deputy Public Defender; Thomas C. Riley, Douglas County Public Defender; Alan 
Stoler, Esq.; Emil Fabian, Esq.; Gerald Soucie, Nebraska Commission on Public 
Advocacy; and Dennis Keefe, Lancaster County Public Defender. 
Nebraska Department of Correctional Services: Ron Riethmuller, Records 
Administrator; Jeannene Douglass, Records Manager; Ginger Shurter, Records 
Officer; Nancy DeRyke, Records Officer; and Lorraine Douglass, Office Clerk. 
Nebraska Parole Board Staff: Barb Wilken, Lisa Peery, Rachel Bauch, Trudy 
Clark, Tanya Forney, and Christy Lyons. 
Others: Senator Ernie Chambers; Three Retired District Court Judges; Julia 
McQuillian, Ph.D., University of Nebraska Sociology Department; Cheryl Wiese, 
Ph.D., Associate Director, Bureau of Sociological Research, University of 
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mitigating circumstances and bases its sentencing decision on a 
weighing ofthose factors. In Nebraska, judges have the exclusive sen-
tencing authority.2 This Article presents a legal and empirical analy-
sis of the administration of that system through 1999. Our empirical 
analysis tracks 185 prosecutions in 175 death-eligible cases that re-
sulted in 89 penalty trials and 29 death sentences, three of which have 
been executed. 
The principal focus of this Article is on arbitrariness and compara-
tive injustice in the administration of the death penalty.3 As it has 
evolved since Furman v. Georgia,4 the legal concept of arbitrariness 
may refer to one or more of the following features of a death penalty 
system: 
• discrimination based on illegitimate and suspect factors, such as the race 
and socioeconomic status of the defendant and victim; 
• geographic disparities in outcomes; 
• random, inconsistent, and capricious outcomes.5 
Nebraska; Joe Steele, State Court Administrator; State District Court Clerks and 
their staffs; State Probation Office Directors, Officers and their staffs; numerous 
Nebraska prosecutors and defense counsel; DeMaris Johnson, Executive 
Director, Nebraska County Attorneys Association; and Helga Kirst, Executive 
Director, Nebraska Criminal Defense Attorneys Association. 
2. Nebraska's system is modeled after Florida's system. See infra note 37. In Flor-
ida, however, the judicial sentencing decision is based in part on an advisory jury 
verdict, which the court is free to accept or reject. 
3. In this Article, we use interchangeably the terms arbitrariness, a legal concept, 
and comparative injustice, a philosophical concept. Robert F. Schopp, Justifying 
Capital Punishment in Principle and in Practice: Empirical Evidence of Distor-
tions in Application, 81 NEB. L. REV. 805 (2002). Each addresses two separate 
types of capital charging and sentencing behavior. The first type is discrimina-
tion which is both arbitrary and comparatively unjust because it treats defend-
ants differently on the basis of morally irrelevant factors such as the race and 
socioeconomic status ofthe defendant or victim or the county of prosecution. The 
second type involves the inconsistent application of substantive standards of 
noncomparative justice, which results in either the "dissimilar treatment of rele-
vantly similar cases or similar treatment of dissimilar cases .... " Id. at 827. 
4. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
5. In terms of the "legal" issues they raise, state and federal courts view these 
sources of arbitrariness and comparative injustice quite differently, although in 
practice all are generally tolerated. Least acceptable are racial disparities held to 
be the product of discrimination deemed intentional, purposeful, or "disparate 
treatment." Random and unprincipled outcomes raise less concern even though 
they constituted a major factual foundation of the Furman holding. 
Charging and sentencing disparities based on geography or decisions that re-
flect the socioeconomic status of the defendant and victim raise the least "legal" 
concern. When criminal defendants raise claims of socioeconomic and geographic 
discrimination, courts often dismiss them outright or on the grounds that the 
appellant provided inadequate evidence. See, e.g., Woods v. State, No. CR-95-
1797, 1998 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 117, at *13 (May 8, 1998) ("We are aware of no 
case in which a strike based on a venire member's economic status alone, which 
was not found to be a pretext for the exclusion on the basis of race, has been 
found to violate Batson and its progeny."); Thomas v. State, 421 So. 2d 160, 163 
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The need t6 avoid "arbitrariness" and promote comparative justice, 
therefore, shapes the following characteristics that one would expect 
to see in a system that is administered in an evenhanded, non-dis-
criminatory manner: 
• decisionmaking is substantially guided by legitimate case characteristics 
that are substantially related to the culpability of the offender; 
• non-discriminatory decisionmaking; 
• geographic uniformity in outcomes; 
• death-sentencing outcomes that are consistent and limited to the most cul-
pable offenders. 
In addition, we focus on the implications of the Supreme Court's 
spring 2002 decision regarding the death penalty, Ring v. Arizona,6 
for the future of the Nebraska system. Ring requires the participation 
of juries in all capital trials, although the scope of that participation, 
beyond the jury's findings of statutory aggravating circumstances, is 
currently unclear. Against this background, we consider possible re-
forms of the Nebraska system that will meet the requirements of Ring 
while preserving the strengths of the Nebraska system that we docu-
ment in this Article. 
In the balance of this Part, we present a review of the literature 
and a legal analysis of Nebraska law and practice, with special refer-
ence to the features of the system that are likely to enhance or to re-
duce the risk of arbitrariness in the administration of Nebraska's 
death penalty. We also consider the extent to which the current sys-
tem conflicts with the requirements of Ring and propose statutory 
modifications of the current system that likely would satisfy the re-
quirements of Ring. 
Part B describes our methodology and documents the impact of le-
gitimate case characteristics on charging and sentencing outcomes in 
(Fla. 1982) (rejecting petitioner's claims of geographic and economic discrimina-
tion on the basis that "the appellant's allegations of discrimination do not consti-
tute a sufficient preliminary factual basis upon which to state a cognizable 
claim"); State v. Williams, No. 03COl-9302-CR-00050, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. 
LEXIS 211, at *23 (April 2, 1996) ("[TJhe Tennessee Supreme Court has summa-
rily dismissed claims regarding economic, gender, and geographic discrimination 
in the imposition of the death penalty."). Our research has not located any case 
in which a criminal defendant successfully appealed a conviction based on a claim 
of socioeconomic or geographic discrimination. 
It is noteworthy, however, that legislatures have specifically protected crimi-
nal defendants from socioeconomic discrimination. For example, the U.S. Con-
gress requires that the United States Sentencing Commission "assure that the 
guidelines and policy statements are entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national 
origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders." 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2001); 
see, e.g., United States v. Stout, 32 F.3d 901 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that socioeco-
nomic factors were not valid grounds for increasing the sentence of a tax evasion 
defendant). 
6. 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002). The changes adopted by the Nebraska Legislature in 
2002 to comply with Ring are described infra note 395. 
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the Nebraska system. Appendix A presents additional detail on meth-
odology. Parts C through E present empirical evidence of arbitrari-
ness in the system. In doing so, we present both statewide data and 
data from the major urban counties and the counties of greater Ne-
braska.7 In addition, we assess the extent to which any evidence of 
arbitrariness (a) appears to be the product of prosecutorial charging 
decisions, judicial sentencing decisions, or both, and (b) is concen-
trated in particular case categories, such as those with low, medium, 
or high levels of defendant culpability. Part F, which presents a sum-
mary of our findings and policy recommendations, can be viewed as an 
executive summary. 
There are three main themes to this Article. The first theme is 
that the Nebraska death penalty system shows no significant evidence 
of purposeful "disparate treatment" discrimination based on the race 
of the defendant or the victim.8 However, evidence of arbitrariness in 
the system exists with respect to three of the arbitrariness issues 
listed above, although, as we discuss below, several findings that bear 
on these issues are open to more than one interpretation. Throughout, 
we seek to explain our findings, but leave it to our readers to assess 
their legal, ethical, and moral significance.9 
A second main theme of this Article is that there are three underly-
ing legal sources of arbitrariness that we document. The first source 
is the breadth of the Nebraska statute's definition of death-eligible 
murder, which results in capital prosecutions in many cases in which 
death sentences are rarely imposed and, to date, have never been af-
firmed on appeal. It is among these cases that the evidence of exces-
siveness is concentrated. The second legal source of arbitrariness is 
the breadth of prosecutorial charging discretion under Nebraska law, 
which contributes to geographic and race disparities and inconsis-
tency in charging and sentencing outcomes. The third source of arbi-
trariness is ambiguity under state law concerning the right of 
prosecutors to waive the death penalty in cases that result in a first-
degree murder conviction and the scope of discretion that sentencing 
7. The major urban counties include Douglas (City of Omaha), Sarpy (City of Belle-
vue and parts of Omaha), and Lancaster (City of Lincoln). The counties of 
"greater Nebraska" embrace the balance of the state. 
8. Our findings document adjusted race-of-victim disparities in judicial death sen-
tencing decisions in the major urban counties, infra section VILC, that are consis-
tent with a pattern and practice of disparate impact based on the race of the 
victim. These disparities are also consistent with race-of-victim disparities docu-
mented in many states. Infra note 11 and accompanying text. However, because 
the disparities are based on small samples and are not statistically significant, 
they will not support an inference that a pattern and practice of race-of-victim 
discrimination actually exists in Nebraska's major urban counties. 
9. See Schopp, supra note 3, for a useful discussion of the limitations of empirical 
studies of death-sentencing systems as a basis for assessing the constitutionality 
and morality of individual death-sentencing systems in practice. 
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judges have when the prosecution seeks to waive the death penalty in 
first-degree murder cases. 
A third main theme of this Article is that the effectiveness of the 
system could be significantly improved through legislative ratification 
of current Nebraska practices or adoption of procedures currently in 
place or proposed in other jurisdictions. This theme concludes in Part 
F with a series of policy recommendations that we believe can reduce 
the level of arbitrariness in Nebraska's charging and sentencing sys-
tem. We also present proposals that we believe would meet the re-
quirements of Ring while maintaining the strengths of Nebraska's 
judicial sentencing system that we document in this Article. 
II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
An extensive body of academic literature has developed over the 
last twenty-five years addressing whether, and to what extent, the 
consideration of non-legitimate factors influences the administration 
of the death penalty.lO The debate over this matter includes a lively 
discussion on both theoretical and methodological dimensions. One 
significant concern raised by this literature is the degree to which de-
cisions of prosecutors and juries are influenced by the race or socioeco-
nomic status (SES) of the defendant or the victim. On the question of 
race, most studies indicate that the race of the defendant does not af-
fect the likelihood that the defendant will receive the death penalty. 
However, a number of studies suggest that the odds of receiving 
the death penalty are enhanced if the victim is white as opposed to 
another race.!1 For example, the Baldus-Woodworth-Pulaski study of 
the administration of capital punishment in Georgia from 1973-1980 
found that, after adjusting for the presence or absence of hundreds of 
10. See David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the 
Post· Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings From 
Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1792 (1998) (summarizing studies) [here-
inafter Philadelphia Study]; U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: 
RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES (GAO/GGO-90-57) (1990) 
(summarizing studies through 1989). 
11. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 10, at 5-6 ("In 82% of the studies, race of 
victim was found to influence the likelihood of being charged with capital murder 
or receiving a death sentence, i.e., those who murdered whites were found to be 
more likely to be sentenced to death than those who murdered blacks. This find-
ing was remarkably consistent across data sets, states, data collection methods, 
and analytic techniques. The finding held for high, medium, and low quality 
studies."). The empirical studies published/reported before 1990 are summarized 
in DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 254-67 (1990) [hereinafter EJDP]. The empirical studies 
published or reported since 1990 reflect the same pattern noted in the GAO re-
port. They are summarized in David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Dis-
crimination and the Death Penalty, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL 
PuNISHMENT app. B (James R. Acker et al. eds., 2d ed. forthcoming 2003). 
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variables for legitimate case characteristics, such as the level of vio-
lence and the defendant's prior record, defendants whose victims were 
white, on average, faced odds of receiving a death sentence that were 
4.3 times higher than similarly situated defendants whose victims 
were black.12 
Studies that have addressed race disparities in sentencing have 
not consistently found racial disparities. Rather, these studies indi-
cate that race disparities in sentencing are highly sensitive to locality 
and vary significantly. For example, Professors Baldus and Wood-
worth's study of Colorado's capital punishment administration deter-
mined that there were no statistically significant race-of-defendant 
effects, and no statistically significant race-of-victim effects in sen-
tencing decisions.13 In a Philadelphia study, however, there were 
findings of both race-of-victim and race-of-defendant effects in jury 
death-sentencing decisions. 14 
Where race effects are present, these studies generally report that 
the principal source of these race effects is the prosecutorial decision 
to seek or waive the death penalty in death-eligible cases. The litera-
ture also suggests that, in terms of offender culpability, the race ef-
fects are concentrated in the mid-range of cases where the facts 
permit the greatest room for the exercise of discretion. Finally, the 
literature suggests that race effects are more likely to influence death 
penalty administration in suburban and rural rather than urban 
areas. 
Some scholars have argued that there are methodological flaws in 
these studies.15 At least two Justices of the United States Supreme 
Court have suggested that discrimination in the administration of the 
death penalty is inevitable.16 To the extent possible, the research de-
12. EJDP, supra note 11, at 319-20. 
13. See Scott Anderson, As Flies to Wanton Boys: Death·Eligible Defendants in Geor· 
gia and Colorado, 40 TRIAL TALK 9-16 (1991) (reporting no race-of-defendant ef-
fects and no statistically significant race-of-victim effects as found in DAVID C. 
BALDUS ET AL., ARBITRARINESS AND DISCRIMINATION IN COLORADO'S POST-FURMAN 
CAPITAL CHARGING AND SENTENCING PROCESS: A PRELIMINARY REPORT (1986) (on 
file with authors)). 
14. Philadelphia Study, supra note 10 (finding no race-of-victim or defendant effects 
in prosecutorial decisionmaking, but race-of-defendant and race-of-victim effects 
in jury decisionmaking). 
15. See Daniel E. Lungren & Mark L. Krotoski, The Racial Justice Act of 1994 -
Undermining Enforcement of the Death Penalty Without Promoting Racial Jus· 
tice, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 655, 662-63 (1995); John C. McAdams, Racial Dispar· 
ity and the Death Penalty, 61 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 153 (1998); Stanley 
Rothman & Steven Powers, Execution by Quota, 116 PuBLIC INTEREST 3, 8 (1994). 
16. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311-13 (1987) (citing viewpoints of Justices 
Brennan and Marshall in text and footnotes); see also David C. Baldus et aI., 
Reflections on the "Inevitability" of Racial Discrimination in Capital Sentencing 
and the "Impossibility" of Its Prevention, Detection, and Correction, 51 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 359, 371 n. 46 (1994) (quoting Memorandum from Antonin Scalia, 
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sign we use in this research attempts to address the concerns raised 
by critics of prior studies. 
To date, there has been no systematic or comprehensive collection 
of information and analysis of the scope provided in this study con-
ducted in Nebraska. Studies with varying levels of detail and method-
ological sophistication have been conductedI7 in Arizona,ls 
California,19 Colorado,20 Georgia,21 Illinois,22 Kentucky,23 Mary-
land,24 Mississippi,25 New Jersey,26 North Carolina,27 Philadelphia, 
Justice, United States Supreme Court to the Conference of the Justices, United 
States Supreme Court 1 (Jan. 6, 1987) (stating that "[slince it is my view that the 
unconscious operation of irrational sympathies and antipathies, including racial, 
upon jury decisions and (hence) prosecutorial decisions is real, acknowledged in 
the decisions of this court, and ineradicable, I cannot honestly say that all I need 
is more proof')) [hereinafter Inevitabilityl. 
17. Philadelphia Study, supra note 10 (surveying studies through 1998); U.S. GEN. 
ACCT. OFF., supra note 10 (summarizing findings of studies through 1989). 
18. PEG BORTNER & ANDY HALL, ARIZONA FIRST-DEGREE MURDER CASES SUMMARY OF 
1995-1999 INDICTMENTS: DATA SET II RESEARCH REPORT TO ARIZONA CAPTIAL 
CASE COMMISSION (2002) (reporting unadjusted race-of-victim effects in charging 
and judicial sentencing decisions but no race-of-defendant effects) (available in 
the University of Nebraska Law College Library). 
19. Stephen P. Klein & John E. Rolph, Relationship of Offender and Victim Race to 
Death Penalty Sentences in California, 32 JURIMETRICS J. 33 (1991) (finding no 
race-of-defendant effects, but significant race-of-victim effects). 
20. See Anderson, supra note 13. 
21. EJDP, supra note 11 (finding no statewide race-of-defendant effects, but finding 
race-of-victim effects in prosecutor and jury decisionmaking). 
22. GLENN L. PIERCE & MICHAEL L. RADELET, RACE, REGION AND DEATH SENTENCING 
IN ILLINOIS, 1988-1997, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUN. 
ISHMENT tech. app. I, Report A (April 14, 2002). 
23. Thomas J. Keil & Gennardo F. Vito, Race and the Death Penalty in Kentucky 
Murder Trials: 1976-1991, 20 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 17 (1995) (finding no race-of-
defendant effects, but significant race-of-victim effects). 
24. David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race-of-Victim and Race-of-Defendant 
Disparities in the Administration of Maryland's Capital Charging and Sentenc-
ing System (1978-1999) (finding white-victim and black-defendantlwhite-victim 
effects in charging and sentencing decisions after adjustment for the number of 
statutory aggravating circumstances charged in the case, but no independent 
black defendant effects) (unpublished manuscript available in the University of 
Nebraska Law College Library). 
25. RICHARD BERK & JOSEPH LOWERY, FACTORS AFFECTING DEATH PENALTY DECI. 
SIONS IN MISSISSIPPI (June 1985) (finding no overall race-of-defendant effects, but 
race-of-victim effects). 
26. See State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059 (N.J. 1992); DAVID S. BAIME, REPORT TO TH~~ 
SUPREME COURT SYSTEMIC PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW PROJECT 2000-2001 TERM 
(June 1, 2001); Leigh Bienan et aI., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in 
New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 RUTG. L. REV. 27 (1988) 
(finding race-of-victim effects and no race-of-defendant effects in prosecutorial 
decisionmaking, and race-of-defendant effects but no race-of-victim effects in jury 
decisionmaking). 
27. BARRY NAKELL & KENNETH A. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH PENALTY 
(1987) (finding statewide race-of-victim effects, no race-of-defendant effects). 
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Pennsylvania,28 South Carolina,29 Texas,3o and Virginia.31 
In this study, we have used the most advanced analytical method-
ology developed in the conduct of prior similar studies. The analysis 
builds on the insights of these studies and seeks to refine the mea-
sures of criminal culpability and other controls that have emerged as 
these studies have become more sophisticated. 
III. LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE NEBRASKA DEATH 
PENALTY SYSTEM 
A Nebraska penalty-trial court stated in 1989 that "the state's pol-
icy is to impose the death penalty sparingly and uniformly."32 This 
aspiration states what appears to be the goal of the Legislature,33 the 
Nebraska Supreme Court,34 and the penalty-trial sentencing judges 
who have addressed the issue. In this section, we analyze the core 
features of Nebraska law and practice that are likely to enhance or 
impede the realization of those goals or are otherwise relevant to the 
risk of arbitrariness. In this regard, we consider the death penalty 
legislation, the jurisprudence ofthe Nebraska Supreme Court, and the 
charging and sentencing practices of Nebraska's prosecutors and 
judges. At a number of points, we contrast the Nebraska system with 
those of other American death-sentencing jurisdictions. In the analy-
sis, we consider the implications of Nebraska law and policy for what 
we are likely to find in our empirical study of the system. We also 
identify a series of narrower questions that we address empirically in 
subsequent portions of this Article. 
Our survey of Nebraska law and practice has benefited greatly 
from an interview with Nebraska State Senator Ernie Chambers35 
28. Philadelphia Study, supra note 10 (finding no race-of-victim or defendant effects 
in prosecutorial decisionmaking, but finding race-of-defendant and victim effects 
in jury decisionmaking). 
29. Raymond Paternoster & Ann Marie Kazyaka, The Administration of the Death 
Penalty in South Carolina: Experiences Over the First Few Years, 39 S.C. L. REV. 
245 (1988) (finding no race-of-defendant effects, but race-of-victim effects). 
30. Deon Brock et aI., Arbitrariness in the Imposition of Death Sentences in Texas: An 
Analysis of Four Counties by Offense Seriousness, Race of Victim, and Race of 
Offender, 28 AM. J. OF CRIM L. 43 (2000) [hereinafter Texas Study]. 
31. JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT AND REVIEW COMMISSION OF THE VIRGINIA GENERAL As-
SEMBLY, REVIEW OF VIRGINIA'S SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PuNISHMENT (2002) [hereinaf-
ter VIRGINIA STUDY]. 
32. State v. Boppre, Case No. 35847, p. 8 (Scotts Bluff Co. Dist. Ct. 1987) (emphasis 
added). All unreported decisions of the Nebraska District Courts cited herein are 
available in the University of Nebraska Law College Library. 
33. See infra note 90 and accompanying text. 
34. See State v. Simants, 197 Neb. 549, 569, 250 N.W.2d 881, 893 (1977). 
35. Interview with Senator Ernie Chambers, District 11, Nebraska Unicameral, Lin-
coln, Nebraska (October 18, 2001) [hereinafter Chambers Interview]. 
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and an extensive joint interview that we conducted with three retired 
Nebraska trial court judges.36 
At first blush, Nebraska appears to be a typical "weighing" state. 
The legislation includes nine aggravating circumstances and seven 
mitigating circumstances, which are listed in Table 1.37 Upon a find-
ing of liability for first-degree murder,38 the statute establishes a 
three stage penalty-trial process in which the sentencing authority de-
termines whether (a) statutory aggravating circumstances are present 
in the case, or (b) statutory mitigating circumstances are present, and 
(c) if they are, whether "the aggravating circumstances ... outweigh 
the mitigating circumstances."39 Only when aggravating circum-
stances outweigh mitigating circumstances maya death sentence be 
imposed.40 On closer examination, however, one sees that the Ne-
braska system is far from typical and that it implicates the issue of 
arbitrariness at more levels than any other death penalty system of 
which we are aware. 
A. Judicial Sentencing 
A significant feature of Nebraska's statute that distinguishes it 
from most weighing statutes is that penalty-trial sentencing is per-
formed exclusively by trial court judges. Only four other states have 
taken this course.41 The Nebraska statute is unique even when com-
36. Interview with three retired Nebraska judges, Lincoln, Nebraska (October 19, 
2001) [hereinafter Judges Interview]. The former judges, who had participated 
in a number of penalty trials, requested anonymity, a request we honor in this 
Article. 
37. This weighing model roughly follows the Florida legislation found constitutional 
in Proffitt u. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
38. The first element of capital murder in Nebraska is liability for first-degree mur-
der (M1). The key elements ofM1 are (a) killing another person with a mens rea 
(mental state) defined as "purposely and with deliberate and premeditated mal-
ice" or (b) killing "in the perpetration of or attempt to" commit one of a series of 
violent felonies. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-303 (Reissue 1995). Deliberation and pre-
meditation also embrace the statutory elements of "administering poison or caus-
ing the same to be done or if by willful and corrupt perjury or subornation of the 
same, he purposely procures the conviction and execution of any innocent per-
son." Id. The second element of a capital murder is a presence in the case of one 
or more of the statutory "aggravating circumstances" listed in Table 1. § 29-2523 
(Reissue 1995). All of the aggravators in Table I, with small technical changes, 
were in the original statute with the exception of § 29-2523 (1) (i), which became 
effective July 15, 1998. 
39. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2519 (Reissue 1995). 
40. Id.; NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2522 (Reissue 1995). 
41. Among states with exclusively judicial death sentencing, Arizona, Montana, and 
Idaho assign the sentencing responsibility to the guilt-trial judge. Colorado as-
signs it to a panel of three judges. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West 2000); 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103 (West 2000); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Michie 
2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (2000). See generally Roxane J. Perruso, 
And Then There Were Three: Colorado's New Death Penalty Sentencing Statute, 
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TABLE 1 
NEBRASKA STATUTORY AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523 (Reissue 1995). Aggravating and mitigating circumstances, 
as follows: 
(1) Aggravating Circumstances: 
(a) The offender was previously convicted of another murder or a crime involv-
ing the use or threat of violence to the person, or has a substantial prior his-
tory of serious assaultive or terrorizing criminal activity; 
(b) The murder was committed in an effort to conceal the commission of a 
crime, or to conceal the identity of the perpetrator of such crime; 
(c) The murder was committed for hire, or for pecuniary gain, or the defendant 
hired another to commit the murder for the defendant; 
(d) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or manifested excep-
tional depravity by ordinary standards of morality and intelligence; 
(e) At the time the murder was committed, the offender also committed an-
other murder; 
(0 The offender knowingly created a great risk of death to at least several 
persons; 
(g) The victim was a public servant having lawful custody of the offender or 
another in the lawful performance of his or her official duties and the offender 
knew or should have known that the victim was a public servant performing 
his or her official duties; 
(h) The murder was committed knowingly to disrupt or hinder the lawful exer-
cise of any governmental function or the enforcement of the laws; or 
(i) The victim was a law enforcement officer engaged in the lawful perform-
ance of his or her official duties as a law enforcement officer and the offender 
knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a law enforcement 
officer. 
The facts upon which the applicability of an aggravating circumstance de-
pends must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
(2) Mitigating Circumstances: 
(a) The offender has no significant history of prior criminal activity; 
(b) The offender acted under unusual pressures or influences or under the 
domination of another person; 
(c) The crime was committed while the offender was under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance; 
(d) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime; 
(e) The offender was an accomplice in the crime committed by another person 
and his or her participation was relatively minor; 
(0 The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the 
act; or 
(g) At the time of the crime, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the 
requirements oflaw was impaired as a result of mental illness, mental defect, 
or intoxication. 
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pared to these four states, however, because it gives the guilt-trial 
judge the power to conduct the penalty trial alone or to request the 
Nebraska Supreme Court to appoint two other judges to share the 
duty.42 On this issue, a recent decision of the Nebraska Supreme 
Court holds that when the trial court opts for a three-judge panel, a 
death sentence imposed by the panel must be unanimous to stand.43 
This research, therefore, provides an opportunity to test the "con-
sistency" hypothesis advanced in Proffitt v. Florida, namely that "judi-
cial sentencing should lead, if anything, to even greater consistency in 
the imposition at the trial court level of capital punishment, since a 
trial judge is more experienced in sentencing than a jury and therefore 
is better able to impose sentences similar to those imposed in analo-
gous cases."44 Implicit in this expectation is the further expectation 
that judicial sentencing systems carry a lower risk of discrimination 
on the basis of race and suspect factors, such as geography and the 
socioeconomic status of the defendant and victim, than do jury death-
sentencing systems. To test these hypotheses, we compare the evi-
dence of arbitrariness and discrimination in the outcomes of Ne-
braska's penalty trials with comparable evidence from New Jersey 
and Pennsylvania, both of which are weighing jurisdictions that rely 
on jury sentencing.45 
The literature and Nebraska law suggest that the difference be-
tween a one- and three-judge sentencing court may have implications 
68 U. COLO. L. REV. 189 (1997). In Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana, 
judges impose a life or death sentence after receiving an advisory jury verdict. 
ALA.. CODE §§ 13A-5-46, 13A-5-47 (1994); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11, § 4209 (1995); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (Supp. 2001). 
Of course, all of these systems have been drawn into question by Ring v. Arizona, 
122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002). 
42. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (Reissue 1995). 
43. State v. Anderson & Hochstein (II), 262 Neb. 311, 328, 632 N.W. 2d. 273, 285 
(2001). In 2002, the Nebraska Legislature made a three-judge panel mandatory 
for all cases. Infra note 395. 
44. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 n.10 (1976) (drawing on an opinion of the 
Florida Supreme Court to the effect that a "trial judge with experience in the 
facts of criminality possesses the requisite knowledge to balance the facts of the 
case against the standard criminal activity which can only be developed by in-
volvement with the trials of numerous defendants"). See Robert F. Schopp, Rec-
onciling "Irreconcilable" Capital Punishment Doctrine as Comparative and 
Noncomparative Justice, 53 FLA. L. REV. 475, 517-24 (2001), for an elaboration of 
the reasons why judicial sentencing panels are likely to enhance consistency com-
pared to juries. However, in Ring, the Supreme Court questioned the extent to 
which data supported the Proffitt hypothesis, stating that "the superiority of judi-
cial fact finding in capital cases is far from evident," 122 S. Ct. at 2342, and ruled 
that, in any event, the Sixth Amendment concerns underlying Ring trump con-
cerns about "rationality, fairness, or efficiency" in death sentencing outcomes. Id. 
45. See infra subsection XI.B.2. 
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for the risk of arbitrariness in the system.46 The Nebraska data indi-
cate that three-judge panels are appointed 50% (44/88) ofthe time. In 
those cases, the death-sentencing rate is 51% (22/43), while in the 
solo-judge cases the rate is 16% (7144).47 When this disparity is ad-
justed to control for offender culpability, the disparity in the rates is 
much reduced, but it still suggests that the solo-judges are more selec-
tive in their sentencing than are the panels.48 How or why could this 
be? 
Our interviews with retired judges suggest two possible reasons 
why a guilt-trial judge may prefer a panel: (1) reduced scrutiny and (2) 
enhanced reliability. The reduced scrutiny theory suggests that when 
a guilt-trial judge thinks a death sentence in the case is likely, he or 
she may believe that a death sentence in the case will have more legit-
imacy and attract less legal and political scrutiny if it is imposed by a 
panel. The death sentence reversal rates in the Nebraska Supreme 
Court-57% (4/7) for the solo decisions versus 36% (8/22) for the panel 
decisions-supports this hypothesis, although the samples are small. 
Indeed, the possibility of greater deference by the Nebraska Supreme 
Court for panel-imposed death sentences may partially explain why 
all six of the Nebraska death sentences vacated in federal court were 
imposed by three-judge panels.49 
46. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SAKS, SMALL-GROUP DECISION MAKING AND COMPLEX INFOR-
MATION TASKS 26 (February 1981) (stating that an extensive review of the litera-
ture suggests that, at least for complex decisionmaking, groups "perform better" 
than individuals by making "more accurate decisions and judgments"); Anderson 
& Hochstein (11), 262 Neb. 311, 632 N.W.2d 273 (holding based on assumption 
that there is less risk of arbitrariness in three-judge panels). See also Schopp, 
supra note 44, at 524 (arguing that judicial panels are likely to surpass both ju-
ries and solo trial judges "in providing deeper and broader understanding of the 
societal standards represented by the law and in "increasing consistency in the 
interpretation and application of the systemic principles and criteria of retribu-
tive justice applied across cases"). 
47. This 34-percentage point disparity in sentencing rates is significant at the .001 
level. One penalty trial is excluded from this analysis because the court indicated 
that it had no discretion under the law because of an earlier Nebraska Supreme 
Court decision in the case. 
48. When culpability is measured by the number of aggravating circumstances in the 
case, the disparity is 16 points (.43-.27), significant at the .03 level. When culpa-
bility is measured with a regression-based measure, the disparity is 26 points, 
significant at the .001 level. 
49. State v. Moore (11), 250 Neb. 805, 553 N.W.2d 120 (1996), rev'd sub nom. Moore v. 
Kinney, 278 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2002); State v. Moore (I), 210 Neb. 457, 316 
N.W.2d 33 (1982), rev'd sub nom. Moore v. Clarke, 904 F.2d 1226 (8th Cir. 1990); 
State v. Anderson & Hochstein (I), 207 Neb. 51, 296 N.W.2d 440 (1980), rev'd sub 
nom. Anderson v. Hopkins, 113 F.3d 825 (8th Cir. 1997), Hochstein v. Hopkins, 
113 F.3d 143 (8th Cir. 1997); State v. Holtan, 197 Neb. 544, 250 N.W.2d. 876 
(1977), rev'd sub nom. Holtan v. Black, 838 F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1988); State v. 
Rust, 197 Neb. 528, 250 N.W.2d 867 (1977), rev'd sub nom. Rust v. Hopkins, 984 
F.2d 1486 (8th Cir. 1993). 
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The retired judges whom we interviewed suggest that a more com-
mon reason a judge may prefer a panel is a desire for the enhanced 
reliability that a panel is likely to afford in difficult, close cases. This 
theory suggests that guilt-trial judges are more inclined to go solo if 
the outcome is clear-whether it be a life or death sentence. Two sub-
sets of cases in Footnote Table 150 provide some support for this hy-
pothesis: (1) the data in Row 2, Column B indicate that the panel 
appointment rate, .35, is lowest in the least aggravated (one-ag-
gravator) cases and (2) the rate is higher, .60, in the mid-range of 
cases (Column B) in terms of offender culpability (two aggravators). 
However, in a third subset of cases (Column D), the data cut against 
the enhanced reliability hypothesis and lend support for the reduced 
scrutiny hypothesis. Namely, the panel appointment rate is the high-
est, .73, in the most aggravated cases (three or more aggravators), a 
case category in which the reliability hypothesis suggests the panel 
appointment rate should be low.51 
Although the enhanced reliability hypothesis only partly explains 
the panel selection outcomes, the assumption that a panel is less 
likely to produce an inappropriate or arbitrary outcome is quite plau-
sible. Indeed, the Nebraska Supreme Court's recent ruling that a 
three-judge panel may only impose a death sentence by a unanimous 
vote clearly reflects that perception. 52 Another virtue of a panel is 
that the augmenting judges are selected by the Chief Justice ran-
domly from around the state. The resulting geographic diversity of 
50. 
FOOTNOTE TABLE 1 
RATES AT WHICH THREE-JUDGE SENTENCING PANELS ARE APPOINTED, 
CONTROLLING FOR THE NUMBER OF STATUTORY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
IN THE CASES: 1973-1999 
A B C D E 
1 Number of Aggravating 1 2 3-6 All Cases 
Circumstances and Number (n=48) (n=25) (n=15) (n=88) 
of Penalty-Trial Cases 
2 Judicial Sentencing Panel .35 .60 .73 .49 
Appointment Rate (17/48) (15125) (11/15) (43/88) 
51. Another possible explanation may be experience. Panels are used somewhat less 
frequently in the major urban counties, .46 (31/67), where penalty trials are quite 
common, than they are in greater Nebraska, .57 (12121), where penalty trials are 
few in number. However, when the culpability of the offenders is taken into ac-
count, there is only a 4-percentage point difference (.48-.52) in the frequency with 
which panels are used in the two areas of the state. 
52. State v. Anderson & Hochstein (II), 262 Neb. 311, 324, 632 N.W.2d 273, 282-83 
(2001). The decision strongly supports the recent legislative decision to mandate 
three-judge panels. Infra note 395. 
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the panels may reduce the risk of geographic disparity in judicial 
decisionmaking.53 
B. Death Eligibility, Fact Finding, and the Weighing of 
Aggravation and Mitigation 
Nebraska has not followed the path of several legislatures of regu-
larly increasing the number of homicides that are death-eligible. 54 In 
contrast, since 1973, the Nebraska Legislature has limited death eligi-
bility in two ways that reduce the risk of excessive sentences. First, in 
1982 it excluded offenders under age 18 from the risk of a death sen-
tence55 and, second, in 1999 it excluded mentally retarded offenders. 56 
In the absence of these limitations in other jurisdictions, either youth 
or mental retardation may be important mitigators in both the charg-
ing and sentencing process. In the jurisdictions that do expose minors 
and mentally retarded defendants to the risk of a death sentence, 
death sentences are only occasionally imposed; however, when they 
are imposed, they often carry a high risk of being comparatively exces-
sive because of their infrequency.57 
A distinctive feature of the Nebraska statute is the much broader 
discretion it allows sentencing judges to impose a life sentence than it 
allows them to impose a death sentence. Compared to many other 
statutes, it appears to create a de facto presumption in favor of a life 
sentence outcome. 
To impose a death sentence, the court must find that statutory ag-
gravating circumstances "outweigh" any statutory mitigating circum-
stances.58 The first issue, therefore, is whether any statutory 
aggravation is present in the case. Although the original statute was 
silent on the state's burden in proving aggravation, the Nebraska Su-
53. Contrary to our expectations, the retired judges we interviewed reported that the 
guilt-trial judge normally had no more influence in the sentencing decision than 
the two judges appointed by the Chief Justice. 
54. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-264.3, 18.2-31 (2001). The number of aggravators 
in Virginia increased from 6 in 1977 to 20 in 2002. See VIRGINIA STUDY, supra 
note 31, at 9-11. 
55. Act of April 20, 1982, LB 787, 1982 Neb. Laws 859. 
56. Act of April 18, 1998, LB 1266, 1998 Neb. Laws 760. As a result of the Supreme 
Court's decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002), which held that the 
execution of mentally retarded defendants is barred by the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment provision of the Eighth Amendment, this prohibition is now 
nationwide. 
57. For examples of death sentences of young and mentally retarded offenders from 
Nebraska, see State v. Victor, 235 Neb. 770, 457 N.W.2d 431 (1990), State v. 
Simpson, 200 Neb. 823, 265 N.W.2d 681 (1978), and State v. Stewart, 197 Neb. 
497, 250 N.W.2d 849 (1977). An additional danger with mental retardation is 
that it may have an aggravating rather than a mitigating effect. See, e.g., Penry 
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
58. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2519 (Reissue 1995). 
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pre me Court required proof beyond a reasonable doubt.59 In 1997, the 
Legislature ratified this standard,60 which is a common requirement 
nationwide.61 In Nebraska, this standard is often invoked by the sen-
tencing court as the basis for finding no aggravation present in the 
case, even in the face of quite convincing evidence. This finding occurs 
most often when the state's case rests on a single statutory 
aggravator.62 
Several of the statutory aggravating circumstances in the Ne-
braska statute are quite broad.63 Prior to 1977, the trial courts had no 
guidance on their interpretation. However, commencing in 1977, the 
year its first death case was decided, the Nebraska Supreme Court 
has narrowed considerably the potential reach of several aggravators 
and has been quite willing to overturn lower-court findings on aggra-
vation.64 A particularly striking example appears in the Court's first 
death-sentencing decisions (a quartet) issued February 2, 1977. In 
59. State v. Simants, 197 Neb. 549, 559, 250 N.W. 2d 881, 888 (1977). 
60. Act of April 18, 1998, LB 422 § (h)(i), 1998 Neb. Laws 117. 
61. In addition, Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002), which builds on Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), held that aggravating factors which expose the 
defendant to the risk of a heightened penalty are elements of the offense requir-
ing proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
62. See, e.g., State v. Jones, Docket 114, No. 158, p. 11 (Douglas Co. Dist. Ct. 1997); 
State v. Benzel, Docket 32, Page 81, pp. 5-6 (Hall Co. Dist. Ct. 1984); State v. 
Lopez, Docket 114, No. 521, p. 4 (Douglas Co. Dist. Ct. 1983); State v. Lynch, 
Docket 111, No. 475, p. 5 (Douglas Co. Dist. Ct. 1982). 
63. The most indeterminate aggravators are: the "substantial prior criminal record" 
factor (a); the "heinous, atrocious, [and] cruel" factor (d); and the "great risk of 
death" to others factor <D. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523 (Reissue 1995). 
64. See for example, Max J. Burbach, Prior Criminal Activity and Death Penalty Sen-
tencing: State v. Reeves, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 547 (1991); Jeanne A. Burke, 
Nebraska's 'Exceptional Depravity' Language at Death's Door: Moore v. Clarke, 24 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1019 (1991). 
Cases construing the "especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or manifested ex-
ceptional depravity" aggravator include: State v. Ryan, 248 Neb. 405, 534 N.W.2d 
766 (1995); State v. Palmer, 224 Neb. 282, 399 N.W.2d 706 (1986); State v. Reeves, 
216 Neb. 206, 344 N.W.2d 433 (1984); State v. Moore (1), 210 Neb. 457, 316 
N.W.2d 33 (1982); State v. Harper, 208 Neb. 568, 304 N.W.2d 663 (1981); State v. 
Otey, 205 Neb. 90, 287 N.W.2d 36 (1979); State v. Peery, 199 Neb. 656, 261 
N.W.2d 36 (1979); State v. Holtan, 197 Neb. 544, 250 N.W.2d 876 (1977); State v. 
Simants, 197 Neb. 549, 250 N.W.2d 881 (1977); State v. Stewart, 197 Neb. 497, 
250 N.W.2d 849 (1977). 
Cases construing the "offender was previously convicted of another murder or 
a crime involving the use or threat of violence to the person, or has a substantial 
prior history of serious assaultive or terrorizing criminal activity" aggravator in-
clude: State v. Bird Head, 225 Neb. 822, 408 N.W.2d 309 (1987); State v. Jones, 
213 Neb. 1,328 N.W.2d 166 (1982); State v. Moore (I), 210 Neb. 457, 316 N.W.2d 
33 (1982); State v. Holtan, 197 Neb. 544, 250 N.W.2d 876 (1977). 
Cases construing the "murder was committed knowingly to disrupt or hinder 
the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of the laws" 
aggravator include: State v. Lotter, 255 Neb. 456, 586 N.W.2d 591 (1998); State v. 
Rust, 197 Neb. 528, 250 N.W.2d 867 (1977). 
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one of those cases, State v. Stewart, the trial court found six ag-
gravators present, but the Nebraska Supreme Court struck most of 
them as unsupported by the evidence.65 This decision sent a strong 
signal to the trial courts and the trend in trial-court findings of aggra-
vating circumstances since then clearly indicates the extent to which 
the discretion of the trial courts has been limited. As a result, trial 
courts now find fewer aggravators: before 1978, the average number 
of aggravators found in the penalty-trial hearing was 4.2; since 1978, 
the average has been 2.3.66 
Judicial comments in sentencing orders also reflect a perception 
that the Nebraska Supreme Court's decisions have significantly re-
duced trial-court sentencing discretion. This perception was apparent 
in the comments of a second sentencing panel following a remand from 
federal court in one particular Nebraska case. The defendant had 
been sentenced to death 22 years earlier. The court noted that it could 
not follow the lead of the original panel and impose another death sen-
tence because the earlier panel "had to reach its conclusions without 
the benefit of the significant appellate guidance from the Nebraska 
Supreme Court with which we have been favored in the intervening 
years."67 In short, on the same evidence, statutory aggravators that 
the court found to exist in the early years were simply not present or 
carried much less "weight" in later years. 
Another distinctive feature of the Nebraska system is the discre-
tion that it gives the sentencing court to impose a life sentence even 
when it finds aggravation but no mitigation in the case. One can rea-
sonably argue that when no mitigation is present, any level of aggra-
vation is sufficient to outweigh the mitigation. Indeed, in at least one 
Cases construing the "great risk of death to at least several persons" ag-
gravator include: State v. Holtan, 197 Neb. 544, 250 N.W.2d 876 (1977); State v. 
Simants, 197 Neb. 549, 250 N.W.2d 881 (1977); State v. Stewart, 197 Neb. 497, 
250 N.W.2d 849 (1977). 
Cases construing the "murder was committed in an effort to conceal the com-
mission of a crime, or to conceal the identity of the perpetrator of such crime" 
aggravator include: State v. Bjorklund, 258 Neb. 432, 604 N.W.2d 169 (2000); 
State v. Lotter, 255 Neb. 456, 586 N.W.2d 591 (1998); State v. Joubert, 224 Neb. 
411, 399 N.W.2d 237 (1986); State v. Palmer, 224 Neb. 282, 399 N.W.2d 706 
(1986); State v. Hunt, 220 Neb. 707,371 N.W.2d 708 (1985); State v. Holtan, 197 
Neb. 544, 250 N.W.2d 876 (1977); State v. Rust, 197 Neb. 528, 250 N.W.2d 867 
(1977); State v. Stewart, 197 Neb. 497, 250 N.W.2d 849 (1977). 
65. State v. Stewart, 197 Neb. 497, 520-26, 250 N.W.2d 849, 863-66 (1977). In the 
Stewart opinion, it is a bit unclear if the court struck four or five of the 
aggravators. 
66. In the cases originally death-sentenced that were retried after a judicial remand, 
the following changes occurred in terms of the number of a statutory aggravating 
circumstances found by the court: Anderson (2 to 1); Bird Head (3 to 2); 
Drinkwalter (2 to 1); Hochstein (2 to 1); Holtan (4 to 2); Rust (4 to 2). 
67. State v. Rust, Docket 91, No. 555, p. 27 (Douglas Co. Dist. Ct. 1997); see also 
State v. Holtan, 197 Neb. 544, 250 N.W.2d. 876 (1977). 
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state, Pennsylvania, the statute mandates a death sentence when ag-
gravation is found but mitigation is not found. 68 In Philadelphia 
County, 55% (63/114) of the death sentences are imposed under this 
circumstance.69 If that rule had pertained in Nebraska during the pe-
riod of this study, we could have seen 35 rather than the 29 death 
sentences actually imposed.7o 
As noted above, when both aggravation and mitigation have been 
found, the Nebraska statute permits the imposition of a death sen-
tence only when the aggravation outweighs the mitigation. Those 
words do not specify explicitly the degree to which the aggravation 
must outweigh the mitigation. Nevertheless, the text of the statute 
also states that when both aggravation and mitigation are found, the 
court must first determine whether the mitigating circumstances "ap-
proach or exceed" the aggravation in the case.71 The Nebraska Su-
preme Court made clear early on that mitigation which merely 
"approaches" the aggravation may justify a life sentence.72 The prac-
tical effect of this rule is that the aggravation must substantially out-
weigh the mitigation in the case. A number of life sentences have 
been imposed on this ground.73 
Another important issue concerns the minimal level of aggravation 
that must be present in the case to "justify" imposition of a death sen-
tence within the meaning of section 29-2522(1). The specific question 
raised by its language is "[w1hether sufficient aggravating circum-
stances exist tojustify" a death sentence (emphasis added). The use of 
the plural "circumstances" suggests that more than one aggravator is 
required to justify a death sentence. However, the Nebraska Supreme 
Court has repeatedly emphasized that the weighing issue is qualita-
tive with respect to both the aggravators and mitigators,74 Sentenc-
ing panels often quote the following language from the first quartet of 
1977 decisions: "In the balancing of the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, we emphasize that a death penalty will not be imposed 
68. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(b) (1998); see Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 
305 (1990) (sustaining the constitutionality of the provision). 
69. Philadelphia Study, supra note 10, at 1645, fig. 1. 
70. All the Nebraska cases with no mitigation advanced to a penalty trial. Two no-
mitigation cases, State v. Palmer (I), 210 Neb. 206, 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981), and 
State v. Palmer (II), 215 Neb. 273, 338 N.W.2d 281 (1983), resulted in death 
sentences. Of course, in the face of such a rule, the Nebraska trial judges may 
have been more inclined to find mitigation present in the cases. 
71. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2522(2) (Reissue 1995). 
72. State v. Stewart, 197 Neb. 497, 526-27, 250 N.W.2d 849, 866 (1977). 
73. See, e.g., State v. Nielson, Case 8044, Page 124, Doc. Y, p. 2 (Wash. Co. Dist. Ct. 
1978); State v. Schaeffer, Case No. 28-279, p. 11 (Hall Co. Dist. Ct. 1977). 
74. The reference in subsection (2) to mitigating "circumstances" supports the Court's 
interpretation since a quantitative standard with respect to mitigation would re-
quire more than one mitigator to "approach" or exceed the "weight" of the aggra-
vation in the case. 
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simply because the aggravating circumstances may outnumber the 
mitigating circumstances. Rather, the test is whether the aggravating 
circumstances in comparison outweigh the mitigating circum-
stances."75 Nevertheless, the Nebraska Supreme Court vacated the 
death sentences in the two single-aggravator death cases it has re-
viewed.76 Moreover, in single-aggravator cases, penalty-trial judges 
have routinely found that the aggravation failed to ''justify'' the impo-
sition of a death sentence even in the absence of mitigation, and not 
uncommonly they pointedly note the "lone" or "only one" aggravator in 
the case.77 
In spite of this evidence, the retired judges we interviewed com-
pletely rejected the suggestion that a "rule of one" or any other quanti-
tative standards were perceived to exist or were applied by either the 
Nebraska Supreme Court or the trial courts. In stating this judgment, 
the former judges relied heavily on the language of the Nebraska Su-
preme Court that outcomes could not be based on mere counts, as well 
as their belief that the sentencing courts meticulously adhered to this 
rule. Against this background, our empirical study scrutinizes the ex-
tent to which the number of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances, in fact, explain sentencing outcomes.78 
Another feature of the system that, over the years, may have made 
both prosecutors and trial judges less prone to seek and impose death 
sentences is the significant rate at which death-sentenced offenders 
have avoided execution and have had their sentences reduced to life 
imprisonment or less. Of the 29 death sentences imposed (during the 
period of this study) against offenders who did not die on death row of 
natural causes, 77% (20/26) have been vacated in post-sentence judi-
cial review. Thirteen of these death sentences were vacated in state 
court79 and six were vacated in federal court.80 Of course, the vaca-
75. State v. Simants, 197 Neb. 549, 569, 250 N.W.2d 881, 892 (1977)(emphasis 
added). 
76. State v. Anderson & Hochstein (II), 262 Neb 311, 632 N.W.2d. 273, 284 (2001) 
(vacating both defendants' death sentences). In the third single-aggravator death 
case, the trial court vacated the death sentence on a post-trial motion. State v. 
Simpson, Docket 686, No. 192 (Lancaster Co. Dist. Ct. 1996) (court file sealed). 
77. See, e.g., State v. Carter, Docket 118, No. 337, p. 1 (Douglas Co. Dist. Ct. 1980); 
State v. Rehbein, Docket 113, No. 475, p. 17 (Douglas Co. Dist. Ct. 1983). 
78. See infra section IV.B. 
79. The death sentences of Anderson and Hochstein (I), Bird Head, Drinkwalter, 
Hunt, Anderson and Hochstein (II), Jones, Palmer (I), Palmer (II), Reeves, 
Sheets, Simants, Stewart, and Victor were vacated by the Nebraska Supreme 
Court, while Simpson's death sentence was vacated in the trial court. State v. 
Anderson & Hochstein (II), 262 Neb. 311, 632 N.W.2d 273 (2001); State v. Sheets, 
260 Neb. 325,618 N.W.2d 117 (2000); State v. Victor, 259 Neb. 894, 612 N.W.2d 
573 (2000); State v. Drinkwalter, 242 Neb. 40, 493 N.W.2d 319 (1992); State v. 
Bird Head, 225 Neb. 822, 408 N.w.2d 309 (1987); State v. Hunt, 220 Neb. 707; 
371 N.W.2d 708 (1985); State v. Reeves, 216 Neb. 206, 344 N.W.2d 433 (1984); 
State v. Palmer (II), 215 Neb. 273, 338 N.W.2d 281 (1983); State v. Jones, 213 
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tion of a death sentence does not terminate all risk of an execution 
since the state normally can seek a death sentence in a subsequent 
prosecution. Nevertheless, of the 21 offenders sent to death row who 
did not die there of natural causes, 67% (14/21) have left death row. 
Three have been executed81 and four remain on death row.82 
There is evidence that the perceived difficulty of making death 
sentences "stick," combined with the high costs to the counties of post-
conviction litigation, may also incline all of the actors in the system to 
attempt to limit death sentencing to the most culpable offenders.83 
Finally, a less visible, but potentially important actor in the judi-
cial sentencing process is the family of the victim. Since 1983, Ne-
braska legislation requires the trial court's presentence investigation 
report to include any "written statements submitted to the county at-
torney by a victim."84 It appears that victim impact statements (VIS) 
in this form are almost always submitted to the county attorney and 
considered by the sentencing judge or panel before passing sentence in 
a penalty tria1.85 
Neb. 1,328 N.W.2d 166 (1982); State v. Palmer (1),210 Neb. 206, 313 N.W.2d 648 
(1981); State v. Anderson & Hochstein (I), 207 Neb. 51; 296 NW.2d 440 (1980); 
State v. Simants, 202 Neb. 828, 277 N.W.2d 217 (1979); State v. Stewart, 197 
Neb. 497; 250 N.W.2d 849 (1977); State v. Simpson, Docket 686, No. 192 (Lancas-
ter Co. Dist. Ct. 1996) (court file sealed). 
80. State v. Moore (II), 250 Neb. 805, 553 N.W.2d 120 (1996); State v. Holtan, 216 
Neb. 594, 344 N.W.2d 661 (1982); State v. Moore (I), 210 Neb. 457, 316 N.W.2d 33 
(1982); State v. Anderson and Hochstein (I), 207 Neb. 51, 296 N.W.2d 440 (1980); 
State v. Rust, 197 Neb. 528, 250 N.W.2d 867 (1977). See supra note 49 for federal 
court citations. Reeves obtained judicial relief in both state and federal court. 
State v. Reeves, 216 Neb. 206, 344 N.W.2d 433 (1984); Reeves v. Hopkins, 102 
F.3d 977 (8th Cir. 1996). 
81. Otey, Joubert, and Williams. 
82. State v. Moore (1), 210 Neb. 457, 316 N.W.2d 33 (1982) (pending the state's deci-
sion in State v. Moore (11), 250 Neb. 805, 553 N.W.2d 120 (1996), from federal 
court Moore v. Kinney, 278 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2002)); State v. Ryan, 233 Neb. 74, 
444 N.W.2d 610 (1989); State v. Lotter, 255 Neb. 450, 586 N.W.2d. 430 (1998); 
State v. Palmer (I), 210 Neb. 206, 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981). 
83. The retired judges we interviewed perceive the financial cost of capital litigation 
outside the major urban counties as a major constraint on prosecutorial willing-
ness to advance cases to penalty trial. 
84. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2261. See also NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 28 (1996) (stating that 
victims have the right "to be informed of, be present at, and make an oral or 
written statement at sentencing ... hearing"). 
85. In the experience of Jerry Soucie, an experienced Lincoln capital defense attor-
ney, "there is at least one, and usually several VIS from various family and 
friends in every homicide PSI [presentence investigation] regardless of social and 
economic status." E-mail from Jerry Soucie to David Baldus, August 15, 2002 (on 
file with author) !hereinafter Soucie E-mail]. 
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C. Comparative Proportionality Review 
Since 1978, Nebraska law has imposed a comparative proportional-
ity review requirement (a) on the trial court in each penalty trial and 
(b) on the Nebraska Supreme Court in its mandatory review of each 
death sentence imposed. The obligation to conduct such a review in 
the trial court before a sentence is imposed is unique to Nebraska, 
while the Nebraska Supreme Court's obligation to conduct such a re-
view after a death sentence is imposed exists today in 18 other death-
sentencing states.86 
The two Nebraska proportionality review requirements adopted in 
1978 were part of a legislative package drafted and sponsored by Sen-
ator Ernie Chambers, who had been concerned for a number of years 
with what he perceived to be significant geographic disparities in 
charging and sentencing practices.87 Senator Chambers' perceptions 
of the operation of the Nebraska system since its adoption in 1973 
were based on a database he personally created by systematically col-
lecting newspaper accounts of the facts and outcomes of homicides 
throughout the state.88 Senator Chambers concluded that both charg-
ing and sentencing practices were substantially more punitive in 
Omaha, his hometown, than they were in the rest of the state. He also 
perceived substantial inconsistencies throughout the state in death-
86. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-53(b)(3) (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(g)(2)(a) (1995); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-35(c)(3) (1997); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.075(3)(c) 
(Michie 1999); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.9.1 § (l)(c) (West 1997); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 99-19-105(3)(c) (1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.035(3)(3) (West 1999); 
MONT. CODE. ANN. § 46-18-310(1)(c) (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2521.03 (Reis-
sue 1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(XI)(c) (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-
3(e) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-4(C)(4) (Michie 2000); N.Y. CRIM. 
PROC. LAW § 470.30(2)(b) (McKinney Supp. 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
2000(d)(2) (1999); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2929.05(A) (Anderson 1999); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 16-3-25(C)(3) (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-
12(3) (Michie 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(D) (1997); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 10.95.130(2)(b) (West 1990). Florida established proportionality re-
view as a matter of state constitutional law. See Sinclair v. State, 657 So: 2d 
1138, 1142 (Fla. 1995) (stating that because it is clearly "unusual" to sentence a 
person to death where others in the same situation were not sentenced to death, 
proportionality review is required under Florida's constitutional prohibition 
against unusual punishments). The Illinois Supreme Court also conducts limited 
proportionality reviews under its statutory authority to review "any death sen-
tence imposed." People v. Johnson, 538 N.E.2d 1118, 1128 (Ill. 1989). The 17 
death penalty states currently without proportionality review are Arizona, Ar-
kansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, 
Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. 
87. Chambers Interview, supra note 35. 
88. Id. 
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sentencing outcomes among cases that were similarly situated 'in 
terms of offender culpability.89 
Another feature of the Nebraska legislation that distinguishes it 
from any other death penalty statute known to us is a series of "legis-
lative findings" drafted by Senator Chambers and enacted as part of 
the 1978 package of reforms,9o which included: 
(a) a finding that "charges resulting from the same or similar circumstances 
have, in the past, not been uniform and have produced radically differing 
results"; 
(b) an admonition that the law "should be applied uniformly throughout the 
state and since the death penalty is a statewide law, an offense which would 
not result in a death sentence in one portion of the state should not result in 
death in a different portion"; 
(c) a finding of the importance of life and an admonition that the "state apply 
and follow the most scrupulous standards of fairness and uniformity" in the 
administration of the death penalty; 
(d) an endorsement of the principle that the death penalty "should never be 
imposed arbitrarily nor as a result of local prejudice or public hysteria"; and 
(e) a finding that "it is necessary for the Supreme Court to review and analyze 
all criminal homicides ... to insure that each case produces a result similar to 
that arrived at in other cases with the same or similar circumstances."91 
The proportionality review provisions in Senator Chambers' legis-
lative package appear to have been inspired by the appellate propor-
tionality review provisions in Georgia's 1973 statute and the 1977 
decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court to adopt a similar procedure 
in State v. Simants.92 The Georgia statute had important visibility in 
1978 because in Gregg v. Georgia,93 which upheld the constitutional-
ity of the Georgia legislation, the United States Supreme Court spoke 
glowingly of the statute as a safeguard against inconsistency. Indeed, 
for the next eight years, there was speculation that the Court might 
eventually require proportionality review or some similar safeguard 
against inconsistent death sentences.94 
1. Proportionality Review in Penalty Trials 
The 1978 amendments to the death penalty statute sponsored by 
Senator Chambers require sentencing judges to determine whether 
89. Id.; see also State v. Palmer (III), 224 Neb. 282, 352-57, 399 N.W.2d 706, 750-52 
(1986) (noting legislative history of Act of April 19, 1978, LB 711, 1978 Neb. Laws 
621). 
90. These findings were passed on April 19, 1978 over the Governor's veto. Act of 
April 19, 1978, LB 711, 1978 Neb. Laws 621. 
91. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2521.01 (Reissue 1995). This latter finding is evident in the 
requirement that the Supreme Court conduct a comparative proportionality re-
view of each death sentence imposed. 
92. See infra note 110 and accompanying text. 
93. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
94. Pulley u Harris, 465 U.S. 37,41-44 (1984), eventually held that such reviews are 
not required. 
HeinOnline -- 81 Neb. L. Rev. 516 2002-2003
516 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:486 
the imposition of a death sentence in the case would be "excessive or 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering 
both the crime and the defendant."95 Since the 1970s, death 
sentences deemed to be excessive in this meaning of the term have 
come to be known as "comparatively excessive." 
A review of the Nebraska penalty-trial sentencing orders before 
and after 1978 suggests that this requirement had an impact on sen-
tencing practices, although the comparative review process applied by 
the courts is not what one might have expected to see. 
a. Pre-1978 
In the pre-1978 sentencing orders, there is no evidence of a com-
parative focus. These orders and our interview with retired judges 
strongly suggest that the sentencing judges considered each case on 
its own merits without any formal consideration of what was done in 
other cases.96 This is a venerable common law tradition and it applies 
across both civil and criminal cases. Nevertheless, it was our assump-
tion that judges would confer informally with colleagues locally or 
statewide at judicial functions about the characteristics of clear "life" 
and "death" cases. The retired judges with whom we spoke said that 
such practices did not exist before or after 1978. The strength of the 
"each case on its own merits" tradition is reflected in one sentencing 
order issued after the 1978 amendments had been adopted, but before 
July 1, 1978, when they became effective. Presented with compara-
tive evidence, the court summarily dismissed the evidence as irrele-
vant because the new law was not yet effective.97 
95. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2522 (Reissue 1995). This language, which is drawn di-
rectly from the Georgia statute approved by the United States Supreme Court in 
Gregg, 428 U.S. 153, requires the sentencing court in Nebraska to conduct what 
is known as a "comparative" proportionality review of death as a possible sen-
tence in the case. In 1978, this form of proportionality review existed in about 20 
other states, including Georgia, but only at the "appellate" level, not at the trial 
court level. 
Trial courts elsewhere have been resistant to the presentation of comparative 
excessiveness evidence and arguments to sentencing juries. Also, defense counsel 
have been concerned that any arguments to juries that death sentences are infre-
quently imposed in a given category of cases, which includes their client's case, 
may motivate the jury to impose a death sentence in the instant case to compen-
sate for the other comparable cases in which a death sentence was not imposed. 
Nebraska has the only judicial sentencing statute of which we are aware that 
imposes a proportionality review obligation on the sentencing authority. 
96. Obviously a court's prior experience in capital sentencing would have an impact 
on the way it views each case. 
97. State v. Otey, Docket 101, No. 489 (Douglas Co. Dist. Ct. 1978). But in a similar 
case with similar timing, State v. Williams, Docket 49, No. 11, (Lancaster Co. 
Dist. Ct. 1978), the court considered the comparative evidence. 
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b. Post-1978 
The Georgia legislation on which the Nebraska proportionality re-
view provision is modeled contemplates a bottom line judgment about 
the comparative "culpability" and "deathworthiness" of a series of 
other offenders with whom the court is comparing the defendant.98 
(We refer to these offenders as the "near neighbors" of the defendant 
before the court.) 
Twenty-five years of experience with proportionality review in 
state supreme courts around the country indicates that judges feel 
very uncomfortable and ill-equipped to make such judgments.99 Ne-
braska trial judges appear to share this sentiment. For example, one 
Nebraska trial court perceived a problem with the statute because the 
language is "broad, vague and presents no definitive guidelines for the 
court to follow."loo In spite of this sentiment, we found numerous 
statements by judges that a death sentence in the case would be "ex-
cessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases." 
However, in none of those cases was comparative excessiveness the 
sole ground or even a significant basis for declining to impose a death 
sentence. In each of those cases, the clear basis for the imposition of 
the life sentence was a determination that no aggravation existed in 
the case or some other rationale based on the "weight" of the aggrava-
tion or mitigation in the case-all more traditional issues of fact and 
statutory interpretation on which judges would feel completely com-
fortable basing a decision.1ol 
This does not mean, however, that the Nebraska judges altogether 
ignored the consistency issue. On the contrary, in keeping with tradi-
98. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-35(c)(3)(2001). 
99. The discomfort flows from a concern about making the raw life or death decision, 
the high visibility associated with the appellate review of death cases, and the 
political risk associated with the reversal of death sentences, especially those im-
posed by juries in states in which appellate judges must stand for re-election. 
Concerns also flow from a lack of consensus on the appropriate measures of de-
fendant culpability to apply and on the level of infrequency in the imposition of 
death sentences among similarly situated offenders that may justify the vacation 
of a death sentence on the grounds of comparative excessiveness. Finally, most 
judges are unfamiliar with the type of data collection and analysis that is neces-
sary to conduct comprehensive and thoroughgoing proportionality review. See 
David Baldus, When Symbols Clash: Reflections on the Future of the Comparative 
Proportionality Review of Death Sentences, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1582, 1583-88 
(1996). 
100. State v. Williams, Docket 49, Page 11, pp. 9-10 (Lancaster Co. Dist. Ct. 1978). 
Another court characterized as "obvious" the problem with "color-matching the 
[comparison cases] with the case at bar." State v. Anderson & Hochstein (I), 
Docket 99, No. 392, p. 17 (Lancaster Co. Dist. Ct. 1978). 
101. Such cases typically do not reference cases on which the comparative judgment 
was based. Also, in many cases in which the sentence was based on an alternative 
ground, the court simply passed over the issue of comparative excessiveness as 
irrelevant. 
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tional common law reliance on precedent, many sentencing orders are 
replete with citations to and reliance on sentencing decisions in trial 
and appellate cases that bear on the evidence required to support fac-
tual findings. Examples of such findings include (a) whether a specific 
aggravating or mitigating circumstance was present in the case, (b) 
whether the aggravation had sufficient "weight" to justify a death sen-
tence, (c) whether the mitigation "approached or exceeded" the aggra-
vation in the case, and (d) whether the aggravation outweighed the 
mitigation. Comparative analyses of this sort were present in a sub-
stantial number of cases, although the level of detail in the analyses 
varied considerably from case to case. It is clear, therefore, that the 
spirit of comparative review is evident in many cases even though 
there is no evidence of the sort of bottom line comparative analysis 
based on overall offender culpability that characterized the holding of 
Furman v. Georgia102 and was contemplated by the Georgia propor-
tionality review statute.103 
One court, in fact, described its perception of the impact of propor-
tionality review at the trial court level. The case involved a remand 
from a federal court of a death sentence that had been imposed 13 
years earlier, before the proportionality review requirement had been 
adopted. In an explanation of why it was imposing a life sentence in a 
case that had originally drawn a death sentence, the court noted that, 
in addition to changes in the law in the interim, the original sentence 
had been imposed "without the opportunity to consider sentences im-
posed in similar cases."104 This case illustrates how the Nebraska Su-
preme Court's narrowing of the statutory aggravating circumstances 
has interacted with the process of proportionality review to reduce the 
number of death sentences imposed. With the court's decisions nar-
rowing discretion under the statutory aggravators over time, death 
sentences became less frequent among the less 'aggravated cases and 
the death sentences affirmed by the court contained larger numbers of 
aggravating circumstances. 
102, 408 UB. 238 (1972). 
103, In terms of their completeness and usefulness as precedents for other courts to 
use in proportionality reviews, the orders in the death-sentenced cases vary in 
terms of the facts and reasoning on which the judgments are based, However, as 
precedent, these orders are less important than the orders in the life-sentenced 
cases because the death cases all result in opinions from the Supreme Court 
which are more detailed and authoritative, The opinions in the life-sentenced 
cases vary significantly in terms of the facts of the case and the court's reasoning. 
Some are merely single page orders with neither facts nor reasoning, some have 
reasoning only, and others are rich in details including citations to the compara-
tive cases examined, In general, however, the orders in life-sentenced cases lack 
sufficient detail regarding the facts of the case to assess meaningfully the crimi-
nal culpability of the offender, 
104, State v. Holtan, Docket 92, No, 634, p, 20 (Douglas Co. Dist. Ct. 1989). 
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Proportionality review also has implications for geographic dispari-
ties in sentencing outcomes. The retired judges we interviewed indi-
cated that sentencing judges generally have limited knowledge of the 
pattern of prosecutorial charging decisions in their counties, and even 
less idea of what transpires in other areas of the state. Moreover, sen-
tencing judges are not likely to have much knowledge of judicial sen-
tencing patterns outside their own county. A properly conducted 
proportionality review, therefore, has the potential of bringing to the 
court's attention evidence on the outcomes of similarly situated cases 
from around the state. To the extent that a court relies on such cases, 
an increase in geographic uniformity might occur; however, the orders 
we have read provide an insufficient basis for assessing the extent to 
which information on similar cases is systematically brought to the 
court's attention. What is clear is that without the availability of such 
information, the potential of proportionality review to enhance uni-
formity in judicial sentencing decisions will be minimal.105 
2. Proportionality Review in the Nebraska Supreme Court 
a. Pre-1978 
Throughout the post-Furman period, Nebraska law has mandated 
an appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court in all death-sentenced 
cases to review the case for possible legal error in either the guilt or 
penalty tria1.106 In addition, the literature suggests that in death 
penalty appeals generally, offender culpability affects the likelihood 
that the death sentence will be vacated or the conviction reversed for 
legal error.107 This process may be usefully described as an informal 
form of proportionally review. In section XI below, we consider the 
extent to which this process appears to hold in Nebraska death cases. 
From 1973 to 1978, the Nebraska Supreme Court heard appeals in 
five death-sentenced cases and reviewed the sentence in each for evi-
dence of "excessiveness" under two doctrines. The first is the tradi-
tional doctrine of excessiveness. Longstanding Nebraska legislation 
105. As we discuss below in our consideration of proportionality review in the Ne-
braska Supreme Court, there is always a question in such reviews of what com-
parison cases the court should consider. The most basic issue on this question is 
whether the court should limit its inquiry to other death cases or should also 
consider similar cases in which life sentences were imposed. Since Palmer (Ill), 
the Nebraska Court has limited its pool of comparison cases to death cases, al-
though it has made no effort to limit the practices of the trial courts in their 
proportionality reviews. As a consequence, since 1986 some sentencing courts 
have limited their review cases to death cases but other courts also include life-
sentenced cases in their proportionality reviews. It is clear that the limitation of 
comparison cases by the sentencing courts to death cases minimizes the capacity 
of trial court proportionality to maintain consistency in sentencing outcomes. 
106. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2524 (Reissue 1995). 
107. Supra notes 76-78. 
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applicable to all criminal appeals empowers the Nebraska Supreme 
Court to vacate a sentence it considers "excessive" and to reduce the 
sentence to the level that it believes is "warranted by the evidence."lo8 
In applying this doctrine, the court relies on its experience and judg-
ment without explicit reference to sentences in any other cases. In a 
1977 case, the facts supported such an excessiveness claim and the 
court emphasized its power to vacate death sentences on that 
ground.109 However, it reduced the sentence to life imprisonment on 
the more conventional ground that the aggravation in the case lacked 
sufficient weight to support a death sentence-a course of action 
likely explained by a concern about encouraging claims under the 
quite subjective excessiveness standard. 
The court's second doctrine to address excessiveness, which it an-
nounced in State v. Simants,110 contemplated proportionality reviews 
along the lines of the Georgia statute, even in the absence of "statu-
tory guidelines" on the subject: 
While we do not have the Georgia provision for proportional review, every cap-
ital case where there can be the slightest question will be considered in com-
parison with other capital cases. In other words, we will compare each captial 
case under review with those previous cases in which the death penalty has or 
has not been imposed under the new statute. By this means review by this 
court guarantees that the reasons present in one case will reach a similar 
result to that reached in similar circumstances in another case.111 
In its affirmance of Simants' death sentence, the court held the 
sentence to be not "excessive" or disproportionate in comparison with 
the three other death sentences decided the same day.112 In three 
other pre-1978 cases, the court reached the same conclusion with re-
spect to both excessiveness doctrines.113 
b. Post-1978 
In 1978, as part of its reform package, the Legislature directed the 
court to conduct a comparative proportionality review in each death 
sentence case to "determine the propriety of the sentence of each case 
... by comparing such case with previous cases involving the same or 
similar circumstances. No sentence imposed shall be greater than 
108. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2308 (Reissue 1995). 
109. State v. Stewart, 197 Neb. 497, 526, 250 N.W.2d 849, 865 (1977) (involving two 
mitigating circumstances and one or at "the very most two" aggravating circum-
stances where the Court reduced the death sentence to life imprisonment because 
the mitigators "approached" the aggravators even though they did not exceed 
them). 
110. 197 Neb. 549, 250 N.W.2d 881 (1977). 
111. [d. at 563-64, 250 N.W.2d at 890. 
112. [d. at 571, 250 N.W.2d at 894. These cases included no comparative analysis of 
the facts of the comparison cases. 
113. State v. Holtan, 197 Neb. 544, 250 N.W.2d 876 (1977); State v. Rust, 197 Neb. 
528,250 N.W.2d 867 (1977); State v. Peery, 199 Neb. 656, 261 N.W.2d 95 (1977). 
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those imposed in other cases with the same or similar circum-
stances."114 The 1978 legislation also required the Nebraska Su-
preme Court to collect information on all cases involving criminal 
homicides committed after the effective date of the Nebraska death 
penalty statute in 1973.115 
The first intention of the 1978 legislation was to ratify the Simants 
comparative proportionality review procedure and bring Nebraska in 
line with approximately 20 other states with legislation that required 
comparative proportionality review like the Georgia law. The 1978 
legislation also sought to prescribe the approach and methodology the 
court used in its proportionality reviews. Specifically, the 1978 
amendments sought to require the Nebraska court to apply what has 
come to be known as the "frequency" approach. Under this approach, 
the court would (1) examine the facts of all cases with the "same or 
similar circumstances" as the death case under review, not simply 
those that advanced to a penalty-trial or resulted in a death sen-
tence,116 and (2) calculate the frequency with which death sentences 
were imposed among those cases. 
Since the court had already committed itselfto conduct proportion-
ality reviews along the lines of the Georgia model, it had no objection 
to statutory codification of that requirement. Also, such legislation 
could be perceived as having added legitimacy to Nebraska death pen-
alty law, since it was unclear at that time whether the United States 
Supreme Court might hold that the Eighth Amendment requires pro-
portionality reviews. 117 A problem arose, however, from the Legisla-
ture's attempt to prescribe the court's methodology in conducting its 
proportionality reviews, i.e., the "all homicides" universe of potentially 
comparable cases, an analysis of the frequency of death sentencing 
among similar cases, and an apparent attempt to bar completely the 
imposition of a death sentence in a case if a life sentence had been 
imposed earlier in a similar case. 
Death-sentenced appellants continued to raise the methodological 
issues suggested by the 1978 legislation and Chief Justice Krivosha, 
who joined the court that year, became a strong supporter of using an 
expansive universe of comparison cases and the frequency approach to 
proportionality review. In addition, the Chief Justice developed a 
broad-based database of homicide cases and used it to apply the fre-
114. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2521.03 (Reissue 1995). The statute actually extends the 
requirement of proportionality review to all criminal homicide convictions. 
115. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2521.02 (Reissue 1995). 
116. Among the state supreme courts that conduct proportionality reviews, most limit 
the universe of cases considered in such reviews to these two pools of cases. The 
New Jersey court is the only one of which we are aware that routinely conducts a 
close factual analysis of all death-eligible cases. See State v. Papasavvas, 790 
A.2d 798, 806 (N.J. 2002); State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059 (N.J. 1992). 
117. Pulley u. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984), held that such reviews were not required. 
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quency approach in the death cases that came before the court. In the 
ten death sentences that were affirmed on his watch, he dissented in 
seven on the ground that the individual death sentences were both 
comparatively excessive under the statute and violative of "the federal 
and state constitutions" because they were imposed "in an arbitrary 
and capricious manner."118 The Chief Justice believed that the princi-
pal sources of arbitrariness in the system were inconsistent charging 
practices by Nebraska prosecutors.119 
The majority of the court, however, did not perceive the inconsis-
tencies pointed out by the Chief Justice to be a problem. It was also 
not persuaded as to the propriety of his proposed methodology. In 
that regard, it first ruled that the Legislature lacked the power to de-
fine the universe of comparison cases considered by the court or to 
prescribe the kind of data that the court must consider in its reviews. 
In Moore (1), the majority limited the pool of potential comparison 
cases to death-eligible first-degree murder cases.120 Until 1986, how-
ever, it continued to consider life-sentenced cases in its reviews, albeit 
in an unsystematic and minimally documented fashion. 
There are several plausible explanations for the Chief Justice's 
failure to persuade the court to accept a frequency approach to propor-
tionality review. First, appellate courts nationwide have been ex-
tremely reluctant to exercise legislatively granted powers to overturn 
death sentences as comparatively excessive. Judges are uncomforta-
ble with (a) decisions that are this close to life/death value judgment, 
(b) the fact-based methodology required for such reviews, and (c) the 
absence of clear standards for assessing when a death sentence is ex-
cessive in a comparative sense. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, no 
118. The seven dissents were in State v. Palmer (Ill), 224 Neb. 282, 399 N.W.2d 706 
(1986); State v. Reeves, 216 Neb. 206, 344 N.W.2d 433 (1984); State v. Moore (I), 
210 Neb. 457, 316 N.W.2d 33 (1982); State v. Harper, 208 Neb. 568, 304 N.W.2d 
663 (1981); State v. Peery, 205 Neb. 271, 287 N.W.2d 71 (1980); State v. Otey, 205 
Neb. 90, 287 N.W.2d 36 (1979); and State v. Williams, 205 Neb. 56, 287 N.W.2d 
18 (1979). He found the death sentences in State v. Joubert, 224 Neb. 411, 399 
N.W.2d 237 (1986), and State v. Anderson & Hochstein (1), 207 Neb. 51, 296 
N.W.2d 440 (1980), not to be excessive. He applied the frequency approach with 
varying degrees of explicitness. In his dissenting opinions, the Chief Justice re-
lied on a series of comparison cases, while in his affirming opinions, he did not. 
See Joubert, 224 Neb. at 443, 339 N.W.2d at 257 (stating there are "no other cases 
with which a comparison can be made"); Anderson & Hochstein (I), 207 Neb. at 
74, 296 N.W. 2d at 453 (stating appellants "absolute and total disregard for the 
value of human life ... makes it separate and different from any other case previ-
ously considered by this court"). 
119. See, e.g., Harper, 208 Neb. at 583,304 N.W.2d at 671 (Krivosha, C.J., dissenting) 
("One need only examine two of the cases released by this court this day to note 
how the matter of prosecutorial discretion of necessity results in the death pen-
alty being arbitrarily imposed."). 
120. Moore (1), 210 Neb at 471-78, 316 N.W.2d at 42-45 (1982) (limiting the pool of 
comparison cases to first-degree murder death-eligible cases). 
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other state supreme court used the frequency approach, and in 1984, 
the United States Supreme Court held that there was no constitu-
tional requirement to conduct any kind of proportionality review.121 
All of these considerations likely influenced the Nebraska Supreme 
Court. In addition, the methodology applied by the Chief Justice in 
his dissents may not have substantially alleviated concerns arising 
from an unfamiliarity with comparative factual judgments and the ab-
sence of clear standards. A third consideration is that application of 
the Chief Justice's approach would have invalidated a high percentage 
of the death sentences appealed. 
Shortly before Chief Justice Krivosha left the court,122 the major-
ity adopted in Palmer (III) the narrowest form of proportionality re-
view in use nationwide-a process in which the universe of potential 
comparison cases is limited to death-sentenced cases. 123 The question 
in such proportionality reviews is whether the culpability of the of-
fender before the court is equal to or higher than the culpability of the 
least culpable offender who has already been sentenced to death.124 
As noted above, the Nebraska Supreme Court's jurisprudence has 
likely enhanced consistency and geographic uniformity by narrowing 
the scope of the statutory aggravating circumstances and its possible 
willingness to identify legal error in cases that appear to be excessive 
or otherwise inappropriate. Also, the court has given maximum dis-
cretion to the trial courts in their conduct of proportionality review.125 
However, it is hard to see how the court's formal system of appellate 
proportionality review could have had much, if any, impact on consis-
tency or geographic uniformity in the state. 
One lesson from Nebraska is that proportionality reviews appear 
to be a much more effective tool for promoting consistency and geo-
graphic uniformity when conducted by sentencing judges than when 
conducted by an appellate court. One reason for this comparative ad-
vantage is that the trial court has more discretion as a fact finder. But 
most importantly, unlike an appellate court, the trial court's ruling 
that a death sentence would be comparatively excessive if it were im-
121. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984). 
122. He resigned July 31, 1987. 
123. State v. Palmer (III), 224 Neb. 282, 325-31, 399 N.W.2d 706, 735-38 (1986). 
124. In its application of this standard, the court's opinions normally give no detail on 
the comparison cases on which it relies to support its judgment that the death 
sentence in the case before it is not comparatively excessive. 
125. For example, while the Nebraska Supreme Court limited the universe of poten-
tial comparison cases to death-sentenced cases, the court has imposed no such 
requirement on the trial court judges. As a consequence, while some trial courts 
continue to consult both life and death cases in their comparative reviews, other 
trial courts follow the Nebraska Supreme Court's lead in limiting the review to 
other death cases. 
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posed does not require the judicial reversal of a death sentence that 
was imposed earlier by a lower court. 
In our empirical study reported below, we test empirically the va-
lidity of the Legislature's perceptions of the system prior to 1978.126 
We also assess the extent to which the data suggest that (a) defendant 
culpability may have influenced the outcomes of judicial review, and 
(b) proportionality review at the trial court level affected the level of 
selectivity, consistency, and geographic uniformity of the system.127 
We also replicate Chief Justice Krivosha's frequency analyses of the 
death-sentenced cases that he heard while on the court.128 
D. Prosecutorial Charging Practices 
Unlike sentencing decisions of judges, the charging decisions ofNe-
braska prosecutors are not normally subject to direct legal oversight 
and judicial review. Nor are there charging guidelines in Nebraska 
that limit the exercise of prosecutorial discretion or provide any form 
of oversight of charging decisions. 
Nebraska prosecutors also have broad discretion to reduce the 
charges in cases originally charged with first-degree murder (M1).129 
However, once a first-degree murder conviction is obtained, by plea or 
trial, section 29-2520 states that a sentencing hearing "shall" be held, 
while section 29-2521 provides that in the hearing: 
evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to 
sentence, and shall include matters relating to ... aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances. (emphasis added). 
This language raises two interpretive issues. The first issue under 
section 29-2520 is whether the word "shall" means that the state 
"must" present aggravation in the sentencing hearing of a death-eligi-
ble case or whether the word "may" that precedes the "shall" confers 
on the state the discretion to waive consideration of the death penalty 
by presenting no evidence of aggravation. The second issue concerns 
the obligation of the court when the state seeks to waive consideration 
of the death penalty by failing to present evidence of aggravating cir-
cumstances. May the court simply enter a life sentence or must it, on 
its own motion, consider aggravation and mitigation and exercise its 
discretion on the life or death sentencing issue? 
On the first issue, some prosecutors appear to believe that the stat-
ute requires them to present evidence of aggravation in all death-eligi-
126. The "differing results" perceived by the Legislature in 1978 refer to the charging 
and sentencing outcomes in Nebraska's death penalty system from April 1973 to 
April 1978. 
127. Infra sections XI.B and XI.C. 
128. Infra subsection XI.B.l.c. 
129. In the 174 cases charged with Ml, 30% were reduced to second-degree murder 
(M2) or less. 
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ble cases that result in an M1 conviction, even though the statute does 
not state that the prosecution "shall" present evidence of statutory ag-
gravating circumstances in every sentencing hearing.13o This "nar-
row" discretion approach is exemplified by the Office of the Douglas 
County Attorney. During the period covered by this study, 96% (541 
56) of that county's M1 convictions advanced to a penalty trial. How-
ever, prosecutors who adhere to the narrow discretion approach often 
waive the death penalty in death-eligible cases by reducing a M1 
charge or charging less than M1 in the first instance as part of a plea 
agreement. For example, in Douglas County 34% (25173) of all death-
eligible cases did not advance to a penalty trial. 
Other Nebraska prosecutors believe they have discretion to waive 
consideration of the death penalty in a M1 sentencing hearing unless 
the court insists upon doing so on its own motion.13l This "broad dis-
cretion" approach is exemplified by the Office of the Lancaster County 
Attorney. Prosecutors there take the view that they have the discre-
tion to waive the death penalty unilaterally or as part of a plea bar-
gain in death-eligible cases when they believe that a sentence less 
than death is appropriate. Prosecutors base these judgments on the 
perceived likelihood that the court will impose a death sentence if the 
case advances to a penalty trial and on the prosecutor's considered 
judgment of whether the facts justify the imposition of a death sen-
tence. During the period covered by this study, in 59% (19/32) of the 
death-eligible cases in Lancaster County, prosecutors offered to waive 
the death penalty or did so unilaterally. Only 41% (13/32) of the 
county's death-eligible cases advanced to a penalty trial.132 
As noted above, the second issue concerns the court's obligation 
when the state seeks to waive the court's consideration of the death 
penalty. Some courts insist on going forward with a consideration of 
the death penalty even if the state seeks to waive it. In one case, a 
prosecutor negotiated a guilty plea with a stipulation that the state 
would "not even acquiesce to the convening of a three-judge panel" and 
that it would advise the court that there was "no need" to consider 
aggravating circumstances and the death penalty option in the sen-
tencing hearing.133 The court ruled that the state could not "bargain 
away" its consideration of a death sentence and that it would be "ex-
ceedingly bad precedent to allow either or both parties ... to decide 
130. However, the language that the evidence which "may" be presented "shall" in-
clude aggravating circumstances can be construed to impose such a requirement. 
131. When such a waiver occurs, the court foregoes consideration of the aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances and simply enters a life sentence. 
132. In such cases, the prosecution usually abstains from presenting an argument in 
favor of a death sentence. 
133. State v. Anissen, Case 2687, Docket 8, Page 19, p. 2 (Richardson Co. Dist. Ct. 
1995). 
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the scope" of the section 29-2520 hearing. 134 In most counties, how-
ever, it appears that the court will defer to the state's desire to waive 
the death penalty in M1 cases. 
When the state abstained from presenting aggravation and the 
court considered aggravation and mitigation on its own motion, the 
outcome in every case was a life sentence.135 It is for this reason that 
we limit our definition of a "penalty trial" to a sentencing hearing in 
which the state presents evidence of aggravation,136 which is gener-
ally accompanied with a request that the court impose a death 
sentence.137 
In the exercise of their discretion, Nebraska prosecutors have no 
duty to consider how likely it is that a penalty trial in the case will 
result in a death sentence that will be affirmed on appeal. However, 
interviews with Nebraska prosecutors suggests that these considera-
tions, in fact, impact the exercise of discretion by some Nebraska pros-
ecutors.138 Prosecutors also have no duty to consider whether the 
interests of justice would be served by the imposition of a death sen-
tence, although, as noted above, it is clear that some Nebraska prose-
cutors are sensitive to this issue.139 Under current law prosecutors 
also have no duty to look, nor do they routinely look, to charging and 
sentencing practices in other jurisdictions for guidance in promoting 
geographic uniformity in their decisionmaking. 
134. [d. at p. 4. 
135. In one case the court declined to find the multiple-victim aggravator present in a 
two-victim murder case because the state had not presented that factor. State v. 
Waldner, Docket 2, No. 530, p. 3 (Colfax Co. Dist. Ct. 1990). 
136. Evidence of statutory aggravation presented in the sentencing hearing may take 
the form of evidence beyond the guilt-trial record, such as detail on the defen-
dant's criminal history, or it may be limited to the submission of the guilt-trial 
record, which may contain a basis for finding that one or more statutory ag-
gravators are present in the case, e.g., multiple victims. 
137. We identified one death-eligible case in which the state presented evidence of 
aggravation but abstained from requesting that the court impose a death sen-
tence. There may be additional such examples of which we are not aware, how-
ever, because we typically did not have notes of testimony from the penalty trial 
and could not discern the state's argument concerning the death penalty. 
We also identified 14 convictions in which the facts did not support the pres-
ence of a single aggravating factor in the case (and therefore a classification of 
the case as death-eligibile), but in the sentencing hearing, which is required for 
all M1 convictions (whether or not the case is death-eligible), the court referred to 
statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances. We classified these cases as 
not death-eligible despite the court's reference to the aggravation and/or 
mitigation. 
138. Telephone Interview with Gary Lacey, Lancaster County Attorney, by Gary 
Young, Research Director of this project (April 17, 2001). 
139. Nebraska prosecutors also have no duty to assess the risk that the imposition ofa 
death sentence in the case would be comparatively excessive when compared 
with the sentences imposed in similar cases. 
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Finally, in the exercise of their discretion, prosecutors are required 
to consider the opinions of the victim's family. Since 1983, Nebraska 
law has required a prosecutor in M1 cases to consult with family mem-
bers if he or she is considering a possible reduction of charges or a 
waiver of the death penalty if it is given in exchange for a guilty 
plea.140 Although the statute does not expressly give family members 
a veto power over prosecutorial decisions, in practice they exercise 
considerable leverage over prosecutorial decisions and some prosecu-
tors are reluctant to reduce charges or waive the death penalty when 
faced with the opposition of family members.141 
E. The Implications of Ring v. Arizona for Capital 
Sentencing in Nebraska 
Ring v. Arizona142 invalidated the Arizona death penalty system 
on Sixth Amendment grounds because, like in the current Nebraska 
system, factual findings of statutory aggravation were strictly a judi-
cial function. Ring holds that because the presence of statutory aggra-
vation in a capital case exposes the defendant to the risk of raising the 
maximum penalty to a death sentence, the statutory aggravating cir-
cumstances are an "element of the offense" that requires jury fact-
finding beyond a reasonable doubt. It was clear, therefore, that the 
Nebraska statute had to be amended to allocate that fact-finding re-
sponsibility to the jury-either as part of its guilt trial fact-finding or 
in a separate penalty trial, although a Nebraska capital defendant 
may waive his or her Sixth Amendment right to jury participation. 143 
140. NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-1~1 (Reissue 1995) (stating that prior to reaching plea 
agreement, the prosecutor "shall consult" with the victim "regarding the content 
of and reasons for such plea agreement"). Section 29-119 defines a "plea agree-
ment" as existing when "as a result of a discussion between the defense counsel 
and the prosecuting attorney: (a) A charge is to be dismissed or reduced; or (b) A 
defendant, if he or she pled guilty to a charge, may receive less than the maxi-
mum penalty permitted by law," Attorney Jerry Soucie states that prosecutorial 
consultation with family members of homicide victims is a long tradition that pre-
dates this legislation. Soucie E-mail, supra note 85. 
141. Attorney Jerry Soucie states: "My experience is that most county attorneys do 
allow significant victim involvement and communication in homicide cases ... 
[and that] victims do have a great deal of influence on plea bargains." Soucie E-
mail, supra note 85. Statutory consultative rights arise only after charges have 
been filed but family members sometimes seek to influence that decision as well. 
The statute gives consultative rights to only a single member of the immediate 
family, NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-119 (2) (stating that ''victim shall include at least 
one family representative"), but in practice many family members and friends are 
permitted to participate in the process. 
142. 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002). 
143. Id. at 2430 ("Because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as 'the 
functional equivalent of a greater offense' ... the Sixth Amendment requires that 
they be found by a jury."). The Nebraska Legislature made exactly this type of 
change in November 2002. Infra note 395. 
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Ring does not specify the extent to which jury involvement in the 
Nebraska system must be enlarged beyond the narrow requirement of 
finding aggravating circumstances. The case clearly does not hold 
that death sentencing in its entirety is exclusively a jury function, as 
has been urged under the Eighth Amendment for many years without 
success.144 Furthermore, Ring does not require a jury role on the is-
sue of statutory mitigation,145 nor does it appear to require that the 
conduct of comparative proportionality review by the sentencing au-
thority, a distinctly legal determination, be considered an element of 
the offense. It appears, therefore, that Nebraska's unique tradition of 
trial court proportionality review would not be disturbed if the Legis-
lature desired to keep it in place. 
The more difficult issue under the Nebraska statute, therefore, is 
whether the sentencing authority's finding that statutory aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the statutory mitigating circumstances is an 
element of the offense that must be decided by ajury.146 The pre-Ring 
case law construing Apprendi147 in other jurisdictions suggests that 
this is a close question. Although, thus far, no case has held the 
weighing decision to be a factual rather than a legal decision, a strong 
argument can be made that the weighing decision calls for an "ulti-
mate finding of fact" 148 that greatly enhances the defendant's risk of a 
heightened penalty. 
If Ring is construed to embrace the weighing decision, there are 
two alternatives available to meet its requirements. One alternative 
would be to allocate the weighing decision (as well as the findings of 
aggravation and mitigation) to Nebraska juries. However, this would 
leave little room for the exercise of judicial discretion and would argue 
for allocating the entire decision to the juries, as Arizona and Colorado 
have recently done. 149 However, we believe that a return to the pre-
Furman Nebraska system of exclusively jury sentencing would have 
unnecessarily abandoned the settled law, tradition, and expectations 
144. See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984). In spite of this authority, Jus-
tice Breyer, in Ring, concurred on the ground that the Eighth Amendment re-
quires exclusively jury death sentencing. [d. at 2446-48. 
145. [d. at 2437 n.4 (noting the distinction in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
(2000), between the necessity for jury findings on aggravation versus the neces-
sity for jury findings on mitigation). 
146. Ring is silent on this issue. See id. 
147. See, e.g., Borchardt v. Maryland, 786 A.2d 631 (2001) (providing an exhaustive 
review of the cases). 
148. [d. at 671 (Raker, J., Bell, C.J., Eldridge, J., dissenting). 
149. Legis. Servo SB 1001 (West), 2002 Ariz.; Colorado HB 02S-1005 (Act Concerning 
Determination ofthe Death Penalty by a Jury), Approved by Colorado House and 
Senate, July 10-11, 2002. Unlike Nebraska, judicial sentencing in Colorado is a 
recent development, existent only since 1995. Moreover, the sentencing courts in 
Colorado did not conduct a proportionality review as part of the penalty trial as is 
done in Nebraska. 
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that have evolved over the last twenty-five years in the administration 
of Nebraska's death-sentencing system (which we document in this 
Article) and could introduce into the system a significant risk of uncer-
tainty, arbitrariness, and discrimination. 
Another drawback to an all-jury sentencing system would be the 
obliteration of the current recess that now occurs in Nebraska be-
tween the end of the guilt trial and the commencement of the penalty 
trial. The typical (median) recess is seven weeks, which gives the par-
ties a window of time in which to focus exclusively on the penalty 
trial.150 Under exclusively jury sentencing systems, the penalty trial 
normally commences immediately upon the entry of a capital murder 
conviction. Experience in such jurisdictions indicates that under the 
pressure of an impending capital guilt trial, defense counsel is often 
inadequately prepared to move immediately into a penalty trial.151 
Moreover, the necessity of pre-trial preparation for a possible penalty 
trial (by both the prosecution and defense counsel) in each potentially 
capital trial may increase substantially the cost of capital litigation. 
By limiting the jury's role to the narrow function of finding statutory 
aggravating circumstances, it would be possible to preserve the cur-
rent practice of declaring a substantial recess between the guilt trial 
and the judicially conducted penalty trial. The recess would also limit 
the necessity for prosecutors and defense counsel to prepare for a pen-
alty trial only in cases that actually result in a Ml conviction and the 
prosecution, having heard the guilt-trial evidence, continues to believe 
that a death sentence is appropriate in the case. 
A second alternative would be to retain judicial sentencing but de-
lete the weighing decision from the statute and adopt the Georgia 
decisionmaking model or some variant of it. Under the Georgia model, 
the sentencing authority makes findings on the statutory aggravators 
alleged by the State and then "consider[s]" and bases its decision on 
those factors and "any mitigating or aggravating circumstances other-
wise authorized by law."152 This approach would appear to (a) limit 
the factual elements of the offense to the statutory aggravating cir-
cumstances and (b) treat the other "considerations" beyond the statu-
tory aggravators as "sentencing factors" that do not require jury 
participation. Except for jury findings on the statutory aggravating 
circumstances, this approach would leave the death penalty decision 
150. In terms of duration, the recess at the 10th percentile is two weeks and at the 
90th percentile it is 17 weeks. 
151. With the jury standing by to hear the penalty trial, courts are naturally reluctant 
to declare a recess in the proceedings and often insist that the penalty trial must 
go forward with or without all of the mitigation witnesses defense counsel would 
like to present. 
152. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b) (2001). The Georgia law provides for comparative 
excessiveness review but only on appeal in the state supreme court. GA. CODE 
ANN. § 17-10-35(c)(3) (2001). 
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in judicial hands, much as it currently is. The drawback of this ap-
proach is that it would lose the focus, discipline, and sensitivity that 
the weighing decision has brought to judicial decisionmaking in Ne-
braska death penalty cases, features that are clearly apparent from a 
reading of the judicial sentencing orders issued since 1973. On bal-
ance, therefore, we believe that the most prudent reform of the Ne-
braska system would limit the jury's role to the bare minimum 
requirement of Ring, i.e., the jury finding the statutory aggravating 
circumstances charged in the case, with the remaining fact-finding 
and sentencing responsibilities left to the court as they are under cur-
rent law. In subsection XII.B.1 we consider legislation to implement 
this approach and contrast it with the measures adopted by the Ne-
braska Legislature to comply with Ring. 
F. Conclusion 
We have presented above a road map of Nebraska law and prac-
tice. What does Nebraska law and practice and our review of the liter-
ature suggest that we are likely to find in our empirical study of 
charging and sentencing outcomes in Nebraska? 
On the question of race-of-defendant and race-of-victim discrimina-
tion in charging and sentencing outcomes, Nebraska law and practice 
give prosecutors and judges broad discretion, but the law requiring 
evenhanded treatment is well-known and the issue is politically sensi-
tive in the state.153 Some studies in other states have documented 
race effects at both these levels of decision, while others have not. 
The issue of discrimination on the basis ofthe socioeconomic status 
ofthe defendant and victim is different because such discrimination is 
the subject of no explicit legal prohibitions and the question has low 
political visibility. 
The issue of geographic disparities in charging and sentencing out-
comes has high political visibility but no legal status. Trial-level pro-
portionality review and three-judge sentencing panels may minimize 
geographic disparities in sentencing; however, no legal mechanism 
speaks directly to the issue and neither the Nebraska Supreme Court 
nor any other state agency monitors geographic disparities in 
outcomes. 
Several features of Nebraska law and practice and the trend of de-
cisions that we describe are likely to reduce the number and frequency 
of death sentences imposed. The first is the legislation excluding mi-
nors and mentally retarded offenders from the pool of death-eligible 
defendants. Second are the provisions of the 1973 legislation that cre-
ate a de facto presumption in favor of a life sentence. Third are the 
153. The retired judges that we interviewed indicate that sentencing judges are par-
ticularly "sensitive" about treating minority defendants fairly. 
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trial court system of proportionality review, the trend of Nebraska Su-
preme Court decisions narrowing the scope of important statutory ag-
gravators, and the substantial record of both the Nebraska Supreme 
Court and the federal courts in vacating death sentences for legal er-
ror. To the extent that prosecutorial charging decisions bear on death-
sentencing frequencies, the policies of counties like Douglas that opt 
for death in a very high proportion of M1 cases would appear to cut 
against the infrequency goal, while the more selective policies of many 
other counties would tend to promote it. 
Although this review of Nebraska law and practice suggests a 
likely decline in the number of death sentences imposed over time, we 
have no basis for predicting how selective the system has been in 
terms of limiting death sentences to the most culpable offenders. 
Another issue is consistency. Furman v. Georgia teaches that in-
frequent death sentencing can create a serious risk of inconsistent 
outcomes. However, the Nebraska Supreme Court's policy of narrow-
ing the breadth of the statutory aggravators should have the effect of 
enhancing consistency, as should proportionality review by sentencing 
judges. Prosecutorial policies in counties like Douglas that advance 
nearly all M1 convictions to penalty trial may enhance consistency, 
while the more selective prosecutorial policies of many other counties 
may reduce it. 
Our empirical study examines the Nebraska data relevant to these 
broad questions. In addition, we test the Proffitt v. Florida hypothesis 
that judicial sentencing produces more consistent results than jury 
sentencing by comparing the Nebraska results with those from other 
states. 
We also closely examine five questions that are relevant to the is-
sue of arbitrariness in the Nebraska system. First, how accurate was 
the Legislature's perception in 1978 that the system was producing 
"radically differing results" in different parts of the state? Second, to 
what extent do the data suggest the application of de facto sentencing 
policies based on specific case characteristics? Third, to what extent 
does offender culpability impact the outcomes of judicial review in the 
Nebraska Supreme Court and the federal courts? Fourth, how valid 
were the proportionality reviews conducted by Chief Justice Krivosha 
as a member of the court? Fifth, what is the comparative level of con-
sistency ofthe death sentences affirmed and vacated by the Nebraska 
Supreme Court? 
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PARTB 
IV. METHODOLOGY, RESEARCH DESIGN, AND MEASURES 
A. Introduction 
The principal focus of this research is on the disposition of death-
eligible defendants, regardless of how the prosecutor charged them 
and whether or not their cases advanced to a penalty trial. The Data 
Collection Instrument (DCI) used to code these cases is a modified ver-
sion of instruments developed in other similar studies. It includes 
quantifiable measures of the strength of evidence for each ofthe statu-
tory aggravating and mitigating circumstances. These measures al-
low us to examine the impact of statutory aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances on both prosecutorial and judicial decisionmaking. A 
second and subsidiary part ofthe research embraces non-capital homi-
cides. We coded these cases with a smaller data collection instrument 
that was completed in the process of screening all the cases to identify 
those that were death-eligible. 
In Appendix A, we describe in detail the case-screening protocol 
that we used, our data sources, and our data coding and entry proce-
dures. In the balance of this section, we describe the measures that 
we used to assess defendant culpability and geographic disparities. 
Each of our measures of defendant culpability is based on a different 
but legally relevant foundation, and each provides an independent ba-
sis for estimating the scope and magnitude of geographic, race, and 
socioeconomic status (SES) disparities in the system after controlling 
for defendant culpability.154 
B. Measures of Defendant Culpability 
As Professor Robert Schopp properly points out, an "evaluation of 
comparative justice" of the type we present in this study requires two 
comparisons. The first is a comparison of the individuals involved in 
the analysis of the "applicable criteria" of noncomparative justice; the 
second is a comparative analysis of individuals who are similarly situ-
ated with respect to those criteria.155 For the purposes of the first 
comparison, the criteria of non comparative justice are the characteris-
tics of the cases that implicate the goals of retribution (guilt, desert, 
and culpability) and deterrence.156 Here we draw on the widely recog-
nized concept of "criminal culpability," which embraces the defen-
154. There is considerable overlap in the measures because of the important role of 
the statutory aggravating circumstances in each. 
155. Schopp, supra note 3, at 826. ("[N)oncomparative justice requires that each indi-
vidual receive treatment appropriate to that individual's merit or desert."). 
156. The second step of an evaluation of comparative justice involves comparisons of 
the treatment of discrete groups of persons defined in terms of race, ethnicity, 
gender, and other illegitimate or suspect classifications. 
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dant's moral blameworthiness and character and the degree of 
victimization inherent in the offense.157 Indicators of moral blame-
worthiness reflect the extent to which the murder was premeditated 
and planned and the defendant's personal responsibility for and role 
in the murder or any contemporaneous crimes. The defendant's char-
acter refers to his or her prior criminal record, other unrelated acts of 
violence, remorse, and cooperation with the authorities. The degree of 
victimization refers to the number of victims killed and injured and 
the severity of their injuries, pain, and suffering. Our measures of 
defendant culpability represent different and overlapping approaches 
to the measurement of criminal culpability. 
A study's measures of defendant culpability are important because 
they provide an objective basis to define groups of similarly situated 
offenders. With such groups defined, comparisons can be made to de-
termine if similarly situated offenders are treated differently because 
of their race or SES or the race or SES of their victims. These assess-
ments provide the basis for assessing concerns about disparate treat-
ment in the system. Disparate treatment exists when prosecutors or 
sentencing judges, in the exercise of their discretion, treat similarly 
situated offenders differently on the basis of illegitimate or suspect 
factors. In contrast to disparate treatment, disparate impact exists 
when the evenhanded application of a facially neutral policy disadvan-
tages a particular group,158 Geographic disparities are another com-
mon form of disparate impact. They may arise, for example, when the 
prosecutors in some counties are more aggressive in advancing cases 
to penalty trial than are their counterparts in other parts of the 
state.159 
Our measures of defendant culpability also enable us to define 
groups of similarly situated offenders as a foundation for addressing 
concerns about consistency and comparative excessiveness in the sys-
tem, without regard to the race and SES of defendants and victims. In 
such analyses, the issues are (a) how frequently similarly situated of-
157. See, e.g., State v. Papasavvas, 790 A.2d 798, 808-09 (N.J. 2002) (defining and 
applying the criminal culpability model in a proportionality review of a death 
sentence). 
158. See infra notes 209-19 and accompanying text for detail and authority supporting 
these legal theories. 
159. Recently documented examples are Virginia and New Jersey, where the evidence 
indicates that suburban prosecutors are more punitive in suburban counties than 
are their counterparts in the major urban centers. See BAIME, supra note 26, at 
53, tbl. A (finding penalty-trial rate of .21 in the three largest countries versus .42 
in the balance of the state); VIRGINIA STUDY, supra note 31, at 39, fig. 15 (finding 
the rates with which prosecutors seek the death penalty are .16 in high density 
counties, .45 in medium density counties, and .34 in low density counties from 
1995 to 1999). 
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fenders are sentenced to death and (b) to what extent the system lim-
its death sentences to the most culpable death-eligible offenders.16o 
Because of the crucial role of defendant culpability in this research, 
we used the following four independent measures of defendant culpa-
bility that have been utilized with success in other similar studies. 
1. The Number of Statutory Aggravating Circumstances Found 
or Present in the Cases 
The first measure of defendant culpability is the number of statu-
tory aggravating circumstances found by the court in penalty trial 
cases or present in the non-penalty trial cases. This is a particularly 
useful measure in this research because of its legal relevance and its 
very significant strength in explaining charging and sentencing out-
comes in Nebraska.161 
2. Number of Statutory Aggravating and Mitigating 
Circumstances Found or Present in the Cases 
The second measure is the number of both aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances found by the court in penalty trial cases and pre-
sent in non-penalty trial cases, e.g., two aggravators and one 
mitigator. This measure is also easily understood, has strong legal 
relevance, and has been used by state courts in the conduct of propor-
tionality reviews.162 Its limitation is that it does not account for the 
differing weights that prosecutors and sentencing authorities may 
place on different aggravators and mitigators. 
3. The Salient Factors Measure 
The third, "salient factors" measure of culpability classifies each 
case initially in terms of its most prominent statutory aggravating cir-
cumstance and then subclassifies it on the basis of other statutory ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstances in the case. The salient 
factors measure we rely on in this research (presented in Appendix A) 
is modeled on a measure developed for proportionality review in 1999 
by Judge David S. Baime, Special Master to the New Jersey Supreme 
Court. This measure shares the strengths of the measures based on 
counts of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and is used by 
some state courts in their proportionality reviews of death-sentenced 
defendants. 163 It can also reflect the different weights placed on indi-
160. In more popular parlance, the most culpable offenders are often referred to as the 
''worst of the worst." 
161. See infra Table 4, Row 1a (providing logistic regression results). 
162. See, e.g., State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1076-78, 1091 (N.J. 1992); Common-
wealth v. Pirela, 507 A.2d 23, 32 (Pa. 1986). 
163. See, e.g., State v. Papasavvas, 790 A.2d 798, 805-07 (N.J. 2002). 
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vidual aggravators and mitigators by prosecutors and sentencing 
authorities. 
4. Logistic Regression-Based Measures 
This set of measures is based on the results of logistic multiple re-
gression analyses that estimate the impact of case characteristics (le-
gitimate, illegitimate, and suspect) on charging and sentencing 
outcome decisions in capital cases. However, the culpability scales de-
veloped in this analysis reflect only the impact of the legitimate case 
characteristics. 
We first developed a logistic regression model of death sentences 
imposed among all death-eligible cases. The regression coefficients es-
timated in this analysis reflect the combined impact of all decisions 
taken by prosecutors and sentencing judges. 
We also estimated "decision-point" logistic regression models that 
focus on the successive stages at which prosecutors and judges ad-
vance the cases through the system. For example, what case charac-
teristics best explain which cases (a) advanced to a penalty trial with 
the state seeking a death sentence, and (b) resulted in a death sen-
tence being imposed. 
In each of these models, we first examined the impact of the num-
ber of statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances (Model 1). 
Next, we conducted systematic screening procedures to determine 
what other legitimate aggravating and mitigating case characteristics 
included in the Del improved the predictive power of the analyses 
(Model 2).164 We then added variables for geography, race, and SES 
of both the defendant and victim (Model 2RS). The regression coeffi-
cients estimated for the geographic, race, and SES variables (after 
controlling for all of the other variables included in the analysis) pro-
vide a useful measure of their average impact on outcomes. 
The final models for the four key decision points, which include 
variables for legitimate, illegitimate, and suspect case characteristics, 
are shown in Table 4.165 The number of variables for legitimate case 
164. In the development of each of these regression models, we screened for possible 
inclusion over 300 variables related to background and criminal record of the de-
fendant, the victim's background, and the characteristics ofthe offense, including 
each of the individual statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In 
the first stage of the screen we examined crosstabulations between each variable 
in the DCI for an association with the outcome variable of at least 10 percentage 
points. For example, if a characteristic of the offense, such as the use of a bizarre 
weapon showed an unadjusted 10-percentage-point higher outcome than we ob-
served in the cases without the characteristic, we created a recoded variable that 
was suitable for inclusion in the regression analysis. This process produced a 
pool of over 200 candidate variables. 
165. The legitimate variables in the model beyond the number of statutory aggravat-
ing and mitigating circumstances were either statistically significant beyond the 
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characteristics in these models is distinctly smaller than what we 
have observed in earlier research. This is explained in part by the 
small number of death-eligible cases and death sentences in the 
database. 166 The principal explanation for the small number of addi-
tionallegitimate variables in the models is the overwhelming explana-
tory power of the number of statutory aggravating circumstances, 
especially in the judicial sentencing decisions. When that variable is 
in the analysis, the many other variables that were candidates for in-
clusion in the analysis simply had nothing additional to add in terms 
of explaining the charging and sentencing outcomes. 
Logistic regression analyses also produce for each explanatory va-
riable a coefficient and an "odds-multiplier," which estimates the ex-
tent to which, on average, the presence of a case characteristic 
increases or decreases the odds that an outcome will occur. For exam-
ple, in Georgia research presented to the U.S. Supreme Court in Mc-
Cleskey v. Kemp, the data suggested that a defendant's odds of 
receiving a death sentence were enhanced, on average, by a factor of 
4.3 if the victim was white. (These statistics for the four most impor-
tant decision points in this research are presented in Table 4.) 
Finally, one may depict the results of the regression with scales 
that reflect the level of criminal culpability estimated for each defen-
dant in the analysis by virtue of the presence or absence in his or her 
case of each of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances included 
in the regression models. Thus, a defendant with many aggravating 
and few mitigating circumstances present in his or her case will be 
ranked among the most aggravated cases, while a defendant with few 
aggravators and many mitigators will be placed among the least ag-
gravated cases,167 The scales we created for this research, which have 
from four to seven culpability levels, enable us to estimate the magni-
tude of the geographic, race, and SES disparities at each culpability 
level and overall. Such an analysis may document, for example, an 
overall average difference in adjusted death-sentencing rates (e.g., 8-
percentage points) between white and minority defendants after con-
.05 level in one of the models or conceptually significant with a coefficient in the 
expected direction, e.g., "victim bound and gagged." The variables for the race 
and SES of the defendant and victim were included in each analysis. The geogra-
phy variable was both included in and excluded from each model to demonstrate 
the impact of geography on the variables for the race and SES of the defendant 
and victim. 
166. However, in a study of the New Jersey system over a nine-year period with 227 
death-eligible cases and 34 death sentences, the same screening process used in 
this research identified a large number of legitimate case characteristics with 
explanatory power in regression analyses. See DAVID C. BALDUS, SPECIAL 
MASTER, DEATH PENALTY PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW PROJECT, FINAL REPORT TO 
THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT tech. app. 10 (Sept. 24, 1991) [hereinafter NEW 
JERSEY REPORT] (available in the University of Nebraska Law College Library). 
167. Figure 6, p. 559-60 infra presents examples for three of the models in Table 4. 
HeinOnline -- 81 Neb. L. Rev. 537 2002-2003
2002] ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY 537 
trolling for the defendant culpability levels estimated in the regres-
sion analysis that underlies the scale. This approach also can indicate 
the ratio between the death-sentencing rates for the two groups of 
cases after adjustment for the levels of defendant culpability. An im-
portant advantage of this measure is that it is easier to interpret than 
the odds-multipliers referred to above.168 
C. A Measure of Geographic Disparity 
Our principal measure of geographic disparity contrasts Ne-
braska's three largest and most urban counties (Douglas County (in-
cluding the City of Omaha), Lancaster County (including the City of 
Lincoln), and Sarpy County (including the City of Bellevue and parts 
of Omaha», with the rest of the state, which we describe as "greater 
Nebraska." The three counties we define as major urban centers con-
tained 49% of the state's population in 2000.169 They also account for 
67% (366/548) of the state's non-capital homicides, 61% (1131185) of 
the state's death-eligible murders, 75% (67/89) of the state's penalty 
trials, and 69% (20/29) of the state's death sentences. 
The distinction we draw here and below between the major urban 
centers of the state and greater Nebraska is not an "urban" v. "rural" 
distinction. Greater Nebraska, as we define it, contains a number of 
smaller cities and major suburban areas. 170 We also recognize that 
there are important differences, some of which we noted above, in 
prosecutorial charging and plea bargaining practices in Nebraska's 
two largest urban areas-Douglas and Sarpy counties on the one 
hand and Lancaster County on the other hand. l71 When our substan-
tive analysis reveals important differences between these two metro-
politan areas, we note them. 
D. A Note on Unadjusted and Adjusted Disparities 
In the course of this report, we often refer to "unadjusted" and "ad-
justed" disparities in charging and sentencing outcomes as they relate 
to the race and the SES of the defendant and the victim. An unad-
justed disparity refers to a difference in a charging or sentencing out-
168. Figure 9, p. 571 infra presents an example. 
169. With 836,431 people, Nebraska's 3 major urban counties (Douglas, Lancaster, 
and Sarpy) accounted for 49% of the total population of 1,711,263 in 2000. Ne-
braska's projected 2001 population is estimated to be 1,713,235. POPULATION DI· 
VISION, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Table CO-EST2001-07-31 Time Series of Nebraska 
Population Estimates by County: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2001 (Released April 
29, 2000), available at http://eire.census.gov/popesUdataicounties/tables/CO· 
EST2001-07·31.php. 
170. There are sizeable cities in many Nebraska counties. 
171. See supra section III.D for a description of differential approaches in the two 
groups of counties to plea bargaining in capital murder cases. 
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come that is associated with a particular characteristic of a defendant 
or victim, without any controls for defendant culpability. For exam-
ple, the overall rate at which cases advance to a penalty trial is .43 
(56/131) in white-defendant cases and .54 (25/46) in minority-defen-
dant cases. The ll-percentage point difference (.43-.54) in these two 
rates is an unadjusted disparity. 
In contrast, an adjusted disparity measures the association be-
tween case characteristics and charging and sentencing outcomes af-
ter controlling for defendant culpability. Odds-multipliers, say for the 
defendant's race estimated in a logistic regression analysis that con-
trols for defendant culpability, are an example of an adjusted dispar-
ity.172 For example, an odds-multiplier of 1.5 for the white-defendant 
variable might tell you that after controlling for defendant culpability, 
on average the odds that a white defendant will receive a death sen-
tence in a penalty trial are 1.5 times higher than the odds faced by 
similarly situated minority defendants. 
Experience has taught us, however, that odds-multipliers are sub-
ject to frequent misinterpretation.173 For that reason, we more com-
monly report adjusted disparities that control for defendant 
culpability on a culpability scale, such as the number of aggravating 
circumstances in the cases or a regression-based culpability scale. Of 
course, adjustments of this type would be unnecessary if all of the 
members of two groups being compared, say white and minority de-
fendants, had the same culpability levels or the same distribution of 
culpability scores when we apply our culpability measures. In that 
situation, the average outcome for the members of the two groups 
would give a valid picture of how similarly situated offenders are be-
ing treated. 
However, we know that the distribution of culpability scores 
among different groups of offenders can vary substantially, a condi-
tion that will create a risk of faulty inference concerning the treat-
ment of similarly situated offenders if adjustments for defendant 
culpability are not introduced into the analysis. For example, if all of 
the white defendants in an analysis had cases with high culpability 
levels and all of the minority defendants had cases of low culpability 
levels, a comparison of the average death-sentencing rates for the two 
groups would be quite misleading. The adjustment procedure that we 
use throughout this report estimates disparities after it reconfigures 
that data so that the members of the two groups being compared have 
similar distributions on the culpability scale being applied. An exam-
ple of such adjusted disparities would be a la-percentage point (.40-
.30) difference in the adjusted rates that death-eligible cases advance 
172. Odds-multipliers are also known as odds-ratios. 
173. The most common error is to interpret the statistic as a multiplier of "probabili-
ties" rather than "odds." 
HeinOnline -- 81 Neb. L. Rev. 539 2002-2003
2002] ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY 539 
to a penalty trial or a 1.3 (.401.30) ratio ofthose rates. 174 In Appendix 
E, we describe the adjustment procedure in more detail. 
E. Convergent Validity and Triangulation of Empirical 
Findings 
This Article addresses five issues related to arbitrariness and com-
parative injustice in prosecutorial charging and judicial sentencing 
decisions. The first four focus on (1) race-of-defendant and race-of-vic-
tim disparate treatment discrimination, (2) adverse disparate impact 
on minority defendants, (3) disparate treatment discrimination based 
on the SES ofthe defendant and victim, and (4) geographic disparities. 
On each of these issues, we evaluate adjusted disparities that we 
estimated with the four measures described above. In so doing, we 
apply the concept of "convergent validity," which has been described 
as "using a number of approaches ... to converge (or triangulate) on 
an understanding or explanation" of the empirical issues.175 The fo-
cus is on the consistency of the adjusted disparities in terms of their 
direction, magnitude, and statistical significance. 
The results presented in this Article's numerous figures are princi-
pally based on the first measure described above-the number of stat-
utory aggravating circumstances in the case. Several figures are also 
based on regression-based scales. We prominently feature the mea-
sure based on the number of statutory aggravators because of its legal 
relevance, understandability, and substantial power in explaining 
charging and sentencing decisions.176 However, on each disparity is-
sue, we present the results estimated with supplemental culpability 
measures by way of a table, figure, or footnote. 177 
The fifth issue concerns the selectivity and consistency of the 
charging and sentencing decisions. The analysis of these questions 
174. See Figure 12 for an example of charging and sentencing outcomes adjusted for 
defendant culpability. 
175. Jennifer K, Robbennolt, Evaluating Empirical Research Methods: Using Empiri-
cal Research in Law and Policy, 81 NEB. L. REV. 777, 800 (2002). 
176. Also, the measures based on the number of statutory aggravating circumstances 
and the regression-based scales embrace all of the cases in each analysis. In con-
trast, the salient factors scale and the scale based on the number of aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances have many more levels. As a result, it is not un-
common in analyses involving small samples to find, for example, a white defen-
dant case classified at a level at which there is no comparable minority 
defendant. When this occurs, the information on that case becomes non-informa-
tive and the analysis loses statistical power. This is another reason why, when 
dealing with small samples, we place more weight on the disparities that are 
estimated controlling for the measures of culpability based on the number of ag-
gravating circumstances and the regression-based scales. 
177. For a few examples of our presentation of the results based on supplemental mea-
sures, see infra notes 222-23, 225-26, 236-37, 238-39, 241-42, 246, 249, and 247-
77. 
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also rests on an application of the four measures of defendant criminal 
culpability described above. Specifically, for each death-sentenced 
case, we used the four measures to estimate the frequency with which 
death sentences were imposed among defendants with comparable 
levels of culpability. We then averaged those four estimates for each 
death-sentenced case to produce two overall estimates of the fre-
quency with which death sentences were imposed among similarly sit-
uated defendants.178 
F. Omitted Variables 
In spite of the very large amount of information we have on each 
case and the substantial effort that we devoted to the measurement of 
defendant culpability, it is clear that our analyses do not account for 
all of the circumstances of the cases that decisionmakers may take 
into account, such as defendant demeanor. Nor can we account for 
other factors that may influence the charging and sentencing out-
comes, such as juror attitudes or attorney argument styles. The issue 
concerning omitted variables is how probable it is that any such omis-
sions biased our estimates concerning the presence or absence of dis-
parities based on race, geography, and SES. The bottom line question 
is not whether there is a lack of precise correspondence between all of 
the facts of each case and the database, but rather whether the sys-
temic effects that we did or did not estimate were biased by the omit-
ted variables. For example, what plausible theory would suggest that 
the introduction of controls for "judicial attitudes" or "attorney argu-
ment styles" would explain away the victim SES effects or the geogra-
phy effects, which our data clearly document? Furthermore, how 
plausible is it that the inclusion of those variables in the analysis 
would uncover evidence of systemic race-of-defendant or race-of-victim 
disparate treatment that our analysis fails to document? In making 
this assessment, recall that an omitted variable can bias the analysis 
only if it is correlated with both the outcome variable, such as sen-
tence imposed, and the illegitimate or suspect variable, such as the 
defendant's race. For the omitted variables of which we are aware, 
with one exception,179 we consider it quite unlikely that both of those 
conditions would be satisfied in the Nebraska data for any of our core 
analyses. 
178. Appendix C, Columns Land M present the overall estimates; the Column L esti-
mate is based on an analysis of penalty-trial cases only, while the Column M 
estimate is based on an analysis of all death-eligible cases. 
179. Infra note 279 and accompanying text, which discusses the implications for our 
findings of disparate treatment based on the SES of the victim of missing data on 
victim impact statements and communications between prosecutors and family 
members. 
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V. THE DISPOSITION OF HOMICIDE CASES: 1973-99 
A. Capital and Non-Capital Cases 
541 
Table 2 first divides the cases by decade and then sorts, on an an-
nual basis, the number of capital and non-capital homicide convic-
tions.180 For each year, we report the total number of convictions and 
the number and proportion of them that we have classified as "death-
eligible." 
The data in Table 2 indicate that the number of homicide convic-
tions has been stable over time, about 27 per year. The number of 
death-eligible offenses has been about 7 a year, ranging from 3 to 15. 
The proportion of death-eligible cases has declined from .27 and .30 in 
the 1970s and 1980s, respectively, to .20 in the 1990s. 
B. The Disposition of Capital Cases 
As noted above, we identified Nebraska's 175 death-eligible cases 
by screening 689 homicides prosecuted during the period of this re-
search that were potentially death-eligible.181 These cases resulted in 
180. As explained infra note 181 and accompanying text, this table excludes 203 homi-
cide convictions that were not potentially death-eligible. The most serious form 
of non-capital homicide in Nebraska is first-degree murder (M1) in cases that do 
not include a statutory aggravating circumstance that would qualify the case as 
capital murder. Non-capital M1 carries a mandatory sentence of life 
imprisonment. 
The next most serious category of non-capital homicide is second-degree mur-
der (M2). The principal distinction between M1 and M2 is the defendant's mens 
rea (mental state). While M1 requires a mens rea of purpose, deliberation, and 
premeditation, M2 requires only that the defendant caused the victim's death 
"intentionally, but without premeditation." In spite of the facial clarity of this 
distinction, there was an ongoing dispute in the Nebraska Supreme Court during 
the last decade about whether proof of "malice" is also required to establish a M2 
conviction. Upon a M2 conviction, the sentencing judge has discretion to sen-
tence the offender to life imprisonment or to a term of years that can range from 
20 years to life imprisonment. 
The third major category of non-capital murder in Nebraska is manslaughter, 
which follows the classic pattern. Manslaughter may involve what would be mur-
der but for the presence of a "sudden quarrel." Manslaughter may also exist 
when the killing is caused "unintentionally while in the commission of an unlaw-
ful act." The punishment for manslaughter is a prison sentence up to 20 years 
(which can include probation with no time served), a fine up to $25,000, or both. 
181. The project initially reviewed a total of 892 homicide cases to arrive at the uni-
verse of 689 cases that we screened for death-eligibility. We excluded from the 
screen 203 cases as not death-eligible as a matter oflaw or because we had insuf-
ficient information to conduct a screen. First, we excluded 67 homicides commit-
ted by persons under 18 after the effective date oflegislation that excluded those 
cases from death-eligibility. Second, we excluded 52 cases that resulted in ac-
quittals, dismissals, or judgments of not guilty by reason of insanity. Third, we 
excluded 26 motor vehicle homicides. Fourth, we excluded 44 M2 retrials for 
cases in which the initial trial had been included in the study but the conviction 
was reversed or vacated during the ongoing dispute in the Nebraska Supreme 
H
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TABLE 2 
NEBRASKA CRIMINAL HOMICIDE CONVICTIONS AND THE PROPORTION 
AND NUMBER OF CAPITAL MURDER CASES, By YEAR: 4120173 TO 121311991 
1970s 1980s 1990s 
A B C D E F G H I 
Proportion & Proportion & Proportion & 
Number of Number of Death- Number of Number of Death- Number of Number of Death-
Year Convictions Eligible Cases Year Convictions Eligible Cases Year Convictions Eligible Cases 
1973-74 19 .21 (4) 1980 32 .31 (10) 1990 19 .32 (6) 
1975 21 .43 (9) 1981 30 .17 (5) 1991 19 .16 (3) 
1976 27 .15 (4) 1982 23 .17 (4) 1992 35 .17 (6) 
1977 31 .35 (11) 1983 23 .43 (10) 1993 36 .17 (6) 
1978 26 .27 (7) 1984 26 .58 (15) 1994 28 .21 (6) 
1979 21 .19 (4) 1985 21 .29 (6) 1995 28 .39 (11) 
1986 37 .24 (9) 1996 27 .22 (6) 
1987 23 .26 (6) 1997 25 .12 (3) 
1988 27 .22 (6) 1998 24 .17 (4) 
1989 27 .33 (9) 1999 34 .15 (5) 
Sub-Totals 145 .27 (39/145) 269 .30 (80/269) 275 .20 (56/275) 
Grand Total (1973-1999) .25 (175/689) 
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185 prosecutions in which the death penalty was a possible outcome 
(10 prosecutions involved a second or third prosecution in the case). 
The test we used to identify death-eligible cases has two parts. The 
first part focuses on first-degree murder (Ml) convictions. We classi-
fied a Ml case as death-eligible if it (a) advanced to a sentencing hear-
ing under section 29-2520 of the Nebraska Statutes, (b) there was 
some evidence of statutory aggravation in the case, and (c) the court 
addressed the issue of whether the sentence should be life or death.182 
For Ml convictions that did not advance to a sentencing hearing be-
cause of a waiver of the death penalty by the state, we classified the 
case as death-eligible only if the facts clearly established that one or 
more statutory aggravating circumstances were present in the case. 
Second, we classified cases as death-eligible when they resulted in 
a conviction for a crime less than Ml only if (a) the conviction was 
pursuant either to an initial charge of less than Ml or a plea bargain 
that reduced an initial Ml charge to the lesser offense, and (b) the 
facts clearly established the presence of the mens rea (mental state) 
required for Ml and one or more statutory aggravating circumstances 
in the case.183 We classify as death-eligible a number of cases that did 
not result in a Ml conviction when the circumstances of the case 
strongly suggest that the prosecutorial decision to charge or accept a 
plea to less than Ml was based on a deathworthiness judgment rather 
than a factual determination that the elements of Ml were not pre-
sent in the case. In contrast, when a jury or judge decision in a guilt 
Court during the last decade whether proof of "malice" is also required to estab-
lish a M2 conviction. See, e.g., Richard E. Shugrue, The Second Degree Murder 
Doctrine in Nebraska, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29 (1996). Finally, we excluded 14 
cases for which we were unable to collect sufficient information to support an 
informed judgment of death-eligibility. The large majority of these cases were 
homicides in which the defendant was found guilty of manslaughter and sen-
tenced to probation with no time served in a Department of Correctional Services 
facility. 
The analysis of non-capital cases embraces 548 prosecutions, 34 of which were 
second prosecutions. The entire study, therefore, included 689 defendants and 
733 prosecutions-185 capital and 548 non-capital. 
182. If there was no evidence of statutory aggravation in the case, we did not classify 
it as death-eligible even if the court made reference to statutory aggravation and! 
or mitigation. 
183. For this purpose, potential liability for Ml could be based on a theory of premed i-
tated murder or felony murder. Cases tried for Ml that resulted in a guilt trial 
conviction of less than Ml were not classified as death-eligible because the fact 
finder determined that the mens rea or felony murder required to support a con-
viction for Ml was not present, regardless of how strong the evidence of death-
eligibility might have been in the case. In short, for a defendant convicted of less 
than Ml to be considered death-eligible, for the purpose of this study, the deci-
sion on liability had to have been made by the prosecution on an initial charge of 
less than Ml or a subsequent charge reduction, typically by way of a plea 
agreement. 
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trial results in less than a Ml conviction, we treat that judgment as a 
factual finding that the elements of Ml were not present in the case. 
Figure 1 presents an overview of the disposition of Nebraska's 
death-eligible cases. Part I, box 1 includes 185 prosecutions against 
175 death-eligible defendants over the period 1973-1999. Box 2A in-
cludes 89 cases in which the state sought a death sentence, while box 
2B includes the 96 cases in which the state waived the death penalty 
either unilaterally or by way of a plea bargain. An offender who 
avoided the risk of a penalty trial could do so in a number of ways. 
First, in cases charged as Ml, prosecutors always have the author-
ity to reduce the charges to M2 or less, either unilaterally or as part of 
a plea bargain, in which event there can be no penalty trial.184 Sec-
ond, for the cases in which the prosecution believes that a Ml convic-
tion (with a mandatory life sentence) is appropriate but that a death 
sentence is either excessive or unlikely to be imposed by the court, 
there are three options. The first option is to enter into a formal plea 
bargain to Ml with a complete waiver of the death penalty, in which 
event the court dispenses with a consideration of aggravation and mit-
igation and imposes a life sentence.185 The second option is a unilat-
eral waiver of the death penalty after a Ml conviction is obtained by 
plea or trial. The third option is for the prosecutor and defendant to 
enter into a plea agreement for an Ml guilty plea with the under-
standing that the prosecutor will present no aggravating evidence in 
the sentencing hearing or make no argument in favor of a death 
sentence .186 
Of the 89 penalty trials shown in Part 1, box 2A, in which the state 
sought a death sentence, 50% were heard by the guilt trial judge alone 
and 50% were heard by a three-judge panel. The death-sentencing 
rate among all of these penalty trials was 33% (29/89). 
For the 17 penalty-trial cases in which the defendant pled guilty, 
the death-sentencing rate was 12% (2117), while in the cases that re-
sulted in a guilt trial conviction, the rate was 37% (27172). The overall 
184. We identified six death-eligible cases that were originally charged M2 or less. It 
is likely that some of these charges were filed pursuant to a pre-indictment plea 
agreement. 
185. We found at least two cases in which such a plea bargain was rejected by the trial 
court and a penalty trial was held. 
186. These pre-trial outcomes may be based on explicit agreements or implicit under-
standings. Our research has documented a broad array of approaches prosecu-
tors use to waive the death penalty with varying degrees of explicitness. In this 
regard, we appreciate the willingness of prosecutors and defense attorneys in 
over 100 cases to describe over the telephone and/or via a questionnaire the pro-
cess of negotiation and agreement when the records in the case were unclear 
about what had transpired in this regard. 
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THE OUTCOMES OF 185 PROSECUTIONS OF DEATH-ELIGIBLE 
OFFENDERS: NEBRASKA, 1973-1999 
Part I. Prosecution Outcomes 
Death-Eligible Prosecutions 
(n=185) 
Case Advanced to a ~ Death Sentence Waived Penalty Trial by the State 
48% (89/185) 52% (96/185) 
~ Death Sentence 
Imposed 
~ Life Sentence 
Imposed 
33% (29/89) 67% (60/89) 
Part II. Judicial Review Outcomes 
(n=29) 
~ Death Sentence Vacated or ~ Death Sentence and Conviction Reversed Conviction Sustained 
66% (19/29) 34% (10/29) 
~ Reversed in 
Federal Court 
~ Reversed by 
Nebraska 
32% (6119) Supreme Court! 
68% (13/19) 
Part III. Status of Death Sentenced Offenders as of January 30, 2002 
~ Total Death-Sentenced Offenders Initially at Risk of Execution 
(n=24) 
~. Death Sentence ~, Defendant Died ~ Defendant on ~ Defendant 
Reduced to Life or on Death Row Death Row Executed 
Less 12% (3/24) 17% (4/24) 12% (3/24) 
58% (14/24) 
'One death sentence, State v. Simpson, was vacated by the trial court before an appeal was taken. 
545 
death-sentencing rate among all death-eligible prosecutions was .16 
(29/185).187 
Part II of Figure 1 indicates the outcomes of judicial review of the 
29 death-sentenced cases. Box 1A indicates that 66% (19/29) of the 
death sentences were vacated. Boxes 2A and 2B indicate that of those 
orders, 68% (13/19) were decisions of the Nebraska Supreme Court 
either on direct appeal or in post-conviction proceedings, while 32% (61 
187. We omit from subsequent analyses of death-sentencing rates one penalty-trial 
case included in Figure 1 in which the court believed it had no legal authority to 
impose a death sentence and therefore exercised no discretion concerning the 
deathworthiness of the defendant. 
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19) of the orders issued from a federal court. In addition, one death 
sentence was vacated by the trial court without an appeal. 
Part III of Figure 1 reports the status of the death-sentenced of-
fenders as of January 30, 2002. Boxes 2A-2D indicate that of the 24 
offenders sentenced to death, 58% (14/24) had their death sentences 
vacated and ultimately left death row alive, 12% (3124) died on death 
row of natural causes, 17% (4/24) remain on death row, and 12% (3/24) 
have been executed. Overall, 29% (7/24) of the originally death-sen-
tenced offenders have been executed or remain on death row at risk of 
execution. 
Table 3 presents data in five-year intervals on the three principal 
charging and sentencing outcomes in the capital murder cases that we 
examine in this report.188 Column B indicates the rates at which 
death-eligible cases advance to a penalty trial with the state seeking a 
death sentence. The Column B analysis embraces all of the death-
eligible cases in the study; we sometimes also refer to that outcome as 
the "penalty-trial rate." This outcome is to be distinguished from the 
measure reported in Column C-the rate at which "death sentences 
are imposed in penalty trials." The Column C outcome excludes cases 
that did not advance to a penalty trial and is sometimes referred to as 
the "penalty-trial death-sentencing rate." Finally, Column D reports 
the "death-sentencing rate among all death-eligible cases." This anal-
ysis embraces all of the death-eligible cases, i.e., the penalty-trial 
cases shown in Column C as well as the cases that did not advance to 
a penalty trial. 
The brackets within each column in Table 3 aggregate the data for 
subgroups of years to highlight the changes that have occurred since 
1987. The data indicate that statewide, since 1987, fewer cases have 
advanced to a penalty trial and that in these hearings, the death-sen-
tencing rate has declined.189 Specifically, Column B documents that 
since 1987 the rate at which cases advance to a penalty trial with the 
state seeking a death sentence declined 14% (7/51).190 There has also 
been a 25% (9/36) decline from .36 to .27 in the penalty-trial death-
sentencing rate. The combined effect of these two trends has been a 
29% (5/17) decline in the rate that death sentences were imposed 
among all death-eligible cases from .17 to .12. These data support the 
expectation that the Nebraska Supreme Court's decisions narrowing 
statutory aggravating circumstances and the introduction of propor-
tionality review would reduce the frequency with which death 
sentences were imposed. 
188. In the text below, we refer to these outcomes as "our three principal outcomes." 
189. These results are not adjusted for the culpability of the offender. 
190. The numerator is the difference in the two rates (.51 and .44); the denominator is 
the earlier .51 rate. 
H
einOnline -- 81 Neb. L. Rev. 547 2002-2003
A 








DISPOSITION OF NEBRASKA CAPITAL MURDERS, 
IN 5-YEAR PERIODS: NEBRASKA, 1973 TO 1999 
B C 
Rates at which Death-
Eligible Cases Advance to 
a Penalty Trial with the Rates that Death 
State Seeking a Death Sentences are Imposed in 
Sentence! Penalty Trials2 
.50 (14128) } .36 (5114) } 
.55 (18/33) .51 (56/110) .56 (10118) .36 (20.55) 
.49 (24149) .22 (5/23) 
.38 (11129) } .18 (2111) } .27 (9.33) 
.48 (22146) .44 (33.75) 
.32 (7/22) 
.48 (89/185) .33 (29/88)" 
D 
Death-Sentencing Rates 
Among All Death-Eligible 
Cases2 
.18 (5/28) } 
.30 (10/33) .17 (20/109) 
.10 (5/48) 
.07 (2129) } .12 (9.75) 
.15 (7/46) 
.16 (29/184)" 
! The Table includes 10 subsequent prosecutions for nine defendants whose death sentences were vacated or whose first-degree murder 
convictions were reversed on appeal. One defendant had two such subsequent prosecutions. Row E includes seven years. 
2 Column C excludes cases that did not advance to a penalty trial, while Columns Band D include all death-eligible cases. 
" Column B includes one case in which the prosecutor perceived the defendant to be death-eligible and advanced the case to a penalty 
trial but the sentencing judge believed the defendant was not death-eligible. Accordingly, that case is excluded from Columns C and D 
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VI. EVIDENCE OF THE IMPACT OF DEFENDANT 
CULPABILITY ON PROSECUTORIAL AND 
JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING 
In this section we apply measures of defendant culpability to eval-
uate the extent to which culpability explains the key outcomes, i.e., 
the rates at which cases advance to a penalty trial and result in the 
imposition of a death sentence. The association between defendant 
culpability, as determined by our core measures, and the key charging 
and sentencing outcomes suggest the degree to which the system oper-
ates in a principled manner, given the statutory and non-statutory ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstances in the cases. 
As noted above,191 our measures of defendant culpability also lay 
the foundation for the analyses presented below in which we evaluate 
evidence of a) disparities in these outcomes based on the race (sections 
VII-VIII) and socioeconomic status (SES) of the defendant and victim 
(section IX), (b) geographic disparities in charging and sentencing out-
comes (section X), and (c) inconsistency and comparative excessive-
ness in death-sentencing outcomes (section XI). Each of these 
inquiries requires the identification of sub-groups of death-eligible of-
fenders with comparable levels of culpability as measured by our prin-
cipal measures of defendant culpability. 
A. The Impact of Individual Statutory Aggravating and 
Mitigating Circumstances 
Figure 2 presents data on the individual impact of each aggravat-
ing and mitigating circumstance on death sentences imposed among 
all death-eligible cases. Part I focuses on the impact of the individual 
statutory aggravating circumstances, while Part II focuses on the im-
pact of the individual mitigating circumstances. Each column 
presents the data for a single aggravator and mitigator, i.e., the death-
sentencing rate when the factor is present or found in the case (the 
shaded bars) and the death-sentencing rate for other cases in which 
the factor was not found in a penalty trial or not present in a non-
penalty trial case. The dotted line across each set of bars indicates the 
.16 overall death-sentencing rate for all cases. The asterisks indicate 
the level of statistical significance between the rates when the factor 
is present and when it is not. 
For example, Column A in Part I indicates that when the "1(a)" 
factor (defendant record of murder, terror, or serious assault) is pre-
sent in the case, the death-sentencing rate among all death-eligible 
cases is .33, which is 23 points above the rate when it is not present 
191. Supra notes 155-60 and accompanying text. 
H
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FIGURE 2 
THE IMPACT OF STATUTORY AGGRAVATION AND MITIGATION ON DEATH-SENTENCING 
RATES AMONG ALL DEATH-ELIGIBLE DEFENDANTS: NEBRASKA, 1973-1999 
(the bars indicate the death-sentencing rates for the subgroups of cases) 
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and 17 points above the .16 average rate among all death-eligible 
offenders. 192 
Part I of Figure 2 indicates that seven of the statutory aggravators 
are associated with death-sentencing rates well above both the .16 av-
erage rate and the rates in the cases in which the factor is not present. 
Also, six of these aggravators, (1(a) through 1(i)), have a statistically 
significant effect in explaining death-sentencing outcomes among all 
death-eligible defendants. The results of a multiple regression analy-
sis show comparable results.193 
Part II of Figure 2 indicates that while the presence of individual 
mitigating circumstances draws down the death-sentencing rates 
among all death-eligible cases, the impacts are much less substantial 
than the impact of the aggravating circumstances, and none of the 
mitigating factors has a statistically significant effect. 194 This result 
is also confirmed in a multiple regression analysis. 195 
B. The Number of Statutory Aggravating and Mitigating 
Circumstances in the Cases 
1. The Number of Aggravating Circumstances 
The most significant factor explaining the pattern of capital charg-
ing and sentencing outcomes in Nebraska is the number of statutory 
aggravating circumstances in the cases. Figure 3 documents their im-
pact on our three principal outcomes: the rates that death-eligible 
cases advance to a penalty trial (Column A), the rates that death 
sentences are imposed in penalty trials (Column B), and death-sen-
tencing rates among all death-eligible cases (Column C). For each of 
these outcomes, the four bars document the applicable rates in cases 
with one, two, three, and four or ·more aggravating circumstances. 
Column A documents that the rate at which death-eligible cases ad-
vance to a penalty trial rises from .41, for the single-aggravator cases, 
to 1.0, or 100%, for the cases with four-or-more aggravating circum-
stances. Column B indicates that the sentencing courts are even more 
192. The numbers assigned to each aggravator and mitigator, at the foot of each bar, 
are drawn from the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances identi-
fied in Table 1, supra. 
193. In explaining death-sentencing rates among all death-eligible offenders, the fol-
lowing statutory aggravators were significant beyond the .05 level: l(a) - 1(e). In 
explaining the rates that cases advanced to a penalty trial, only factor 1(c) was 
significant beyond the .05 level. These results are not shown in Figure 2. 
194. The lack of significance in several of the categories with substantial disparities, 
e.g., Columns B, E, and F, is explained by the small number of cases in which the 
factor is present. 
195. In the model of death-sentencing outcomes among all death-eligible cases, none of 
the statutory mitigators was significant at the .05 level. In the analyses of the 
cases that advanced to a penalty trial, the catch-all mitigator was significant at 
the .001 level. 
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sensitive to the number of aggravators. In the single-aggravator 
cases, death sentences are rare, in the two-aggravator cases life or 
death is a close issue, while in cases with three-or-more aggravators, 
there appears to be a strong presumption in favor of a death sentence. 
Finally, the data in Column C, which reflects the impact of both 
prosecutorial charging and judicial sentencing decisions, reveals a 
very strong association between the risk of a death sentence among all 
death-eligible cases and the number of statutory aggravators in the 
cases. Cases with three-or-more aggravators, shown in Columns Band 
C, account for 48% (14/29) of the total number of death sentences im-
posed. Moreover, among these cases, the death-sentencing rate is 74% 
(14119). 
The striking impact of the number of aggravating circumstances on 
sentencing outcomes is also apparent in the logistic regression models 
presented in Table 4 (Row 1a). No other variable comes close to it in 
explaining the charging and sentencing outcomes. 
The most plausible explanation for the significant role of the num-
ber of aggravating circumstances in predicting the outcomes of the 
cases is that the Nebraska system allocates the death-sentencing re-
sponsibility exclusively to judges while the statute requires the sen-
tencing judges to assure themselves that any death sentences they 
impose are proportionate to the "penalty imposed in similar cases, 
considering both the crime and the defendant."196 The judges have 
access to all ofthe reported death-sentenced cases and defense counsel 
regularly present information on other comparable cases sentenced to 
life or less in the sentencing hearings. For a rule of thumb in defining 
similar cases, the measure of the number of aggravating circum-
stances in the case has a firm foundation in the statute and is rela-
tively easy to apply. As noted above, the retired judges whom we 
interviewed deny that trial judges consciously apply quantitative 
standards based on the number of statutory aggravators in the case. 
Nevertheless, the data are consistent with the application of a de facto 
rule that for cases with three or more aggravators, a death sentence is 
almost certain, .93 (14/15); for the two-aggravator cases, it is a close 
issue, .48 (12/25); and for the single-aggravator cases, there is a sub-
stantial presumption against a death sentence, .06 (3148). 
The data in Figure 3 suggest that the number of aggravating cir-
cumstances has considerably less impact on prosecutorial decision-
making than it does on judicial death-sentencing decisions. Indeed, in 
the single-aggravator category, in which a death sentence is a rare 
event, 41% of the cases advance to a penalty trial. The regression re-
sults in Table 4 tell a similar story.197 
196. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2522(3) (Reissue 1995). 
197. The regression coefficient for the number of statutory aggravators in the model 
for the judicial decisions (2.9: Row la, Column F) is 5.7 times higher than the .51 
H
einOnline -- 81 Neb. L. Rev. 552 2002-2003
FIGURE 3 
CHARGING AND SENTENCING OUTCOMES AMONG ALL DEATH-ELIGIBLE CASES, CONTROLLING FOR THE NUMBER 
OF STATUTORY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES FOUND OR PRESENT IN THE CASES: NEBRASKA, 1973-1999 
(the three columns of bars represent the rates at which death-eligible cases advance to a penalty trial (Column A), the rates that 
death sentences are imposed in penalty trials (Column B), and the death-sentencing rates among all capital cases (Column C» 
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TABLE 4 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS OF FOUR CHARGING AND 
SENTENCING OUTCOMES 
(the number in the Columns are logistic odds-multipliers and regression coefficients 
(in parenthesis) estimated for the applicable explanatory variables in Column A; 
there are two models for each outcome-the first with the geography variable (2.e) 
omitted and the second with it included) 
A B C D E F G H I 
Death-Eligible 
Death Cases Advanced 
Sentence to Penalty Trial Death Death Sentence 
Waived by wI State Sentences are Imposed Among 
PlealUniiateral Seeking a Death Imposed in a AIl Death-
Explanatory Variables Decision Sentence Penalty Trial Eligible Cases 
1. Legitimate Case 
Characteristics 
a. Number of Statutory .53 .48 1.67 1.75 18.1 18.1 12.2 12.2 
Aggravating (-.64)* (-.72)* (.51)* (.56)* (2.9)* (2.9)* (2.5)* (2.5)* 
Circumstances 
b. Number of Statutory 1.26 1.23 .83 .83 .72 .72 .58 .54 
Mitigating (.23) (.21) (-.19) (-.19) (-.13) (-.13) (-.16) (-.17) 
Circumstances 
c. Victim Bound and - - 1.31 1.72 - - - -
Gagged (.27) (.54) 
d. Def. Killed Two or .41 .35 1.97 2.46 - - - -
More Victims' (-.90) (-1.05)* (.68) (.90) 
e. Guilty Plea - - - - .11 .12 .04 .05 
(-2.2)* (-2.1) (-3.3)* (-3.1)* 
f. Def. Committed an - - - - - - 4.48 4.95 
Additional Crime (1.5) (1.4)* 




a. White Def. 1.95 1.46 .63 .73 1.61 1.55 1.40 1.40 
(.67) (.38) (-.45) (-.31) (.48) (.44) (.33) (.33) 
b. White Victim .97 .76 .92 .97 1.03 1.03 .86 .88 
(-.03) (-.27) (-.09) (-.03) (.03) (.03) (-.15) (-.12) 
c. Def. SES Scale 1.21 1.08 .72 .72 .86 .87 .55 .86 
(High, Middle, Low) (.20) (.08) (-.33) (-.33) (-.15) (-.14) (-.58) (-.14) 
d. Victim SES Scale 1.82 2.03 .55 .54 .30 .30 .27 .30 
(High, Middle, Low) (.72)* (.71)* (-.59)* (-.61)* (-1.2)* (-1.2)* (-1.3)* (-1.2)* 
e. Geography Variable 
-
.27 - 2.8 - .95 - .93 
l=Major Urban County (-1.3)* (1.03)* (-.05) (.08) 
O=Other County 
• In multiple victim cases, in terms of aggravation in the case, the model reflects the more or most 
aggravated murder, as the case may be. 
* = indicates a level of confidence in the estimate that, in Bayesian terms, is the analogue to 
statistical significance at the .05 level or beyond in frequenist terms. 
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2. The Number of Statutory Aggravating and Mitigating 
Circumstances 
In contrast to the results shown in Figure 3 and Table 4 (Row la, 
Columns B through I), an analysis of the impact of the number of mit i-
gating circumstances in the cases indicates that they have much less 
impact on outcomes. The regression results shown in Table 4 (Row 1b, 
Columns B through I) document a weak, non-significant association 
among all of the cases. 
The much weaker impact of the statutory mitigating circum-
stances on death-sentencing outcomes is also highlighted in Figure 4, 
which breaks down all of the death-eligible cases according to the 
number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the cases. 
The rows (Parts I-IV) group the cases according to the number of ag-
gravating circumstances, while the Columns (B through G) group the 
cases according to the number of mitigators in the cases. 
The data in Figure 4 indicate, first, that death sentences are quite 
rare in the cases with three or more mitigators (Columns E through 
G), although these cases account for only 26% (47/184) of the total. It 
is also useful to look at the interaction between the impact on mitiga-
tion and the number of aggravators in the cases. The Part I data (one 
aggravating circumstance) suggest a slight effect for the mitigators 
since the three death sentences imposed in that category had only one 
or two mitigators. In Part II (two aggravating circumstances), there is 
an apparent effect with the rates declining as the number of mitiga-
tors increases from one to five. In Parts III and IV, which contain the 
highly aggravated cases, small differences in mitigation have no effect 
at all.198 Thus, it is only in the few close cases in Part II that we can 
perceive a meaningful effect from mitigation (a result consistent with 
the expectation that individual case characteristics have their great-
est impact in the mid-range of cases where the room for the exercise of 
discretion is greatest).199 In the single-aggravator cases (Part I), 
there is little to mitigate in the first place, while in the most aggra-
vated cases (Parts III and IV), the aggravation overwhelms fairly sig-
nificant levels of mitigation, i.e., the death-sentencing rates are very 
high in the face of two or three mitigating circumstances.2oo 
coefficient for that variable in the model for the prosecutorial decisions (.52: Row 
la, Column D). 
198. However, none of these cases had four or five mitigators, which might make a 
difference. Figure 4 omits one penalty trial case in which the sentencing judge 
did not believe he had the authority to impose a death sentence. 
199. "Mid-range" refers to the mid-range in terms of defendant culpability. 
200. However, the three-mitigator category in Part III contains only one case. 
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FIGURE 4 
DEATH-SENTENCING RATES AMONG ALL DEATH-ELIGIBLE CASES, 
CONTROLLING FOR THE NUMBER OF STATUTORY AGGRAVATING AND 
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES FOUND OR PRESENT IN THE CASES: 
A 
Number of Statutory 
Aggravating 
Circumstances 
Part I. One Aggravating 
Circumstance 
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Part II. Two Aggravating 
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Circumstances 
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C. Salient Factors of the Cases 
We next applied the salient factors of the cases measure of culpa-
bility, which is presented in Appendix B. This measure assigns each 
case to a single category identified by its most serious aggravating 
circumstance. 
Column B, Parts I-IV of Figure 5 documents a significant impact of 
three of the statutory aggravating circumstances (1(a), 1(c), and l(e» 
when they are accompanied by another statutory aggravating circum-
stance and two or fewer mitigating circumstances. For example, Part 
II, Column B indicates that among the "l(e)" multiple-victim cases 
with low mitigation and an additional aggravating circumstance, the 
death-sentencing rate was .43 (6/14). However, Column A, Parts V 
and VI indicate that two of the aggravators most commonly charged 
and found (l(b) and l(d» have average death-sentencing rates that 
are lower than the overall average (.16) and have only a marginal im-
pact on charging and sentencing outcomes, even in the presence of ad-
ditional aggravation and low mitigation (Column B). 
Figure 5 also demonstrates that the highest death-sentencing rate 
is only .43 (Part II, Column B) among any of the five salient factors 
categories (with more than 5 cases). Thus, in terms of distinguishing 
the cases that result in death sentences from those that do not and 
identifying the most deathworthy offender, the salient factors mea-
sure does less well than the measure based on the number of statutory 
aggravating circumstances in the cases. 
D. Regression-Based Measures and Scales 
We also conducted multiple regression analyses of the key charg-
ing and sentencing outcomes. The models are presented in Table 4.201 
With them, we also created culpability scales that reflect the impact of 
the legitimate factors only in explaining charging and sentencing out-
comes. We used the regression results for three outcomes to create 
the scales shown in Figure 6. Each level of the scale groups together 
cases that are similar in terms of the predicted probability that the 
case would result in a death sentence or advance to a penalty trial, as 
the case may be. 
Part I presents the results for death sentences imposed among all 
death-eligible cases, controlling for defendant culpability on a four-
level culpability scale. These outcomes reflect the prosecutorial charg-
ing decisions and the judicial sentencing decisions. In contrast, Parts 
II and III focus separately on the judicial decisions (Part II) and 
prosecutorial decisions (Part III). The results for judicial decision-
making shown in Part II document a strong relationship between the 
201. See supra subsection IV.B.4 and accompanying text for a description of the 
screening process used to create the regression models. 
HeinOnline -- 81 Neb. L. Rev. 557 2002-2003
2002] ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY 557 
FIGURE 5 
DEATH-SENTENCING RATES AMONG ALL DEATH-ELIGIBLE CASES, 
CONTROLLING FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF EACH CASE UNDER THE 
SALIENT FACTORS MEASURE OF DEFENDANT CULPABILITY: 
Part I. Defendant with a Prior 
HomicidelManslaughter 
Conviction (I (a)) 
Part II. Multiple Victims (I (e)) 
Part III. Defendant with a 
Violent Criminal Record but 
Without Murder/Manslaughter 
(1 (a)) 
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I The designation at the conclusion of each part's description indicates the principal statutory aggmvating 
circumstance in these cases, e.g., for Part I cases, the principal aggmvator is (I(a», See Table I for a list of the 
statutory aggravators. 
2 An "aggmvated" case includes one or morc additional aggravating circumstances. except for Part II. in which 
"aggmvated" refers to the presence of a contemporaneous felony. such as robbery or arson. 
3 A low mitigation case has two or fewer statutory mitigating circumstances (a) found or recognized by the coun in a 
~nallY trial case or (b) present in a non-penalty trial case. 
These cases are subclassified only in terms of high and low mitigation. 
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FIGURE 6 
DEATH-SENTENCING RATES AMONG ALL DEATH-ELIGIBLE CASES 
(PART I) AND IN PENALTY TRIALS (PART II), AND THE RATES THAT 
CASES ADVANCE TO PENALTY TRIAL (PART III), CONTROLLING FOR 
DEFENDANT CULPABILITY ON REGRESSION-BASED CULPABILITY SCALES1 
(the bars indicate the death-sentencing rates among each category of cases defined in 
terms of defendant culpability estimated on a regression-based scale) 
A 
Part I. Death-Sentencing 




Part II. Rates that Death 
Sentences are Imposed in 
Penalty Trials2 
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Two Three 
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Continued on Next Page 
lThe-regression-hased scales used in this Figure are based on the models presented in Table 4 without 
a control for the geography variable. 
2This Figure does not include one death-eligible case in which the sentencing court did not believe it 
had discretion to impose a death sentence. 
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defendant culpability and the likelihood that death sentences will be 
imposed, i.e., a steady increase in the death-sentencing rate as the 
cases become more aggravated.202 The results for prosecutorial deci-
sionmaking shown in Part III present a quite different picture. 
Among the cases at levels one through four, which account for 78% 
(144/185) of the prosecutions, there appears to be no relationship be-
tween the culpability level of the cases and likelihood that they will 
advance to a penalty trial. Only among the most aggravated cases at 
levels five through seven does the risk of a penalty trial become sub-
stantial.203 These findings provide support for Chief Justice 
Krivosha's belie~o4 that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion was 
the principal source of inconsistency in death-sentencing outcomes 
that he perceived in the system. 
In McCleskey v. Kemp, Justice Powell commented that the data 
before the Court concerning charging and sentencing decisions in 
Georgia's capital charging and sentencing system "results in a reason-
able level of proportionality among the class of murderers eligible for 
the death penalty.''205 We think the same can be said of Nebraska's 
penalty-trial death-sentencing decisions depicted in Part II of Figure 
6. Indeed, the levels of defendant culpability measured appear to ex-
plain the death-sentencing outcomes of the Nebraska system even bet-
ter than they did in the Georgia data.206 This result is most likely 
attributable to the fact that the crucial penalty-trial death-sentencing 
decisions are made by experienced judges, many of whom are likely 
aware of the pattern of death-sentencing rates in cases with varying 
levels of culpability. Moreover, as noted above, the Nebraska statute 
imposes on the sentencing judges an obligation to consider the risk of 
comparative excessiveness in any death sentences they impose. How-
ever, the results for the prosecutorial decisionmaking in Nebraska 
202. The R2 for the judicial sentencing model was .52. R2 is a measure of the power of 
all of the variables in a multiple regression model to explain variations in the 
defendant/outcome variable on a scale from .00 (low) to 1.0 (high). In comparison 
to other sentencing research, an R2 of .52 is quite respectable. 
203. The R2 for the prosecutorial charging model was only .19. 
204. Supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
205. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987) (stating that "the system sorts out 
cases where the sentence of death is highly likely and highly unlikely, leaving a 
midrange of case where the imposition of the death penalty in any particular case 
is less predictable"). 
206. For the jury death-sentencing model, the R2 in the Georgia research was .42, 
EJDP, supra note 11, at 645, while the comparable measure for the Nebraska 
judicial death-sentencing model was .52. See infra subsection XI.B.2 for a com-
parison of the level of consistency in Nebraska's judicial sentencing system with 
the New Jersey jury sentencing system, which imposes death sentences at about 
the same rate as Nebraska. 
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show much less proportionality than did their counterparts in 
Georgia.207 
We note, also, the teaching of McCleskey that a death-sentencing 
system which results in a reasonable level of proportionality can also 
be heavily influenced by illegitimate case characteristics. Specifically, 
in spite of the evidence of proportionality to which Justice Powell re-
ferred, the data in McCleskey showed substantial and statistically sig-
nificant race-of-victim disparities that were consistent with a pattern 
and practice of race-of-victim disparate treatment in the cases.208 
PARTC 
VII. EVIDENCE OF DISPARATE TREATMENT IN CHARGING 
AND SENTENCING OUTCOMES BASED ON THE 
RACE OF THE DEFENDANT AND VICTIM 
A. Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact Legal 
Theories 
In an evaluation of race disparities in a capital sentencing system, 
it is useful to consider the concepts of "disparate treatment" and "dis-
parate impact." These legal theories are used in the courts in a vari-
ety of different contexts, such as employment and housing 
discrimination cases209 and important consequences turn on whether 
207. An analysis of prosecutorial decisions to advance death-eligible cases to penalty 
trial in Georgia produced an R2 of .45. EJDP, supra note 11, at 643. The R2 in the 
comparable Nebraska model of prosecutorial decisionmaking is .15. A compara-
ble 39 variable model in the Georgia research for the imposition of death 
sentences among all death-eligible cases, which reflects the impact of both charg-
ing and sentencing decisions, produced an R2 of .35. Id. at 631. The W for the 
corresponding Nebraska model is .51. 
208. The Court did not question the validity of those findings of the Georgia research. 
It rejected the petitioner's claims on the ground that he had not shown purposeful 
discrimination in his case and that the risk of race-of-victim discrimination in his 
case was not strong enough to constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution. 
209. For an extensive collection of employment discrimination cases raising disparate 
treatment and disparate impact theories, see Linda Hamilton Kreiger, The Con-
tent of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal 
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995). For a similar collection 
of cases concerning fair housing and fair lending, see Peter E. Mahoney, The 
End(s) of Disparate Impact: Doctrinal Reconstruction, Fair Housing and Lending 
Law, and the Antidiscrimination Principle, 47 EMORY L.J. 409 (1998). Another 
example of cases in which these theories have been used is the public school fi-
nance litigation both in federal and state courts. See Randal S. Jeffery, Equal 
Protection in State Courts: The New Economic Equality Rights, 17 LAW & INEQ. 
J. 239 (1999) (collecting and discussing state cases challenging public school fi-
nancing schemes on the basis of disparate treatment and disparate impact); 
Jonathan M. Purver, Validity of Basing Public School Financing System on Local 
Property Taxes, 41 A.L.R.3d 1220 (1972) (collecting early constitutional chal-
lenges to public school financing schemes). 
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documented race disparities are held to constitute disparate treat-
ment or disparate impact.210 The United States Supreme Court and 
many state courts have raised a high bar for parties advancing claims 
based on these theories.211 We emphasize, however, that these legal 
theories have nothing to do with the discretion of state legislatures to 
shape their death penalty laws as they see fit.212 Legislatures have 
210. Most importantly, in many cases, a party must be able to establish disparate 
treatment in order to set forth a discrimination claim under the Equal Protection 
Clause. See, for example, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and Village 
of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 
(1977), which both held that to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a 
party must show a discriminatory intent or purpose. Many civil rights statutes, 
however, expressly allow plaintiffs or criminal defendants to state a claim based 
on disparate impact as well as disparate treatment. For example, the Americans 
with Disabilities Act includes disparate impact expressly in its definition of dis-
crimination. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3) (1994). 
211. In McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), the Supreme Court established a 
burden of proof for establishing disparate treatment claims in the capital sen-
tencing context that is impossible to meet in the absence of direct admissions of 
discriminatory intent by prosecutors or jurors. The Supreme Court has also 
made disparate impact claims more difficult to raise by increasing the eviden-
tiary requirements for discrimination claims. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. 
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (making a Title VII employment discrimination dis-
parate impact claim much more difficult to establish); Guardians Ass'n. v. Civil 
Servo Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983) (requiring a plaintiff to make a showing of 
intentional discrimination to succeed on a Title VII claim). 
212. In an analogous situation, on several occasions the United States Congress has 
expanded a civil rights statute after the Supreme Court issued a restrictive read-
ing. See Serena J. Hoy, Interpreting Equal Protection: Congress, the Court, and 
the Civil Rights Acts, 16 J. L. & POL. 381 (2000) (discussing the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act of1978, the Voting Rights Act of 1982, and the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 as three cases in which Congress expanded civil rights acts in response to 
Supreme Court decisions construing previous statutes narrowly). In a particu-
larly pointed example, Congress codified the disparate impact claim for employ-
ment discrimination claims in the 1991 amendments to Title VII. See Donald O. 
Johnson, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and Disparate Impact: The Response to 
Factionalism, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 469, 493 (1992) (noting that "Congress stated 
its clear intent 'to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding 
the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection 
to victims of discrimination" (citing Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 3(4))); Michael J. 
Zimmer, Individual Disparate Impact Law: On the Plain Meaning of the 1991 
Civil Rights Act, 30 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 473, 473 (1999) ("Congress intended to fix 
the damage to disparate impact law caused by the Supreme Court in Wards Cove 
Packing Co. v. Atonio, [490 U.S. 642 (1989)]."). The U.S. Supreme Court has also 
recognized that, pursuant to Title VII, federal agencies have the authority to pro-
mulgate regulations that support disparate impact claims. See Guardians Ass'n. 
v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 584 n.2, 591-92, 623 n.15 (1983); see also 
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 540-42 (2001) (explaining 
the plaintiffs Title VII claim and its basis in Department of Education 
regulations). 
State courts and legislatures also have the discretion to respond to discrimi-
nation or to correct inequities working with and based on their own constitutions 
and statutes. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of 
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the authority to correct disparities in charging and sentencing out-
comes, whether or not the data establishing them would support a dis-
parate treatment or disparate impact legal claim in a court of law. 
Nevertheless, these two ways of conceptualizing disparities in capital 
charging and sentencing outcomes based on the race and SES of de-
fendants and victims, and the place of prosecution are helpful in un-
derstanding the Nebraska system and what our data demonstrate. 
By disparate treatment we refer to the differential treatment of 
similarly situated defendants at discretionary points of decision in the 
charging and sentencing system on the basis of the race or SES of 
defendants or their victims. Disparate treatment is sometimes re-
ferred to as "purposeful" or "invidious" discrimination. The Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits 
disparate treatment on the part of governmental bodies when it is 
based on race. In the context of capital sentencing, the Eighth 
Amendment also prohibits disparate treatment on the basis of race.213 
It is important to note that the statistical methodology we apply in 
this study, which has been employed in numerous similar studies, can 
only detect systemic disparate treatment when there is a pattern and 
practice of discrimination across many cases in a discretionary deci-
sionmaking system. If disparate treatment occurs in only a few cases, 
the methodology that we apply will not detect it. 
In contrast to disparate treatment, disparate impact arises when a 
decision rule that is facially neutral with respect to group status, such 
as race or gender, is applied evenhandedly but its application pro-
duces an adverse impact on a protected groUp.214 This can take place 
in either a discretionary or non-discretionary decisionmaking sys-
Individual Rights, 90 fuRV. L. REV. 489 (1977) (noting that state courts can in-
terpret state constitution provisions to give more protection than similar provi-
sions of the federal constitution). This independent discretion has been 
particularly evident in nationwide cases concerning public school financing. 
Even though claims based on the Federal Constitution are extremely difficult to 
raise, state courts have upheld claims under equal protection provisions in state 
constitutions. See Randal S. Jeffrey, Equal Protection in State Courts: The New 
Economic Equality Rights, 17 LAW & INEQ. 239, 241 (1999) (noting that state 
courts had found state constitutional violations in seven out of 22 equal protec-
tion-based education financing cases). 
213. But see McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). While the United States Su-
preme Court has recognized basic rights of indigent criminal defendants, such as 
the right to counsel, it has never recognized wealth or poverty as suspect classifi-
cations under the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 
297,323 (1980) ("[TJhis Court has held repeatedly that poverty, standing alone, is 
not a suspect classification."). AB discussed above, supra note 5, claims based on 
socioeconomic or geographic discrimination are difficult to bring. 
214. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.s. 424, 431 (1971) (noting that Title VII, 
which prohibits employment discrimination, "proscribes not only overt discrimi-
nation but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation"). 
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tem.215 The focus of disparate impact theory is not on the differential 
treatment of individuals. Rather, it is on the protection of groups, 
such as racial minorities and women, when they are given protected 
status under the law. 
The concept of adverse disparate impact has emerged in several 
areas of anti-discrimination law over the last 30 years.216 A common 
example arises in employment law when an employer adopts a job 
qualification that is applied evenhandedly to all job applicants, but its 
application excludes a disproportionately high proportion of minorities 
or women. A good example is a minimum height and weight require-
ment of, say, 5 feet 8 inches and 150 pounds. Because, on average, 
women are shorter than and weigh less than men, a higher proportion 
of women than men are excluded by the evenhanded application of 
this otherwise facially-neutral job qualification.217 The adverse im-
pact is not intentionally caused. It exists because, on average, men 
and women are physically different. 
Under the anti-discrimination laws that recognize the theory of 
disparate impact, a facially-neutral policy that produces an adverse 
impact is not per se invalid. Its continued use will be permitted if the 
policy at issue meets the test of necessity. In the employment and 
housing contexts, the test is whether the policy producing the adverse 
impact can satisfy the test of "business necessity."218 
Public education provides an example of an adverse impact on mi-
norities that is produced by state law and policy. In most states, fund-
215. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 988 (1988). In Watson, 
Justice O'Connor provides examples of discretionary and non-discretionary sys-
tems. Non-discretionary decisionmaking systems that have had a disparate im-
pact include written aptitude tests, Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 
(1975), written tests of verbal skills, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), 
height and weight requirements, Dothard v. Rawlison, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), and a 
rule against employing drug addicts, New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 
440 U.S. 568 (1979). Some discretionary decisionmaking systems include hiring 
decisions based on personal knowledge of candidates and recommendations, 
Furneo. Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978), discretionary promotions, 
United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983), 
and management decision based on perceptions of relations between co-workers, 
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). 
216. See, e.g., supra note 209. 
217. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). 
218. Under this test, proof of an adverse disparate impact gives rise to a burden on the 
employer or landlord to justify the policy producing the adverse impact in terms 
of "business necessity." Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). If such 
a justification is forthcoming, such as the need for minimum height and weight 
requirements for firefighters, the policy may stand. If the requirement "cannot 
be shown to be related to job performance," id., it may not be used. See also 
Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425-26 (1975). If the employer 
meets this burden, the plaintiff must show that an alternative requirement exists 
that substantially meets the employer's needs and has less of an adverse impact. 
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ing of public schools is primarily a local responsibility, and funding 
levels per student vary widely across many states. If minorities 
largely reside in communities with per student appropriation for pub-
lic education that are below the statewide average, they experience an 
adverse disparate impact by virtue of where they reside and the state 
laws that delegate discretion for school financing to local officials.219 
In the balance of this section, we examine evidence of disparate 
treatment based on the race of the defendant and victim. In section 
VIII, we consider two forms of disparate impact that adversely affect 
minority defendants. The first is a statewide adverse impact on mi-
nority defendants in the rates that cases advance to penalty trial. The 
second is an adverse impact on minority defendants in the rates that 
death-sentenced offenders are executed. In section IX, we examine ev-
idence of disparate treatment based on the SES of the defendant and 
victim. In section X, we examine geographic disparities that produce 
an adverse impact on offenders in major urban counties. 
B. Evidence of Disparate Treatment Based on the Race of 
the Defendant 
1. Unadjusted Statewide Minority-Defendant Disparities in 
Charging and Sentencing Outcomes 
The issue of race-of-defendant discrimination in Nebraska's capital 
charging and sentencing system is raised by straightforward 
demographics. Racial minorities constitute approximately 10% of the 
population of the state of Nebraska.220 Yet, as indicated in Part I of 
Figure 7, they are dramatically overrepresented at each stage in its 
capital charging and sentencing system.221 
219. See JEAN ANYON, GHETTO SCHOOLING: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF URBAN EDUCA-
TIONAL REFORM (1997); Linda Darling-Hammond, Inequality and Access to 
Knowledge, reprinted in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION 
465 (James A. Banks & Cherry A. McGhee eds., 1995). 
220. The 2000 census reports 90.8% white, 4.4% Mrican American, 1.6% Asian, 1.3% 
Native American, .1% Native Islander, and 3.3% "some other race." U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 TABLE DP-1- PROFILE OF GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHARAC-
TERISTICS: NEBRASKA 2000 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/ 
cen2000/dp 1/2kh31. pdf. 
221. The overrepresentation of minorities in the population of death-eligible offenders 
is largely the product of the overrepresentation of minorities among individuals 
arrested for homicide. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS: 1999354, tbl. 4.10 (2000) (reporting nationwide, blacks con-
stituted 54% (5,868/10,850) of persons arrested for murder and non-negligent 
manslaughter in 1998). We identified the death-eligible offenders by screening 
all Nebraska homicide convictions. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
The only way bias could have enhanced the proportion of minorities among those 
arrested for homicide would be if similarly situated white defendants had not 
been arrested, prosecuted, and convicted of homicide. To our knowledge there are 
no data available to test that hypothesis. 
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FIGURE 7 
RACE-OF-DEFENDANT DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL CHARGING AND 
SENTENCING DECISIONS: NEBRASKA, 1973-1999 






Whose Cases Advanced 





~-----______ I~:I ______ -----~ 
(50/185) (29/89) (7/29) 
567 
Part II. Unadjusted Minority-Defendant Disparities in Capital Charging and Sentencing 
Outcomes 
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FIGURE 7 (CONTINUED) 
Part III. Minority-Defendant Disparities in Capital Charging and Sentencing Decisions 
after Adjustment for the Number of Statutory Aggravating Circumstances in the Cases 
(the number in parenthesis above each set of bars is the average rate for all cases) 
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Part I indicates that minorities represent 27% of the death-eligible 
offenders and account for 33% of the offenders whose cases advance to 
a penalty trial, but only 24% of the offenders who were sentenced to 
death. These numbers, which are not adjusted for defendant culpabil-
ity, indicate that the cases of minorities are more likely to advance to 
a penalty trial than are whites, but are less likely to receive death 
sentences. Part II of Figure 7 presents the differential selection rates 
that shape the representation rates in Part 1. Specifically, Column A 
documents a statistically significant 14-percentage point (.58-.44) 
statewide disparity in the rates that minorities advance to a penalty 
trial. However, Column B reports a 12 percentage-point (.37-.25) 
lower death-sentencing rate for minority defendants. The combined 
effects of these two decision points are shown in Part II, Column C, 
which indicates that among all death-eligible cases, the death-sen-
tencing rate is 2 percentage points lower for minorities. Of these dis-
parities, the only one consistent with a pattern and practice of 
disparate treatment is the 14-percentage point minority-defendant 
disparity in the rates that cases advanced to penalty trial (Column A). 
For this reason, we consider that decision point in more detail below 
in analyses that control for the culpability of the offenders and the 
geographic location of their prosecution. 
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2. Statewide Minority-Defendant Disparities in Charging and 
Sentencing Decisions Controlling for Offender 
Culpability 
Part III of Figure 7 presents statewide race-of-defendant dispari-
ties adjusted for offender culpability as measured by the number of 
statutory aggravating circumstances in the cases. Column A docu-
ments a 16-percentage point (.60-.44) minority-defendant disparity in 
the rates that cases advance to a penalty tria1.222 These results are 
consistent with a statewide pattern and practice of disparate treat-
ment in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. In contrast, the capi-
tal sentencing data reported in Columns Band C reveal only small 
disparities that could easily arise by chance.223 
Figures 8 and 9 indicate that the race effects in prosecutorial deci-
sionmaking are concentrated in the low and mid-range cases in terms 
of defendant culpability. Figure 8, Column B, documents significant 
effects in the one-aggravator category in which 63% (116/185) of the 
state's death-eligible defendants are prosecuted. Figure 9 controls for 
offender culpability with a 7-level scale based on the logistic regres-
sion analyses presented in Table 4. It indicates that the race effects 
are most prominent in the mid-range cases ranging from levels 2 to 5 
on the two scales. 
222. Estimates based on alternative measures of defendant culpability were as fol-
lows: concerning minority-defendant disparities in the rates that cases advance 
to penalty trial, controlling for the number of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances in the cases, the statewide minority-defendant disparity is 4 points 
(p=.1O); controlling for the salient factors measure, the disparity is 7 points 
(p=.04); controlling for the regression-based scale, the disparity is 10 points 
(p=.06); in the logistic regression analysis in Table 4, Column D, the coefficient 
for the white defendant variable is .63, which results in a minority defendant 
odds multiplier of 1.6 that is not statistically significant (NS). 
223. For judicial death-sentencing rates, controlling for the number of aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances, the minority-defendant disparity is 
-19 points and not significant (NS); controlling for the salient factors measure, 
the disparity is -2 points (NS); controlling for the regression-based scale, the dis-
parity is -14 points (NS); in the logistic regression analysis in Table 4, Column F, 
the coefficient for the white defendant variable is .48, which results in a minority-
defendant odds multiplier of .62 (NS). 
For death sentences imposed among all death-eligible cases, controlling for 
the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the minority-defendant 
disparity is -6 points (NS); controlling for the salient factors measure, there is no 
disparity; controlling for the regression-based scale, the disparity is 1 point (NS). 
In the logistic regression analysis in Table 4, Column H, the coefficient for the 
white victim variable is .33, which results in a minority-defendant odds multi-
plier of .62 (NS). 
H
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FIGURE 8 
STATEWIDE MINORITY-DEFENDANT DISPARITIES IN THE RATES AT WHICH DEATH-ELIGIBLE CASES TERMINATE 
IN A NEGOTIATED PLEAlWAIVER (PART 1) AND ADVANCE TO A PENALTY TRIAL (PART II), CONTROLLING FOR 
THE NUMBER OF AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE CASES: NEBRASKA, 1973-1999 
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, After adjustment for the number of statutory aggravating circumstances, the overall minority-defendant disparity was -19 percentage points (.32 - .51), significant at the .01 level. 
2 After adjustment for the number of statutory aggravating circumstances, the overall minority-defendant disparity was +15 percentage points (.59 - .44), significant at the .061evel. 
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FIGURE 9 
STATEWIDE MINORITY-DEFENDANT DISPARITIES IN THE RATES AT WHICH DEATH-ELIGIBLE CASES (A) 
TERMINATE IN A NEGOTIATED PLEAlWAIVER AND (B) ADVANCE TO A PENALTY TRIAL, CONTROLLING FOR 
DEFENDANT CULPABILITY WITH A REGRESSION-BASED SCALE: NEBRASKA, 1973-1999 
(the height of each bar indicates the negotiated plea and penalty trial rates for the subgroup of cases at each level of culpability esti-
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11be overall adjusted minority-defendant disparity is -16 percentage points (.34 - 50). significant at the .04 level. 


























HeinOnline -- 81 Neb. L. Rev. 572 2002-2003
572 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:486 
3. Race-of-Defendant Disparities in the Exercise of Prosecutorial 
Discretion After Adjustment for the Place of Prosecution (in 
Major Urban Counties v. the Counties of Greater Nebraska) 
Without more, the statewide race effects presented above suggest a 
distinct possibility of a pattern and practice of the disparate treatment 
of minority offenders in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. At 
first blush, this interpretation appears plausible because the dispari-
ties are concentrated in the low to middle level range of defendant 
culpability where there is the greatest room for the exercise of discre-
tion.224 An alternative possibility is that these disparities are ex-
plained by something other than differential treatment of similarly 
situated white and minority defendants. This alternative is exactly 
what emerged as a more plausible explanation when we estimated the 
race effects separately for the major urban counties and greater 
Nebraska. 
The results of that analysis are presented in Figure 10. Part 1 
presents the minority representation rates at the three key stages in 
the process, without adjustment for defendant culpability. For the 
major urban counties, where 90% of the prosecutions against minori-
ties occur, a comparison ofthe data in Columns A and B in Part I, Row 
A suggests no disparity in the rates that cases advance to penalty trial 
and a comparison of the data in Columns C and B suggests a lower 
death-sentencing rate for minority defendants. The data in Part I, 
Row B for greater Nebraska tell a similar story but the samples are 
too small to support any inferences about the impact of race on the 
exercise of discretion. 
Part II of Figure 10 presents the data based on comparative charg-
ing and sentencing rates for white- and minority-defendant cases after 
adjustment for offender culpability measured by the number of statu-
tory aggravating circumstances in the cases. Panel A presents the re-
sults for the major urban counties. Column A of these data reports a 
slightly higher penalty-trial rate (5 percentage points) in the minority-
defendant cases and a slightly lower minority death-sentencing rate 
(Column B), which combine to produce parity in the death-sentencing 
rate among all death-eligible cases (Column C). The 5-point disparity 
in the rates that cases advance to a penalty trial is consistent with a 
pattern and practice of disparate treatment, but the low magnitude of 
the disparity and its lack of statistical significance do not support that 
inference. 
Panel B presents the results for greater Nebraska. It shows, in 
Column A, a lower penalty-trial rate in the minority defendant cases 
and the number of minority-defendant cases that advanced to a pen-
224. See, for example, Columns Band C of Figure 8. 
H
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FIGURE 10 
RACE-OF-DEFENDANT DISPARITIES IN NEBRASKA'S CAPITAL CHARGING AND SENTENCING SYSTEM, 
CONTROLLING FOR WHETHER THE PROSECUTION IS IN A MAJOR URBAN COUNTY OR A COUNTY OF GREATER 
NEBRASKA: NEBRASKA, 1973-1999 
Part I. Proportion of Minority Defendants at Successive Stages in the Process 
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FIGURE 10 (CONTINUED) 
Part U. Minority-Defendant Disparities in Capital Charging and Sentencing Outcomes After Adjustment for the Number of 
Statutory Aggravating Circumstances in the Cases 
(the number in parenthesis above each set of bars is the average rate for all cases) 
A 
Rates at which Death-
Eligible Cases Advance 
to a Penalty Trial 
A. Major Urban Counties 
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lOne minority-defendant case included in Column A is excluded from Columns B and C because the sentencing court in his penalty trial case did not believe it 
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alty trial (n=l), thus making meaningful analysis of the sentencing 
decisions impossible. 
Figure 11 presents a more detailed analysis of prosecutorial deci-
sionmaking controlling for the place of prosecution. Column A, Part I 
indicates that without adjustment for defendant culpability, in the 
major urban counties, there is a I-percentage point minority-defen-
dant disparity. After controls for culpability are introduced, white de-
fendants appear to enjoy a slight advantage in three subgroups of 
cases (Columns B, C, and D). However, the effects are small, and in 
Columns C and D, the sample sizes are also small. If there were a 
significant minority-defendant effect in the major urban counties, it 
almost certainly would have appeared in the one-statutory aggravator 
cases with good sample size that are shown in Part I, Column B. 
For greater Nebraska, Column A, Part II shows an unadjusted dis-
parity that is consistent with disparate treatment favoring white de-
fendants. However, when controls for defendant culpability are 
introduced, the results are mixed, not significant, and the samples are 
very small. Therefore, in both areas ofthe state, the evidence does not 
support an inference of differential treatment on the basis of the race 
of the defendant. 
Figure 12 expands the major urban counties versus greater Ne-
braska analysis to embrace minority-defendant effects in the three 
key outcomes after adjustment for defendant culpability using regres-
sion-based culpability scales. Part I documents the minority-defen-
dant effects in the major urban counties. Figure 12, Part I shows no 
effects in the charging and plea bargaining decisions (Column B), a 
higher penalty trial death-sentencing rate for whites (Column C), and 
a comparable disparity among all death-eligible cases (Column D).225 
In greater Nebraska (Part II), white-defendants fared better in pen-
225. When we dis aggregate the data for the major counties and we compare Lancaster 
County with Douglas and Sarpy Counties combined, the sample sizes are small in 
Lancaster County. In each place, the adjusted disparity is a higher rate for white 
defendants and not statistically significant, i.e., 9 points (p=.38) in Douglas/Sarpy 
and 5 points (p=.47) in Lancaster County. 
The results of supplemental analysis in the major urban counties, using alter-
native measures of defendant culpability, were as follows: Concerning the impact 
of the race of the defendant on the rates that cases advance to penalty trial in the 
major urban counties, controlling for the number of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances in the cases, the minority-defendant disparity is 5 points (NS); 
controlling for the salient factors measure, the disparity is -7 points (NS). 
For the judicial death-sentencing rates in the major urban counties, control-
ling for the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the minority-
defendant disparity is -15 points (NS); controlling for the salient factors mea-
sure, the disparity is -9 points (p=.09). 
For death sentences imposed among all death-eligible cases in the major ur-
ban counties, controlling for the number of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances, the minority-defendant disparity is -7 points (NS); controlling for the 
salient factors measure, the disparity is -6 points (NS). 
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FIGURE 11 
MINORITY-DEFENDANT DISPARITIES IN THE RATES AT WHICH DEATH-ELIGIBLE CASES ADVANCE TO A PENALTY 
TRIAL, CONTROLLING FOR THE PLACE OF DECISION (MAJOR URBAN COUNTIES V. GREATER NEBRASKA) AND THE 
NUMBER OF AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE CASES: NEBRASKA, 1973-1999 
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All Cases Without Adjustment for 
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1 After adjustment for the number of statutory aggravating circumstances, the overall minority-defendant disparity was 5 percentage poinls (.62 - .57), significant at the .68 level. 
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FIGURE 12 
MINORITY-DEFENDANT DISPARITIES IN CHARGING AND SENTENCING 
DECISIONS IN MAJOR URBAN COUNTIES AND GREATER NEBRASKA, 
CONTROLLING FOR DEFENDANT CULPABILITY USING A 
REGRESSION-BASED SCALE 
(the bar indicates the penalty trial and death-sentencing rates after adjustment for 
culpability with a regression-based scale) 
ABC D 
Pan I. Major Urban Counties I 
Pan II. Greater Nebraska I 
Legend: 
Rates at which 
Death-Eligible 
Cases Advance to 
a Penalty Trial 
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D White-Defendant Cases D Minority-Defendant Cases 
I The sample sizes in Columns Band 0 may vary because cases are omitted from the adjusted analysis if there is not 
at least one case in each racial category (e.g., white v. minority defendants) for a given culpability level. 
, Because of the sparseness of the data in the adjusted analyses, the effects reported in Part 1, Column C and Part 11, 
Column C are unadjusted disparities. 
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alty trials (Column C), but there was only one minority defendant and 
the disparity is not statistically significant.226 None of the disparities 
in Figure 12 is statistically significant and none suggests a pattern 
and practice of more punitive treatment of minority defendants in ei-
ther area of the state. The results estimated with two other measures 
of defendant culpability are to the same effect. 
The weak minority-defendant disparities in both areas of the state 
suggest that the statewide race effects documented in prosecutorial 
decisionmaking are primarily a byproduct of the greater rate that 
cases advance to a penalty trial in the major urban counties. Specifi-
cally, 90% of the prosecutions against minority defendants, statewide, 
are conducted in the major urban counties.227 The foregoing demon-
strates, therefore, the risk of error that can arise when important and 
relevant variables are omitted from a quantitative analysis. 
If this explanation of the statewide race effects in prosecutorial 
decisionmaking documented in Figures 10, 11, and 12 is correct, it 
presents a classic example of Simpson's paradox. This paradox exists 
when a strong association between two variables, suggesting a causal 
relationship between them, is substantially reduced or reversed when 
the data are disaggregated on the basis of a third variable.228 Here 
we initially see strong statewide race disparities in prosecutorial 
charging and plea bargaining practices, but these perceived dispari-
ties virtually evaporate when we distinguish between and control for 
the differing practices of prosecutors in the major urban and other 
counties.229 The foregoing demonstrates, therefore, the risk of error 
226. The results of supplemental analysis in greater Nebraska using alternative mea-
sures of defendant culpability were as follows: Death-eligible cases in greater Ne-
braska involved only 5 minority defendants (compared to 45 in the major urban 
counties), and only one of these cases advanced to a penalty trial. For the rates 
that cases advance to penalty trials in greater Nebraska, controlling for the num-
ber of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the cases, the minority-defen-
dant disparity is -18 points (NS); controlling for the salient factors measure, the 
disparity is -7 points (NS). 
Because only one minority defendant case advanced to a penalty trial, we con-
ducted no further analyses of that outcome. 
For death sentences imposed among all death-eligible cases in greater Ne-
braska, controlling for the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, 
the minority-defendant disparity is -6 points (NS); controlling for the salient fac-
tors measure, the disparity is -1 point (NS). 
227. Figure 12 Parts I and II, Column B (dark bars) indicate a statewide total of 50 
(45+5) minority defendants with 45 prosecuted in the major urban counties. 
228. E.H. Simpson, The Interpretation of Interaction in Contingency Tables, B13 J. 
Roy. STAT. Soc. 238 (1951). 
229. A particularly striking and comparable example of Simpson's paradox is a study 
in the 1970s, which documented that, overall, women applicants to graduate pro-
grams at the University of California-Berkeley were rejected at a much higher 
rate than the male applicants. However, closer scrutiny revealed that the women 
tended to apply to the more selective departments (such as English and history) 
and the men tended to apply to the less selective departments (such as science 
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that can arise when important and relevant variables are omitted 
from a quantitative analysis. 
C. Evidence of Disparate Treatment Based on the Race of 
the Victim 
The race-of-victim issue applies only in the major urban counties. 
The reason is that a minority victim was present in only 16% (30/185) 
of the cases statewide and 93% (28/30) of those prosecutions took place 
in the major urban counties. Moreover, the three death sentences im-
posed in minority-victim cases were imposed in those counties. Ac-
cordingly, we limit our race-of-victim analysis to the major urban 
counties.23o 
Even though the sample of minority-victim cases is small, an as-
sessment of the issue is important for two reasons. First, it is the 
most commonly documented form of race discrimination in U.s. capi-
tal charging and sentencing systems. When race-of-victim discrimina-
tion does exist, it typically results in more punitive charging and 
sentencing outcomes in white victim cases. 
Second, the presence of race-of-victim discrimination in a system 
can bias downward estimates of minority-defendant disparities in 
analyses that do not also control for the race of the victim. The reason 
for such bias is that the vast majority of homicides in America are 
intra-racial vis-a.-vis the defendant and victim. This means that be-
cause defendants in most white victim cases are also white, the usual 
form of race-of-victim discrimination, which treats white victim cases 
more punitively, has the effect of enhancing death-sentencing rates in 
the white defendant cases, not because of the defendant's race but be-
cause of the victim's race. Also, since the defendant in most minority-
victim cases is a racial minority, race-of-victim discrimination biases 
downward the death-sentencing rate in the minority-defendant cases 
because the system treats minority-victim cases less punitively than it 
does white-victim cases.231 It is important, therefore, (a) to assess any 
and mathematics). When the study disaggregated the data by the department of 
application, the selection rate for female applicants was higher than it was for 
male applicants both in the individual departments and overall. Peter J. Bickel 
et. aI., Sex Bias in Graduate Admissions: Data from Berkeley, reprinted in STATIS-
TICS AND PuBLIC POLICY 113-30 (William B. Fairley & Frederick Mosteller eds., 
1977). 
230. The two minority-victim cases prosecuted in greater Nebraska involved white de-
fendants and neither advanced to a penalty trial. The race-of-victim analysis in 
the report of this research that we submitted to the Nebraska Commission on 
Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, supra note 1, differs somewhat from the 
analysis in this section because its focus is statewide rather than on the major 
urban counties. 
231. Research from Georgia in the 1970s clearly reflects this pattern. Those data doc-
umented substantial race-of-victim effects. As a result, the unadjusted data 
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evidence of race-of-victim discrimination in Nebraska's major urban 
counties and (b), if such disparities are found to exist, to estimate mi-
nority-defendant disparities after controlling for the race ofthe victim. 
In the major urban counties of Nebraska, the distribution of death-
eligible cases on the basis of the defendantivictim racial combination 
differs from the usual pattern in that nearly one-half of the minority-
defendant cases involved a white victim.232 However, there is evi-
dence of the usual pattern in which minority-victim cases are treated 
less punitively than white-victim cases, an outcome that reduced 
somewhat the overall death-sentencing rate in the black-defendant 
cases. However, the adjusted white-victim disparities are based on 
small samples and are not statistically significant. For that reason 
they do not support an inference of disparate treatment based on the 
race of the victim. 
Figure 13 presents the evidence. Part I documents the key charg-
ing and sentencing outcomes controlling for the defendantivictim ra-
cial combination, while Parts II and III report the unadjusted and 
adjusted white-victim disparities among all of the cases. The place to 
begin is Column C, Row 5, which indicates an overall death sentencing 
rate of .18 (20/112) among all death-eligible cases. Within Column C, 
a comparison of Rows 1 and 2 (minority defendants) with Rows 3 and 
4 (white defendants) documents higher death sentencing rates in the 
white-defendant cases than in the black-defendant cases, which is 
consistent with the race-of-defendant findings reported above.233 In 
addition, a comparison of Column C, Rows 1 and 2 reveals a partial 
explanation for the lower death-sentencing rate in the minority-defen-
dant cases, i.e., the .09 (2/23) rate in the minority-defendantiminority-
victim cases (Row 2) is one-half the .18 rate reported for the minority-
defendantiwhite-victim cases (Row 1).234 However, this unadjusted 9-
showed a considerably lower death-sentencing rate in the black-defendant cases 
than in white-defendant cases. EJDP, supra note 11, at 315, tbl. 50, n.l (among 
all death-eligible cases, the unadjusted death-sentencing rate for the white-de-
fendant cases was .10 versus .07 for the minority defendant cases). However, 
upon the introduction of controls for the race of the victim, black defendants faced 
only a slightly reduced risk of being sentenced to death, while a substantial 
white-victim effect persisted in the data. In a logistic regression analysis, which 
controlled for 39 non-racial variables, the black-defendant effect was slightly neg-
ative (an odds multiplier of .94, p.=.88), while the race-of-victim effect was 
strongly positive (an odds multiplier of 4.3, p.=.003). [d. at pp. 319-20, tbl. 52. 
232. 49% (22/45) of the minority-defendant cases involved a white victim, while only 
7% (5167) of the white-defendant cases had a minority victim. As noted above, we 
limit this analysis to the major urban counties of the state because only two 
white-victim cases were prosecuted in greater Nebraska. 
233. Supra subsection VII.B.3. 
234. lithe death sentencing rate in the minority-defendanUminority-victim cases had 
been the same as the rate in the minority-defendanUwhite-victim cases, the over-
all black-defendant death sentencing rate would have been .18 (8/45) instead of 
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percentage point white-victim disparity is based on small samples and 
is not statistically significant. 
Columns A and B of Part I document that the principal source of 
the less punitive treatment in the minority-defendantlminority-victim 
cases is the judicial death-sentencing decisions. Specifically, Row 2, 
Column A, indicates that these cases advanced to a penalty trial at 
only a slightly lower rate, .57, than the .60 overall average rate shown 
in Row 5. In contrast, Column B, Row 2, reports a judicial death-sen-
tencing rate of .15, which is only one-halfthe .30 overall rate shown in 
Row 5. It was the combined effects of these two outcomes that pro-
duced the .09 overall death-sentencing rate reported in Column C, 
Row 2 for the minority-defendantlminority-victim cases, which is one-
half the overall rate of .18 (20/112) shown in Row 5. 
Part II of Figure 13 presents the unadjusted white-victim dispari-
ties among all cases in the major urban counties. The results show 
weak race-of-victim effects (5 percentage points) in the prosecutorial 
decisions (Column A) and a slightly larger effect in the judicial deci-
sions (9 percentage points). The overall unadjusted white-victim dis-
parity among all death-eligible cases shown in Column C is 9 points 
and the ratio of the death-sentencing rates is 1.8 to 1 (.201.11). 
The adjusted race-of-victim effects shown in Part III of Figure 13 
tell a similar story. With the introduction of controls for offender cul-
pability, the white-victim disparity in the prosecutorial decisions is 7 
points (Column A). In the judicial decisions (Column B), the disparity 
is 13 points with a 1. 7 to 1 ratio (.31/.18). These results are consistent 
with a pattern and practice of disparate treatment based on the race 
of the victim. They are also consistent with a pattern of race-of-victim 
effects documented in many states.235 However, because of the small 
samples involved none of the disparities is statistically significant.236 
the actual rate of .13 (6/45), both of which are lower than the overall rate in the 
white defendant cases of .21 (14/67). 
235. Supra note 11. 
236. As is suggested by the data in Part I of Figure 13, race-of-victim effects are con-
centrated in the minority-defendant cases for which we have a sample of 45 cases 
that are almost evenly split between the white victim (n=22) and minority-victim 
(n=23) cases. The adjusted white-victim disparities in the rates that these cases 
advance to penalty trial are 7 points (.60 v .. 53) controlling for the number of 
aggravating circumstances in the cases and 19 points (.63 v . .44) controlling for 
the regression-based scale. Neither of these adjusted disparities is statistically 
significant. Nor are the adjusted white-victim disparities in the judicial death-
sentencing decisions statistically significant. Those disparities are 24 points (.33 
v .. 09) controlling for both the number of aggravating circumstances in the cases 
and the regression-based scale. For the death-sentencing rates among all death-
eligible cases, the disparities controlling for these two measures are 4 points (.12-
.08) and -3 points (.11-.14) respectively. 
For the white-defendant cases with only 5 minority victim cases, controlling 
for the two measures of offender culpability applied above, the adjusted dispari-
ties in the rates that cases advance to penalty trial are 3 points (.59-.56) and 13 
H
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FIGURE 13 
CHARGING AND SENTENCING OUTCOMES CONTROLLING FOR THE DEFENDANTNICTIM RACIAL COMBINATION 
(PART I) AND WHITE-VICTIM DISPARITIES (PARTS II & III) IN NEBRASKA'S MAJOR URBAN COUNTIES: 
NEBRASKA, 1973-1999 
Part I. Charging and Sentencing Outcomes Controlling for the Race of the Defendant and Victim 
A B C 
Rates at Which Death-Eligible Rates at Which Death Death-Sentencing Rates 
Cases Advance to a Sentences are Imposed in Among All 
Penalty Trial Penalty Trials Death Eligible Cases 
I. Minority Defendantl 
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FIGURE 13 (CONTINUED) 
Part II. Unadjusted White-Victim Disparities 
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For the bottom line of death sentencing among all death-eligible 
cases in the analysis (Column C), the disparity is only 3 points and the 
ratio of the rates declined to 1.2 to 1 (.19/.16).237 
We also estimated race-of-defendant effects in the major urban 
counties, controlling for the race-of-the victim. The results of those 
analyses, which are consistent with the data in Part I of Figure 13, 
revealed no significant minority-defendant effects in either charging 
or sentencing outcomes.238 
The data, therefore, do not support a finding that a pattern and 
practice of race-of-victim discrimination exists in either charging or 
sentencing decisions in the major urban counties. These results also 
indicate that the absence of data suggesting a pattern and practice of 
disparate treatment based on the race of the defendant is not an arti-
fact of a failure to control for the race-of-victim effects in the system. 
points (.59-.46) respectively; the adjusted disparities in the judicial death-sen-
tencing rates are 8 points (.33-.25) and 12 points (.34-.22); and the adjusted death 
sentencing disparity among all death-eligible cases are -5 points (.20-.25) and 8 
points (.21-.13) respectively. None of these disparities is statistically significant. 
237. Supplemental estimates computed with three alternative measures of defendant 
culpability reveal similar results with respect to both charging and sentencing 
decisions. Concerning race-of-victim effects in the rates that cases advance to 
penalty trial in the major urban counties, controlling for the number of aggravat-
ing circumstances, the white-victim disparity is 7 points (NS); controlling for the 
number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the cases, the white-vic-
tim disparity is 21 points (NS); controlling for the salient factors measure, the 
disparity is 14 points (NS). 
For the judicial death-sentencing rates in the major urban counties, control-
ling for the number of aggravating circumstances in the cases, the white-victim 
disparity is 18 points (NS); controlling for the number of aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances, the white-victim disparity is 24 points (NS); controlling for 
the salient factors measure, the disparity is 20 points (NS). 
For death sentences imposed among all death-eligible cases in the major ur-
ban counties, controlling for the number of aggravating circumstances in the 
cases, the white-victim disparity is 6 points (NS); controlling for the number of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the white-victim disparity is 14 points 
(NS); controlling for the salient factors measure, the disparity is 12 points (NS). 
238. Among the white-victim cases, there are 62 white defendants and 22 minority 
defendants. After adjustment for the number of aggravating circumstances in the 
cases and the regression-based scales, the adjusted minority-defendant dispari-
ties in the rates that cases advance to penalty trial are 3 points (.62-.59) and (.61-
.58) respectively. However, the adjusted minority-defendant disparities in the 
judicial sentencing decisions are mixed: +8 points (.41-.33) and -9 points (.25-.34). 
The adjusted minority-defendant disparities among all death-eligible cases are 
zero points (.20-.20) and -8 points (.14-.22) using the two measures of offender 
culpability referred to above, none of which is statistically significant. 
Among the minority-victim cases (n=28), the sample of white defendants (n=5) 
is too small to support a meaningful analysis. To the extent that adjusted dispar-
ities exist in these cases, if anything, they suggest more punitive treatment of the 
white defendants, although none of them is significant. 
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D. Evidence of Minority-DefendantlWhite-Victim Disparate 
Treatment 
Research in other jurisdictions and many legal practitioners sug-
gest that even if the data fail to support "main" race-of-defendant or 
race-of-victim effects in the system, one is likely to see a significant 
race effect when minorities cross the racial divide and kill whites. 
The data in Figure 14 test the hypothesis that minorities who kill 
whites are treated more punitively than are all other racial combina-
tions of defendants and victim. The unadjusted disparities in Part I, 
Column A support this hypothesis with respect to the prosecutorial 
charging decisions, i.e., a 16-percentage point higher penalty-trial rate 
for minority defendants with white victims. However, Column B 
shows no race effects in the sentencing decisions. The combined effect 
of these two decision points produces the 5-percentage point minority-
defendant/white-victim disparity among all death-eligible cases shown 
in Column C. 
The adjusted effects shown in Part II are comparable to the Part I 
results, except for the 13-point disparity shown in Column B; however, 
the bottom line in Column C shows no effect at all.239 These data, 
therefore, fail to support an inference of disparate treatment in judi-
cial sentencing decisions. Nevertheless, because the statewide results 
of the prosecutorial charging decisions (Part I, Column A) are consis-
tent with a pattern and practice of disparate treatment, we gave them 
closer scrutiny in Figures 15 and 16. 
The Figure 15 data-Part I (plea bargains) and Part II (advancing 
to penalty trial)-show more punitive effects for minority defendants 
with white victims. The disparities are primarily concentrated in the 
single aggravator category (Column B) where the disparities are large 
and statistically significant. 
239. The adjusted disparities computed with our supplemental measures of offender 
culpability are to the same effect. Concerning the impact of the defendantlvictim 
racial combination on the rates that cases advance to penalty trial, controlling for 
the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the cases, the state-
wide black-defendantlwhite-victim disparity is -2 points (NS); controlling for the 
salient factors measure, there is no disparity; controlling for the regression-based 
scale, the disparity is 7 points (p=.09). 
For the judicial death-sentencing rates, controlling for the number of aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances, the minority-defend antiwhite-victim dis-
parity is -14 points (NS); controlling for the salient factors measure, the disparity 
is 6 points (NS); controlling for the regression-based scale, the disparity is -3 
points (NS). 
For death sentences imposed among all death-eligible cases, controlling for 
the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the minority-defen-
dantlwhite-victim disparity is -4 points (NS); controlling for the salient factors 
measure, the disparity is 3 points (NS); controlling for the regression-based scale, 
the disparity is -4 points (NS). 
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FIGURE 14 
MINORITY-DEFENDANTIWHITE-VICTIM DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL 
CHARGING AND SENTENCING OUTCOMES: NEBRASKA, 1973-1999 
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FIGURE 15 
STATEWIDE MINORITY-DEFENDANT/WHITE-VICTIM DISPARITIES IN THE RATES AT WHICH DEATH-ELIGIBLE 
CASES (PART 1) TERMINATE IN A NEGOTIATED PLEAlWAIVER AND (PART II) ADVANCE TO A PENALTY TRIAL, 
CONTROLLING FOR THE NUMBER OF STATUTORY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE CASES: 
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Legend: c::::J Minority-DefendantlWhite-Victim Cases = Other Defendant Cases 
I The overall average minority-defendantlwhite-victim disparity controlling for the number of statutory aggravating circumstances is -19 percentage points 
(.29 - .48), significanl at the .06 level. 
2 The overall average disparity controlling for the number of statutory aggravating circumstances is +12 percentage points (.S8 - .46), significant at the .18 level. 
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Figure 16 introduces controls for the place of prosecution. In the 
major urban counties (Part I), there is a modest, but not significant, 
effect in the rates that minority-defendantJwhite-victim cases advance 
to a penalty trial (Column B) as well as in the penalty trial death-
sentencing rates (Column C).240 However, Column D indicates that 
after adjustment for defendant culpability in a scale based on an anal-
ysis of death sentences imposed among all death-eligible cases, the 
death-sentencing rate is lower for minority defendants in white-victim 
cases than it is for all other defendant!victim racial combinations.241 
The data for greater Nebraska (Part II) show minority-defendant! 
white-victim effects that are consistent with a theory of disparate 
treatment (Column D), but because of the small disparities based on 
very small samples, they fall well short of establishing a pattern and 
practice of differential treatment of similarly situated defendants.242 
240. When the comparison is between Douglas/Sarpy Counties and Lancaster County, 
the data indicate a 10 pt. non-significant (p=.44) disparity in Douglas/Sarpy with 
a higher penalty-trial rate in the minority-defendantlwhite-victim cases. In 
Douglas County, the rate for the minority defendants with white victims is 5 
points lower (p=.86). 
241. The disparities estimated with our supplemental measures of culpability, the re-
sults are comparable. Concerning the impact of the defendant-victim racial com-
bination on the rates that cases advance to penalty trial in major urban counties, 
controlling for the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the 
cases, the minority-defendantlwhite-vicitm disparity is -8 points (NS); control-
ling for the salient factors measure, the disparity is -17 points (NS); controlling 
for the regression-based scale, the disparity is +3 points (NS). For the judicial 
death-sentencing rates, controlling for the number of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, the minority-defendantlwhite-victim disparity in the major coun-
ties is -7 points (NS); controlling for the salient factors measure, the disparity is 
-6 points (p=.01); controlling for the regression-based scale, the disparity is -3 
points (NS). 
For death sentences imposed among all death-eligible cases, controlling for 
the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the minority-defen-
dantlwhite-victim disparity in the major urban counties is -6 points (NS); con-
trolling for the salient factors measure, the disparity is -5 points (NS); controlling 
for the regression-based scale, the disparity is -6 points (NS). 
242. The disparities estimated in greater Nebraska with controls for our supplemental 
measures of offender culpability are comparable. Note that there were four mi-
nority-defendantlwhite-victim cases, one of which advanced to a penalty trial, 
and resulted in a death sentence. Concerning the impact of the defendant-victim 
racial combination on the rates that cases advance to penalty trial in greater 
Nebraska, controlling for the number of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances in the cases, the minority-defend antiwhite-victim disparity in greater Ne-
braska is -18 points (NS); controlling for the salient factors measure, the 
disparity is -7 points (NS); controlling for the regression-based scale, the dispar-
ity is -9 points (NS). 
Because only one minority-defendantlwhite-victim case advanced to a penalty 
trial, we conducted no additional analyses of that outcome. 
For death sentences imposed among all death-eligible cases, controlling for 
the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the minority-defen-
dantlwhite-victim disparity in greater Nebraska is -7 points (NS); controlling for 
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FIGURE 16 
MINORITY-DEFENDANTIWHITE-VICTIM DISPARITIES IN CHARGING AND 
SENTENCING DECISIONS IN MAJOR URBAN COUNTIES AND GREATER 
NEBRASKA, CONTROLLING FOR DEFENDANT CULPABILITY WITH A 
REGRESSION-BASED SCALE: NEBRASKA, 1973-1999 
A 
Part I. Major Urban Counties' 
Part 11. Greater Nebraska' 
n= 
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Rates at which 
Death-Eligible 
Cases Advance to 
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Legend: 0 Minority-DefendantlWhite-Victim Cases 0 Other Cases 
I The unadjusted disparity is 21 percentage points - .50 (214) for the minority-defendantlwhite-victim cases v .. 29 
(20/68) for the "other cases." Twenty-four "other cases" were omitted from the adjusted analysis reported here 
because of an absence of minority-defendantlwhite-victim cases at the same level of CUlpability. 
the salient factors measure, the disparity is -2 points (NS); controlling for the 
regression-based scale, the disparity is 1 point (NS). 
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Our overall conclusion is that the minority-defendantlwhite-victim 
disparities in the statewide data are a byproduct of the fact that 85% 
(22/26) of the minority defendants with white victims are prosecuted 
in the major urban counties, which advance all cases to penalty trial 
at much higher rates than is the case in the counties of greater Ne-
braska. Just as it did in the analysis of the main minority defendant 
effects in statewide prosecutorial decisionmaking, the introduction of 
controls for the place of prosecution explains away the minority-defen-
dantlwhite-victim effect. 
Finally, what is a likely explanation for the failure of our findings 
to support an inference of a pattern and practice of disparate treat-
ment on the part of Nebraska's prosecutors and judges? One possibil-
ity is weak methodology and insufficient data on the cases. We 
consider this implausible because the same methodology has docu-
mented compelling evidence of disparate treatment in other jurisdic-
tions and it has produced striking evidence in this study of disparate 
treatment based on the SES of the victim. However, as noted earlier, 
the statistical methodology that we used cannot detect disparate 
treatment in a small number of cases. To detect disparate treatment 
there must be a quite strong pattern and practice of it across a sub-
stantial number of cases. 
Another possible explanation is that prosecutors and sentencing 
judges are sensitive to the danger of unconscious bias and make a con-
scious effort to treat cases evenhandedly. Race discrimination is 
widely perceived to be an important legal and political issue in capital 
sentencing and, at least with respect to race-of-defendant discrimina-
tion, the law on the issue is clear. A plausible explanation, therefore, 
is that the law has had a deterrent effect in controlling the impact of 
any bias, conscious or unconscious, that may have otherwise been re-
flected in the decisions. 
The results of this analysis stand in sharp contrast to data from 
Georgia and Philadelphia, which document race-of-defendant and 
race-of-victim effects in jury sentencing.243 The Nebraska results, 
therefore, support the Proffitt hypothesis that judicial sentencing is 
likely to be more principled and consistent than jury sentencing in 
capital cases. 
VIII. EVIDENCE OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT OF STATE LAW 
AND POLICY ON MINORITY DEFENDANTS 
The preceding analysis does not support a theory of disparate 
treatment in capital charging and sentencing decision making on the 
243. See EJDP, supra note 11 (detailing race-of-victim effects injury and prosecutorial 
decision making); Philadelphia Study, supra note 10 (detailing race-of-defendant 
and race-of-victim effects in jury sentencing decisions). 
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basis of the race of the defendant or victim. However, the impact of 
differential prosecutorial charging policies in the major urban coun-
ties and greater Nebraska presents a good example of an "adverse dis-
parate impact" on racial minorities statewide. The adverse impact 
exists even though there is no significant evidence of the disparate 
treatment of minorities within either the major urban counties or 
greater Nebraska. We consider those results in section A below. 
Also, among the 24 offenders who have been sentenced to death in 
Nebraska, in terms of the three such defendants from that group who 
have been executed to date, there is a disparity that adversely affects 
minority defendants. We consider those results in section B below. 
A. Evidence of a Statewide Disparate Impact on Minority 
Defendants in the Rates that Death-Eligible Cases 
Advance to Penalty Trial 
The data document a statewide adverse disparate impact on mi-
nority defendants that flows from a combination of three things: (1) 
state law, which delegates to local prosecutors broad discretion in the 
prosecution of death-eligible cases, (2) a significant difference between 
the major urban counties and the counties of greater Nebraska in the 
rates that prosecutors advance death-eligible cases to penalty trials, 
and (3) the fact that 90% of Nebraska's minority defendants in death-
eligible cases are prosecuted in the major urban counties of the state. 
Nebraska law and the law of all other states of which we are aware 
delegates extremely broad discretion to prosecutors in capital charg-
ing decisions.244 In Nebraska, as noted above, prosecutorial discre-
tion appears to be exercised without regard to charging practices in 
other counties. As a result, there is significant variation in the rates 
at which prosecutors advance cases to penalty tria1.245 
Most striking in this regard is the difference in those rates between 
the major urban counties and greater Nebraska in terms of the rates 
that the death penalty is waived and cases are advanced to penalty 
trials. For both outcomes, Figure 17 documents the unadjusted dis-
parities as well as the disparities computed after adjustment for of-
fender culpability. The bottom line is that after adjustment for 
offender culpability, Part II, Column B indicates that death-eligible 
defendants in the major urban counties are more than twice as likely 
(.58/.28) to advance to a penalty tria1.246 
244. There is precedent in the employment context for treating the impact of a discre-
tionary stage in a decisionmaking system as a source of disparate impact. See 
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 
245. Among the 31 counties with one or more death-eligible cases, the average pen-
alty-trial rate was .48 (89/185) ranging from .66 (48/73) to .0 (in 14 counties). 
246. The disparities estimated with our supplemental measures of offender culpability 
are to the same effect. Geographic disparities in prosecutorial charging and plea 
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FIGURE 17 
GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES IN THE RATES THAT CASES (A) TERMINATE 
IN A NEGOTIATED PLEA OR UNILATERAL WAIVER OF THE DEATH 
PENALTY AND (B) ADvANCE TO A PENALTY TRIAL: 
NEBRASKA, 1973-1999 
A 
Cases Terminated with a 
Negotiated Plea or 
Unilateral Waiver 
of the Death Penalty 





Cases Advanced to 
a Penalty Trial 
+28 pts.**** 
(113) 
Part II: After Adjustment for the Number of Aggravating Circumstances in the Cases' 
-32 ,,, ..... { 
.65 11 +30 pts.**** 1.58 
, ~ 
n= (113) (72) (107) (72) 
Legend: c:::::J Major Urban Counties c:::::J Greater Nebraska 
Level of Significance of Disparity: ****=.0001 
'See infra Figure 29, page 625, note 4 for an explanation of the disparity between the sample sizes 
in Column B, Parts I and II of this Figure. 
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The second relevant datum is that 90% (45/50) of the minority 
death-eligible defendants are prosecuted in Nebraska's major urban 
counties. Figure 18 documents the consequences of the interaction be-
tween (a) the higher penalty-trial rates in the major urban counties 
and (b) the disproportionate concentration of minority defendants in 
those counties. The result shown in Column B is a substantially 
higher penalty-trial rate in minority-defendant cases statewide, i.e., 
32% (14/44) higher without adjustment for defendant culpability (Part 
1) and 36% (16/44) higher when the rates are adjusted for defendant 
culpability (Part II). This adverse impact occurs in spite of the evi-
dence presented above suggesting a policy of evenhanded treatment of 
minority defendants in both areas of the state.247 
Figure 19 indicates that the disparate impact against minority de-
fendants is concentrated in the cases with one or two aggravating cir-
cumstances. The minority-defendant disparity among these cases is 
the principal source of the overall 14-point minority-defendant dispar-
ity shown in Column A of the figure. 248 
This adverse impact on minorities is analogous to the adverse im-
pact on minorities, noted above, that exists in states in which the level 
of expenditures for public education are almost solely within the dis-
cretion of local school boards and there is wide variation in the tax 
bases available to support public education. This often results in 
lower expenditures per pupil in predominately minority communities 
than in predominately white communities. 
Given the adverse impact of prosecutorial charging decisions on 
minorities, statewide, one could reasonably expect to see an adverse 
impact against minorities in the imposition of death sentences among 
all death-eligible cases. Indeed, if sentencing judges imposed death 
bargaining decisions are substantial after adjustment for all of our measures of 
defendant culpability. For the rates that cases result in a negotiated plea, con-
trolling for the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the cases, 
the disparity in rates between the major urban counties and greater Nebraska is 
-31 points (p=.OOOl); controlling for the salient factors measure, the disparity is 
-29 points (p=.OOOl); controlling for a regression-based scale, the disparity is -34 
points (p=.OOOl); in the logistic regression analysis in Table 4, Column C, the 
odds multiplier for the major urban county variable is .27 and statistically 
significant. 
Concerning the rates that cases advance to penalty trial, controlling for the 
number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the major urban county 
disparity is 31 points (p=.0002); controlling for the salient factors measure, the 
disparity is 31 points (p=.OOOl); controlling for the regression-based scale, the 
disparity is 32 points (p=.OOOl); in the logistic regression analysis in Table 4, 
Column E, the odds multiplier for the major urban county variable is 2.8 and 
statistically significant. 
247. Supra subsection VII.B.3. 
248. When the regression-based scale is used, the data document a similar effect con-
centration of disparities among the cases with weak and middling levels of 
culpability. 
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FIGURE 18 
STATEWIDE MINORITY-DEFENDANT DSPARITIES IN THE RATES THAT 
DEATH-ELIGIBLE CASES TERMINATE IN A NEGOTIABLE PLEA OR A 
UNILATERAL WAIVER OF THE DEATH PENALTY (COLUMN A) AND 
ADVANCE TO A PENALTY TRIAL (COLUMN B): NEBRASKA, 1973-1999 
A 
Cases Terminated with 
a Negotiated Plea or a 
Unilateral Waiver of 
the Death Penalty 
Part I: Without Adjustment for Defendant Culpability 
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FIGURE 19 
MINORITY-DEFENDANT DISPARITIES IN THE RATES THAT CASES ADVANCE TO A PENALTY TRIAL, CONTROLLING 
FOR THE NUMBER OF AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE CASES: NEBRASKA, 1973-1999 
(the numbers in the bars indicate the rates at which death-eligible cases advance to a penalty trial') 
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I After adjustment for the number of statutory aggravating circumstances, the overall white-defendant disparity was -15 percentage points 
(.44 - .59), significant at the .06 level. 
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sentences at comparable rates in white- and minority-defendant cases, 
this is exactly what one would see. However, as the data in Parts I 
and II of Figure 7 indicate, this does not occur. The reason it does not 
is that in spite of the more punitive treatment of the minority defend-
ants statewide (Column A), the penalty-trial judges sentence minority 
defendants to death at a lower rate than they do white defendants 
(Column B). The bottom line results for the state as a whole are 
shown in Column C. These data reveal only small, non-significant 
and inconsistent disparities on the order of 2 and 3 percentage points. 
These results clearly indicate that the race-of-defendant disparities in 
the rates that cases advance to penalty trial statewide do not produce 
a statewide adverse impact in the rates that death sentences are im-
posed among all death-eligible cases.249 
What then are the implications of the adverse impact on minorities 
flowing from the sharp disparities in the rates that death-eligible 
cases advance to penalty trial in the major urban counties as con-
trasted to greater Nebraska? Under existing law, the adverse impact 
raises no legal claim. But does it have moral implications? One view 
is that the adverse disparate impact on minority defendants is not a 
matter of moral concern because it is merely an anomaly resulting 
from the fact that racial minorities primarily reside in the state's ma-
jor urban areas. 
An alternative view is that the disparate impact is a matter of 
moral concern for two reasons. The first is that, notwithstanding its 
demographic origins, the adverse impact places a significant and dis-
proportionate burden on minority defendants.25o The second concern 
is that the breadth of discretion permitted prosecutors under state 
law, which is the legal source of the disparate impact, has not been 
justified in terms of necessity. One possible justification for existing 
law is a long tradition supporting the broad exercise of prosecutorial 
249. On the issue of geographic disparities in sentencing outcomes, we estimated simi-
lar results controlling for alternative measures of defendant culpability. Control-
ling for the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the cases, the 
major urban county disparity in judicial death-sentencing rates is 5 points (NS); 
controlling for the salient factors measure, there is no disparity; controlling for 
the regression-based scale, there is no disparity; in the logistic regression analy-
sis in Table 4, Column G, the odds multiplier for the major urban county variable 
is .95, and is not statistically significant. For death sentences imposed among all 
death-eligible cases, controlling for the number of aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances, the major urban county disparity is 9 points (NS); controlling for the 
salient factors measure, the disparity is 6 points (NS); controlling for the regres-
sion-based scale, the disparity is 4 points (NS). In the logistic regression analysis 
in Table 4, Column I, the odds multiplier for the major urban county variable is 
.93, and is not statistically significant. 
250. In employment and housing discrimination law, a substantial adverse disparate 
impact against a protected group will not stand unless it can be justified by a 
compelling business interest. 
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discretion in all cases. However, given the severity of the penalty of 
death and the consequences of advancing a case to a penalty trial, one 
can legitimately question whether the cost can be justified by tradition 
alone. 
Another possible justification for the disparate impact is the impor-
tance of penalty trials as a vehicle for delivering justice, i.e., death 
sentences in truly deathworthy cases. In this regard it is important to 
distinguish between cases involving a single aggravating circum-
stance and cases involving two or more aggravators. Figure 19 docu-
ments minority-defendant disparities in the rates that cases advance 
to a penalty trial, controlling for the number of aggravating circum-
stances in the cases. Column A reports an unadjusted disparity of 14 
percentage points in all cases, a population that includes 50 minority 
and 135 white defendants. Column B documents the disparity in the 
one-aggravator cases, which embrace 63% (116/185) ofthe death-eligi-
ble cases and 70% (35/50) of the minority-defendant cases. Among 
this substantial group of cases, there is a significant disparate impact 
that contributes substantially to the overall disparity reported in Col-
umnA. 
Figure 20 breaks down charging and sentencing outcomes by geog-
raphy and the number of aggravating circumstances in the cases. 
Part I presents the results for the major urban counties and Part II 
presents the data for greater Nebraska. The data in Column B pre-
sent the outcomes of the one-aggravator cases. Part II indicates that 
in greater Nebraska, 20% (8/41) of the single-aggravator cases ad-
vanced to penalty trial and none resulted in a death sentence. Part I 
indicates that in the major urban counties, 53% (40175) of the single-
aggravator death-eligible cases advanced to a penalty trial. But as is 
shown in Part I, Column B (darkest bar), only three of those 40 pen-
alty trials resulted in a death sentence, yielding a death-sentencing 
rate of 4% (3175). Moreover, each of those death sentences was re-
duced to a life sentence in the Nebraska courts.251 The one-ag-
gravator cases, which are a significant source of the disparate impact 
in the rates that cases advance to penalty trials, contribute, therefore, 
very little to the overall level of death penalty imposition in Nebraska 
as a whole and in the major urban counties. 
The data underlying Figure 19 indicate that there is also a signifi-
cant adverse impact among the 69 cases involving two or more aggra-
vating circumstances. Specifically, there is a 19-percentage point (.74-
.55) average minority-defendant disparate impact among those cases 
(not shown in Figure 19). However, there is a much stronger justifica-
tion for the adverse impact on minority defendants in these cases be-
251. Supra note 76. See infra note 413 for evidence of concern in the Nebraska Legis-
lature about the adverse disparate impact on minority defendants in the rates 
that similarly situated death-eligible cases advance to penalty trial. 
H
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FIGURE 20 
CHARGING AND SENTENCING OUTCOMES IN MAJOR URBAN COUNTIES AND GREATER NEBRASKA, CONTROLLING 
FOR THE NUMBER OF STATUTORY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE CASES: NEBRASKA, 1973-1999 
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cause they produce 90% (26/29) of the death sentences that are 
imposed statewide and 85% (17/20) of the death sentences imposed in 
the major urban counties (not shown in Figure 19). 
B. Evidence of an Adverse Impact on Minority Defendants 
in the Execution of Death-Sentenced Offenders 
Among the 24 Nebraska offenders sentenced to death from 1973 
through 1999, the data document a minority-defendant disparity in 
terms of the three defendants who have actually been executed. Spe-
cifically, the population of offenders sentenced to death consists of 7 
minorities and 17 whites, while the population of defendants actually 
executed consists of one white defendant (Joubert) and two minority 
defendants (Williams and Otey).252 
Figure 21 presents an overview of the minority defendant dispari-
ties in execution rates. The most striking statistic is shown in Part I, 
Column C: minority defendants constitute 67% (2/3) of the offenders 
who have been executed to date. When compared to their 33% (7/21) 
representation rate (Column A) among all defendants sentenced to 
death (who did not die on death row of natural causes), that statistic 
suggests that death-sentenced minority defendants face a higher risk 
of execution than do death-sentenced defendants who are white. 
We recognize the small numbers underlying these statistics, but in 
terms of public perceptions, executions are the most visible and impor-
tant outcome of the process. Of the three persons thus far executed, 
the two black defendants had white victims and the one white defen-
dant had two white victims.253 
In spite of the findings presented above, there is no compelling evi-
dence of disparate treatment on the basis of the race of the defendant 
or the victim in Nebraska's charging and sentencing system. One 
would never know it, however, on the basis of these three cases. 
Though they may fail as proof of racial discrimination, their symbolic 
force is substantial. The political salience of these two executions 
motivates us to assess the extent to which it reflects a pattern and 
practice of disparate treatment against minority offenders or dispa-
rate impact against minority offenders who have been sentenced to 
252. Four white offenders, Palmer, Moore, Ryan, and Lotter, remain on death row, 
and three white offenders died on death row of natural causes. The three white 
offenders on death row who died of natural causes are Harper, Perry, and Bjork-
lund. Unless otherwise indicated, as in Figure 23, these cases are excluded from 
the balance of this analysis. For the disposition of the death-sentenced cases 
without regard to race see supra Figure 1. 
253. In an October 2001 hearing on the findings of this research in the Judicial Com-
mittee of the Nebraska Legislature, Senator Ernie Chambers focused on that sta-
tistic as the most graphic evidence of what he believed to be the racist character 
of the Nebraska system of capital punishment. 
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FIGURE 21 
RACE-OF-DEFENDANT DISPARITIES IN EXECUTION RATES AMONG 
DEATH-SENTENCED OFFENDERS: NEBRASKA, 1973-19991 
Part I. Proportion of Minority Defendants at Successive Stages in the Post-Sentencing Process 
A B C 
Defendants Death Sentences that Defendants 
Sentenced Were Executed or Executed 
to Death Remain at 
Risk of Execution 
'.67 
~---------~---------(7121) (217) (2/3) 
Part II. Unadjusted Minority-Defendant Disparities in the Risk of Execution Among 
Death-Sentenced Offenders 
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Rates that Death-Sentenced 
Defendants Were Executed 
or Remain at Risk of Execution 
(.33) 
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Legend: c:::::J White-Defendant Cases c:::::J Minority-Defendant Cases 
'Three defendants, all white, who died of natural causes on death row (Harper, Perry, Bjorklund) are 
excluded from this Figure. The seven minorities sentenced to death were: Bird Head, Jones, Otcy, Reeves, 
Stewart, Victor, and Williams. Otey and Williams were executed. There are no minorities currently on 
death row. The fourteen white defendants sentenced to death, who did not die on death row of natural 
causes, were: Anderson, Drinkwalter, Hochstein, Holton, Hunt, Joubert, Lotter, Moore, Palmer, Rust, 
Ryan, Sheets, Simants, and Simpson. Of the whites sentenced to death, Joubert was executed and four 
remain on death row: Lotter, Moore, Palmer, and Ryan. 
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death. In this section, therefore, we seek to explain and understand 
why ofthe 7 minorities sentenced to death during the 25 year period of 
our study, two black offenders with white victims have been executed 
while, during the same period, of the 11 white offenders sentenced to 
death, only one was executed and he is widely considered to be the 
''worst of the worst" Nebraska offender during the entire period of this 
study.254 
Part I, Column B of Figure 21 indicates that if the focus shifts to 
death-sentenced offenders who have either been executed or remain at 
risk of execution on death row, the picture is quite different. Minori-
ties constitute 29% (2/7) of this group, a figure that is quite compara-
ble to the 33% (7/21) minorities among the whole pool of death-
sentenced offenders shown in Column A. However, two white death 
row members included in this tabulation have, by Nebraska stan-
dards, been on death row only a short while, thereby reducing the im-
minence of their risk of execution.255 Otey and Williams are the two 
minorities in this pool, as there are no minorities on death row from 
the period covered by this study.256 
Part II of Figure 21 presents the same data in terms of selection 
rates. Column A documents a 4.1 (.29/.07) times higher execution rate 
in the minority-defendant cases. While Column B indicates that, in 
terms of the rates that offenders were executed or remain at risk of 
execution, the rate is slightly lower for the minority offenders. 
There are several possible explanations for the minority-defendant 
disparity described above. The first is the offender's length of time on 
death row. Williams and Otey were on death row for a very long time: 
Otey for 16 years and Williams for 13 years. To put this theory in 
perspective, it is useful to compare them with white offenders who 
were on death row for comparable periods of time and avoided execu-
tion. For this purpose, we focus on the white offenders who were sen-
tenced to death in 10-year periods before and after Otey and Williams 
were sentenced, but have not been executed. In the earlier 10-year 
period, two death sentences were imposed against white offenders 
who remained on death row for many years, i.e., Rust (19 years) and 
Holton (13 years). In the 10 years after Otey and Williams went to 
death row, they were joined by eight white offenders, who also spent 
254. The black offenders are Otey (who raped and murdered a woman), executed Sep-
tember 1994, and Williams (who murdered two women, one of whom he raped), 
executed December 1997. State v. Otey, 205 Neb. 90, 287 N.W.2d 36 (1979); 
State v. Williams, 205 Neb. 56, 287 N.W.2d 18 (1979). The white offender is 
Joubert (who methodically murdered two children), executed July 1996. State v. 
Joubert, 224 Neb. 411, 399 N.W.2d 237 (1986). 
255. Lotter has been there about 7 years and Ryan has been there about 15 years. The 
other whites are long-time death row inmates-Moore (21 years) and Palmer (21 
years). 
256. Nor have any racial. minorities been sentenced to death since January 2000. 
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long periods of time there, i.e., Anderson (22 years), Hochstein (22 
years), Palmer (21 years), and Moore (21 years).257 It is clear, there-
fore, that years on death row alone does not explain why Otey and 
Williams were executed while none of the white offenders were. 
What then distinguishes the white offenders, with many years on 
death row, from Otey and Williams? The short answer is judicial re-
lief in the Nebraska Supreme Court or the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals. A significant proportion ofthe white offenders got such relief 
while Otey and Williams did not. 
Relief from either the Nebraska Supreme Court or the Eighth Cir-
cuit may have two consequences relevant to avoiding execution. If, on 
remand, another death sentence is imposed, the offender's clock for 
filing appeals starts anew. This re-start extends his time on death 
row, with a greatly diminished risk of execution for many years. If, on 
remand, the offender is sentenced to life imprisonment or less, he 
leaves death row altogether. The white offenders with whom we are 
comparing Otey and Williams were very successful on both of these 
fronts. 258 In contrast, Otey and Williams were completely unsuccess-
ful at the first step of obtaining any form of judicial relief. Their 
"clocks" for filing appeals were never re-set. As a result, their cases 
moved steadily along toward execution. 
The question, therefore, is how likely it is that the race of the de-
fendant played a role in Otey's and Williams' failure to secure any 
form of judicial relief. One possibility is that unconscious bias in the 
courts affected their cases. To address this question, we first computed 
unadjusted race-of-defendant disparities in appellate outcomes in the 
Nebraska Supreme Court and in the Eighth Circuit, which are 
presented in Figure 22. The Part I results are based on the outcomes 
for both courts, while Parts II and III present separate results for the 
two courts. The samples are quite small, but they suggest that in gen-
eral minority defendants do better than white defendants on appeal 
(Part I), particularly in the Nebraska Supreme Court (Part II). 
257. In this later period, two minorities (Jones and Reeves) were sentenced to death. 
Jones's sentence was remanded by the Nebraska Supreme Court, State v. Jones, 
213 Neb. 1, 328 N.W.2d 166 (1982), and he was later sentenced to life; Reeves 
remained on death row for 20 years before having his sentence remanded by the 
Nebraska Supreme Court, State v. Reeves, 216 Neb. 206, 344 N.W.2d 433 (1984), 
followed by a prosecutorial waiver of his death sentence. 
258. Anderson, Hochstein, Palmer, and Moore obtained new trials in which new death 
sentences were imposed. Anderson v. Hopkins, 113 F.3d 825 (8th Cir. 1997); 
Hochstein v. Hopkins, 113 F.3d 143 (8th Cir. 1997); Palmer v. Grammer, 863 
F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1988); Moore v. Kinney, 119 F.Supp. 2d 1022 (D. Neb. 2000). 
Rust and Holtan received life sentences on remand. State v. Rust, Docket 91, 
Page 555, p. 28 (Douglas Co. Dist. Ct. 1994); State v. Holtan, Docket 92, No. 634, 
p. 20 (Douglas Co. Dist. Ct. 1989). Anderson and Hochstein ultimately had their 
sentences reduced to life by the Nebraska Supreme Court. State v. Anderson & 
Hochstein (II), 262 Neb. 311, 632 N.W.2d 273 (2001). 
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FIGURE 22 
UNADJUSTED MINORITY-DEFENDANT DISPARITIES IN THE RATES THAT 
DEATH SENTENCES ARE REVERSEDN ACATED IN JUDICIAL REVIEW: 
NEBRASKA, 1973-19991 
(the number in parenthesis above each pair of bars is the average of all cases) 






Part II: Sentences Vacated/Convictions Reversed in the Nebraska Supreme Court on 
Direct Appeal in Post-Conviction Proceedings or in the Trial Court3 
(.48) 





Part III: Rate That Sentences Are Vacated/Convictions Reversed in the 8'h Circuit Federal 
Court of Appeals' 
(.54) 
-27 piS . 
. 60 
(6/10) (113) 
Legend: c::::::::J White Defendants c::::::::J Minority Defendants 
I The unit of observation in this Figure is death sentences imposed (0=29) rather than death-sentenced 
offenders (0=24). Three offenders received two death sentences (Anderson. Hochstein, and Moore) and 
one (Palmer) received three. 
2 White defendants Anderson and Hochstein obtained relief in both state and federal court as did minority 
defendant Reeves. 
J Eight white defendants with death sentences reversed/vacated in the Nebraska Supreme Court are: 
Simams. Hunt. SheelS. Drinkwaller. Palmer (I). Palmer (II). Hochstein (II). and Anderson (II). This 
tabulation also includes a ninth white defendant, Simpson, whose sentence was vacated in the trial court on 
the grounds of mental retardation. The thirteen white defendants denied relief in the Nebraska Supreme 
Court are Palmer (III). Moore (I). Moore (II). Ryan. Lotter. Harper. Perry. Bjorklund. Anderson (I). 
Hochstein (I). Hollon. RUSI. and Joubert. 
The five minOrity defendants with sentences vacated in the Nebraska Supreme Court are Stewart. 
Bird Head. Reeves. Victor. and Jones. The two minority offenders denied relief are Otey and Williams. 
who have been executed. 
4 Part III is limited to cases that have been reviewed by the Eighth Circuit. The six white defendants with 
sentences vacated are: Holtan. Rusi. Anderson (I). Hochslein (I). Moore (I). and Moore (II). The four white 
defendanlS denied relief are Joubert. Harper. Ryan. and Palmer (III). The one minority defendant granted 
relief was Reeves (who later also obtained relief in the Nebraska Supreme Court); Otey and Williams were 
denied relief and executed. 
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It is in federal court (Part III) that minorities do less well. The 30-
percentage point minority-defendant disparity is consistent with dis-
parate treatment, but the sample sizes are too small to support such 
an inference even if all of the cases were factually and legally identical 
and had equally competent counsel. Of course, the cases are not iden-
tical and we lack the capacity to compute adjusted disparities holding 
constant many legitimate case characteristics (e.g., the law, the facts 
of the cases, and the trial court decisions that underlie the appellate 
claims) that normally determine appellate outcomes. 
However, there is one possibly relevant characteristic for which we 
do have data-the culpability of the offender. The literature and prac-
titioners suggest that offender culpability is often a factor in appellate 
decisions.259 We see a similar effect in the Nebraska data with the 
most highly aggravated death-sentenced cases being less likely to pre-
vail on appeal and ultimately less likely to avoid the risk of execu-
tion.260 When we adjust the race disparities in Figure 22 for offender 
culpability, the race disparities are reduced. Moreover, the facts of 
Otey and Williams could appear to the court as particularly aggra-
vated-violent rape murders. (The same can be said of the Joubert 
case with two child victims).261 In contrast, the culpability levels of 
white-defendant cases with which we are comparing Otey and Wil-
liams could be perceived as somewhat less severe.262 
259. See, e.g., EJDP, supra note 11, at 214, tbl. 46 (reporting that on a six-level culpa-
bility scale, the reversal rate of death sentences on procedural grounds in the 
Georgia Supreme Court during the 1970s was .39 (7/18) among the two least ag-
gravated levels and .22 (8/36) among the two most aggravated levels); JAMES S. 
LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II: WHY THERE IS So MUCH ERROR IN 
CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT ii, 183, 320 (2002), available at 
http://www.law.columbia.edulbrokensystem2 (finding that at the federal habeas 
stage, for each additional aggravating factor, the reversal rate drops by 15%). 
260. We classified the cases in terms of culpability with a four-level culpability scale 
based on a logistic regression model. The following statistics indicate the dispar-
ity in rates between the most aggravated level of cases and the three less aggra-
vated levels of death-sentenced cases: obtaining judicial relief in state or federal 
court (.50 [7/14] v .. 75 [9/12]); obtaining relief in the Nebraska Supreme Court 
(.29 [4/14] v .. 53 [8/15]); avoiding the risk of execution completely (.46 [6/13] v .. 82 
[9/11]). 
261. When State v. Otey, 205 Neb. 90, 287 N.W.2d. 36 (1979), and State v. Williams, 
205 Neb. 56, 287 N.W.2d. 18 (1979), are viewed in the context of other rape mur-
der and multiple victim cases, their distinctive level of aggravation is less obvi-
ous. See infra Appendix D, Categories G.1 (includes rape murders) and D.1 
(includes multiple victim cases). 
262. State v. Moore (I), 210 Neb. 457, 316 N.W.2d 33 (1982) (finding defendant robbed 
and shot two victims on two separate occasions who were older cab drivers re-
sponding to defendant's request for pickup); State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 313 
N.W.2d 648 (1981) (finding defendant beat and strangled his victim-pawn dealer 
who purchased coins and silver from the defendant in the past); State v. Ander-
son & Hochstein (I), 207 Neb. 51, 296 N.W.2d 440 (1980) (finding defendant paid 
another $1,500 to kill defendant's boss because defendant was dissatisfied with 
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To explore further the possible impact of race in the ultimate dispo-
sition of death-sentenced cases, we estimated race-of-defendant dis-
parities in the rates that offenders who obtained judicial relief on 
appeal were ultimately able to obtain complete relief from the risk of 
execution and leave death row with a sentence of life imprisonment or 
less. 
Complete relief from the risk of execution was obtained in two 
ways. In a few cases, after the Nebraska Supreme Court vacated the 
death sentence, it proceeded to reduce the sentence to life imprison-
ment thereby removing the offender from death row.263 More com-
monly, complete relief was obtained on remand through an acquittal, 
a prosecutorial decision to drop charges or waive the death penalty, or 
a penalty-trial life sentence.264 
Figure 23 presents unadjusted race disparities in the rates that 
death-sentenced offenders have avoided the risk of a death sentence 
and left death row alive. Part I embraces all of those decisions, while 
Part II is limited to prosecutorial and judicial decisions on remand 
that removed the offender from death row. In each analysis, minority 
offenders have been more successful in avoiding the risk of execution. 
The data suggest that the minority-defendant disparity in the ac-
tual execution rate (two of the three offenders thus far executed were 
black defendants with white vicims) reflects the failure of Otey and 
his working conditions); State v. Holtan, 197 Neb. 544, 250 N.W.2d 876 (1977) 
(finding defendant robbed a bar at gunpoint and shot victim after herding the 
victim and others into the bathroom where they were tied up by the eventual 
victim); State v. Rust, 197 Neb. 528, 250 N.W.2d 867 (1977) (finding defendant 
and others robbed a grocery store, and during a pursuit by police, defendant 
killed a civilian who came to the assistance of the pursuing police). 
263. Examples are State u. Anderson & Hochstein (II), 262 Neb. 311, 632 N.W.2d 273 
(2001), State u. Victor, 259 Neb. 894, 612 N.W.2d. 513 (2000), and State u. Stew-
art, 197 Neb. 497, 250 N.W.2d 849 (1977). We also include in the analysis one 
case, State u. Simpson, 200 Neb. 823, 265 N.W.2d 681 (1978), in which final relief 
from the death sentence was granted by the trial court before an appeal was 
taken to the Nebraska Supreme Court. 
264. Examples are Simants (found not guilty by reason of insanity on retrial); Sheets 
(The Nebraska Supreme Court vacated Sheets' conviction on hearsay grounds be-
cause a taped statement of a co-perpetrator implicating Sheets, which the co-
perpetrator had given to the police in exchange for a waiver of the death penalty 
in his case, was played to the jury in Sheets' trial after the co-perpetrator had 
committed suicide thereby denying Sheets an opportunity to cross examine him. 
Without the taped statement, the prosecutor believed the case against Sheets 
was too weak to take to ajury and dismissed the charges, whereupon Sheets was 
released from death row, a free man. Scot Bauer, Nebraska Death-Row Inmate 
Set Free, THE GRAND ISLAND INDEPENDENT (Neb.), June 13, 2001, at http:// 
www.theindependent.comlstories!061301!new_deathrow13.html); Reeves and 
Drinkwalter (death sentence waived); and Jones, Bird Head, Holton, and Rust 
(resentenced to life imprisonment). As noted above, supra note 258, on remand 
the following were resentenced to death: Anderson and Hochstein (I), Moore (I), 
Palmer (I), and Palmer (II). 
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FIGURE 23 
UNADJUSTED MINORITY-DEFENDANT DISPARITIES IN THE RATES THAT 
DEATH-SENTENCED DEFENDANTS AVOID THE RISK OF EXECUTION: 
NEBRASKA, 1973-19991 
(the number in parenthesis above each pair of bars is the average rate for all cases) 




Part II: The Risk of Execution Avoided Through Prosecutorial and Judicial Sentencing 






Legend: c::J White Defendants c::J Minority Defendants 
'The unit of observation in this Figure is the death-sentenced offender regardless of how many death 
sentences were imposed in his case. Three white defendants who died on death row of natural causes are 
excluded from the Figure. 
2Death-sentenced whites who avoided the risk of execution are Holtan, Rust, Anderson, Hochstein, 
Simpson, Simants, Sheets, and Drinkwalter. Whites who did not avoid risk of execution are: Joubert 
(executed) and Ryan, Moore, Lotter, and Palmer (on death row). Death-sentenced minorities who avoided 
the risk of execution are Stewart, Victor, Jones, Bird Head, and Reeves. Otey and Williams were executed. 
Of the fourteen defendants who avoided execution, the Nebraska Supreme Court reduced the sentence to 
life in four cases: Stewart, Anderson, Hochstein, and Victor. A trial court set the sentence to life as to 
Simpson. 
3ln nine cases, the risk of execution was avoided by a prosecutorial charging or judicial sentencing 
decision on remand from a Nebraska Supreme Court or federal court decision reversing the conviction or 
vacating the death sentence: Simants, Hunt, Jones, Sheets, Drinkwalter, Bird Head, Reeves, Holton, and 
Rust. 
HeinOnline -- 81 Neb. L. Rev. 607 2002-2003
2002] ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY 607 
Williams to obtain judicial relief that would have slowed down their 
movement toward execution or have resulted in remands that may 
have taken them off death row entirely. We find no race-of-defendant 
disparities in the appellate decisions of the Nebraska Supreme Court 
or in the charging and sentencing decisions of Nebraska prosecutors 
and sentencing judges in the cases that are remanded by the courts. 
The rate of success in federal courts is associated with the race of the 
defendant, but because of the small samples and the lack of controls 
for many legitimate case characteristics, the data do not support an 
inference of bias in the Eighth Circuit. It also appears that offender 
culpability may have contributed to Otey's and Williams' lack of suc-
cess in federal court. One, therefore, can plausibly characterize the 
disparity as an adverse impact of an unpredictable discretionary pro-
cess that performs a vital criminal justice function in reducing the risk 
of error and arbitrariness in the system. From this perspective, the 
adverse impact would be clearly justified. 
Finally, it is useful to consider how likely it is, as the years go by, 
that the minority disparate impact in the rate of actual executions 
(among the 21 offenders sentenced during the period of our study) will 
persist, diminish, evaporate, or reverse. The foregoing analysis indi-
cates that this will depend on the outcomes of judicial appeals and 
possible remand and commutation decisions for the four white offend-
ers currently on death row. (As noted above, there are no minorities 
on death row for the period covered by this study or otherwise.) 
If one of the four white offenders currently on death row is exe-
cuted, the comparative execution rates will be .29 (2/7) for minorities 
versus .14 (2/14) for whites (a +15 point disparity). If two of the white 
offenders on death row are executed, the disparity will be +8 points 
(.29-.21); if three are executed, there will be no disparity (.29-29); and 
if all four are executed, there will be a -7 point disparity (.29-.36). 
PARTD 
IX. EVIDENCE OF DISPARATE TREATMENT IN CHARGING 
AND SENTENCING OUTCOMES BASED ON THE 
SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS (SES) OF THE 
DEFENDANT AND VICTIM 
We measure the socioeconomic status of defendants and victims in 
terms of their occupations. There is a substantial literature on the 
importance of different occupations and the prestige associated with 
each.265 For this analysis, we drew on the results of a nationwide 1989 
opinion poll that asked a "representative sample of non-institutional-
265. The literature is summarized well in Keiko Nakao & Judith Treas, Updating Oc-
cupation Prestige and Socioeconomic Scores: How the New Measures Measure Up, 
in 24 SOCIOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY 1-72 (Peter V. Marsden ed., 1994). 
HeinOnline -- 81 Neb. L. Rev. 608 2002-2003
608 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:486 
ized adults to evaluate the prestige of occupational titles."266 We used 
these scores to rank-order the occupations reported in our case records 
for defendants and victims and created a three-level scale of high, 
middle, and low SES for each.267 
A. Defendant SES 
The statewide data document no significant disparities in charging 
and sentencing outcomes on the basis of the SES of the defendant. 
That is, there is no evidence that defendants are treated differently 
because of their SES. Nor are such effects apparent when we focus 
separately on the major urban counties and greater Nebraska.26B 
B. Victim SES 
266. [d. at 5. The scores are reported at id. at 42-69. Sociologists also use prestige 
scores to estimate a "socio-economic index" (SEI) by regressing the prestige scores 
on the education and income levels of the people who are employed in the differ-
ent occupations. These scores appear to be the preferred measures in sociological 
studies of "occupational mobility and related process of status allocation" because 
they are better predictors of these outcomes than are the unadjusted prestige 
scores. David L. Featherman & Robert M. Hauser, Prestige or Socioeconomic 
Scales in the Study of Occupational Achieument, in 4 SOCIOLOGICAL METHODS & 
RESEARCH 403, 405 (1976). However, we believe that the unadjusted prestige 
scores are more relevant to our research because they reflect the perceived "stan-
dard of living, power and influence over other people, level of qualifications, and 
the value to society" of people in different occupations. [d. at 404. 
267. Although we obtained a prestige score for each victim, we were guided in our 
three-level classification by the codes for Questions 50 (defendants) and 82 (vic-
tims) in the DCI, which were as follows: High SES: Professional and Managerial 
(professional [doctor, lawyer, etc.], executive or business person, small business 
person or farmer [other than farm worker], judge, legislator, government official, 
and military officer); Law Enforcement and Military (police officer and military 
officer), and Government Officer; Middle SES: White-Collar (office worker, apart-
mentlhotel manager, store manager, secretary, government employee), Misc. (ju-
venile, student, retired persons, homemaker, supported by family, disabled), 
Enlisted Military Personnel; and Low SES: Blue-collar and unskilled laborers 
including farm workers, Service Workers (including security guard, store clerk, 
service station attendant, waiter, waitress, domestic, custodian, etc.), Unstable or 
Extralegal (including drifter, professional criminal (organized crime), prostitute 
or pimp, individual criminal (e.g., thief), drug dealer, sporadic odd jobs, no partic-
ular skill, chronically unemployed (including recipient of public assistance)). 
268. There were five high SES defendants. One of them advanced to a penalty trial 
and received a life sentence, for an overall death-sentencing rate among high SES 
death-eligible offenders of .00 (0/5). The comparable rate for the mid-range SES 
defendants was .32 (7/22). However, the rate for low SES defendants was .14 (201 
145). The comparison oflow SES defendants versus all others showed no signifi-
cant effects before or after adjustment for defendant culpability. The number of 
high SES defendants was too small to support a meaningful analysis of high SES 
offenders versus others. 
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1. Statewide Disparities 
A "high victim SES effect" means there is a greater risk of a pen-
alty trial and death sentence for the defendant when his or her victim 
has high SES. A "low victim SES effect" means there is a reduced risk 
of a penalty trial and death sentence when the victim has low SES. 
The statewide data document disparities in charging and sentenc-
ing outcomes based on the SES of the victim both before and after 
adjustment for defendant culpability. The evidence of both high and 
low victim SES effect appears throughout the state. 
Part I of Figure 24 presents adjusted data on the statewide impact 
of victim SES, while controlling for the number of aggravating circum-
stances in the cases.269 Column A indicates the impact on the rates 
that death-eligible cases advance to a penalty trial, while Columns B 
and C indicate the impact on penalty trial death-sentencing rates and 
death-sentencing rates among all death-eligible cases. In each column 
the incremental increase in the relevant rate is indicated. For exam-
ple, Column C indicates that for death-sentencing rates among all 
death-eligible cases, the disparity between the low and middle victim 
SES categories is 10-percentage points, a ratio of 3.0 (.15/.05), and 
that the disparity between the middle and high victim SES categories 
is 13-percentage points, a ratio of 1.9 (.28/.15). The death-sentencing 
rate in the high victim SES cases is 5.6 (.28/.05) times higher than it is 
in the low victim SES cases. In each column the association between 
the outcome variable and three victim SES levels is statistically sig-
nificant at the .01 level or higher. 
The practical significance of victim SES in the system is suggested 
by a comparison of the data in Part I of Figure 24 with the data in 
Part II of the figure, which document the impact that the number of 
statutory aggravating circumstances has on charging and sentencing 
outcomes.270 The comparison indicates that the impact on charging 
and sentencing outcomes of each increment in victim SES level 
(shown in Part I) is quite comparable to the impact of each additional 
statutory aggravating circumstance in the case (shown in Part II). 
The practical importance of victim SES is also reflected in the re-
gression models in Table 4 (Row 2.d)271; it is useful here to compare 
the regression coefficient for victim SES with the coefficient for the 
number of statutory aggravating circumstances in the two models for 
prosecutorial decisionmaking (Columns B to E). The coefficients for 
victim SES (disregarding the sign of the coefficient) range from .59 to 
.72, while the coefficients for the number of aggravating circum-
269. These data are comparable to those presented in Figure 19, Column A, but after 
adjustment for defendant culpability. 
270. These data are drawn from Figure 3 supra. 
271. See Table 4 supra p. 553. 
H
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FIGURE 24 
VICTIM SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS (SES) EFFECTS IN CHARGING AND SENTENCING OUTCOMES, CONTROLLING 
FOR THE NUMBER OF STATUTORY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE CASES: NEBRASKA, 1973-1999 
(the bars indicate the death-sentencing rate in each subgroup of cases adjusted for the number of aggravators in the cases) 
PART I: THE IMPACT OF VICTIM SES ON CHARGING AND SENTENCING OUTCOMES 
n= 
A 
Rates at which Death-
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Rates that Death 
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in Penalty Trials2 




Rates Among All 
Death-Eligible Cases3 
(91) (66) (23) 
Legend: c:::t Low SES Victim c::J Middle SES Victim ,.1 High SES Victim 
'The victim SES effects are significant at the .002 level after adjusunent for defendant culpability. 
2 The victim SES effects are significant at the .01 level after adjustment for defendant culpability. 
3 The victim SES effects are significant at the .001 level after adjusunent for defendant culpability. 
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FIGURE 24 (CONTINUED) 
PART II: THE IMPACf OF THE NUMBER OF STATUTORY AGGRA VA TING CIRCUMSTANCES ON CHARGING AND SENTENCING OUTCOMES 
n= 
A 
Rates at Which Death-Eligible Cases 
Advance to a Penalty Trial by the 
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stances in Row 1a range from .51 to .72. This suggests that each 
change in victim SES had an impact on prosecutorial decisionmaking 
that was comparable to the impact of each additional statutory aggra-
vating circumstance in the cases.272 
Figures 25 and 26 present statewide data on the impact of high 
and low victim SES before and after adjustment for the number of 
statutory aggravators in the cases. Figure 25 presents the data on 
victims with high SES. Part I, Column A reports an unadjusted dis-
parity of 17 percentage points. The effects are almost exclusively con-
centrated in the two-aggravator cases (Column C), where the room for 
the exercise of discretion is broad. 
Part II offers a picture of the impact of high victim SES on (1) the 
rates cases advance to a penalty trial (Column A), (2) judicial sentenc-
ing decisions (Column B), and (3) death-sentencing among all death-
eligible cases, after adjustment for the number of aggravating circum-
stances in the cases (Column C). The data indicate statewide victim 
SES effects in both charging decisions (Column A shows 28 percentage 
points) and sentencing decisions (Column B shows 23 percentage 
points). It is the presence of disparities at both of these decision 
points that produces the overall20-point impact among all death-eligi-
ble cases shown in Part II, Column C. 
Figure 26 presents a comparable analysis oflow victim SES dispar-
ities, a category of cases in which eight death sentences were imposed. 
Part I (Column A) indicates an unadjusted -12-percentage point dis-
parity in death-sentencing rates among all death-eligible cases, while 
footnote 2 reports a statistically significant -15-percentage point dis-
parity after adjustment for the number of aggravating circumstances 
in the cases. Columns C and D identify the two- and three-aggravator 
cases as the principal types of cases in which these disparities appear. 
Part II of Figure 26 indicates that the disparities appear in both 
the prosecutorial charging (Column A) and judicial sentencing deci-
sions (Column B), which combine to produce the -14-percentage point 
impact among all death-eligible cases (Column C).273 The data also 
document that the disparities are concentrated in the cases involving 
one and two statutory aggravating circumstances. 
We estimated the impact of victim SES with a variety of measures 
of defendant culpability. The results show a pattern of statewide 
272. A similar analysis of judicial sentencing decisions (Columns F and G) reveals a 
statistically significant victim SES coefficient, but the magnitude of the victim 
SES variable is only 41% 0.212.9) of the size of the coefficient for the number of 
aggravating circumstances in the cases. 
273. In the analysis of minority-defendant effects, the disparities appeared in the 
prosecutorial decisions but not in the judicial sentencing decisions. 
H
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FIGURE 25 
STATEWIDE HIGH VICTIM SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS (SES) DISPARITIES IN CHARGING AND SENTENCING 
OUTCOMES, CONTROLLING FOR THE NUMBER OF STATUTORY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE CASES: 
NEBRASKA, 1973-1999 
Part I. High Victim SES Effects in Death-Sentencing Rates Among All Death-Eligible Cases. Controlling for the Number of 
Statutory Aggravating Circumstances (Columns B to E) 
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FIGURE 26 
STATEWIDE Low VICTIM SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS (SES) DISPARITIES IN CHARGING AND SENTENCING 
OUTCOMES, CONTROLLING FOR THE NUMBER OF STATUTORY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE CASES: 
NEBRASKA, 1973-1999 
Part I. Low Victim SES Disparities in Death-Sentencing Rates Among All Death-Eligible Cases· 
A 
All Cases Without Adjustment for 
Defendant Culpability 
-12 Pts.*-{c-=---M 
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Part II. Overall Low Victim SES Disparities in Charging and Sentencing Outcomes After Adjustment for the Number of Aggravators 
in the Cases2 ABC
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Legend: = Victim with Low SES c:::J Other Victim Cases 
I The one case difference between the number of low victim SES cases in Part I. Column A and in Part II, Column C is explained by the fact that there is a single low victim SES 
case with six aggmvators for which there is no comparison case in the "Other Victim Cases" category. 
2 The overall low victim SES disparity in the death-sentencing rate among all death-eligible defendants is -15 percentage points (.08 - .23), significant at the .002 level. 
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high274 and low275 victim SES effects that is consistent with the data 
in Figures 25 and 26. 
Overall, these results are consistent with a pattern and practice of 
disparate treatment on the basis of victim SES. However, the results 
of the race analysis presented above suggest caution in inferring that 
such a pattern exists, in fact, without introducing controls for the 
place of prosecution. In the next section, we test the hypothesis that 
the statewide victim SES disparities we have documented are a by-
product of differential charging and sentencing practices in the major 
urban counties and greater Nebraska, even though these practices 
are, in fact, evenhanded in each place with respect to victim SES. 
274. Concerning statewide high SES victim disparities in the rates that cases advance 
to penalty trial, controlling for the number of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances in the cases, the statewide high SES victim disparity is 12 points (p=.01); 
controlling for the salient factors measure, the disparity is 16 points (NS); con-
trolling for the regression-based scale, the disparity is 25 points (p=.01); in the 
logistic regression analysis in Table 4, Column D, the odds multiplier for the vic-
tim SES variable is .55 (from high to middle to low), which is statistically 
significant. 
For judicial death-sentencing rates, controlling for the number of aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances, the high SES victim disparity is 3 points (p=.01); 
controlling for the salient factors measure, the disparity is 6 points (NS); control-
ling for the regression-based scale, the disparity is 21 points (p=.01); in the logis-
tic regression analysis in Table 4, Column F, the odds multiplier for the victim 
SES variable is .30, which is statistically significant. 
For death sentences imposed among all death-eligible cases, controlling for 
the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the high SES victim 
disparity is 7 points (p=.01); controlling for the salient factors measure, the dis-
parity is 7 points (p=.08); controlling for the regression-based scale, the disparity 
is 15 points (p=.04). 
275. Concerning statewide low SES victim disparities in the rates that cases advance 
to penalty trial, controlling for the number of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances in the cases, the statewide high SES victim disparity is -20 points 
(p=.01); controlling for the salient factors measure, the disparity is -11 points 
(NS); controlling for the regression-based scale, the disparity is -17 points 
(p=.05). 
For the judicial death-sentencing rates, controlling for the number of aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances, the low SES victim disparity is -19 points 
(p=.03); controlling for the salient factors measure, the disparity is -20 points 
(p=.05); controlling for the regression-based scale, the disparity is -18 points 
(p=.05). 
For death sentences imposed among all death-eligible cases, controlling for 
the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the low SES victim dis-
parity is -14 points (p=.01); controlling for the salient factors measure, the dis-
parity is -13 points (p=.01); controlling for the regression-based scale, the 
disparity is -10 points (p=.01). 
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2. Disparities in the Major Urban Counties and Greater 
Nebraska 
Recall that the race-of-defendant effects documented statewide in 
prosecutorial charging and plea bargaining decisions were largely the 
product of evenhanded but different charging. and plea bargaining 
practices in the major urban counties and greater Nebraska. In this 
section we examine that possibility with respect to victim SES. 
Figure 27 separately replicates the three-level victim SES analysis 
presented in Figure 24 for the major urban counties and greater Ne-
braska. The victim SES effects are apparent in both areas of the 
state. The specific patterns of SES effects in prosecutorial charging 
and judicial sentencing decisions vary in the two areas, but the bottom 
line of disparities among all death-eligible cases is strong and consis-
tent in both areas. 
Figure 28 highlights these patterns by focusing separately on the 
high and low victim SES effects in the major urban counties and 
greater Nebraska after adjustment for the number of aggravating cir-
cumstances in the cases. The data in Part I, which focus on the high 
SES victim effects, document patterns in both parts of the state that 
are quite comparable in terms of magnitude and levels of statistical 
significance.276 Part II tells a similar story for the low SES victim 
276. High victim SES effects in the major urban counties: Concerning high SES vic-
tim disparities in the rates that cases advance to penalty trial, controlling for the 
number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the cases, the high SES 
victim disparity in the major urban counties is -5 points (NS); controlling for the 
salient factors measure, the disparity is -5 points (NS); controlling for the regres-
sion-based scale, the disparity is 7 points (NS). 
For the judicial death-sentencing rates, controlling for the number of aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances, the high SES victim disparity in the major 
urban counties is -8 points (p=.04); controlling for the salient factors measure, 
the disparity is -5 points (NS); controlling for the regression-based scale, the dis-
parity is 14 points (p=.02). 
For death sentences imposed among all death-eligible cases, controlling for 
the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the high SES victim 
disparity in the major urban counties is 1 point (NS); controlling for the salient 
factors measure, the disparity is -5 points (NS); controlling for the regression-
based scale, the disparity is 13 points (p=.08). 
High victim SES effects in greater Nebraska: Concerning high SES victim 
disparities in the rates that cases advance to penalty trial, controlling for the 
number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the cases, there is no 
high SES victim disparity in greater Nebraska. Controlling for the salient factors 
measure, the disparity is -4 points (NS); controlling for the regression-based 
scale, the disparity is 22 points (p=.03). 
For the judicial death-sentencing rates, controlling for the number of aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances, the high SES victim disparity in greater 
Nebraska is -14 points (NS); controlling for the salient factors measure, the dis-
parity is -9 points (NS); controlling for the regression-based scale, the disparity is 
-24 points (NS). 
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FIGURE 27 
VICTIM SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS (SES) EFFECTS IN CHARGING AND 
SENTENCING OUTCOMES IN MAJOR URBAN COUNTIES AND GREATER 
NEBRASKA, CONTROLLING FOR THE NUMBER OF STATUTORY 
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE CASES: NEBRASKA, 1973-1999 
(the bars indicate penalty-trial rates (Column A) and death-sentencing rates 
(Columns B & C)) 
A B 
Rates at which Death- Rates that Death 
Eligible Cases Advance Sentences are Imposed 
to a Penalty Trial l in a Penalty Trial' 
Part I. Major Urban 
Counties' 
n= (52) (44) (19) 
Part n. Greater Nebraska 
n= (39) (25) (8) 
(28) (26) (13) 
40 





(52) (42) (19) 
(39) (24) (8) 
Legend: I:::J Low SES Viclim I:::J Middle SES Victim _ High SES Victim 
t The victim SES effects in Part I for this outcome are not Significant (p=.15), while the effects in Part II are 
significant at the .0 I level. 
'The victim SES effects in Part I for this outcome are significant at the .01 level and the effects in Part II are 
significant at the .08 level. 
, The victim SES effects in Parts I and II for this outcome are significant at the .01 level. 
4 In Lancaster County, there are no statistically significant victim SES effects in either charging or sentencing 
outcomes. In Douglas and Sarpy Counties, there are significant victim SES effects in the rates that cases advance to 
a penalty trial (low .50; medium .76; high .80) (p=.02) and in penalty-trial death-sentencing rates (low .00; medium 
.20; high .37) (p=.01). In death sentencing among all death-eligible cases in Douglas and Sarpy Counties, the victim 
SES effects are significant at the .001 level (low .00; medium .18; high .31). 
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effects.277 These data strongly suggest that defendants whose crimes 
are comparable in terms of their criminal culpability are treated dif-
ferently on the basis of the SES of their victims by both prosecutors 
and sentencing judges. 
The victim SES effects that we have documented indicate that a 
morally irrelevant circumstance of the cases unrelated to the culpabil-
ity of the defendant may be (1) an important factor in prosecutorial 
and judicial decisionmaking and (2) that the system denies the equal 
standing of all victims.278 However, we add the following caveat on 
this finding. 
For death sentences imposed among all death-eligible cases, controlling for 
the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the high SES victim 
disparity in greater Nebraska is -1 point (NS); controlling for the salient factors 
measure, there is no disparity; controlling for the regression-based scale, the dis-
parity is 2 points (NS). 
277. Low victim SES effects in the major urban counties: Concerning low SES victim 
disparities in the rates that cases advance to penalty trial, controlling for the 
number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the cases, the low SES 
victim disparity in the major urban counties is -9 points (NS); controlling for the 
salient factors measure, the disparity is -1 point (NS); controlling for the regres-
sion-based scale, the disparity is -11 points (NS). 
For the judicial death-sentencing rates, controlling for the number of aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances, the low SES victim disparity in the major 
urban counties is -13 points (NS); controlling for the salient factors measure, the 
disparity is -14 points (NS); controlling for the regression-based scale, the dispar-
ity is -17 points (p=.04). 
For death sentences imposed among all death-eligible cases, controlling for 
the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the low SES victim dis-
parity in the major urban counties is -8 points (NS); controlling for the salient 
factors measure, the disparity is -5 points (NS); controlling for the regression-
based scale, the disparity is -6 points (NS). 
Low victim SES effects in greater Nebraska: Concerning low SES victim dis-
parities in the rates that cases advance to penalty trial, controlling for the num-
ber of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the cases, the low SES victim 
disparity in greater Nebraska is -15 points (NS); controlling for the salient fac-
tors measure, the disparity is -27 points (p=.04); controlling for the regression-
based scale, the disparity is -21 points (p=.04). 
For the judicial death-sentencing rates, controlling for the number of aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances, the low SES victim disparity in greater Ne-
braska is -37 points (NS); controlling for the salient factors measure, the 
disparity is -31 points (NS); controlling for the regression-based scale, the dispar-
ity is -30 points (NS). 
For death sentences imposed among all death-eligible cases, controlling for 
the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the low SES victim dis-
parity is -12 points (p=.08); controlling for the salient factors measure, the dis-
parity is -17 points (NS); controlling for the regression-based scale, the disparity 
is -14 points (p=.01). 
278. As Robert Schopp argues, a system's reliance on such factors violates the princi-
pal of "comparative justice" and remains a "serious defect in the institution ... 
because it constitutes a failure of the institutional structure to conform to the 
principles that justify that structure . . . . [And] it represents a failure of the 
institutional function of disciplining the manner in which the state exercises co-
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Although the disparities on the impact of victim SES effects are 
adjusted for offender culpability, we have no data on the process of 
communication between the family members of the victims and the 
prosecutor and the judge. This has relevance to the interpretation of 
our data for two reasons. First, there is evidence that the influence of 
family members with prosecutors is associated with the SES of the 
victim, with the higher status family members receiving more defer-
ence.279 To the extent that this is the case, it may explain, at least in 
part, the more punitive practices of prosecutors in cases with high 
SES victims and their less punitive practices in cases with low SES 
victims.280 Second, there is evidence that the relevance and persua-
siveness of the family member written submissions to the sentencing 
judge may be also be associated with victim SES.281 The reason ap-
pears to be that writers with higher education and social status focus 
more effectively on the virtues of the decedent and the resulting loss of 
the survivors. To the extent the victim impact statements affect judi-
ercive force against its citizens." Schopp, supra note 3, at 825-26. A comparable 
rationale underlies the Fourteenth Amendment prohibition against race-of-vic-
tim discrimination. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 n.8 (1987) (claim-
ing standing based on the argument that application of the State's statute has 
created a classification that is "an irrational exercise of governmental power" ... 
because it is not "necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state ob-
jective"). Professor Schopp expresses a further concern that disparate treatment 
based on victim SES 
discriminates against the victims (immediate and extended) whose 
murders are treated as less important than other similar murders in 
that their murderers receive lesser penalties .... If the state refrains 
from prosecuting and punishing crimes against some classes of victims, 
such as prostitutes or transients, the state effectively denies the equal 
standing of those victims, and of others who share the traits that define 
those classes. 
Schopp, supra note 3, at 830-31. 
279. In the opinion of Attorney Jerry Soucie, at least in Omaha and Lincoln, high SES 
family members are generally more effective than low SES family members in 
terms of bringing pressure to bear on the office of the county attorney if they 
disagree with a plea bargain: "A lower SES victim's family might get a single shot 
on the 10 o'clock news, but that would be it. The VP of an advertising firm will 
have rallies, posters, letters to the editor, etc." Soucie E-mail, supra note 85. 
280. Also, several of the high status victims are police officers, who are a protected 
class under the Nebraska death-sentencing statute, i.e., the murder of a police 
officer may implicate statutory aggravating circumstances 1(g), 1(h), or 1(i). See 
Table 1 supra. However, none of the three police victim death-eligible cases re-
sulted in a death sentence. 
281. Attorney Jerry Soucie reports that lower SES writers tend to dwell on sentencing 
dispositions ("I hope he is executed or never let out of prison") in their impact 
statements, which in his opinion "don't ... have much of an impact on the sen-
tencing judge. They are seen as a way for the family to vent their frustrations"; 
in contrast, "[hligher SES statements tend to be longer and more reflective of the 
loss. They tend not to focus on the disposition, but discuss hurt, loss, etc. They 
may have slightly greater impact, but I don't know that for sure." Soucie E-mail, 
supra note 85. 
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FIGURE 28 
HIGH (PART 1) AND Low (PART II) VICTIM SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS 
(SES) DISPARITIES IN CHARGING AND SENTENCING OUTCOMES IN 
MAJOR URBAN COUNTIES AND GREATER NEBRASKA, ADJUSTED FOR 
THE NUMBER OF STATUTORY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE 
CASES: NEBRASKA, 1973-1999 
(the bars indicate the penalty trial (Column A) and death-sentencing rates (Col-
umns B & C) after adjustment for the number of statutory aggravating circum-
stances in the cases)l 
Part I. High Victim SES Effects ABC 
A. Major Urban Counties! 
Rates at Which 
Cases Advance to 
a Penalty Trial 
+ 14 pts. 
. 69 
1.55 
n= (19) (94) 
B. Greater Nebraska' 
+ 54 pts.··· 
. 75 
n= (8) (64) 
Rates that Death 
Sentences are 
Imposed 
in Penalty Trials 
Death-Sentencing 
Rates Among All 
Death-Eligible Cases 
[140 . +.22 pts.·· B=j + 17 pts .••• _ .. , .27 .10 
.18; 
(13) (54) (19) (94) 
+ 27 pts . 
.53 u .> 1 +2Ipts.·· 
L};J 
(6) (15) (8) (63) 
Legend: c:::::J High Victim SES c:::::J Other Victims 
! The source of the high victim SES disparities shown in this panel are Douglas and Sarpy Counties where there is a 
20 point disparity (.80 v .. 60) (p = .18) in the adjusted rates that cases advance to a penalty trial; a 26 point disparity 
(.37 v .. 11) (p = .02) in penalty trial death-sentencing rates; and a 25 point disparity (.31 v .. 06) (p = .01) in the rates 
death sentences are imposed among all death-eligible cases. In Lancaster County, the charging and sentencing rates 
are lower in the high victim-SES cases than in the other cases. 
, The discrepancies in case counts between Pan II, Columns A and C reflect the fact that in one case the sentencing 
court believed it had no discretion to impose a death sentence under the law. Accordingly, that case is omitted from 
Columns C. 
*=significant at .10 level; "=significant at .05 level; "'=significant at the .Olleve!. 
Continued on Next Page 
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FIGURE 28 (CONTINUED) 
Part II. Low Victim SES Effects 
A 
Rates at Which 
Cases Advance to 
a Penalty Trial 
A. Major Urban Counties] 
-12 pts. 
. 53 
n= (52) (61) 




n= (39) (33) 
B 
Rates that Death 
Sentences are 
Imposed 




















(8) (12) (39) (32) 
Legend: c::::::J Victim Low SES c::::::J Other Victims I 
3 Douglas and Sarpy Counties are the source of the low victim SES adjusted disparities shown in this panel. For 
those two counties. the overall disparity in the adjusted rates at which cases advance to penalty trial is -26 points 
(.52 v .. 7S). (p = .02); the penalty-trial death-sentencing disparity is -25 points (.06 v .. 31) (p = .02); the overall 
adjusted disparity in death sentences imposed among all death-eligible cases is -22 points (.04 v .. 26) (p = .001). In 
Lancaster County, the adjusted charging and sentencing rates are higher in the cases with low SES victims. 
4 The discrepancies in case counts between Part II, Columns A and C reflect the fact that in one case the sentencing 
court believed it had no discretion to impose a death sentence under the law. Accordingly, this case is omitted from 
Columns C. 
'=significant at. IO level; "=significant at .05 level; "'=significant at the .01 level; ····=significant at the .001 
level. 
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cial sentencing decisions, they may partly explain the association we 
have documented between victim SES and those outcomes. 
Because the level of victim SES is associated with the influence of 
their surviving family members in the charging and sentencing pro-
cess, adjustment for that influence would likely reduce the magnitude 
ofthe SES disparities that we document.282 The amount of that effect 
is unknown, but given the magnitude of the victim SES effects that we 
have documented, we consider it unlikely that the control would ex-
plain away all or even a significant part of the disparity. Moreover, 
even if it did explain away the effect statistically, there remains the 
question of whether that adjustment would cure the defect in the sys-
tem associated with the victim SES disparities-discrimination 
against victims (immediate and survivors) whose murders are treated, 
in fact, as less important because of the SES of decedents and their 
survivors. 
The victim SES effects documented in the Nebraska death-sen-
tencing system are consistent with findings of other studies.283 The 
literature suggests that such effects in prosecutorial decisionmaking 
may be explained by the perceived impact that victim SES may have 
on prospects for either a jury guilt-trial conviction and/or the court's 
imposition of a death sentence. In addition, press coverage and mani-
festations of community concern about a homicide are often correlated 
with the victim's SES. The impact of victim SES on both prosecutors 
and judges may also reflect differential identification, generally un-
conscious, with high and low status victims. 
Finally, what could explain the differences in the results of our 
race and victim SES findings? Each analysis was conducted with the 
same database and methodology, yet the results are quite different. 
One explanation may be that prosecutors and judges are not sensitive 
282. The impact of the control is likely to be greater on the prosecutorial disparity 
than on the judicial disparity. We also tested the hypothesis that the victim SES 
effects may reflect (a) a greater willingness on the part of the sentencing judges to 
find statutory mitigation present in low victim SES cases, when the evidence 
would support such a finding, and/or (b) a reduced willingness to find statutory 
mitigation present in high victim SES cases, when the evidence would support 
such a finding. A correlation analysis of trial court findings of statutory mitiga-
tion when the evidence of statutory mitigation was either "strong" or "sufficient" 
to support a finding of the presence of statutory mitigation by a "preponderance" 
of the evidence does not support the hypothesis. Specifically, the willingness of 
the sentencing judges to find mitigation when the evidence supported such a find-
ing was slightly higher (r=.08) in the high victim SES cases and slightly lower 
(r=-.05) in the low victim SES cases, with neither effect being statistically 
significant. 
283. See, e.g., EJDP, supra note 11, at 588 (reporting that research from Georgia, 
1973-1978, presents a logistic regression coefficient of -2.63 and an odds multi-
plier (p=.OOl) for a low SES victim effect in an analysis of death-sentencing rates 
among death-eligible defendants convicted of murder). 
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to the issue ofSES discrimination. We noted above that race discrimi-
nation is widely perceived to be an important political and legal issue 
in capital sentencing. As a result, prosecutors and sentencing judges 
appear to be sensitive to the question. In contrast, there is no law that 
specifically addresses the defendant and victim SES issues. Also, 
prosecutors and judges may not be aware of the biases that may have 
produced these results. Recall that in the 1970s, the issue of race-of-
victim discrimination was not widely perceived as an issue. Indeed, 
not until McCleskey did the Supreme Court rule that race-of-victim 
discrimination was unlawful. In Georgia, statewide data from the 
1970s, on the one hand, revealed evenhanded treatment of black and 
white offenders, but, on the other hand, the same data documented 
race-of-victim disparities comparable to the victim SES disparities we 
see in Nebraska. 
The results may also reflect a more subtle effect of bias based on 
victim SES. It is possible that most prosecutors and judges are less 
aware of such bias and as a consequence are less likely to be deterred 
in acting on it even if they perceive it as inappropriate. We consider it 
instructive in this regard that the retired judges whom we interviewed 
could offer no explanation for the victim SES effects in our results and 
did not appear to regard such discrimination as a particularly impor-
tant issue. 
X. EVIDENCE OF GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES IN CHARGING 
AND SENTENCING OUTCOMES 
A. Unadjusted and Adjusted Geographic Disparities 
In this section, we examine further the impact of geography on 
charging and sentencing outcomes in Nebraska. 284 We document dis-
parities in prosecutorial charging and judicial sentencing practices in 
the state's major urban counties vis-a-vis greater Nebraska.285 Our 
findings indicate that these disparities are concentrated in the cases 
with low to median offender culpability. We consider several possible 
explanations for the disparities. 
Figure 29, Part I, presents unadjusted geographic disparities in 
charging and sentencing outcomes between the major urban counties 
and greater Nebraska for the entire 1973-1999 period. Column A doc-
uments a 28-percentage point disparity in the rates that death-eligible 
cases advanced to a penalty trial. This means that the risk of a pen-
alty trial was 1.9 (.59/.31) times higher in the major urban counties 
284. We examined above, section VIII.A, the process by which more punitive 
prosecutorial policies in the major urban counties produce an adverse impact on 
minority defendants. 
285. See supra note 169-71 and accompanying text for a definition of the major urban 
counties. 
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than it was in greater Nebraska. In contrast, the penalty-trial death-
sentencing rate, shown in Part I, Column B was 13 percentage points 
(.43-.30) higher in greater Nebraska than it was in the major urban 
counties. The combined effect of these two decision points is shown in 
Part I, Column C: a 5-percentage point higher death-sentencing rate 
in the major urban counties than in greater Nebraska. 
Part II of Figure 29 presents the statewide results after adjust-
ment for defendant culpability, measured by the number of aggravat-
ing circumstances in the cases. Column A shows a slightly larger 
geographic disparity in the rates that cases advance to a penalty trial, 
but Column B documents penalty-trial death-sentencing rates that 
are quite comparable: .27 and .29. The bottom line is shown in Col-
umn C of Part II, a 5-percentage point higher death-sentencing rate 
among all death-eligible cases in the major urban counties. Although 
this disparity is not statistically significant, in practical terms it 
means that over the 27 -year period covered by this research, the risk 
of a death sentence for death-eligible offenders has been 50% (5110)286 
higher in the major urban counties than it has been in greater Ne-
braska, although for the average death-eligible offender in each locale, 
the difference has been only 5 percentage points (.15-.10).287 
Figure 30 presents data on the relationship between the magni-
tude of the geographic disparities and the culpability levels of the 
cases. Part I, which focuses on the prosecutorial charging decisions, 
reports in Column A a 30-percentage point (.58 -.28) adjusted dispar-
ity between the major urban counties and greater Nebraska in the 
rates that cases advance to penalty trial. Columns B through E report 
disparities controlling separately for the number of aggravating cir-
cumstances in the cases. The data show sharp disparities across every 
culpability level. In contrast, Part II, which presents comparable re-
sults for the judicial decisions, shows mixed results across culpability 
levels, which explains why the overall disparity in Column A, control-
ling for offender culpability, is so small. 
B. Geographic Disparities Over Time 
Figure 31 depicts Nebraska charging and sentencing practices in 
the major urban counties and greater Nebraska counties in five-year 
intervals since 1973. The vertical bars for each time period from left 
to right present (a) the rates at which cases advance to a penalty trial 
(the penalty-trial rate), (b) the judicial penalty-trial death-sentencing 
286. The denominator is the death-sentencing rate in greater Nebraska and the nu-
merator is the difference in the rates between the two parts of the state. 
287. We conducted a variety of supplemental analyses in which we estimated geo-
graphic disparities controlling for other measures of offender culpability. The re-
sults concerning the rates that cases advance to penalty trial are reported in the 
text accompanying note 246, supra. 
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FIGURE 29 
UNADJUSTED AND ADJUSTED DISPARITIES BETWEEN MAJOR URBAN 
COUNTIES AND GREATER NEBRASKA IN CAPITAL MURDER CHARGING 
AND SENTENCING OUTCOMES: NEBRASKA, 1973-1999 
A 
Rates at which Cases 
Advance to a Penalty Trial 
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Death Sentence 1 
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Part II. Geographic Disparities Adjusted for the Number of Aggravating Circumstances in the Cases4 
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•••• = disparity significant at the .001 level 
I The penalty-trial rates were .67 (54/81) in Douglas and Sarpy Counties; .41 (13/32) in Lancaster County; and .31 
(22n2) in greater Nebraska. 
'The penalty-trial death-sentencing rates were .28 (IS/54) in Douglas and Sarpy Counties; .38 (5/13) in Lancaster 
County; and .43 (9/21) in greater Nebraska. 
3 The death-sentencing rates among all death-eligible offenders were .19 (15/81) in Douglas and Sarpy Counties; .16 
(5/32) in Lancaster County; and .13 (9n I) in greater Nebraska. 
4 The reduced number of major urban county cases in Part 11 is explained by the fact that all cases with four or more 
aggravators (0=6) were prosecuted in major urban counties. Because there are no greater Nebraska cases with 
comparable levels of culpability these six cases are omitted from the adjusted rates calculation in Part 11. 
H
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FIGURE 30 
GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES IN CHARGING AND SENTENCING OUTCOMES, CONTROLLING FOR THE NUMBER OF 
STATUTORY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE CASES: NEBRASKA, 1973-1999 
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rate, and (c) the death-sentencing rate among all death-eligible cases, 
without adjustment for defendant culpability. The data reveal three 
striking patterns. First, in the major urban counties (Part I), the judi-
cial death-sentencing rates (middle bars) are uniformly lower than the 
rates at which prosecutors advance cases to a penalty trial (left bars). 
However, in greater Nebraska (Part II), with the single exception of 
the first five years (Column B), the penalty-trial death-sentencing rate 
has approximated (Column C) or exceeded (Columns D to F) the rate 
at which prosecutors advance cases to a penalty trial. This suggests 
that outside the major urban counties, prosecutors are more discrimi-
nating in advancing to penalty trial cases that are likely to result in a 
death sentence.288 
The second pattern of interest in Figure 31 is the sharp decline in 
judicial death-sentencing rates in the major urban counties since 
1982, while in greater Nebraska the average rate has increased, al-
though the sample sizes are small. The third pattern of interest in 
Figure 31 is a sharp decline in greater Nebraska in the rate that cases 
have advanced to a penalty trial since 1987, while the penalty-trial 
rate has remained stable and much higher in the major urban coun-
ties during this same period. 
Figure 31 sheds light on another issue: the Legislature's perception 
in early 1978 of "radically differing results" in different parts of the 
state.289 A comparison of Column B in Part I and Part II suggests 
what the Legislature may have had in mind. 290 This contrast docu-
ments judicial death-sentencing rates in the major urban counties for 
the period 1973-1977, which are twice as high as the rates in greater 
Nebraska (.44 v .. 20). The disparity in the unadjusted rates that cases 
advanced to a penalty trial was substantially higher in the major ur-
ban centers (.56 v . .42). Moreover, the death-sentencing rate among 
all death-eligible offenders was 3.1 (.25/.08) times higher in the major 
urban counties. 
In Figure 32, we focus more sharply on the trends suggested by 
Figure 31 by dis aggregating the data before and after 1983, when the 
decline in penalty-trial death-sentencing rates in the major urban 
counties began. The data in Figure 32 present unadjusted geographic 
288. We are modeling a case winnowing process. The penalty-trial death-sentencing 
rates vis-a.-vis the rate at which cases advance to a penalty trial is a measure of 
how discriminating prosecutors are in advancing cases to penalty trials in terms 
of the criteria the judges use in imposing death sentences. 
289. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
290. Because the Legislature was unlikely to have had any substantial information on 
the culpability of the individual death penalty defendants, it is likely that the 
disparities unadjusted for defendant culpability present the best picture of the 
Legislature's perceptions. In fact, the disparities perceived by the Legislature 
were based on Senator Ernie Chambers' analysis of a database he created from 
newspaper reports of homicide prosecutions in Nebraska. 
H
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FIGURE 31 
UNADJUSTED CHARGING AND SENTENCING OUTCOMES IN CAPITAL MURDER CASES IN MAJOR URBAN AND 
GREATER NEBRASKA COUNTIES, OVER TIME: NEBRASKA, 1973-1999 
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disparities for our three principal outcomes. Part I presents data on 
prosecutorial decisionmaking. A comparison of Columns Band C of 
Part I indicates that in both geographic areas a smaller proportion of 
cases advanced to a penalty trial after 1982, but the unadjusted geo-
graphic disparity is essentially the same in each time period: 28 and 
31 percentage points, both statistically significant. 
Part II shows disparities in penalty-trial death-sentencing rates 
for both periods. Note that the direction of the disparities changed 
completely. In the earlier period (Column B) the rate was nearly twice 
as high (.57 v .. 27) in the major urban counties while in the later pe-
riod (Column C) it was more than 3 times (.60 v .. 17) higher in greater 
Nebraska. 
The data in Part III depicting death-sentencing rates among all 
death-eligible cases show the effects of the changes in penalty-trial 
death-sentencing rates in the major urban counties documented in 
Part II. Again, the disparities reversed. In the earlier period, the 
death-sentencing rate among all death-eligible cases was 3.7 (.37/.10) 
times higher in the major urban counties while in the later period it 
was 1.4 times (.14/.10) higher in greater Nebraska. 
In Figure 33, we again disaggregate the data into pre- and post-
1983, and estimate geographic disparities after adjustment for defen-
dant culpability. The measure of defendant culpability in Figure 33 is 
the number of statutory aggravating circumstances in the cases. A 
comparison of Columns Band C of Part I indicates that after control-
ling for defendant culpability, the geographic disparities in the rates 
at which cases advance to a penalty trial are in the same direction and 
somewhat more pronounced and statistically significant in the post-
1982 period. 
Part II confirms that the direction of the geographic disparity in 
judicial death-sentencing is different in the two periods. But after ad-
justment for defendant culpability, the disparities are dramatically re-
duced and no longer statistically significant. We have rarely seen the 
introduction of controls for defendant culpability have such a substan-
tial effect on an unadjusted disparity of the magnitude shown in Fig-
ure 32, Part II. 
Part III presents the adjusted geographic disparities in the rates 
that death sentences were imposed among all death-eligible cases. 
Column B indicates that in the earlier period, the death-sentencing 
rate in the major urban counties was substantially higher (15 percent-
age points) than it was in greater Nebraska. In the later period, the 
disparity changes direction and is much smaller, declining from 15 
percentage points to a non-significant 1 point. These results indicate 
the importance of evaluating sentencing practices on the basis of 
death-sentencing outcomes that have been adjusted for defendant cul-
pability. The results (Figure 33, Part II, Column B) also suggest that 
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FIGURE 32 
UNADJUSTED GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES IN CHARGING AND SENTENCING 
OUTCOMES: NEBRASKA, 1982 AND EARLIER v. 1983-1999 
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HeinOnline -- 81 Neb. L. Rev. 631 2002-2003
2002] ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY 631 
FIGURE 33 
GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES IN CHARGING AND SENTENCING OUTCOMES: 
NEBRASKA, 1982 AND EARLIER v. 1983-1999, CONTROLLING FOR THE 
NUMBER OF AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE CASES 
(the bars indicate the penalty-trial rates (Part I) and death-sentencing rates (Parts II 
& III) after adjustment for the number of statutory aggravating circumstances in 
the cases) 
A 
Part I. Rates at 
Which Death-Eligible 
Cases Advance to a 
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Part II. Rates that 
Death Sentences 
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Legend: c:::J Major Urban Counties c:::J Greater Nebraska 
I The 1982 and earlier cases reponed below do not include six death-sentenced cases from the major urban counties because those 
cases involved four or more aggravating circumstances and there were no cases with more than three aggravators in greater 
Nebraska. 
Level of statistical significance of disparity: *=.10; ·*=.05; and ***=.01 
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both before and after 1982, judges in the major urban counties and 
greater Nebraska shared a comparable conception of what constituted 
a "death case," although in the post-1982 period, the data (Part II, 
Column C) document somewhat higher judicial death-sentencing rates 
in greater Nebraska. 
Our first conclusion is that adjustment for defendant culpability 
does not explain the geographic disparities in the rates that capital 
cases advance to a penalty trial either before or after 1983 (Figure 33, 
Part n. Moreover, during the pre-1983 period, defendant culpability 
does not explain the geographic disparities in the rates that death 
sentences are imposed among all death-eligible cases (Part III, Col-
umn B), even though it does explain the disparities in penalty-trial 
death-sentencing rates during this period (Part II, Column B). During 
the post-1983 period, defendant culpability explains291 a significant 
portion of the geographic disparities in both sentencing rates (Part II, 
Column C) and in the rates that death sentences are imposed among 
all death-eligible cases (Part III, Column C). 
Our second conclusion is that since 1982, judicial sentencing poli-
cies have tended to offset and partially cancel out prosecutorial charg-
ing and plea bargaining practices. Specifically, the higher rates at 
which death-eligible cases advance to a penalty trial in the major ur-
ban counties appear to have been offset somewhat by sentencing rates 
of the judges in the major urban counties that are slightly below the 
statewide norm. Similarly, the practices of prosecutors in greater Ne-
braska in advancing death-eligible cases to a penalty trial at rates be-
low the statewide norm are offset, in part, by the sentencing practices 
of the judges in those counties that are slightly above the statewide 
norm. 
The changes documented above since the early 1980s suggest that 
the 1978 amendments to the death-sentencing statute (requiring com-
parative proportionality review at the trial court level) and the Ne-
braska Supreme Court's narrowing of the scope of several statutory 
aggravating circumstances and limiting death sentencing statewide 
likely influenced the decline of death-sentencing rates in the major 
urban counties. These factors may also have contributed to the emer-
gence statewide of a de facto "two aggravator" rule as a presumptive 
threshold for the imposition of a death sentence. Changes ofthis mag-
nitude do not normally occur by chance. 
These data raise some obvious questions about the reasons for the 
persistent geographic disparities in prosecutorial decisionmaking. In 
the balance of this section, we consider the possible differences in the 
291. What we mean by "explain" is that when the analysis takes into account different 
levels of criminal culpability of the defendants in the two different parts of the 
state, what initially appear to be large differences in sentencing practices tum 
out to be only modest non-significant differences or no differences at all. 
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two geographic areas that could explain the disparities. Our analysis 
on each of these issues presented below indicates that none of these 
factors explain away the geographic disparities in prosecutorial charg-
ing and plea bargaining practices (measured by the rates at which 
cases advance to a penalty trial with the state seeking a death sen-
tence). We also consider other qualitative explanations that appear 
more plausible. 
C. Alternative Explanations for Geographic Disparities in 
the Rates that Cases Advance to a Penalty Trial 
One plausible theory to explain the geographic disparities in the 
rates that cases advance to a penalty trial is that prosecutors outside 
the major urban counties are more conservative than their counter-
parts in the major urban counties in their assessment of the level of 
deathworthiness in a death-eligible case that is required to justify the 
state's seeking a death sentence. Another possibility. is that prosecu-
tors in the two areas may differ in terms of the discretion they believe 
they have under the law to waive the death penalty in first-degree 
capital murder cases unilaterally or in a plea bargain.292 
Knowledgeable Nebraska legislators, judges, prosecutors, defense 
counsel, and others have suggested several other possible 
explanations:293 
1. More resources are available to prosecutors in large urban counties to pros-
ecute capital cases. 
2. Prosecutors in the major urban counties have more experience with capital 
prosecutions and therefore are more inclined on the basis ofthis experience 
to advance a case to penalty trial than are their counterparts in greater 
Nebraska. 
3. Judicial attitudes about the deathworthiness of an individual case may 
have a significant effect on the willingness of a prosecutor to advance a 
capital case to a penalty trial. 
4. Prosecutors may be influenced in their decisions to advance a capital case 
to a penalty trial by the imminence of their re-election. 
5. Differences in the frequency with which problems of proof "compel" a 
waiver of the death penalty in order to obtain a conviction. 
6. Different levels of violent crime that influence prosecutorial charging 
policies. 
7. Traditions in prosecutorial charging practices that reflect different public 
expectations in predominately stranger versus more closely knit 
communities. 
8. Differences in support for capital punishment on the part of individual 
prosecutors. 
We have developed measures that permit us to test empirically the 
plausibility of several of these alternative explanations for the geo-
292. Interviews with prosecutors in the Douglas County Attorney's Office suggest that 
such a perception may exist in that office. 
293. We appreciate the helpful comments and suggestions of County Attorneys at the 
2001 Annual Meeting of the Nebraska County Attorneys Association. 
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graphic disparities in the rates at which cases advance to penalty 
trial. However, some of the more plausible explanations are not sus-
ceptible to empirical testing. 
1. Disparities in Financial Resources 
It is commonly believed throughout the country that small counties 
can be adversely affected if they are required to independently finance 
complex, long-term criminal trials, an apt description of many capital 
prosecutions.294 Accordingly, one reasonably might expect to see 
fewer capital cases advance to a penalty trial in counties with fewer 
prosecutorial resources.295 Capital litigation requires prosecutorial 
resources, compensation for the attorneys of indigent defendants, and 
juror fees. 
We tested in two ways the hypothesis that disparities in 
prosecutorial resources explain geographic disparities in the rates 
that cases advance to penalty trials in Nebraska. We first developed a 
series of quantitative measures of prosecutorial resources296 and cor-
related them with the rates that cases advance to a penalty trial. The 
only measure that showed a significant relationship to the penalty 
trial outcome was the variable for the County Attorney's overall 
budget, which is substantially higher in the major urban counties.297 
Next, we introduced that variable into a logistic regression analy-
sis designed to explain which cases advanced to a penalty trial. The 
model also included variables for defendant culpability, the race and 
SES of the defendant and victim, and whether the case was prose-
cuted in a large urban or other county (the "geography" variable). In 
this analysis, the variable for the magnitude of the prosecutorial 
budget was statistically significant, but it suggested that after control-
ling for geography and defendant culpability, the larger the 
prosecutorial budget on average, the less likely the cases were to ad-
294. In Nebraska, for example, many counties in the state are currently staffed by a 
part-time County Attorney. Senator Ernie Chambers and the retired judges we 
interviewed share the judgment that prosecutors in smaller counties are substan-
tially deterred from pursuing death-eligible cases capitally because of their finan-
cial implications. We heard stories of counties that were taken to the edge of 
bankruptcy financing capital litigation. The case of State v. Ryan, 222 Neb. 875, 
387 N.W.2d 705 (1986), was one example given. 
295. There is also an issue of caseload. In a number of major urban counties in this 
country that have substantial prosecutorial resources, the case load is so high 
that there are few resources available to finance capital trials and plea bargains 
are a common means for disposing of capital cases. 
296. The measures are: (a) the County Attorney budget for 1997-98, (b) the salary of 
the County Attorney, and (c) the salaries of the Deputy County Attorneys in the 
county, all of which are derived from the County Budget Reports to the Nebraska 
State Auditor: 1997-98 (1999). 
297. The Pearson correlation coefficient was .21, significant at the .01 level. 
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vance to a penalty trial.298 In addition, the "geography" variable, 
which distinguishes between the rates at which cases advance to a 
penalty trial in large urban and other counties, remained substantial 
and significant.299 
Our second approach was to consider the availability of resources 
from the Attorney General's Office to assist small counties in the con-
duct of complex criminal cases. In a number of states, including Ne-
braska, the Office ofthe Attorney General offers prosecutorial services 
to assist smaller counties in the conduct of complex criminal cases. 
The Nebraska experience has been that smaller counties request such 
assistance in criminal prosecutions approximately 5 to 8 times a 
year.300 Requests routinely are made for such assistance in homicide 
cases, although the exact number is unknown. According to Assistant 
Attorney General William Howland, no such request for assistance in 
the prosecution of a complex case, capital or non-capital, has ever been 
denied by the Office of the Nebraska Attorney Genera1.301 
These analyses suggest that differences in prosecutorial resources 
do not explain the differences in the rates at which capital cases ad-
vance to penalty trial in Nebraska's major urban counties and greater 
Nebraska. However, the costs of litigation involve considerably more 
than prosecutorial resources-most notably attorneys' fees for defend-
ants and juror fees which can put a serious strain on the budget of a 
small county. Moreover, the availability of support in the Office of the 
Attorney General does not mean that smaller communities necessarily 
will request assistance as an alternative to waiving the death penalty. 
In many smaller counties, there appears to be significant resistance to 
"outside" intervention from the Office of the Attorney General. To the 
extent that these factors contribute significantly to the geographic dis-
parities in penalty-trial rates that we have documented, they are un-
likely to change in the foreseeable future. 
2. The Experience of Prosecutors in Capital Litigation 
The hypothesis that the experience of prosecutors in handling capi-
tal cases could explain the differences in the rates that cases advance 
to penalty trial is entirely plausible. Capital trials with the state 
seeking a death sentence are a significant test for lawyers on both 
sides. It would be understandable if prosecutors with less experience 
298. The regression coefficient was -.01, significant at the .05 level. 
299. The regression coefficient for prosecution in a major urban county was 3.8, signif-
icant at the .01 level, which is larger than the 1.1 coefficient estimates in our core 
models reported in Table 4. 
300. Interview with William Howland, Assistant Attorney General, Nebraska Attor-
ney General's Office, at the annual meeting of the Nebraska County Attorneys 
Association (March 20, 2001). 
301. [d. 
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were more inclined to waive the death penalty unilaterally or by way 
of a plea agreement, than their counterparts with more years of expe-
rience in capital litigation. 
To test this hypothesis, we developed a series of measures of the 
experience of prosecutors in handling homicide cases in general and 
capital cases in particular during the time period covered by this pro-
ject. The measures distinguish between simply handling a homicide 
prosecution and trying the case.302 
The measure of prosecutorial experience revealing the strongest 
correlation with whether a death-eligible case advanced to a penalty 
trial is the number of capital trials the prosecutor conducted.303 It 
indicates that, on average, the higher the number of capital trials, the 
higher the likelihood that a prosecutor's cases will advance to a pen-
alty trial. This result is consistent with expectations since the larger 
number of penalty trials in the major urban counties would naturally 
result in more experience with such litigation for the prosecutors in 
those counties. 
The next step of the analysis was to include the variable for prose-
cutor experience in trying capital cases in the regression analysis de-
signed to explain which capital cases advanced to a penalty trial. In 
that analysis, the variable for prosecutorial experience did not emerge 
as a significant predictor in explaining which cases advanced to a pen-
alty trial, and its inclusion in the analysis did not weaken the strong 
effect of the geography variable, which distinguishes between the 
large urban counties and the counties of greater N ebraska.304 
It is interesting to note that prosecutorial experience in trying cap-
ital cases is also strongly correlated with the imposition of a death 
sentence in a penalty trial. The data suggest that the more capital 
trials a prosecutor has conducted, the greater the likelihood the court 
will return a death sentence.305 One might expect to see this on the 
assumption that the more experienced prosecutors would be assigned 
to the most aggravated cases, which have a greater likelihood of a 
302. The measures are based on counts of prosecutor and defense attorney names 
among the over 700 cases in our larger universe of homicide cases from which we 
culled the death-eligible cases. The record of each of those cases indicates the 
names of the lawyers on each side and whether the case was tried or resulted in a 
guilty plea. With this information, we created a measure of how many homicide 
and capital cases each prosecutor and defense counsel handled from 1973 to 1999 
and how many of those cases were tried. One limitation of these measures is that 
they cover the entire period of the study and are not tailored to the prior experi-
ence of each prosecutor and defense attorney at the time of each prosecution. 
303. The correlation coefficient was .22, significant at the .001 level. 
304. The regression coefficient for the prosecutorial experience in trying capital cases 
variable was .31, significant at the .26 level. The regression coefficient for the 
major urban counties versus greater Nebraska counties variable was 1.3, signifi-
cant at the .01 level. 
305. The simple correlation coefficient is .26, significant at the .02 level. 
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death sentence. However, after adjustment for defendant culpability 
in a regression analysis, the association between prosecutorial experi-
ence and the death-sentencing outcome continues to hold.306 
Also of interest is the apparent impact of defense counsel's experi-
ence on the likelihood of a penalty trial and a death sentence in a pen-
alty trial. Contrary to expectations, the more experienced the defense 
counsel, the higher the risk of a penalty trial,307 even after controlling 
for defendant culpability and the place of the trial. The experience of 
defense counsel showed no unadjusted association with the death-sen-
tencing outcome, and there was no effect apparent in the regression 
analysis, which controlled for defendant culpability.30B 
This analysis suggests that the experience of the prosecution in 
conducting capital litigation, especially trying capital cases, may have 
some effect on the frequency with which capital cases advance to a 
penalty trial. However, it does not significantly explain the docu-
mented disparity in the rates at which cases advance to a penalty trial 
in the major urban counties and the counties of greater Nebraska. 
We noted above that one way smaller counties can compensate for 
a lack of prosecutorial experience in handling capital litigation is to 
seek assistance from the Office of the Attorney General. However, we 
also noted, in this regard, that in many smaller counties there is sig-
nificant resistance to that course of action. 
3. Judicial Sentencing Practices as a Proxy for Judicial 
Attitudes 
Some have suggested that in the exercise of discretion concerning 
the advancement of cases to penalty trial, prosecutors are constrained 
by their perceptions of the trial judge's attitude regarding the propri-
ety of the death penalty in the case. On the one hand, if the prospects 
are high that the judge will impose a life sentence, economy may sug-
gest that a faster way to get there is simply to waive the death penalty 
and avoid the risk of irritating the court with an unnecessary sentenc-
ing hearing. On the other hand, there are cases in which the prosecu-
tor wants to waive the penalty trial in a plea bargain but the court 
expressly refuses to countenance the agreement and insists on a sen-
tencing hearing.309 
306. In this analysis, the coefficient for the number of capital trials conducted is 3.4, 
significant at the .02 level, a very large effect. 
307. r=.32, p=.OOOl. 
308. r=.l1, p=.36. In the regression analysis, the coefficient for the experience of de-
fense counsel in trying capital cases was .66 (p=.24). 
309. Our records document two such cases in which the court records clearly indicate 
that the court insisted on conducting a penalty trial when the prosecutor sought 
to waive the death penalty as part of a plea bargain. There may be other occur-
rences of this that were not apparent on the records in our files. 
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To test this hypothesis we ideally need a measure of the trial 
judge's attitude about the appropriateness of the death penalty in 
each case. However, we have no factual basis for creating that mea-
sure. What we have instead is the basis for creating a measure of 
judicial penalty-trial voting practices that likely reflects the culpabil-
ity levels of the cases heard by each judge (i.e., the more aggravated 
the case, the more likely it is that death is the result). 
Our principal measure of judicial attitudes was the proportion of 
penalty-trial cases in which each judge had been involved (for judges 
with participation in three or more sentencing hearings) that resulted 
in a death sentence. Because of the small number of judges who had 
heard three or more cases, we developed alternative measures that 
count the number of cases in which each judge participated and the 
result was a death sentence.3lO The measures also distinguished be-
tween cases in which the judge had presided alone or had empanelled 
a three-judge court. We developed these measures on the basis ofthe 
information in the DCI indicating the name(s) of the judges who par-
ticipated in each sentencing hearing.3ll 
None ofthe measures of judicial attitudes showed a significant re-
lationship with the rate that prosecutors advanced cases to a penalty 
trial, either with or without controls for defendant culpability.3l2 In 
fact, the data are consistent with a greater likelihood of a penalty trial 
when the judge has participated in more cases that resulted in a life 
rather than a death sentence.3l3 We are inclined to discount, there-
fore, the likelihood that the geographic disparities in the rates that 
310. We prepared a similar measure of the number of times a judge's case resulted in 
a life sentence. 
311. These measures have limitations, i.e., we have small samples for many judges 
and there is a distinct correlation between the number of cases heard with either 
sentencing outcome and the number of years the judge has been on the bench, 
although it is unclear the bias this may introduce. Another possible concern is 
that we have no controls for the relative culpability levels of the defendants in 
cases that each judge hears. For example, the judges associated with many life-
sentenced cases may have participated in a disproportionate number of cases 
with low levels of culpability. However, we consider it reasonable to assume that 
there is a random distribution among the judges in terms of the culpability levels 
of the cases that they hear. 
312. The simple correlation, r, of our principal measure, the death-sentencing rate 
among all cases heard by each judge, was -.07,p=.39. There is a weak non-signif-
icant positive correlation between the number of solo penalty trials of the judges 
that resulted in a death sentence and the advancement of cases to a penalty trial 
(r=.12,p=.16). However, there is also a similar weak positive correlation between 
the number of solo penalty trials and the advancement of cases to a penalty trial 
(r=.12, p=.16). 
313. In the regression analysis, the coefficient for the number oflife sentence outcome 
cases in which the judge has participated was .21, p=.03. This may reflect the 
fact that the judicial death-sentencing rates are lower in the major urban coun-
ties where the cases are most likely to advance to a penalty trial, although the 
place of prosecution was controlled for in the regression. In addition, the 
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capital cases advance to a penalty trial are the product of judicial in-
fluence over prosecutorial decisions. 
4. The Imminence of Prosecutorial Elections 
Because of the political salience of the death penalty in many juris-
dictions, the record of an elected prosecutor or elected judge in prose-
cuting and sentencing in capital cases is sometimes a salient factor in 
their re-election campaigns. It is commonly believed, therefore, that 
in some jurisdictions, elected prosecutors and judges may be influ-
enced in their decisionmaking by the imminence of their re-election. 
We tested this hypothesis by first creating a measure of the time 
between the date of conviction of each capital case and the prosecu-
tor's next election. (We did not apply this analysis to the sentencing 
judges because they are appointed.) We then correlated this measure 
with the rate that prosecutors advance cases to penalty trial. We also 
created a scale that classified the cases in one-to-four year periods be-
tween the prosecutor's next election and the date of conviction. State-
wide, and at the local level, these measures showed no effect in 
bivariate analyses or in logistic regression analyses. 
Finally, we conducted a logistic regression analysis that (in addi-
tion to measures for defendant culpability, the race of the defendant 
and the victim, and the SES of the defendant and victim) included 
variables for (a) judicial propensity to impose a death sentence, (b) 
county attorney budgets, (c) the experience of the prosecutor and de-
fense counsel, and (d) the imminence of prosecutorial elections. In 
terms of explaining the rates at which cases advance to a penalty trial, 
only the experience of defense counsel variable had a significant coeffi-
cient.314 The coefficient for the geography variable remained substan-
tial and significant beyond the .10 level.315 
5. Differences in the Frequency of Problems of Proof that 
"Compel" Plea Bargains 
The data in this study concerning prosecutorial charging and plea 
bargaining practices are limited to the information available to us in . 
court records and pre-sentence investigation reports (PSI).316 Also, 
probability of a penalty trial is lower for judges with higher levels of participation 
in cases that result in a death sentence (the logistic coefficient is -1.4 (p=.17)). 
314. b=1.0, p=.02. 
315. b=2.7, p=.07. 
316. At the proposal stage of the study, we intended to request the individual prosecu-
tors who handled guilty pleas to provide us with their comments on their motiva-
tions for entering the pleas, if collecting that information was feasible. However, 
subsequent discussions with members of the Crime Commission Subcommittee 
that supervised the study indicated that it was probably unreasonable to expect 
that much fruitful information would be provided to us on this issue. These dis-
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for 100 cases where it was unclear if a plea-bargain offer had been 
made by the prosecution, we inquired of both the prosecutor and de-
fense counsel if such an offer had been made. However, neither of 
these sources identify proof problems that may have "compelled" a 
waiver of the death sentence and the offer of a plea bargain as the 
exclusive means of obtaining a conviction.317 In such cases, the deci-
sion to waive the death penalty would not necessarily reflect a discre-
tionary decision concerning the deathworthiness of the defendant, but 
rather may reflect a practical judgment informed by the need to obtain 
a guilt-trial conviction. 
We do not believe it plausible that our inability to distinguish be-
tween "compelled" and "non-compelled" plea bargain agreements has 
biased our documented geographic disparities concerning the rates 
that cases result in plea bargains and advance to penalty trials. Such 
bias would occur only if the compelled plea bargains were a much 
more common phenomena in greater Nebraska (where plea bargains 
are more common and penalty trials are less common) than they are 
in the major urban counties, particularly Douglas County, which ad-
vances death-eligible cases to penalty trial at a higher rate than any 
other county in the state. We consider it more likely that the inci-
dence of compelled plea bargains is randomly distributed throughout 
the state. In this regard, recall that the geographic disparity in the 
rates that cases advance to penalty trial is very large. Accordingly, 
bias in our finding as a result of this omitted variable would require a 
significantly higher incidence of compelled plea bargains outside Ne-
braska's major urban counties than occurs in the major urban centers. 
We consider this unlikely. 
The upshot of our analyses is that none of the rival hypotheses of-
fered to explain the geographic disparities in the rates at which cases 
cussions raised the concerns that County Attorneys would be uncomfortable pro-
viding us their mental impressions regarding the strength of their cases, the 
quality of evidence used to convict defendants or as the factual bases for pleas, 
and similar information. Such mental impressions would ordinarily not be dis-
coverable by defendants because they would be subject to a work-product privi-
lege. A concern was raised that if these matters were disclosed for this study, the 
disclosure would constitute a waiver of the attorney's work-product privilege over 
those mental impressions, and defendants may be able to seek discovery of that 
information to support litigation in their cases. We also raised the possibility of 
collecting this type of information at the annual meeting of the Nebraska County 
Attorneys Association held in March of 2001, and requested that County Attor-
neys advise us if, in their judgment, County Attorneys would be willing to dis-
close this information. Discussions with County Attorneys at that meeting did 
not allay the concerns raised earlier regarding discovery of that information. 
None of the County Attorneys with whom we spoke at that time indicated that 
they would be willing to provide that information. 
317. A classic example is when the testimony of a co-perpetrator is the only source of 
information available in a case and a condition for the co-perpetrator's coopera-
tion is a plea bargain including the waiver of a death sentence. 
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advance to penalty trial appear plausible. Our conclusion, therefore, 
is that those geographic disparities are more likely explained in the 
two ways suggested above. The first possibility is different 
prosecutorial perceptions of the breadth of prosecutorial discretion 
under the law to waive the death penalty in capital prosecutions.31S 
The second possibility is differential perceptions of the degree of cul-
pability and deathworthiness of similarly situated death-eligible of-
fenders that needs to exist before a case is advanced to a penalty trial 
with the state seeking a death sentence. What might explain these 
different perceptions in the major urban counties and greater 
Nebraska? 
The disparities in prosecutors' policies may reflect differences in 
community attitudes and concerns about crime and the necessity of 
prosecuting capital murder cases to the full extent of the law. Cer-
tainly, Nebraska's major urban counties have higher crime and homi-
cide rates than do the other counties.319 Prosecutors in the major 
urban counties may well be reacting to those community attitudes and 
concerns. 
Additional explanations that have been offered to explain the geo-
graphic disparities in penalty trial rates are less susceptible to empiri-
cal testing but they may provide the most plausible explanations for 
the disparities. An explanation offered by state Senator Ernie Cham-
bers is that because smaller communities are more closely knit, of-
fenders there are more likely to be known in the community and less 
likely to be viewed as demonized by the community than is the case in 
. the major urban counties where offenders are more likely to be viewed 
as strangers whom few people know and with whom even fewer people 
identify. The argument posits that these differences have an impact 
318. See supra note 129 and accompanying text for a description of the different legal 
interpretations. 
319. In the Nebraska "metropolitan" statistical areas, where 864,156 persons reside, 
the FBI "Crime Index Total" was 46,775 in 1999 (5.4 %). The crime index total is 
"composed of selected offenses used to gauge fluctuations in the overall volume 
and rate of crime reported to law enforcement. The offenses included are the 
violent crimes of murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, 
and aggravated assault, and the property crimes of burglary, larceny-theft, motor 
vehicle theft, and arson." In the cities outside metropolitan areas, where 392,151 
persons reside, the crime index total was 15,923 (4.1%). In rural areas, where 
409,693 persons reside, the crime index total was 5,746 in 1999 (1.4%). FBI, UNI-
FORM CRIME REP., INDEX OF CRIME BY STATE (1999). 
Because of the concentration of minority defendants in the major urban areas, 
where cases advance to a penalty trial at a higher rate, there is a significant 
correlation between the proportion of minority homicide defendants (capital and 
non-capital) in the county and the frequency with which death-eligible cases ad-
vance to a penalty trial (r=.27, significant at the .0001 level). The death-sentenc-
ing rate among all death-eligible cases is also positively associated with the 
proportion of minority homicide defendants in the county but the correlation is 
weak and not statistically significant (r=.l1, p=.16). 
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on prosecutorial perceptions of offender culpability and deathworthi-
ness and impact their willingness to seek death sentences in death-
eligible cases. 
Senator Chambers also suggested that outside the major urban 
counties there are prosecutors who are personally opposed to capital 
punishment and that those sentiments interact with concerns about 
the cost of capital litigation and the lack of prosecutorial experience in 
capital litigation to hold down the rate at which death-eligible cases 
advance to penalty trial. 
The foregoing analysis suggests that a combination of factors ap-
pears to explain the differences in penalty-trial rates ranging from dif-
fering perceptions about prosecutorial authority to waive the death 
penalty in first-degree murder cases, finances available to support 
capital litigation, prosecutorial experience trying homicides, percep-
tions of community support for aggressive charging practices in death-
eligible cases, and a tradition of resistance in smaller counties to re-
questing the assistance of the Office of the Attorney General in the 
conduct of capital litigation. To the extent that this analysis is cor-
rect, it appears unlikely that charging practices in greater Nebraska 
are likely to come into line with those of the major urban counties. A 
reduction of these geographic disparities is more likely, therefore, to 
arise from changes in charging practices in the major urban counties. 
Finally, what are the legal and moral implications of the geo-
graphic disparities we have documented in the rates that death-eligi-
ble cases advance to penalty trial? As we noted above,32o this 
evidence will not support a legal claim in Nebraska or any other juris-
diction of which we are aware. However, from the perspective of com-
parative justice the problem is clear. Compared to offenders 
prosecuted in greater Nebraska, death-eligible defendants in the ma-
jor urban areas are subjected to a much higher risk that their cases 
will advance to a penalty trial solely by reason of where they are pros-
ecuted. The place of prosecution is a morally irrelevant factor that has 
nothing whatsoever to do with a defendant's criminal culpability and 
deathworthiness. This, of course, was the reason that in 1978 the Ne-
braska Legislature expressed its concern about the lack of geographic 
uniformity in the state's administration of the death penalty.321 It is 
clear, however, that in the absence of further legislative or judicial 
action, the geographic disparities documented in this study will 
persist. 
320. Supra note 5. 
321. Supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
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PARTE 
XI. EVIDENCE OF CONSISTENCY AND SELECTIVITY IN 
CHARGING AND SENTENCING OUTCOMES 
A. Introduction 
In this section we assess the extent to which the charging and sen-
tencing outcomes of the Nebraska death penalty system are consistent 
and selective. By "consistency" we refer to the frequency with which 
penalty trials are conducted and death sentences are imposed in cases 
with comparable levels of defendant culpability. By "selectivity" we 
refer to the extent to which penalty trials and death sentences are 
limited to the most aggravated and deathworthy cases. Concerns 
about consistency and selectivity flow from the principle of compara-
tivejustice, which condemns "either dissimilar treatment of relevantly 
similar cases or similar treatment of relevantly dissimilar cases."322 
1. Consistency 
Consistency addresses the issue of horizontal equity323 that under-
lies the arbitrariness rationale of Furman v. Georgia. In Justice Stew-
art's explanation of why the death sentences before the Furman Court 
were "cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by light-
ning is cruel and unusual," he noted that "of all the people convicted of 
rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as 
these, the petitioners are among a capriciously selected random hand-
ful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed."324 He 
concluded that the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion cannot tolerate "legal systems that permit this unique penalty to 
be so wantonly and freakishly imposed."325 
In this research, we define a death sentence in an individual case 
as "inconsistent" and "comparatively excessive" if there exist many 
other cases involving defendants with comparable levels of criminal 
culpability that result in life sentences or less. We refer to the other 
defendants with comparable levels of criminal culpability as the de-
fendant's "near neighbors." For example, if it can be demonstrated 
that a death-sentenced defendant has a large number of near neigh-
bors in terms of their criminal culpability and none of those offenders 
has been sentenced to death, the logic of Furman v. Georgia suggests 
322. As noted above, Schopp, supra note 3, and accompanying text, the principle of 
comparative justice also condemns discrimination on the basis of the race and 
SES of defendants and victims "because it differentiates among offenders on the 
basis of morally irrelevant factors .... " [d. at 827. 
323. Horizontal equity calls for similar treatment of relevantly similar cases. 
324. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
325. [d. 
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that this defendant's death sentence is inconsistent and comparatively 
excessive. 
There are at least three levels of concern about inconsistency in 
capital charging and sentencing. First, inconsistent outcomes are un-
principled. Second, they undercut any deterrent effect the death pen-
alty may have. Third, they reflect an insufficient community 
consensus on the level of culpability that is required to justify the exe-
cution of a fellow citizen.326 
The level of consistency of an individual death sentence determines 
the risk that it is "comparatively excessive," while the level of consis-
tency across all charging and sentencing outcomes in a system is a 
measure of the risk that the system as a whole is "arbitrary and 
capricious."327 
Inconsistency and comparative excessiveness are relative matters 
and one's assessment of the risk of such sentences depends on two 
things. First is the level of frequency with which death sentences are 
imposed among a death-sentenced defendant's near neighbors. For 
example, ifthe death-sentencing rate among a defendant's near neigh-
bors is above 80%, the system is operating quite consistently and there 
is no risk of comparative excessiveness in that death sentence. How-
ever, if the death-sentencing rate among a defendant's near neighbors 
326. Justice White addressed these concerns in Furman, 408 U.S. at 311-12, by 
stating: 
[W]hen imposition of the penalty reaches a certain degree of infre-
quency, it would be very doubtful that any existing general need for ret-
ribution would be measurably satisfied. Nor could it be said with 
confidence that society's need for specific deterrence justifies death for so 
few when for so many in like circumstances life imprisonment or shorter 
prison terms are judged sufficient, or that community values are mea-
surably reinforced by authorizing a penalty so rarely invoked. Most im-
portant, a major goal of the criminal law-to deter others by punishing 
the convicted criminal-would not be substantially served where the 
penalty is so seldom invoked that it ceases to be the credible threat es-
sential to influence the conduct of others." 
In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 222 (1976), Justice White, concurring, also 
emphasized the link between the frequency with which death sentences are im-
posed and the deterrent effect of capital punishment. 
327. Furman, 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). Beyond the infrequency of 
death sentencing perceived by the Furman Court, the crucial flaw in the death-
sentencing systems declared unconstitutional in Furman was the complete ab-
sence of legislative standards to guide the discretion of the sentencing authori-
ties. The death-sentencing amendments adopted in every death sentencing state 
after Furman, including Nebraska, provide these standards in the form of statu-
tory aggravating circumstances. For this reason, a claim of comparative exces-
siveness in a jurisdiction with sentencing standards no longer implicates the 
Eighth Amendment under current law. Gregg, 428 U.S 153. However, many 
state legislatures, including the Nebraska Legislature, have expressed concern 
about inconsistency in death sentencing in general and comparatively excessive 
death sentences in individual cases. 
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is 2%, the level of consistency is very low and the risk is very high that 
his death sentence is comparatively excessive. 
The second consideration is one's normative judgment concerning 
the degree of inconsistency that is acceptable from a moral and legal 
perspective. Some might consider unacceptable any death sentence 
imposed in a case in which the death-sentencing rate among that de-
fendant's near neighbors is not well-above 50%.328 Another quite dif-
ferent view might consider death sentences unacceptable only if the 
death-sentencing rate among each defendant's near neighbors is less 
than 10%. With these two considerations in mind, it is possible to 
classifY death-sentenced cases on a continuum that reflects the level of 
death-sentencing among each death-sentenced offender's near neigh-
bors. The degree of one's concern about the overall consistency of the 
system produced by such evidence will reflect his or her judgment of 
the degree of inconsistency that is morally and legally acceptable. 
2. Selectivity 
Selectivity focuses on the extent to which penalty trials and death 
sentences are limited to the most culpable cases. It reflects another 
goal of Furman v. Georgia, which is reflected in the observation of Jus-
tice White that he could perceive no "meaningful basis for distinguish-
ing the few cases in which [a death sentence] is imposed from the 
many cases in which it is not."329 
328. Few state courts have given extended consideration of the minimal level of death 
sentencing required among a death-sentenced defendant's near neighbors to rule 
out concerns about comparative excessiveness. One state justice who has ad-
dressed the issue under a frequency system of proportionality review believes 
that the law requires a death-sentencing frequency among near neighbors that is 
well above 50% to negate concerns about comparative excessiveness. State v. Jef-
fries, 717 P.2d 722, 744 (Wash. 1986) (Utter, J., dissenting) (stating that the 
death-sentencing rate among similar cases should be "significantly greater than 
50 percent"). To the same effect one could argue that a 50% chance of a death 
sentence among similar cases is equivalent to the toss of a coin and that a much 
higher level of consistency is required. Coley u. State, 204 S.E.2d 612 (Ga. 1974), 
a capital rape case, suggests that a death-sentencing frequency below 25% among 
similar cases raises serious concerns about comparative excessiveness. This case 
can also be read to imply that a death-sentencing rate above 25% among a defen-
dant's near neighbors is sufficient to satisfy concerns about comparative 
excessiveness. 
329. Furman, 408 U.S. at 313. A violation of the principle of vertical equity involves 
the imposition of death sentences for offenders with relatively low levels of crimi-
nal culpability and the imposition of life sentences or less for considerably more 
culpable offenders, including the most culpable defendants. 
Among both the public and the courts there is substantially greater support 
for the goal of selectivity than there is for the goal of consistency. For example, in 
its proportionality reviews of death sentences, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
pays lip service to the goal of consistency, but is very much concerned about the 
selectivity of the death sentences it reviews. See, e.g., State v. Papasavvas, 790 
A. 2d 798, 807 (N.J. 2002) ("Although precedent-seeking review [which focuses on 
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Figure 34, which documents the distribution of life and death 
sentences, controlling for offender culpability, provides a sense of the 
system's selectivity. The four levels of offender culpability, based on a 
logistic regression model of death sentencing outcomes among all 
death-eligible cases, are indicated on the horizontal axis. The number 
of life and death sentenced cases at each level of culpability is shown 
on the vertical axis. The life and death sentences at each culpability 
level are consistent with a reasonably selective system, i.e., there ap-
pear to be relatively few death sentenced cases in which the offender's 
level of culpability is lower than an offender who received a life 
sentence. 
We measure selectivity in two ways. The first is the frequency of 
penalty trials and death-sentencing outcomes over time. We also com-
pare Nebraska frequencies with comparable data from other jurisdic-
tions for which we have data. The assumption here is that less 
frequent death sentencing is more selective death sentencing. How-
ever, this assumption needs to be tested since it is always possible 
that, even though death sentences are infrequently imposed, they may 
not be allocated to the most aggravated and deathworthy cases. In-
deed, this is exactly what characterized the Georgia system that the 
court invalidated in Furman v. Georgia-in terms of culpability, the 
few cases that resulted in death sentences could not be meaningfully 
distinguished from the many cases that did not result in a death 
sentence. 
The second component of a selectivity analysis, therefore, calls for 
a measure of culpability that enables one to identify the most aggra-
vated cases in the system and to assess the extent to which death 
sentences are limited to those cases. We do this in three ways. Our 
first measure of culpability is the frequency of death sentencing 
among similarly situated offenders, whom we characterize as the de-
fendant's near neighbors. This approach assumes that if a very high 
proportion of an offender's near neighbors are also sentenced to death, 
his case is highly aggravated and deathworthy. However, this may 
not always be true. 
An alternative approach is to apply an a priori measure of culpabil-
ity that is based on a legislative judgment of culpability. For this pur-
pose we use the number of aggravating circumstances in the case. 
the selectivity issue) is intended to complement frequency analysis [which focuses 
on the consistency issue) ... we traditionally have placed greater reliance on 
precedent-seeking review."). The proportionality reviews of the Florida Supreme 
Court focus exclusively on the selectivity issue. The court does not even address 
the issue of consistency in its analyses, which are limited to a comparative analy-
sis of appealed death sentenced cases. See, e.g., Almeida v. State, 748 So. 2d 922, 
933 (Fla. 1999) (the goal of the review process is to "reserve" the death penalty for 
crimes that fall "within the category of both (1) the most aggravated, and (2) the 
least mitigated of murders"). 
H
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FIGURE 34 
NEBRASKA (1973-1999): DISTRIBUTION OF LIFE AND DEATH SENTENCES 
AMONG ALL DEATH-ELIGIBLE CASES, CONTROLLING FOR DEFENDANT CULPABILITY 
(death-sentencing rates are in parentheses) 
Number of Sentences 
(Death = 29, Life = 155) 
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Our second alternative measure reflects the judgments of prosecutors 
and judges in seeking and imposing death sentences. For this pur-
pose, we rank the cases in terms of culpability as estimated in a logis-
tic regression analysis. 
Our third measure of selectivity identifies the number and propor-
tion of death sentences imposed in cases with a level of criminal culpa-
bility that is equal to or less than the culpability level of the 95th 
percentile life-sentenced case. In an ideal system, no offender with a 
level of criminal culpability less than the most culpable life-sentenced 
offender would be sentenced to death. Although this goal is probably 
beyond reach under current conditions, the extent to which a system 
approximates this norm is relevant evidence of the level of selectivity 
of a death sentencing system. 
B. Evidence of Inconsistency and Comparative 
Excessiveness 
The following analysis has two parts. First, we present evidence of 
the consistency of the Nebraska system in imposing 29 death 
sentences during the period covered by this study. The approach we 
apply is known as the "frequency approach" to proportionality review. 
It is the approach that was urged on the Nebraska Supreme Court in 
the 1980s by Chief Justice Krivosha.330 The frequency approach is 
factually based and attempts to estimate for each death-sentenced of-
fender the frequency with which death sentences are imposed among 
his or her near neighbors.331 The estimates produced for each case in 
this manner provide a basis for assessing how consistently the system 
as a whole imposes death sentences. These data also lay the founda-
tion for assessments of whether individual death sentences are com-
paratively excessive. 
Second, we test the Proffitt hypothesis by comparing the Nebraska 
record on consistency with comparable evidence from New Jersey, a 
state with jury sentencing. 
1. The Nebraska Data 
a. Quantitative Analysis 
The data we have developed on the consistency of Nebraska's 
death-sentencing system are presented in Figure 35, Table 5, and Ap-
pendix C. Figure 35 provides an overview of the death-sentencing 
330. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
331. David Baldus, When Symbols Clash: Reflections on the Future of the Comparative 
Proportionality Review of Death Sentences, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1582, 1595-
1606 (1996) (discussing the distinction between the frequency approach and the 
"precedent seeking approach" that is applied by most appellate courts that con-
duct proportionality reviews, including the Nebraska Supreme Court). 
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rates among the cases that we define as near neighbors to each ofNe-
braska's death-sentenced offenders. Part I presents near neighbor 
death-sentencing rates among the other defendants whose cases ad-
vanced to a penalty trial with the state seeking a death sentence. This 
part reflects only the degree of consistency of judicial penalty-trial 
sentencing decisions. Part II broadens the inquiry and focuses on the 
death-sentencing rates among near neighbors who were selected from 
the universe of all death-eligible offenders in this study. This part re-
flects the impact on the consistency of outcomes of both prosecutorial 
charging and judicial sentencing decisions. It also documents the fact 
that a number of offenders whose cases did not advance to a penalty 
trial have levels of criminal culpability that are comparable to the de-
fendants who were sentenced to death. 
We calculated the frequency of death sentencing among each 
death-sentenced defendant's group of near neighbors by utilizing an 
average estimate based on our principal measures of defendant culpa-
bility: (a) the number of aggravating circumstances in the case, (b) the 
number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the case, (c) 
the salient factors of the case measure, and (d) a regression-based cul-
pability scale.332 For each death sentence imposed, these measures 
identify eight overlapping but different groups of near neighbors. The 
first four groups of cases consist of near neighbors whose cases ad-
vanced to a penalty trial, while the second four groups of cases consist 
of near neighbors identified among all death-eligible cases regardless 
of whether they advanced to a penalty trial. Each of these frequencies 
presents a different estimate of the death-sentencing rate among a 
group of offenders with levels of culpability comparable to each death-
sentenced offender. We then averaged those groups of four estimates 
for each death-sentenced case-one group based on the penalty-trial 
near neighbors and one group based on the near neighbors among all 
of the death-eligible defendants.333 Those two averages determine 
where each death-sentenced case is classified in Part I (penalty-trial 
near neighbors) and Part II (near neighbors identified among all 
death-eligible cases) of Figure 35. 
Part I, Column I indicates that when the analysis is limited to pen-
alty-trial near neighbors, for 38% (11/29) of the death-sentenced de-
fendants, the average death-sentencing rate among the cases we 
classified as comparable in terms of culpability was above .80.334 We 
332. Supra section IV.B. 
333. The estimate for each offender under each measure is presented in Appendix C. 
Column L of the Appendix presents the average of the four estimates based on 
the penalty-trial near neighbors, while Column M presents the average of the 
four estimates based on the near neighbors drawn from all death-eligible cases. 
334. The numbers above .80 are the average of four different estimates of death-sen-
tencing rates among similarly situated offenders in categories on the culpability 
scale in which there were three or more offenders. The estimates for each death-
H
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FIGURE 35 
EVIDENCE OF INCONSISTENCY AND COMPARATIVE EXCESSIVENESS IN NEBRASKA DEATH-SENTENCED CASES, 
1973-1999: A CLASSIFICATION OF DEATH-SENTENCED OFFENDERS ACCORDING TO THE DEATH-SENTENCING 
RATE AMONG CASES WITH COMPARABLE LEVELS OF CULPABILITY ("NEAR NEIGHBORS"), MEASURED WITH AN 
AVERAGE OF FOUR DIFFERENT MEASURES OF DEFENDANT CULPABILITY! 
(the bars indicate the number of death-sentenced offenders with the death-sentencing rates among near neighbors that is indicated 
at the foot of each bar)2 
Part I. Average Death-Sentencing Rates Among Near Neighbors Whose Cases Advanced to a Penalty Trial 
A B c D E F G 
(the average statewide death-sentencing rate among all death-eligible 
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Part II. Average Death-Sentencing Rates Among Near Neighbors Identified Among All Death-Eligible Offenders 
A B c D E F G 
(the average statewide death-sentencing rate among all penalty trial 
cases is .16 (29/184» 
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characterize these death sentences as presumptively or prima facie 
evenhanded and comparatively non-excessive. A final judgment on 
the issue would require close analysis of the records of the cases that 
we have identified as near neighbors to assure that they are properly 
classified as comparable in terms of defendant culpability.335 
Appendix C, Column L also identifies three death-sentenced cases 
in which the average death-sentencing rate estimated among near 
neighbors was less than or equal to the .33 average death-sentencing 
rate among all penalty-trial cases.336 We classify these three death 
sentences, which fall in Part I, Columns C and D of Figure 35, as pre-
sumptively or prima facie comparatively excessive because .33 is in 
the range of death sentencing that one would expect to see ifthe death 
sentences were randomly assigned among all of the penalty-trial 
cases. Again, close analysis of the records of the cases that we have 
identified as their near neighbors (with our four measures of defen-
dant culpability) may indicate that, in fact, the cases of those offend-
ers were actually much less culpable than these death-sentenced 
defendants, which would explain the low death-sentencing rate among 
their near neighbor cases. If that were the case, good practice would 
call for the identification of the near neighbors who were in fact most 
comparable to these defendants in terms of their criminal culpability. 
The data in Part II of Figure 35 reflect the impact of both judicial 
sentencing decisions and prosecutorial charging decisions. Because 
the data suggest that prosecutorial decisionmaking statewide is con-
siderably less discriminating in terms of defendant culpability than is 
judicial decisionmaking,337 we would expect to see considerably less 
consistency in the results that reflect the influence of prosecutorial 
decisionmaking. That is exactly what we see in the results presented 
in Part II, i.e., the system appears considerably less discriminating in 
terms oflimiting death sentences to the most aggravated cases. None 
of the death sentences in Part II is classified in Column I where the 
death-sentencing rate among near neighbors is 80% or higher. In ad-
sentenced defendant under each measure are presented in Appendix C. We used 
only estimates based on three or more near neighbor cases. 
335. This analysis is exactly what counsel for the defendant and the state do when 
this approach is used in a judicial proportionality review. The cases are distin-
guished on their facts to persuade the court to select what each side considers the 
appropriate group of near neighbor comparison cases. If such an analysis reveals 
a misclassification, the death-sentencing rates among the properly defined cate-
gory of near neighbors would provide the basis for assessing the level of death 
sentencing among the defendant's similarly situated near neighbors. 
336. See cases 2, 8, and 26, Appendix C, Column L. 
337. As noted above, supra notes 206-07, the results of multiple regression analyses 
are much more predictable in the analysis of judicial decisionmaking than they 
are in the analysis of prosecutorial decisionmaking. This finding should not be 
surprising given the substantial geographic disparities we have documented in 
the rates that cases advance to penalty trial. See infra sections X.A and XII.B. 
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dition, 52% (15/29) of the death cases are in categories in which fewer 
than 50% of the defendant's near neighbors received a death sentence 
(Columns A to E). However, in only one case is the death-sentencing 
rate among near neighbors less than the average rate (.16). 
Assuming the validity of the culpability classifications of each of 
the death-sentenced cases shown in Figure 35, what do these data tell 
us about the extent to which the system as a whole produces consis-
tent results? In such a system one would find that virtually all death 
sentences were limited to defendants in culpability categories in 
which 80-100% of similarly culpable offenders received a death sen-
tence, i.e., they would be classified in Column I in Part I of Figure 35. 
This would mean that all of the sentencing judges applied a common 
conception of which offenders were truly deathworthy. Similarly, in 
Part II nearly all of the cases would be classified in Column I, which 
would mean that, statewide, both the sentencing judges and the pros-
ecutors shared a conception of which offenders were the worst of the 
worst.338 The Nebraska system falls short of that model of consis-
tency since only 38% (11/29) of death sentences in Part I fall into such 
a highly selective category and none of the death sentences in Part II 
fall into that category. 
What about the other extreme-a substantially random system in 
which the culpability and deathworthiness of the offenders had little 
or nothing to do with who received a death sentence? In such a sys-
tem, each group of near neighbors would approximate a random sam-
ple of all of the cases in each analysis. In Part I, all of the cases would 
be more or less equally distributed above and below Column D, which 
embraces the .33 average penalty-trial death-sentencing rate.339 In 
Part II, the cases would be distributed among the bars above and be-
low Column B, which embraces the .16 average death-sentencing rate 
among all death-eligible cases. 
The data in Parts I and II of Figure 35 indicate that the system 
clearly does not allocate death sentences randomly in terms of crimi-
nal culpability. All but one of the death sentences imposed are classi-
fied in a category in which the death-sentencing rate among the 
338. Of course, the sentencing judges make no formal determination of the 
deathworthiness of the death-eligible cases that do not advance to a penalty trial. 
The impact of prosecutorial decisionmaking is felt in every case. 
It is important to note that the approach we use here for estimating death-
sentencing rates among similar cases can be viewed as biasing the results some-
what in the direction of suggesting more consistency than actually exists. The 
reason for this is that in each category of cases in which a death-sentenced of-
fender was classified, we counted that defendant's death sentence as a death sen-
tence that was imposed among similarly situated cases. 
339. If the average death-sentencing rate were .35 and there were 10 near neighbor 
cases, the standard deviation around .35 would be plus or minus 15 percentage 
points and one case in 20 would be in the .65 or the .05 category. 
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defendant's near neighbors is higher, and often very much higher, 
than the average death-sentencing rate among all cases. 
However, even in Part I, the data suggest that many more death 
sentences are imposed in categories in which the death-sentencing 
rate among the defendant's near neighbors is well below .BO. Moreo-
ver, in both Parts I and II there are a number of death-sentenced cases 
classified in and around (Column E) the category in which 50% of the 
defendant's near neighbors are sentenced to death. In assessing con-
sistency, a 50% probability ofreceiving a death sentence is important 
because it approximates the outcome of a coin toss. Death sentences 
are imposed with this level of frequency or less among near neighbors 
(Columns A to E) in 28% (8/29) of the cases in Part I and 52% (15/29) 
of the cases in Part II. 
Even though we base our estimates on four different measures of 
defendant culpability, Table 5 indicates that the average of those esti-
mates is highly correlated with the number of aggravating circum-
stances in the cases. Column A classifies the cases in terms of the 
number of aggravating circumstances. For each of those subgroups of 
cases, Columns Band C list the average rate that death sentences are 
imposed among each death-sentenced defendant's near neighbors; 
Column B presents the estimates based on the penalty-trial near 
neighbors; and Column C presents the estimates based on near neigh-
bors among all death-eligible cases. For example, Row 2, Column B 
indicates that for the cases with two aggravating circumstances, death 
sentences are imposed on average 54% of the time among penalty-trial 
near neighbors. (The parenthetical below the 54% estimate indicates 
that the range of estimates for the 12 cases in this category was from 
40% to 62%.) 
The differences between the estimates in Columns Band C parallel 
the differences between the estimates shown in Parts I and II of Fig-
ure 35; i.e., the Column B estimates reflect the impact of judicial pen-
alty-trial decisionmaking alone, while the Column C estimates reflect 
the impact of both judicial and prosecutorial decisions among all 
death-eligible cases. 
The data in Table 5 clearly indicate that the greatest risk of incon-
sistency and comparative excessiveness exists in cases involving one 
or two aggravating circumstances. For cases with three or more ag-
gravating circumstances, there is a very high level of consistency 
when the point of comparison is the treatment of other penalty-trial 
defendants (Column B) and a consistent level of sentencing above .50 
when the point of comparison is all death-eligible cases (Column C). 
b. Qualitative Analysis 
Another way to assess the consistency of outcomes of a death pen-
alty system is to compare narrative summaries of the cases that re-
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TABLE 5 
ESTIMATED DEATH-SENTENCING RATES FOR DEFENDANTS WITH 
COMPARABLE LEVELS OF DEFENDANT CULPABILITY IN 29 NEBRASKA 
DEATH-SENTENCED CASES, CONTROLLING FOR THE NUMBER OF 
STATUTORY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE CASES: 
NEBRASKA, 1973-19991 
A B C 
Number of Aggravating 
Circumstances and Comparable Cases 
Number of Death- Comparable Penalty- Among All Death-
Sentenced Cases Trial Cases Eligible Defendants 
1 29% 9% 
(n=3) (.22-.33) (.09-.28) 
2 54% 39% 
(n=12) (.40-.62) (.80-.51) 
3 82% 61% 
(n=8) (.79-.87) (.42-.66) 
4-6 87% 75% 
(n=6) (.79-.90) (.70-.79) 
1 The second line of data in each box indicates the range of estimates for death sentences 
imposed among near neighbors for the cases classified in that box. 
suIted in death sentences with narrative summaries of factually 
comparable cases that received a sentence oflife imprisonment or less. 
The vehicle for this approach is presented in Appendix D, which clas-
sifies each of the 185 death-eligible cases identified in this research in 
terms of its "salient factor," as those factors are enumerated in Appen-
dix B. For each case under each salient factor category, we identify 
the county in which the case was prosecuted and present a brief fac-
tual and procedural summary of the case. Under each sub-heading, 
we first present narrative summaries for the cases that resulted in a 
death sentence; these are followed by the cases that advanced to a 
penalty trial with the state seeking a death sentence and the court 
returned a life sentence, and those cases are followed by the cases that 
did not advance to a penalty trial. 
For example, Salient Factor category D ("Multiple Victims") em-
braces 25 cases in which the most prominent statutory aggravating 
circumstance in the case was multiple victims, which are further sub-
classified according to the following levels of criminal culpability: 
1. Aggravated with Low Mitigation (n=13) 
2. Aggravated with High Mitigation (n=3) 
3. One Statutory Aggravator with Low Mitigation (n=4) 
4. One Statutory Aggravator with High Mitigation (n=5) 
A review of the narrative summaries indicates that death 
sentences were limited to five cases in the most aggravated category-
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D.1. We invite the reader to scrutinize the facts of all of these cases to 
assess the extent to which (a) the five cases that resulted in death 
sentences can be meaningfully distinguished from the cases that did 
not and (b) the cases that did not advance to a penalty trial can be 
meaningfully distinguished from those that did. 
c. A Note on Proportionality Review in the Nebraska 
Supreme Court 
We described above how, since 1986, the Nebraska Supreme Court 
basically has abandoned the field when it comes to formal comparative 
proportionality reviews.34o The reviews conducted since then have 
been strictly pro forma and oflittle consequence in terms of promoting 
consistency in the system. One wonders, therefore, whether that pro-
cess would have been significantly improved if the Court had followed 
the lead of Chief Justice Krivosha in the 1980s in his application of a 
frequency approach to the review process along the lines required by 
the Legislature's 1978 amendments. In six cases he would have va-
cated the death sentence as comparatively excessive while, in three, 
he would have affirmed. 
Our analysis of these nine cases indicates that the level of consis-
tency measured by the defendant's rate of death sentencing among 
"near neighbors" was actually higher for the death sentences that he 
would have reversed as comparatively excessive than it was for the 
death sentences that he would have affirmed as not comparatively ex-
cessive.341 The most likely explanation for the differences in his re-
sults and ours is that the Chief Justice's universe of comparison cases 
was not limited to death-eligible cases as we have defined that term; it 
was limited to homicides from the 1970s and 1980s, and he lacked 
measures of criminality that would have enabled him to distinguish 
finely between the culpability levels of the cases.342 In short, these 
results confirm the critical importance to the meaningful conduct of 
340. Supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
341. In our analysis of the seven cases that he would have reversed as comparatively 
excessive, the average level of death sentencing among the defendant's near 
neighbors among all death-eligible cases over the entire period 1973-1999 was .67 
(ranging from .47 to .79), while in the cases he would have affirmed as not exces-
sive, the comparable statistics were .41 (ranging from .41 to .42). If the analysis 
is limited to penalty-trial near neighbors, for the death sentences he deemed to be 
excessive, the average death-sentencing rate among near neighbors was .82 
(ranging from .59 to .90), while for the three death sentences he considered not to 
be excessive, the average death-sentencing rate among near neighbors was .64 
(ranging from .57 to .79). 
342. The 1978 statute contemplated a universe of comparison cases that embraced all 
criminal homicides, rather than only those that were death-eligible. For exam-
ple, approximately 50% of the comparison cases used in the Chief Justice's dis-
senting opinion in Palmer (Ill) did not meet the test of death eligibility that we 
applied in the research. 
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proportionality review of good data on potential near neighbors and 
good measures of defendant culpability. 
2. Testing the Proffitt Hypothesis with a Comparative 
Assessment 
How well does the Nebraska system work in comparison to sys-
tems in other jurisdictions? We have comparable data on the consis-
tency of penalty-trial sentencing outcomes only for the New Jersey 
system (1983-1991).343 Nebraska and New Jersey have similar lists of 
statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The principal 
distinction between them is that New Jersey has almost exclusively 
jury death sentencing while Nebraska has exclusively judicial death 
sentencing conducted by appointed judges. In addition, as noted 
above, the Nebraska judges operate under a statute that requires 
them to consider the risk of comparative excessiveness when they im-
pose death sentences. Against this background, we should expect to 
see less risk of comparatively excessive death sentences in the Ne-
braska system in the penalty-trial decisions and we could also expect 
this effect to result in a level of consistency among all death-eligible 
cases that is higher in Nebraska than it is New Jersey. As we explain 
below, the data are consistent with these expectations. 
We compare the two systems with three measures. The first is the 
proportion of death sentences that are imposed in cases in which 70% 
or more of the defendant's near neighbors receive a death sentence. 
The second and third measures are the proportion of the death 
sentences imposed in cases in which the death-sentencing rate among 
the death-sentenced offender's near neighbors is (a) lower than 50% or 
(b) lower than the average death-sentencing rate among all cases con-
sidered in the analysis. The analysis below documents that when the 
focus is exclusively on penalty-trial decisions, the Nebraska system is 
distinctly superior, but when the analysis reflects the impact of judi-
cial sentencing decisions and prosecutorial charging decisions, the 
systems are quite comparable. 
a. Death-Sentenced Cases in Which 70% or More of the 
Defendant's Near Neighbors Receive a Death 
Sentence 
When we limit the first measure to penalty-trial near neighbors, 
the Nebraska system appears to be more consistent than the New 
Jersey system. Specifically, in 48% (14/29) of death sentences imposed 
in Nebraska, the death-sentencing rate among penalty-trial near 
343. NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra note 166. 
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neighbors is 70% or higher. The comparable figure in New Jersey is 
29% (10/34).344 
When the near neighbors are drawn from the universe of all death-
eligible cases and the numbers reflect the impact of both prosecutorial 
charging and penalty-trial sentencing decisions, the Nebraska and 
New Jersey systems are comparable. In Nebraska, 17% (5/29) of the 
death sentences meet the 70% standard while in New Jersey 15% (51 
34) meet it.345 
b. Death-Sentenced Cases in Which Fewer than 50% of the 
Defendant's Near Neighbors Receive a Death 
Sentence 
On the second issue, concerning the proportion of death sentences 
imposed in cases in which the rate of sentencing among near neigh-
bors is below 50%, the Nebraska system is also more effective than the 
New Jersey system. When the focus is limited to death-sentencing 
rates among near neighbors whose cases advanced to a penalty trial, 
the death-sentencing rate among near neighbors is less than fifty per-
cent only 21% (6/29) of the time in Nebraska and 35% (12/34) of the 
time in New Jersey. 
When the focus expands to embrace death-sentencing rates among 
comparable defendants in the entire population of death-eligible of-
fenders, the death-sentencing rate among near neighbors is less than 
52% (15/29) of the time in Nebraska death cases and 62% (21/34) of 
the time in the New Jersey death cases. 
c. Death-Sentenced Cases in Which the Death-Sentencing 
Rate Among the Defendant's Near Neighbors is Less 
than the Overall Average Rate 
The third issue focuses on the proportion of death sentences im-
posed in cases in which the rate of sentencing among the defendant's 
near neighbors is below the average death-sentencing rate. Here, we 
find that the overall average death-sentencing rates in Nebraska and 
New Jersey are comparable. The penalty trial death-sentencing rates 
are 33% in Nebraska and 30% in New Jersey. For death sentencing 
among all death-eligible cases, the rate is 16% in Nebraska and 15% 
in New Jersey. When the near neighbors are limited to penalty-trial 
defendants, the death-sentencing rate among near neighbors is less 
than the overall average 3% (1129) of the time in Nebraska and 9% (31 
34) of the time in New Jersey. 
When the near neighbors are drawn from all death-eligible cases, 
the death-sentencing rate among near neighbors is less than the over-
344. Id. at Tbl. 19. 
345. Id. at Tbl. 20. 
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all average 3% (1/29) of the time in Nebraska and 6% (2/34) of the time 
in New Jersey. 
Overall, these comparative data suggest that New Jersey and Ne-
braska are quite effective in avoiding clearly excessive death 
sentences, i.e., those with death-sentencing rates among near neigh-
bors that are well below the overall average for all cases in the analy-
sis.346 In terms of limiting death sentences to the most aggravated 
cases, the penalty-trial outcomes in Nebraska are clearly superior, but 
when the analysis embraces the impact of judicial sentencing deci-
sions and prosecutorial charging decisions, the results are only 
slightly better in Nebraska.347 
As suggested above, the greater consistency of the Nebraska pen-
alty-trial decisions vis-a.-vis New Jersey is most likely the product of 
Nebraska's system of exclusively judicial sentencing under a statute 
that requires the sentencing judges to assess the risk of comparative 
excessiveness associated with each death sentence they impose. The 
New Jersey penalty-trial decisions, in contrast, are almost entirely 
jury decisions. However, when the impact of prosecutorial charging 
decisions is added to the analysis, the risk of comparative excessive-
ness in the two systems appears to be quite comparable in terms ofthe 
imposition of death sentences among all death-eligible cases. 
C. Evidence of Selectivity in the Imposition of Death 
Sentences 
1. Quantitative Analysis 
We focus here on the extent to which death sentencing is limited to 
the most aggravated cases-the "worst of the worst" as they are com-
monly described in the Nebraska media. We also examine the extent 
to which the process of appellate review in the Nebraska Supreme 
Court appears to enhance or diminish the selectivity of the system as 
the death-sentenced cases move toward execution. 
We have documented that death sentencing has become less fre-
quent over the last twenty-five years. We believe this is, in significant 
part, because of the narrowing of statutory aggravators by the Ne-
braska Supreme Court and the conduct of proportionality review in 
sentencing hearings. A good example in this regard is the 1977 case of 
Rodney Stewart, in which the trial court found six aggravators pre-
sent. The Nebraska Supreme Court found only one present and re-
duced the death sentence to life imprisonment. This is a strong model 
for greater selectivity. 
To expand this inquiry, we need a more systematic measure of of-
fender culpability. Our first measure in this regard is the frequency of 
346. See supra discussion in this subsection. 
347. See supra subsections XI.B.2.a and XI.B.2.b. 
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death sentencing among similarly situated cases. A high frequency of 
death sentencing among a death-sentenced defendant's near neigh-
bors reflects a strong consensus on the part of prosecutors and judges 
that this defendant's case is particularity deathworthy, while a low 
rate of death sentencing among his near neighbors reflects a weaker 
consensus about the deathworthiness of his case. Because a high or 
low rate of death sentencing among similarly situated cases also im-
plicates the level of consistency that we discussed in the previous sec-
tion, the concepts of consistency and selectivity are closely related. 
We first revisit Figure 35, which classifies the cases in terms of the 
frequency of death sentencing among similarly situated offenders. 
Part I, which is limited to a comparative analysis of only penalty-trial 
cases, indicates that in 48% (14129) of the cases the death-sentencing 
rate among the defendant's near neighbors is greater than. 70. Part II 
reflects the judgments of both judges and prosecutors. From that per-
spective, in only 17% (5/29) of the death-sentenced cases is the rate of 
death sentencing among similarly situated offenders greater than .70. 
Figure 35 also indicates that there are a significant number of death 
sentences imposed among cases in which there appears to be a quite 
low level of consensus on the deathworthiness of the offender. 
Next, we consider the extent to which the Nebraska Supreme 
Court appears to respond to offender culpability in its assessments of 
"legal" error in the cases and to strive informally to limit executions to 
the most aggravated cases. By finding legal error more often in less 
aggravated death-sentenced cases, a court can weed out some portion 
of the least aggravated cases and keep in the system the more aggra-
vated cases for which there is a stronger consensus on the offender's 
culpability. We noted above that there does appear to be an impact, as 
has been documented in other research.348 Specifically, when we fo-
cus on cases affirmed and reversed, we see that among the cases af-
firmed, the average rate of death sentencing among the defendant's 
near neighbors is .75 (ranging from .49 to .90) whereas among the 
cases vacated the average is 20 percentage points lower, .55 (ranging 
from .33 to .82).349 Thus, even though the Nebraska Supreme Court 
may not formally conduct meaningful proportionality reviews, it ap-
pears that offender culpability may be a distinct factor in its 
decisionmaking. 
We evaluated selectivity in three other ways. First we examined 
the distribution of death-sentenced cases in terms of the number of 
statutory aggravating circumstances in the cases. Recall that in 
terms of predicting who is sentenced to death the number of ag-
348. Supra notes 13, 14 and accompanying text. 
349. Among the offenders who have been executed the statistics are .75 (ranging from 
.59 to .88) and for those currently on death row, the statistics are .69 (ranging 
from .49 to .85). 
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gravators in the case is, by far, the best predictor. This is consistent 
with the legislative policy; i.e., if one aggravator is sufficient to justify 
a death sentence, that justification must surely rise as the number of 
aggravators in the case increases. We found that 48% (14/29) of the 
death sentences were imposed in cases with three or more ag-
gravators, 41% (12/29) were imposed in two-aggravator cases, and 
10% (3/29) were imposed in single-aggravator cases. 
We also rank ordered the cases in terms of their predicted 
probability of receiving a death sentence. When the predictions were 
based on an analysis of penalty trials, 45% (13/29) of the defendants 
had a predicted likelihood of being sentenced to death that was over 
.90 and when the analysis was based on death sentencing among all 
death-eligible cases, those same 13 offenders had a predicted 
probability of .80 or higher. These were the defendants with three or 
more aggravating circumstances in their cases. For the remainder of 
the cases, with the exception of the single-aggravator cases, the esti-
mates were between .50 and .70 (For the one-aggravator cases, the 
estimates were below .10). 
When we focus on the five defendants executed or currently on 
death row, the predicted probabilities for only two (Williams and Lot-
ter) are in the top, most aggravated category. Among the 12 most ag-
gravated cases by this measure, three died on death row of natural 
causes and eight others have left death row alive. Among this top 
group, only Williams was executed. 
Among the least aggravated of the two-aggravator cases and the 
single-aggravator cases, all have left death row alive. 
As noted above, our third measure of selectivity focuses on the per-
centage of death sentences that possess criminal culpability scores 
that are equal to or less than the culpability score ofthe 95th percentile 
life-sentenced case. Among all death-eligible cases, 28% (8/29) of the 
Nebraska death sentences are in that category. As a point of compari-
son, based on comparable methodology, among post-Furman Georgia 
cases that resulted in a jury guilt-trial conviction between 1973 and 
1979, 29% of the death sentences fell into this category, while in the 
pre-Furman period, 61% of the Georgia death sentences fell into this 
category.350 
The upshot of these findings is that while death sentences are im-
posed in highly aggravated cases with reasonable regularity, many 
death sentences are also imposed in less aggravated cases. Moreover, 
those executed thus far and those now remaining on death row are not 
necessarily the most culpable offenders, many of whom had their 
sentences vacated and left death row alive. 
350. EJDP, supra note 11, at 91. 
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2. Qualitative Analysis 
Another way to assess the consistency of outcomes of a death pen-
alty system is to compare narrative summaries of the cases that re-
sulted in death sentences with narrative summaries of factually 
comparable cases that received a sentence oflife imprisonment or less. 
The vehicle for this approach is presented in Appendix D, which clas-
sifies each of the 185 death-eligible prosecutions identified in this re-
search in terms of its "salient factor," as those factors are enumerated 
in Appendix B. For each case under each salient factor category, we 
identify the county in which the case was prosecuted and present a 
brief factual and procedural summary of the case. Under each sub-
heading, we first present narrative summaries for the cases that re-
sulted in a death sentence; these cases are followed by the cases that 
advanced to a penalty trial with the state seeking a death sentence 
and the court returned a life sentence, and those cases are followed by 
the cases that did not advance to a penalty trial. 
For example, salient factor category D ("Multiple Victims") em-
braces 25 cases in which the most prominent statutory aggravating 
circumstance in the case was multiple victims, which we further sub-
classified according to the following levels of criminal culpability: 
1. Aggravated with Low Mitigation (n=13) 
2. Aggravated with High Mitigation (n=3) 
3. One Statutory Aggravator with Low Mitigation (n=4) 
4. One Statutory Aggravator with High Mitigation (n=5) 
A review of the narrative summaries indicates that death 
sentences were limited to five cases in the most aggravated category-
D.l. We invite the reader to scrutinize the facts of all of these cases to 
assess the extent to which (a) the five cases that resulted in death 
sentences can be meaningfully distinguished from the cases that did 
not and (b) the cases that did not advance to a penalty trial can be 
meaningfully distinguished from those that did. 
PARTF 
XII. SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Principal Findings and Conclusions 
1. Race-or-Defendant and Race-of-Victim Disparate Treatment 
Our first finding is that there is no significant evidence of systemic 
disparate treatment on the basis of the race of the defendant or the 
race of the victim in either the major urban counties or the counties of 
greater Nebraska on the part of either prosecutors or judges.351 In 
351. See supra section VII. 
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the major urban counties, where 93% (28/30) of the prosecutions in 
minority-victim cases took place, the data document white-victim dis-
parities in judicial sentencing decisions that are consistent with a pat-
tern and practice of race-of-victim discrimination. However, because 
these disparities are based on small samples and are not statistically 
significant, they do not support a conclusion that sentencing judges in 
Nebraska's major urban counties systemically treat offenders differ-
ently on the basis of the victim's race.352 
These findings suggest that prosecutors and judges are sensitive to 
the issue of racial equity and that the law prohibiting racial discrimi-
nation has had a deterrent effect. Our findings also provide support 
for the Proffitt hypothesis that judicial sentencing is superior to jury 
sentencing in terms of arbitrariness and comparative justice. In con-
trast to our Nebraska results, data from Pennsylvania, a state with a 
weighing system similar to Nebraska, document evidence of disparate 
treatment in jury penalty trials based on the race ofthe defendant and 
the victim.353 
2. Adverse Disparate Impact on Minority Defendants 
Our second finding is that state law, which authorizes broad dis-
cretion in prosecutorial charging decisions and the differential charg-
ing and plea bargaining practices of prosecutors in the major urban 
counties and the counties of greater Nebraska, produces a statewide 
"adverse disparate impact" on racial minorities.354 This adverse im-
pact flows from more punitive prosecutorial charging practices for all 
cases in the major urban counties. As noted in the preceding section, 
the data indicate that prosecutors in the major urban counties of Ne-
braska treat whites and minorities evenhandedly. However, the data 
also indicate that after adjustment for defendant culpability, those 
prosecutors advance all death-eligible cases to penalty trials at a sub-
stantially higher rate than do their counterparts in greater Nebraska. 
Because 90% of the minority defendants charged with capital murder 
in Nebraska are prosecuted in the major urban counties, minorities 
are more impacted than whites by the greater willingness of prosecu-
tors in these counties to advance death-eligible cases to penalty trials. 
Therefore, by virtue of the counties in which their crimes are commit-
ted and/or prosecuted, minority defendants, statewide, face a higher 
risk that their cases will advance to penalty trials (with the state 
352. To the extent that there may be race-based disparate treatment in the system, it 
does not occur with sufficient frequency for our analytic methods to detect. 
353. Philadelphia Study, supra note 10, at 1686-87 (race-of-victim effects), 1688-89, 
1758-59 tbls. 6 & El (race-of-defendant effects). 
354. See supra section VIlLA. 
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seeking a death sentence) than do similarly situated white defendants 
statewide.355 
The sources of this adverse impact, therefore, are (a) state law, 
which delegates to local prosecutors broad discretion in the prosecu-
tion of death-eligible cases, (b) significant differences in the rates that 
cases advance to penalty trial in the major urban counties and the 
counties of greater Nebraska, and (c) the fact that 90% of minority 
defendants in death-eligible cases are prosecuted in the major urban 
counties of Nebraska. This adverse impact on minorities is analogous 
to the adverse impact on minorities that exists in states where local 
appropriations for the support of public education are lower in pre-
dominately minority communities than they are in predominately 
white communities. This finding does not suggest or intimate that the 
Nebraska death-sentencing system is racially biased. Our findings 
are quite to the contrary. 
What are the implications of this adverse disparate impact? From 
a legal standpoint, it is clear that this evidence would not support a 
legal claim under existing law. But what are the moral implications? 
One view is that the adverse disparate impact on minority capital de-
fendants that we have documented is not a matter of moral concern 
because it is merely an anomaly resulting from the fact that minori-
ties primarily reside in the state's major urban counties. An alterna-
tive view is that the adverse impact is a matter of moral concern 
because it places a significant, disproportionate, and unjustified bur-
den on minority defendants.356 
From this perspective, there are two possible justifications for 
statewide adverse impact on minorities in the rates that cases ad-
vance to penalty trials. The first is tradition, as the charging practices 
in the major urban counties have been more punitive in their practices 
than in greater Nebraska since 1973. A second, more importantjusti-
fication for the adverse impact is the necessity of aggressive charging 
practices as a vehicle for delivering justice. This justification lacks 
force in cases with only one aggravating circumstance because death 
sentences are rarely imposed in those cases. However, in cases with 
two or more aggravators, there is a substantial justification for any 
adverse impact caused by aggressive charging practices because many 
death sentences are imposed in those cases. 
Given the adverse impact of prosecutorial charging decisions on 
minorities statewide, one would reasonably expect to see a statewide 
355. The discretion of prosecutors to which we refer has nothing to do with non-capital 
homicide; it pertains strictly to the discretion authorized with respect to cases 
that are death-eligible under Nebraska law. 
356. In employment and housing discrimination law, a substantial adverse disparate 
impact against a protected group will not stand unless it can be justified by a 
compelling business interest. 
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adverse impact against minorities in the imposition of death 
sentences. Indeed, if the sentencing judges imposed death sentences 
at the same rate across the state, this is exactly what one would see, 
because statewide, a higher proportion of minority defendants ad-
vance to penalty trials. However, this does not occur. The reason it 
does not is that the penalty-trial judges in the major urban counties, 
where all but one of the minority defendant penalty trials were held, 
sentence white defendants to death at a higher rate than they do mi-
nority defendants. As a consequence, the statewide data document 
only small, non-significant, and inconsistent race-of-defendant dispari-
ties on the order of 2 and 3 percentage points in the rates that death 
sentences are imposed among all death-eligible cases.357 These dis-
parities do not constitute a significant adverse impact against minori-
ties, statewide, in the rates that death sentences are imposed among 
death-eligible cases. 
3. Minority-Defendant Adverse Impact Among Death Row 
Prisoners Executed 
The data reveal an adverse impact on minority offenders in the 
frequency with which death-sentenced offenders are actually exe-
cuted.358 Specifically, of the seven minority offenders sentenced to 
death, two (Otey and Williams) have been executed. Of the seventeen 
white defendants sentenced to death, only one (Joubert) has been exe-
cuted. This disparity is not explained by the number of years the of-
fenders have been on death row, for there are a number of white 
defendants who either were or have been on death row far longer than 
Otey and Williams. The explanation is that white offenders on death 
row were more successful in obtaining judicial relief in federal court 
than Otey and Williams, who were denied such relief. 
In general, the evidence indicates that black offenders have been 
less successful than white offenders in obtaining relief in federal 
court, although they have been more successful than white offenders 
in obtaining relief in the Nebraska Supreme Court. However, because 
of the small number of cases in the analysis and the lack of controls 
for legitimate case characteristics (concerning the strength of post-
conviction claims), the data do not support an inference of the dispa-
rate treatment of minority offenders in federal court. Moreover, the 
perceived severity of Otey's and Williams' offenses may have contrib-
uted to their lack of success in federal court. Whether the adverse 
impact on minority offenders in execution rates persists over time 
with respect to the men sentenced to death between 1973 and 1999, 
however, will depend on the outcomes of appeals and possible re-
357. See supra Figure 7, Parts II & III, Column C. 
358. See supra section VIII.B. 
HeinOnline -- 81 Neb. L. Rev. 665 2002-2003
2002] ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY 665 
mands in the cases of the four white offenders currently on death row, 
as there are no blacks offenders now on death row. 
4. Disparate Treatment Based on the Socioeconomis Status 
(SES) of the Defendant and Victim 
The data provide no evidence of systemic differential treatment of 
defendants on the basis of their SES. The data do, however, document 
substantial statewide disparities in charging and sentencing outcomes 
based on the SES of the victim. Since 1973, defendants whose victims 
have high SES have faced a significantly higher risk of advancing to a 
penalty trial and receiving a death sentence than have other defend-
ants. Specifically, defendants with high SES victims were 1.7 (.70/.42) 
times more likely to advance to a penalty trial, 2.1 (.43/.20) times more 
likely to be sentenced to death in a penalty trial, and 3.2 (.29/.09) 
times more likely to be sentenced to death among all death-eligible 
defendants.359 Defendants with low SES victims faced a substantially 
reduced risk of advancing to a penalty trial and of being sentenced to 
death. These defendants were .68 (.39/.57) less likely to see their 
cases advance to a penalty trial, .57 (.23/.40) less likely to receive a 
death sentence in a penalty trial, and .39 (.09/.23) less likely to receive 
a death sentence among all death-eligible defendants.36o All of these 
victim SES disparities are statistically significant. Furthermore, 
when the focus shifts from the state as a whole to SES effects esti-
mated separately within the major urban and other counties, both 
high and low victim SES effects are apparent throughout the state.361 
What are the implications of these findings? As noted above,362 
under current law, the evidence developed here will not support a le-
gal claim. However, from a moral perspective, we agree with Robert 
Schopp's view363 that disparate treatment of the type we have docu-
mented violates the principal of "comparative justice" and is a "serious 
defect ... because it constitutes a failure of the institutional structure 
to conform to the principles that justify that structure . . .. [And] it 
represents a failure of the institutional function of disciplining the 
manner in which the state exercises coercive force against its citi-
zens." We also share his concern that it "discriminates against the 
victims (immediate and extended) whose murders are treated as less 
important than other similar murders .... "364 
359. See supra Figure 25, Part II. 
360. See supra Figure 26, Part II. 
361. See supra Figures 27 & 28. 
362. Supra note 5. 
363. Schopp, supra note 3, at 825-26. 
364. Id. at 830. 
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5. A Trend of Declining Death-Sentencing Rates 
The data document a significant decline in death-sentencing rates 
since 1982. This trend reflects a slight decline in the rates at which 
prosecutors seek death sentences. However, it is principally the prod-
uct of diminished judicial death-sentencing rates since 1978. This 
sentencing trend appears largely to be the product of (a) interpreta-
tions of the Nebraska Supreme Court narrowing the scope of a num-
ber of statutory aggravating circumstances and (b) the 1978 
requirement of comparative proportionality review in penalty trials. 
This trend appears to have reduced geographic disparities in death-
sentencing outcomes, and enhanced consistency in death-sentencing 
outcomes among similarly situated cases. 
6. Geographic Disparities in the Exercise of Prosecutorial 
Discretion 
Our sixth finding is that the Nebraska system is characterized by 
sharp disparities in charging and plea-bargaining practices in the ma-
jor urban counties vis-a.-vis the counties of greater Nebraska.365 The 
data also document less prominent but important geographic dispari-
ties in judicial death-sentencing rates. 
In the major urban counties, prosecutors appear to apply quite dif-
ferent standards than do their counterparts elsewhere in the state in 
terms of their willingness to waive the death penalty unilaterally or 
by way of a plea bargain. The difference is captured in the fact that 
after adjustment for the culpability of the offender, death-eligible 
cases in the major urban counties are more than twice (.58/.28) as 
likely as comparable cases in greater Nebraska to advance to a pen-
alty trial with the state seeking a death sentence.366 The geographic 
disparities in prosecutorial charging decisions have existed since 1973 
and have grown larger since 1982.367 
These disparities are not explained by differing levels of defendant 
culpability. Nor are they explained by differences in prosecutorial re-
sources, by prosecutorial experience in handling and trying capital 
cases, or the attitudes of the trial judge about the death penalty.36B 
However, it is widely perceived in Nebraska that the overall resources 
of smaller counties, which affect their ability to compensate defense 
counsel for indigent offenders and pay jurors, affect prosecutorial deci-
sionmaking. Specifically, these concerns are believed to create an in-
centive for prosecutors in smaller counties to negotiate pleas and 
waive the death penalty in cases that would be likely to advance to a 
365. See supra section X. 
366. See supra Figure 29, Part II, Column A. 
367. See supra Figures 32 & 33. 
368. See supra section X.C. 
HeinOnline -- 81 Neb. L. Rev. 667 2002-2003
2002] ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY 667 
penalty trial in major urban counties. It is important that, when re-
quested, the Office of the Nebraska Attorney General will provide 
prosecutorial assistance in the litigation of capital cases; however, it 
appears that in many smaller counties, there is significant reluctance 
to rely on "outside" support of this sort. If this explanation for the 
comparatively low rate that capital cases advance to penalty trial in 
greater Nebraska is correct, it is unlikely that capital charging prac-
tices in those counties will change in the foreseeable future. 
As suggested above, geographic disparities in the rates that pen-
alty-trial judges impose death sentences are less pronounced. During 
the entire period of this study, the adjusted difference in judicial 
death-sentencing rates is only 2 percentage points: .27 in the major 
urban counties compared to .29 in greater Nebraska.369 However, 
this overall disparity masks significant differences before and after 
1983. Before 1983, in the major urban counties, the unadjusted death-
sentencing rate was more than twice as high (.57 v .. 27) as it was in 
greater Nebraska.370 The geographic disparities, both in charging 
and sentencing practices in this earlier period, are consistent with the 
perceptions of Senator Ernie Chambers when he wrote and promoted 
the sentencing reforms that were adopted by the Legislature in 1978. 
However, since 1982, there has been a reversal in the geographic dis-
parities in penalty-trial death-sentencing rates. Since then, the unad-
justed death-sentencing rate in the counties of greater Nebraska has 
been 3.5 (.601.17) times higher than the rate in the major urban 
counties.371 
Most of the geographic disparities in penalty-trial death-sentenc-
ing rates are explained by differing levels of defendant culpability. Af-
ter adjustment for defendant culpability, before 1983 the death-
sentencing rate in the major urban areas was 6 percentage points 
higher (.37 v .. 31) than it was in greater Nebraska; since 1982 it has 
been 7 points lower (.22 v .. 29).372 
What impact have these changes in judicial death-sentencing prac-
tices had on geographic disparities in the rates that death sentences 
are imposed among all death-eligible cases? Over the entire period of 
this study, the rate that death sentences were imposed among all 
death-eligible cases was 5 percentage points (.15 v .. 10) higher than 
the rate in the major urban counties.373 However, the system has 
been far from stable. Pre-1983, both penalty trial and death-sentenc-
369. See supra Figure 29, Part II, Column B. 
370. See supra Figure 32, Part II, Column B. 
371. Id. at Part II, Column C. 
372. See supra Figure 33, Part II. 
373. See supra Figure 29, Part II, Column C. This disparity represents a 50% (5/10) 
higher rate in the major urban counties (the denominator is the rate in greater 
Nebraska and the numerator is the difference in the rates for the two areas over 
the course of this study). 
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ing rates were higher in the major urban counties than they were in 
greater Nebraska. This produced a death-sentencing rate among all 
death-eligible cases that was 2.4 times (.26 v .. 11) higher in the major 
urban counties than it was in greater Nebraska.374 But, since 1982, 
there has been a shift in judicial sentencing practices-a substantial 
(15-percentage point) decline in the rate in the major urban counties 
and a slight (2-point) decline in greater Nebraska.375 
A significant consequence of these changes is that since 1982 they 
have tended to minimize the effects of the geographic disparities in 
prosecutorial decisions that have continued since 1973. Specifically, 
the penalty-trial death-sentencing rates in the major urban counties 
have minimized the effect of the higher rates at which cases advance 
to penalty trials in those counties. Similarly, the higher-than-average 
judicial sentencing practices in the counties of greater Nebraska offset 
the effects ofthe lower-than-average penalty-trial rates of their prose-
cutors. The bottom line since 1982 is that among all death-eligible 
cases, the death-sentencing rates in the two areas of the state have 
been quite comparable: .12 for the major urban counties compared to 
.13 for greater Nebraska.376 
This "canceling out" effect of the judicial sentencing decisions does 
not change the fact, however, that since 1982 similarly situated of-
fenders in major urban counties face a 33-percentage point (.57-.24) 
and 2.4 (.57/.24) times higher risk of advancing to a penalty trial 
strictly by virtue of where they are prosecuted than do similarly situ-
ated offenders in greater Nebraska.377 Also, of the death-eligible 
cases that have advanced to a penalty trial since 1982, those tried in 
greater Nebraska have faced a 7-percentage point (.29-.22) and 1.3 
(.29/.22) times higher risk of receiving a death sentence than have 
similarly situated offenders prosecuted in the major urban 
counties.378 
As noted, under current law, the evidence of geographic disparities 
that we have documented in the administration of Nebraska's death 
penalty will not support a legal claim in Nebraska or any other juris-
diction of which we are aware. However, from a moral perspective, 
the problem is clear. Solely by virtue of where they reside and/or are 
charged, death-eligible defendants prosecuted in the major urban ar-
eas face a much higher risk of being subjected to a penalty trial and 
374. See supra Figure 33, Part III, Column B. 
375. The decline in judicial sentencing rates in the major urban counties in the 1980s 
appears to reflect the statewide decline in death-sentencing rates produced by (a) 
the Nebraska Supreme Court's narrowing of several statutory aggravating cir-
cumstances and (b) the 1978 legislative introduction of comparative proportional-
ity review in penalty trials. 
376. See supra Figure 33, Part III, Column C. 
377. See supra Figure 33, Part I, Column C. 
378. See supra Figure 33, Part II, Column C. 
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the concomitant risk of being sentenced to death. An offender's county 
of prosecution is a morally irrelevant factor that has nothing whatso-
ever to do with his or her criminal culpability and deathworthiness. 
And it is for exactly that reason that the Legislature in 1978 con-
demned geographic disparities in the administration of Nebraska's 
death penalty-disparities that have grown stronger since that time. 
7. Consistency and Selectivity of Charging and Sentencing 
Outcomes 
Our findings provide support for the Proffitt hypothesis in terms of 
its claim of greater consistency in judicial sentencing compared to jury 
sentencing. Specifically, the consistency of the Nebraska penalty-trial 
decisionmaking appears to be greater than the level of consistency in 
jury decisionmaking in New Jersey,379 a state whose death penalty 
system is quite comparable to Nebraska's except for the jury sentenc-
ing. However, the data do not support a conclusion that the death-
sentencing outcomes of the system are uniformly consistent or that 
the system limits death sentencing and executions to the most culpa-
ble death-eligible offenders, the group often referred to in popular par-
lance as the "worst of the worst."380 
The level of consistency in the Nebraska system suggested by our 
data depends on the range of cases one considers in the analysis. In 
that regard, there are at least two possible options. One is to limit the 
focus to the outcomes of penalty trials, which are strictly a product of 
judicial sentencing decisions. A second option is to expand the focus to 
embrace the imposition of death sentences among all death-eligible 
cases, outcomes that are the product of both judicial sentencing deci-
sions and prosecutorial charging decisions. 
When one's focus is limited to penalty-trial outcomes, the system 
appears to work well when compared, for example, to New Jersey, a 
state in which penalty-trial death sentencing is almost exclusively a 
jury responsibility. (Our principal measure of consistency in each 
death-sentenced case is the percentage of defendants with comparable 
levels of criminal culpability, the death-sentenced defendant's "near 
neighbors" who were sentenced to death.) In Nebraska penalty trials, 
48% (14/29) ofthe death sentences were imposed in cases in which the 
death-sentenced defendant's near neighbors were sentenced to death 
more than 70% of the time. In New Jersey, the comparable figure is 
29% (10/34).381 
The Nebraska Supreme Court (as do all other state courts of which 
we are aware) resists the adoption of a quantitative standard for as-
379. See supra note 343 and accompanying text. 
380. See supra section XI. 
381. See supra Figure 35, Part I and note 344 and accompanying text. 
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sessing aggravation, insisting that it is not the "number" but the 
"weight" of the aggravation that counts. The lower courts also use this 
approach. Nevertheless, the data are consistent with the application 
of a de facto penalty-trial standard to the effect that for cases with 
three or more statutory aggravating circumstances, a death sentence 
is almost certain; for cases with two aggravators, the outcome could go 
either way, depending on the facts of the case; and for cases with only 
a single aggravator, there is a very strong presumption in favor of a 
life sentence. 
In spite of this penalty trial performance, the data on those cases 
suggest that a number of death sentences may have been imposed in 
cases that are clearly not among the worst of the worst.382 Specifi-
cally, the data suggest that 28% (8/29) of the death sentences were 
imposed in cases in which the defendant's penalty-trial near neighbors 
were sentenced to death half or less of the time, and in 45% (13/29) of 
the death-sentenced cases, the defendant's near neighbors were sen-
tenced to death 60% or less of the time. However, in only one death-
sentenced case was the death-sentencing rate among penalty-trial 
near neighbors below the average death-sentencing rate for all pen-
alty trials, which is .33. 
When the comparative proportionality analysis is expanded to em-
brace death sentencing among all death-eligible cases, the results look 
less favorable than they do when the analysis is limited to penalty-
trial near neighbors.383 In that analysis, we find that in only 17% (51 
29) of the Nebraska death-sentenced cases were death sentences im-
posed in cases in which the defendant's near neighbors were sen-
tenced to death more than 70% of the time. In 52% (15/29) of death-
sentenced cases, a death sentence was imposed among the defendant's 
near neighbors 50 percent or less of the time. However, only one 
death sentence was imposed in a case in which the death-sentencing 
rate among the death-sentenced defendant's near neighbors was less 
than .16, which is the average death-sentencing rate among all death-
eligible offenders. 
Of the 24 offenders sentenced to death during the period from 
1973-1999, three died on death row of natural causes (they were 
highly aggravated cases). Of the remaining 21 defendants, 67% (141 
21) have left death row alive as a result of appellate court decisions 
and favorable outcomes on remand. Three offenders were executed 
and four remain on death row. With two exceptions, the defendants 
executed and currently on death row are not among the most aggra-
vated cases. Those who have left death row alive include most of the 
382. See supra Figure 35, Part I. 
383. See supra Figure 35, Part II. 
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least aggravated cases and nearly all of the most highly aggravated 
cases. 
8. Legislative Ambiguity Concerning Prosecutorial Charging and 
Judicial Sentencing Discretion 
Our final finding is that there exists in section 29-2521 of the Ne-
braska Statutes an ambiguity concerning the right of prosecutors to 
waive the death penalty in sentencing hearings in death-eligible cases 
that result in a first-degree murder conviction. There is also an ambi-
guity under this provision when the state seeks to waive the death 
penalty in first-degree murder cases by not presenting evidence of ag-
gravation. The ambiguity in this situation concerns the obligation of 
the sentencing court to make findings on statutory aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances and consider the option of a death sentence 
in the case. 
B. Policy Recommendations 
In this section we present two sets of legislative recommendations. 
The first set in subsection XII.B.1 addresses the requirements of Ring 
v. Arizona with a minimum possibility of increasing the risk of arbi-
trariness and discrimination in the system. The second set addresses 
the distortions that this study has documented in the application of 
the Nebraska death penalty system since 1973.384 The objective of 
these recommendations is to promote comparative justice in the sys-
tem by (a) enhancing its selectivity, consistency, and geographic uni-
formity and (b) reducing the risk that the race or socioeconomic status 
of the offender or victim are factors in charging and sentencing deci-
sions. Each of these recommendations is based on current Nebraska 
practice, or law and policy either currently in place in other jurisdic-
tions or recommended elsewhere. 
1. Legislative Amendments to Satisfy the Requirements of Ring 
v. Arizona 
A principal finding of this research is that compared to the other 
American death-sentencing systems of which we are aware, the Ne-
braska system has considerable strengths in terms of its capacity to 
limit death sentencing to the most aggravated cases and to minimize 
the risk of arbitrariness and discrimination in charging and sentenc-
ing outcomes. Important sources of these strengths are judicial sen-
tencing, Nebraska statutory and case law which regulates the 
384. Professor Schopp provides a useful framework for evaluating claims that evi-
dence of distortion in application can justify abolition of capital punishment. 
Schopp, supra note 3, at 833-38. In this section we limit ourselves to recommen-
dations that limit the level of distortion in practice. 
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weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the re-
quirement that the sentencing judges conduct a comparative propor-
tionality review before they impose a sentence. Accordingly, we 
believe that statutory modifications required to meet the require-
ments of Ring should strive to maintain these strengths to the great-
est extent possible. 
For this reason, we believe that a return to the pre-Furman Ne-
braska system of exclusively jury sentencing would unnecessarily 
abandon the settled law, tradition, and expectations that have evolved 
over the last twenty-five years in the administration of Nebraska's 
death-sentencing system and could introduce into the system a signifi-
cant risk of uncertainty, arbitrariness, and discrimination. Rather, 
we believe that the requirements of Ring would be satisfied if the 
jury's role were limited to findings of statutory aggravating circum-
stances in the form of a special verdict at the guilt trial or in a bifur-
cated hearing on the statutory aggravating circumstances. The 
following new section would define the jury's role in a capital 
prosecution: 
PROPOSED NEW SECTION -NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523.1-Jury Fact-Finding 
Role in Capital Prosecutions. 
(1) Whenever the state seeks a death sentence in a first-degree murder 
case, the statutory aggravating circumstances on which it intends to rely shall 
be charged as an element of the offense in the indictment or information as 
the case may be. 
(2) When a statutory aggravating circumstance is an element of a first-
degree murder charge, subject to the limitations of paragraphs (3) and (4) 
below, the state may present evidence of the aggravating circumstance in a 
jury guilt trial and request a jury instruction on the aggravating circum-
stance, in which event the court shall instruct the guilt-trial jury to make a 
special finding of fact on the presence of the aggravating circumstance 
charged by the state. The jury shall be instructed that a finding that a statu-
tory aggravating circumstance is present in the case must be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt and that a jury finding that the circumstance is present in 
the case must be unanimous. 
(3) Before trial, the defendant in a case in which the state is seeking a 
death sentence may waive his or her right to a jury finding of the presence of 
an aggravating circumstance in his or her case, in which event the court will 
make findings of fact pursuant to section 29-2521 on the presence of any ag-
gravating circumstances charged by the state for which the defendant has 
waived his or her right to jury fact-finding. The defendant may also waive his 
or her right to a jury guilt trial, in which event the court will decide both the 
defendant's guilt or innocence under the murder charge and the presence of 
statutory aggravating circumstances if the defendant is convicted of first-de-
gree murder. 
(4) Before trial, a defendant may request the bifurcation of the jury's first-
degree murder guilt determination and its finding(s) of statutory aggravation, 
in which event, upon a defendant's conviction for first-degree murder, the 
court shall promptly conduct a separate aggravation hearing before the same 
jury to determine if a statutory aggravating circumstance is present in the 
case. In such a hearing, the state and the defendant may present evidence 
relevant to the existence of the aggravating circumstance at issue, as well as 
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arguments for and against a finding that the aggravating circumstance has 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Evidence concerning the presence of 
statutory mitigating circumstances will not be presented or argued in the ag-
gravation hearing. A defendant may also stipulate to the presence of a statu-
tory aggravating circumstance in the case, in which event the jury will not be 
instructed on the issue and it will be treated by the sentencing court as having 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
(5) At the commencement of voir dire in a capital case, potential jurors 
shall be advised by the court that the state is seeking a death sentence in the 
case. 
(6) A guilt- or post-guilt-trial jury, as the case may be, shall also be in-
structed that (a) its finding that an aggravating circumstance is present in the 
case may provide the basis for the imposition of a death sentence by the court 
in a sentencing hearing that will be conducted at the conclusion of the defen-
dant's guilt trial if he or she is found guilty of first-degree murder, (b) that a 
jury finding that the aggravating circumstance is not present in the case will 
limit the discretion of the sentencing judge and require the court to impose a 
sentence of life imprisonment, and (c) that if the jury finds a statutory aggra-
vating circumstance present in the case, the sentencing court at a sentencing 
hearing may impose a death sentence if it finds, on the basis of all of the evi-
dence in the case, which may include mitigating evidence that the jury has not 
heard, that sufficient aggravating circumstances exist to justify the imposi-
tion of a sentence of death. 
(7) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude the state from de-
termining that a death sentence shall not be sought in the case. 
673 
Section (1)'s charging requirement meets the requirement of Ring 
that a statutory aggravating circumstance, which serves as a basis for 
a capital prosecution, must be charged as an element of the offense.385 
385. The proposal does not exclude the prior-record statutory aggravating circum-
stance (section 29-2523(1)(a)) from the jury fact-finding requirement. The two 
prongs of this aggravator are that the defendant was (a) "previously convicted of 
another murder or a crime involving the use or threat of violence to the person" or 
(b) has a "substantial history of serious assaultive or terrorizing criminal activ-
ity." An exclusion of this aggravating circumstance from Ring's requirements is 
suggested by language in Apprendi u. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488 (2000), on 
which Ring is based, that excludes from the jury fact-finding requirement "the 
fact of a prior conviction." However, that decision and Almendarez·Torres u. 
United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), suggest that the exclusion is limited to non-
discretionary ministerial findings based on a simple reading of a defendant's 
prior record. The elements of the Nebraska O)(a) aggravator involve a much 
more discretionary judgment than was contemplated in those Supreme Court de-
cisions. Moreover, Justice Thomas' concurrence in Apprendi, a 5-4 decision which 
he joined, suggests that the entire "prior record" exclusion, even when it involves 
a simple reading of a defendant's prior record, may not be good law over the long 
run. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 507-08 (arguing that the historical record clearly 
establishes that "when a statute increases punishment of some core crime based 
on the fact of a prior conviction, the core crime and the fact of the prior crime 
together create a new, aggravated crime"). Prudence, therefore, calls for the in-
clusion of all of the statutory aggravators under Nebraska's jury fact-finding 
model. To the extent that this raises questions about the presentation of pre judi-
cial evidence in the guilt trial, such as the defendant's prior record, when it would 
not otherwise be admissible, sections (3) and (4) of the proposal provide three 
defendant options to reduce the risk of prejudice. 
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Section (2), which provides for jury guilt-trial findings on statutory 
aggravating circumstances, obviates the need for a separate jury pen-
alty tria1386 and the guilt-trial jury would be death qualified as it is 
under current practice with only a slight modification.387 
Sections (3) and (4) address the issue of possible prejudice to the 
defendant that may arise from the jury's consideration of both the de-
fendant's guilt and statutory aggravation in a single proceeding. Sec-
tion (3) enables the defendant to have a jury guilt trial and waive his 
or her rights under Ring, which will empower the sentencing court to 
make all findings of statutory aggravation as is now done under Ne-
braska law. The section also enables a defendant to waive a jury guilt 
trial in which event the penalty trial will also be conducted by the 
court if the defendant is convicted of first-degree murder. 
Section (4) permits a defendant found guilty of first-degree murder 
to request a bifurcated "aggravation" hearing at the conclusion of the 
guilt trial. This section also authorizes a defendant to stipulate to the 
presence of a statutory aggravating circumstance, thereby avoiding 
the risk that jury fact-finding on aggravation may prejudice the jury 
on the guilt issue, a risk that is particularly evident when the (l)(a) 
prior-record aggravator is charged.388 The four options in sections (3) 
and (4) will minimize the risk of unnecessarily recreating the pre-
Furman dangers associated with unitary capital trials.389 
386. Under current practice, with the exception of the prior-record statutory aggravat-
ing circumstance, (l)(a), the evidence offered to establish statutory aggravating 
circumstances is normally presented in the guilt trial and incorporated in the 
record of the sentencing hearing by reference thereto. This part of our proposal is 
also consistent with the suggestion of Justice Scalia in Ring that "[tjhose States 
that leave the ultimate life-or-death decision to the judge may continue to do so-
by requiring a prior jury finding of aggravating factor in the sentencing phase or, 
more simply, by placing the aggravating-factor determination (where it logically 
belongs anyway) in the guilt phase." Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2445 
(2002). 
387. The Nebraska statutes permit voir dire challenges for cause in capital cases when 
the venire member's "opinions are such as to preclude him from finding the ac-
cused guilty of an offense punishable with death." This section should be ex-
panded to include guilt- and penalty-trial "findings of the presence of a statutory 
aggravating circumstance." NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2006(3) (Reissue 1995). 
388. The bifurcated trial and stipulation provisions of our proposal are consistent with 
Justice Thomas' perception, stated in Apprendi, of possible alternatives to mini-
mize jury prejudice with respect to proof of a defendant's prior record in a guilt 
trial. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 520 n.10 (stating that it has been common practice to 
address concerns about jury prejudice by "permitting the defendant to stipulate 
to the prior conviction" or to "bifurcate the trial"). We propose providing the de-
fendant these options with respect to all of the statutory aggravating circum-
stances, not merely the (l)(a) aggravator based on the defendant's prior record. 
389. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 220, 228 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing). In a unitary trial, the defendant would face a dilemma in terms of whether 
his testimony on the presence of the statutory aggravating circumstances would 
prejudice him in the guilt decision and the unitary trial would conflate a purely 
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Sections (5) and (6) require jury instructions on the capital nature 
of the prosecution and the implications for the possible imposition of a 
death sentence of the jury's fact findings on aggravating circum-
stances. These sections would ensure that jurors were fully informed 
of the consequences of their fact-finding responsibilities.39o Further-
more, the instructions would recognize, as has been documented else-
where, that findings of aggravation and mitigation may reflect the 
sentencing authority's judgment of the defendant's deathworthi-
ness.391 The instructions would further recognize that sentencing ju-
rors commonly make up their minds on the life/death-sentencing 
outcome by the close of the guilt trial, without the benefit of any evi-
dence on mitigation.392 Finally, the jury role recommended here 
would introduce the values of the community into the sentencing pro-
cess, an important Eighth Amendment interest.393 
Section (7) would underscore the right of the state to waive the 
death penalty at any stage of a capital prosecution. 
Under this proposal, the trial court in a section 29-2521 sentencing 
hearing would be in a position to take into account jury fact findings 
factual question on guilt with a potentially value-laden judgment on the presence 
of statutory aggravating circumstances. 
390. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246, 258 (1988) (holding that the "nar-
rowing function" of a finding of statutory aggravation may be "performed by jury 
findings at either the sentencing phase of the trial or at the guilt phase," but 
three dissenting justices criticized the holding because at the guilt phase of a 
capital trial, the jury has not been adequately instructed to ensure the "appropri-
ate awareness of its 'truly awesome responsibility'''). 
391. See Philadelphia Study, supra note 10 (finding that Philadelphia juries who are 
advised that their failure to find mitigation after they have found aggravation 
will result in a mandatory death sentence, commonly find an aggravator present 
and no mitigation present in the case even though the evidence would clearly 
support a finding of mitigation). Nebraska's death qualification of guilt-trial ju-
rors in capital trials under current law reflects a perception ofthe extent to which 
attitudes on a defendant's deathworthiness may influence jury factual findings of 
the defendant's guilt or innocence. Supra note 387. 
392. In a study of 894 capital jurors, Bowers and Steiner found that nearly half 
(48.3%) of the jurors who were questioned thought they knew what sentence 
should be imposed during the guilt trial before the sentencing phase began. Of 
the jurors who thought they knew what sentence should be imposed during the 
guilt trial, 64.1% said they were "absolutely convinced" of what the punishment 
should be before the sentencing phase began and 41.3% said they were "pretty 
sure" of what the punishment should be before the sentencing phase began. Bow-
ers and Steiner's study also indicates that the propensity to make sentencing de-
cisions during the guilt trial stems from jurors discussing sentencing during 
guilt-trial deliberations. William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Choosing 
Life or Death: Sentencing Dynamics in Capital Cases, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT 
WITH CAPITAL PuNISHMENT 325-26 (J.R. Acker et al. eds., 1998). 
393. Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that ju-
ries are "more likely to express the conscience of the community on the ultimate 
question of life or death" (citations omitted)). 
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on statutory aggravation394 and defendant stipulations on the pres-
ence of aggravation and then proceed to exercise its sentencing discre-
tion in a manner that is quite comparable to current practice. The 
court would make findings on statutory mitigation, which is permissi-
ble under Ring, weigh the statutory aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances, conduct a comparative proportionality review, and 
impose a life or death sentence. In our judgment, no further changes 
in Nebraska law would be needed to satisfy the requirements of Ring 
v. Arizona.395 
2. Legislation to Clarify the Scope of Prosecutorial and Judicial 
Discretion Under Section 29-2521, Which Defines the Procedure 
for a First-Degree Murder Sentencing Hearing 
There is ambiguity under current law concerning a prosecutor's 
discretion to waive the death penalty in a death-eligible first-degree 
murder case. Although most prosecutors believe they have such dis-
cretion, some do not and believe that section 29-2521 requires them to 
present evidence of a statutory aggravating circumstance in the sen-
tencing hearing if it is present in a case. The second ambiguity con-
cerns the obligation of the trial court to conduct a penalty trial in a 
death-eligible first-degree murder case when the prosecutor seeks to 
waive the death penalty. Although most Nebraska courts acquiesce in 
the prosecution's waiver, some judges press ahead and conduct a pen-
alty trial in spite of the stated preference of the prosecution for a life 
sentence. The data indicate, however, that in these cases the court 
ultimately acquiesces in the state's desire and imposes a life sentence. 
394. Nebraska Revised Statute section 29-2521, which describes the evidence to be 
considered by the sentencing court would require a slight amendment along the 
following lines: The court shall consider "any jury findings of fact or any defen-
dant stipulations concerning the presence of statutory aggravatIng circumstances 
In the case" that are presented by the state as well as any "matters presented 
that relate to any of the mitigatIng circumstances set forth In sectIOn 29-2523, 
and If the defendant waives his or her rIght to Jury participation In the proceed-
Ings the court shall consider eVidence presented by the state that relates to any 
statutory aggravatIng circumstances charged In the case." (new matter 
underlIned). 
395. Supra note 145. A fall 2002 special session of the Nebraska Legislature amended 
the penal law to conform it to the requirements of Ring, by providing for a post 
guilt trial "aggravation hearing" in which the guilt-trial jury will make findings 
on the statutory aggravating circumstances alleged by the state. Findings of 
statutory mitigating circumstances, the weighing decision, and the imposition of 
a death or life sentence will remain in judicial hands via a three-judge sentencing 
panel; solo-judge sentencing is no longer an option in Nebraska. Act of Nov. 22, 
2002, LB 1, 2002 Neb. Laws __ , sec. 5, § 29-1603(2) (Ninety-Seventh Leg., 3d 
Spec. Sess.) (providing for notice of aggravation in the charging information), sec. 
11, § 29-2520 (instituting procedure for the jury aggravation hearing to be pre-
sided over by a three-judge panel that includes the guilt-trial judge). 
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One consequence of the currently conflicting interpretations of the 
code is that in counties where prosecutors believe they lack the au-
thority to waive the death penalty, many penalty trials are held in 
cases with low levels of aggravation and with virtually no prospect 
that a death sentence will be imposed. The proposed amendment 
would make clear that prosecutors have the discretion to waive the 
death penalty in death-eligible cases, as they do in every other Ameri-
can death penalty system of which we are aware. The proposal would 
also make clear that the prosecution's desire to waive a death sen-
tence in the case controls. 
The data indicate, therefore, that the interests of geographic uni-
formity and consistency396 would be served by the following amend-
ment to the Nebraska statute:397 
(2) In a first-degree murder prosecution, the State may, in its discretion, try a 
defendant non-capitally, notwithstanding the presence of an aggravating cir-
cumstance in the case, in which event a defendant convicted of first-degree 
murder will be sentenced to life imprisonment. 
The proposed amendment would make clear that the prosecution 
has the discretion to waive the death penalty in a death-eligible case 
and that the court's obligation to consider death as a sentencing option 
depends on the state's decision to seek a death sentence. This would 
eliminate the risk of tension between the court and the prosecution, as 
well as the need for consideration of death as a sentencing option 
when there is no prospect that a death sentence will be imposed. 
3. Legislation to Limit the Power of the Court to Impose a Death 
Sentence to Cases in Which It Believes That the Facts of the Case 
"Clearly Justify" the Imposition of a Death Sentence and That as 
a "Matter of Law" the Statutory Aggravating Circumstances 
"Substantially [or Clearly] Outweigh" the Statutory Mitigating 
Circumstances 
As a condition for the imposition of a death sentence, section 29-
2522 currently requires the sentencing court to determine that the 
statutory aggravating circumstances in the case are sufficient "to jus-
tify imposition of a sentence of death." A requirement that the court 
believes the aggravating circumstances "clearly" justify the imposition 
of a death sentence would reinforce the Legislature's intention that 
396. Supra section X. 
397. This proposal, which is modeled in part on a recent North Carolina amendment 
(N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2004(a) (2001)), would be added as a new paragraph (2) to 
section 29-2520. The existing language of section 29-2520 would be renumbered 
paragraph (1). 
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death sentences be limited to the most aggravated death-eligible 
cases.398 
We suggest further that the current judicial "weighing" standard 
be amended to require a finding that the statutory aggravation 
"clearly" or "substantially" outweighs the mitigation to support the 
imposition of a death sentence.399 Under current law, there is ambi-
guity concerning the degree to which aggravation must outweigh miti-
gation, although the case law clearly suggests that statutory 
aggravation must outweigh mitigation by more than a trivial 
amount.400 The "clearly" or "substantially" requirement that we pro-
pose would reinforce the Legislature's intention that death sentences 
be limited to the most aggravated cases.401 
We also recommend a characterization of the weighing decision as 
a "matter oflaw" to make plain that this is the core value judgment for 
the court that determines the life or death sentencing outcome. 
4. Legislation to Limit the Power of Prosecutors to Seek a Death 
Sentence to Cases in Which the Prosecutor Believes That the 
Facts of the Case "Justify" or "Clearly Justify" the Imposition of 
a Death Sentence 
Under current law, prosecutors may seek a death sentence in a 
death-eligible case regardless of the offender's level of criminal culpa-
bility. As a consequence, death sentences are sought by the state in 
cases with quite low levels of criminal culpability in which it is ex-
tremely unlikely that the court will impose a death sentence. How-
ever, this is not the statewide practice. In a number of counties, more 
than death eligibility is required to trigger a decision to seek a death 
sentence in the case. One such factor is the prosecutor's beliefthat the 
facts of the case justify the imposition of a death sentence. The 
398. The proposed amendment would be to section 29-2522(1), underlined here, as fol-
lows: [the sentencing judge's decision shall be based on the following considera-
tions:) "(1) Whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist to'clearly justify 
imposition of a sentence of death." --
399. The proposed amendment would be to section 29-2519, underlined here, as fol-
lows: "The Legislature therefor determines that the death penalty should be im-
posed only ... when as a matter oflaw the aggravating circumstances existing in 
connection with the cnme substantially [or clearly) outweigh the mitigating cir-
cumstances .... " The New York statute, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. 400.27(1l)(a) (2001), is 
precedent for this standard. (providing that the statutory aggravation must "sub-
stantially outweigh" the mitigation in the case). 
400. Supra, note 71 and accompanying text. 
401. As a means oflimiting death sentencing to the most aggravated cases, we believe 
that a "substantially outweigh" requirement is preferable to a requirement that 
the statutory aggravation outweighs the statutory mitigation beyond a reasona-
ble doubt because it emphasizes that the weighing decision is a legal value-based 
judgment rather than a finding of fact that must be allocated to a jury under 
Ring. 
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amendment proposed here would require the existence of such a 
prosecutorial belief as a predicate to a prosecutorial demand for a 
death sentence in a death-eligible case.402 The application of this 
standard would promote the interests of selectivity and consistency by 
bringing the standards guiding the exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
into conformity with the standards guiding the exercise of judicial 
discretion.403 
There is important precedent for this requirement outside Ne-
braska as well. Specifically, the federal death penalty law authorizes 
the government to seek a death sentence in death-eligible cases only 
when "the attorney for the government believes that the circum-
stances of the offense are such that a sentence of death is Justified 
under the Daw]."404 Department of Justice data indicate that in their 
application of this section United States Attorneys seek a death sen-
tence in 27% ofthe cases that are death-eligible under federallaw.405 
A similar provision in Nebraska that required the prosecution to be-
lieve that a death sentence in the case was "justified" or "clearly justi-
fied," could reduce significantly the level of geographic disparity in 
prosecutorial decisionmaking that we have documented in this study. 
5. Legislation to Limit Death Sentencing to Cases in Which the 
Defendant Had a Substantial Level of Mental 
Culpability (Mens Rea) 
One risk of arbitrariness under the Nebraska statute is its failure 
to require a level of mental culpability that is higher than the mini-
mum level required by the United States Constitution, i.e., reckless-
ness.406 Under Nebraska's felony-murder doctrine, a defendant with 
402. The amendment would add the following language, underlined here, to section 
29-2521, which regulates the conduct of penalty trials: "In the proceeding for de-
termination of sentence, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the 
court deems relevant to sentence, and, if the County Attorney believes that the 
circumstances of the offense are such that a sentence of death IS Justified [or 
clearly Justified) under the law, shall mclude matters relatmg to any of the aggra-
vatmg or mltIgatmg circumstances set forth in section 29-2523 ... ." 
403. If the Legislature were to establish a "clearly justified" standard for the judicial 
imposition of a death sentence, as we have suggested in the preceding section, 
geographic uniformity would be promoted if a similar standard were applied to 
limit the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The evidence is clear that a major 
source of inconsistency in the current system is the deviation between the stan-
dards applied by prosecutors and judges in their evaluation of death-eligible 
cases. 
404. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3593(a) (2000) (emphasis added), amended by 116 Stat. 1758 (Nov. 
2,2002). 
405. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM: A STA-
TISTICAL SURVEY (1988-2000) 7 (Sept. 12, 2000) (available in the University of 
Nebraska Law College Library). 
406. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157-58 (1987) (stating "we hold that the reckless 
disregard for human life implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities 
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only a Tison level of recklessness may be sentenced to death. Our re-
view ofthe Nebraska capital cases indicates that all ofthe defendants 
thus far sentenced to death had a mens rea that was substantially 
more culpable than recklessness, i.e., knowledge or intention to 
kill.407 Nevertheless, the breadth of Nebraska's current first-degree 
murder statute, as limited only by Tison, puts defendants with a mens 
rea of recklessness at risk of a penalty trial and death sentence. 
Accordingly, we recommend that the mens rea for death-eligibility 
be heightened to knowing or intentional killing. The proposed amend-
ment based on the New Jersey statute408 would be to section 29-2521, 
which regulates the conduct of penalty trials, with new matter 
underlined: 
In the proceeding for determination of sentence, evidence may be presented as 
to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence and, if the defendant 
(a) committed the homicidal act by his own conduct, (b) was an accompitce 
who procured the commiSSIOn of the offense by payment or promise of pay-
ment or anything of pecumary value, or (c) was the leader of a conspiracy who 
commanded or by threat or promise solicited the commiSSIOn of the homicide, 
shaII Include matters relatmg to any of the aggravating or mlbgatmg circum-
stances set forth in section 29-2523 .... 
6. Legislation to Limit Death Sentencing to Cases in Which the 
Defendant's Level of Criminal Culpability is Comparable to That 
Historically Found in Cases with Two or More Statutory 
Aggravating Circumstances 
This amendment would add to the trial court's comparative propor-
tionality review procedure a presumption against the imposition of a 
death sentence in cases with a single aggravating circumstance. Our 
empirical findings support such a rule in two ways. First, with few 
exceptions, both trial courts and the Nebraska Supreme Court have 
applied such a rule de facto for over twenty-five years. As a conse-
quence, during the entire period of this research only three death 
sentences were imposed in single-aggravator cases and none of those 
offenders was executed or remains on death row. The proposed legis-
lation would ratify that rule by adding the following additional stan-
dard (underlined) under section 29-2522 (3), which imposes on the 
trial courts its proportionality review requirement: 
(3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the pen-
alty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant, 
and in the course of this review, the court, in cases involving one statutory 
aggravating circumstance, will apply a presumptIOn In favor of a life sentence 
known to carry a grave risk of death represents a highly culpable mental state, a 
mental state that may be taken into account in making a capital sentencing judg-
ment when that conduct causes its natural, though also not inevitable, lethal 
result"). 
407. See the narrative summaries of the death-sentenced cases in Appendix D. 
408. This proposal is modeled after N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 11-3 c. (2002). 
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unless the level of criminal culpability in the case is comparable to that pre-
sent histoncally m Nebraska capItal cases mvolvmg two or more statutory 
aggravatmg clrcumstances.409 
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This new standard would create an additional comparative propor-
tionality review requirement in cases with a single statutory aggra-
vating circumstance. It would also create a presumption in favor of a 
life sentence in those cases. A death sentence would be appropriate in 
single-aggravator cases only if the statutory aggravating circumstance 
has exceptional weight and there is little or no mitigation in the case. 
The legislative history of this amendment should indicate that the 
level of "criminal culpability" underlying the new standard embraces 
(a) the defendant's "moral blameworthiness," (b) the "degree of victim-
ization," and (c) the "character of the defendant."41o 
This standard would underscore the Legislature's commitment to 
selectivity in death sentencing without limiting the capacity of the 
system to deliver justice. The standard would also reduce the amount 
of capital litigation by approximately 50%, yielding considerable fi-
nancial savings.411 The proposed limitation may also improve the 
strength of the capital cases that are prosecuted, thereby enhancing 
the likelihood that the death sentences imposed will be sustained on 
appeal. 
The proposed limitation would reduce substantially the level of ar-
bitrariness in the system,412 which flows principally from geographic 
409. The other two standards in section 29-2522 are (1) "Whether sufficient aggravat-
ing circumstances exist to justify imposition of a sentence of death" and (2) 
"Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which approach or exceed the 
weight given to the aggravating circumstances." 
410. State v. Papasavvas, 790 A.2d 798, 808 (N.J. 2002) (propounding death sentence 
comparative proportionality decision with the following detail on the three ele-
ments of criminal culpability: "Moral blameworthiness - motive, premeditation, 
justification or excuse, evidence of mental disease, defect or disturbance, knowl-
edge of victim's helplessness or effect on nondecedent victims, defendant's age 
and involvement in planning the murder; Degree of victimization - violence and 
brutality of the murder, injury to nondecenent victims; Character of the defen-
dant - prior record, other unrelatied acts of violence, remorse, and capacity for 
rehabilitation"). 
411. 55% (48/88) of the state's penalty-trial cases involved one statutory aggravating 
circumstance and a death sentence was imposed in three of them: State v. Hoch-
stein, 262 Neb. 311, 632 N.W.2d 273 (2001), State v. Andersen, 216 Neb. 521, 344 
N.W.2d 473 (1984), and State v. Simpson, 200 Neb. 823, 265 N.W.2d 681 (1978). 
412. Important precedent for this proposal is the policy applied by the Florida Su-
preme Court in its proportionality reviews of death sentences, designed to limit 
death sentencing to the most aggravated and least mitigated cases. See supra 
note 329. In pursuit of that goal the Florida court applies a presumption that 
death sentences will be vacated by the court as disproportionate ifthey involve "a 
single-aggravator case where there is substantial mitigation." Jones v. State, 705 
So. 2d 1364, 1366 (Fla. 1998). During the 2002 session of the Nebraska Legisla-
ture, Senator Kermit A. Brashear, Chair of the Judiciary Committee, introduced 
legislation along this line. His proposal goes beyond a presumption and limits 
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disparities in the rates that cases advance to penalty trial.413 Our 
findings indicate that these effects are heavily concentrated in the sin-
gle-aggravator cases and, to a lesser extent, in the two-aggravator 
cases. Accordingly, the proposed rule would limit geographic dispari-
ties in the rates that prosecutors advance cases to penalty trial. Sec-
death sentencing to death-eligible cases involving at least two statutory ag-
gravators or the "heinous, atrocious, and cruel" aggravator. LB 1281, sec. 4, 97th 
Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2001), available at LEXIS 2001 Bill Text NE L.B. 1281 
(proposing amendments to section 29-2522). See infra note 413 for a description 
of the Senator's rationale for this proposal. 
413. Concern about the level of adverse disparate impact on minorities is a principal 
justification for the proposal of Nebraska Senator Kermit Brashear. Ai3 he ex-
plains in a statement of intent for his proposal: 
[W]ithout dispute, there exists an adverse impact on minority defend-
ants in capital cases. 
The source of the adverse impact is state law, which gives prosecutors 
broad discretion in prosecution of death-eligible cases, and that racial 
minorities principally reside in the major urban counties of Nebraska. 
The data from the study clearly indicate that the source of the racial 
impact comes from cases in which only one aggravating circumstance is 
present. ... In order to direct attention to this fact pattern and promote 
debate thereon, LB 1281 requires proof ofthe existence of at least two (2) 
aggravating factors in order for a death sentence to be imposed unless 
one such proved aggravator is that the murder was "especially heinous, 
atrocious, cruel, or manifested exceptional depravity by ordinary stan-
dards of morality." 
Introducer's Statement of Intent LB 1281, 97th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., p. 3 (Neb. 
2001), available at http://www.unicam.state.ne.usJPDF/StatementOfIntent_ 
LB1281.pdf. 
Senator Brashear's objective of limiting death sentencing to the most aggra-
vated cases as a means of reducing race effects in the system is consistent with 
the recommendation of Justice Stevens in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 
(1987). In that case the evidence documented significant disparate treatment 
based on the race of the victim that was concentrated in the mid-range of cases in 
terms of offender culpability. The data also established that there were no signif-
icant race effects among the most aggravated cases. Accordingly, Justice Stevens 
proposed the following solution: "If Georgia were to narrow the class of death-
eligible defendants to those [most aggravated] categories, the danger of arbitrary 
and discriminatory imposition of the death penalty would be significantly de-
creased, if not eradicated." [d. at 366. 
Senator Brashear's recommendation is also consistent with a recommendation 
of the Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment, appointed by Illinois Gov-
ernor George Ryan in 2000. A majority of this commission concluded that the 
"death penalty has been applied too often in Illinois since it was reestablished in 
1977" and recommended that death-eligibility be limited to cases in which the 
"defendant has murdered two or more persons, or where the victim was either a 
police officer or a firefighter; or an officer or inmate of a correctional institution; 
or was murdered to obstruct the justice system; or was tortured in the course of 
the murder." GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON CAPITAL PuNISHMENT, RECOMMENDATIONS 
ONLY i, ii (2002), available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/ 
commission]eport/summary]ecommendations.pdf (available in the University 
of Nebraska Law College Library). 
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ond, it would reduce the level of adverse disparate impact against 
minority offenders in the rates that cases advance to penalty trial. 
Third, the proposed rule would reduce the impact of the socioeconomic 
status of victims on charging and sentencing outcomes. Fourth, the 
proposal would enhance the consistency and selectivity of the system 
and reduce the risk of comparative excessiveness in death-sentencing 
outcomes. 
7. Legislation (a) to Require the Development of Statewide 
Standards for the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in Capital 
Cases, and (b) to Require Prosecutorial Consultation with a 
Prosecutorial Advisory Committee as a Condition for the Court's 
Convening of a Penalty Trial 
A significant finding of this research is a striking lack of consis-
tency in prosecutorial decisions to seek death sentences.414 The prin-
cipal explanation for this inconsistency is a tradition among Nebraska 
prosecutors to set and apply their own countywide standards of 
deathworthiness without regard to prosecutorial policies and practices 
in other parts of the state. The legislation proposed here would re-
sult in the establishment of statewide standards for the evaluation 
of the deathworthiness of death-eligible defendants beyond those in-
cluded in existing law.415 These proposals are based on existing 
414. Supra section X. 
415. The proposal would add the following new paragraph to section 23-1213: 
There is hereby created within the Nebraska County Attorney Stan-
dards Advisory Council a Death Penalty Advisory Committee (the "com-
mittee") consisting of the four county attorney members of the Council. 
Within one year of the appointment ofthis committee, it shall, in consul-
tation with the Attorney General, the Nebraska County Attorney's Asso-
ciation and the Nebraska Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 
promulgate guidelines to guide the exercise of discretion of county attor-
neys in their determinations of whether to seek a death sentence in 
death-eligible cases. The committee will also entertain requests from 
county attorneys for confidential advisory opinions on the appropriate-
ness of seeking death sentences in individual cases. In this process of 
review, the committee shall also invite from defense counsel a written 
submission, and the committee may solicit from the county attorney and 
defense counsel any other information it considers relevant. The com-
mittee shall render its advisory opinions in writing within three months 
of its receipt of submissions from the county attorney and defense coun-
sel. In its deliberations on requested advisory opinions, the committee 
shall consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the case, 
relevant decisions of the United States and Nebraska Supreme Court, its 
own prosecutorial guidelines for seeking a death sentence in death-eligi-
ble cases, and the pattern ofprosecutorial charging and judicial sentenc-
ing cases in comparable cases since 1973. Under no circumstances will 
the committee or the county attorney who requested the opinion disclose 
the nature of the opinion to the defendant, the media, or any other 
person. 
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practices both in the states416 and in the federal death penalty 
system.417 
This proposal contemplates an expansion of the responsibilities of 
the Nebraska County Attorney Standards Advisory Council, a legisla-
tively created body consisting of four county attorneys or deputy 
county attorneys (one each from Douglas and Lancaster counties and 
two from greater Nebraska), a law professor, and two county com-
missioners or supervisors.418 The proposal would create a Death 
Penalty Advisory Committee (the "committee") within the Advisory 
Council, consisting of the four county attorney members of the 
Council.419 
The committee would be charged with the responsibility for 
promulgating statewide standards for prosecutors to determine 
whether a death penalty in a death-eligible case is appropriate. The 
guidelines would be advisory in nature and would create no rights or 
duties in the state or capital defendants. 
The committee would also review requests of county attorneys for 
confidential advisory opinions on the appropriateness of a capital 
prosecution in individual death-eligible cases. In its consideration of 
requests for such opinions, the committee would consider all evidence 
of aggravation and mitigation in the case submitted by the county at-
torney seeking the advisory opinion and defense counsel, as well as 
data on the disposition of Nebraska death-eligible cases since 1973. 
The advisory opinion of the committee would be issued in writing 
within three months of the final submission concerning the requested 
opinion. Under no circumstances would the committee or the county 
416. New Jersey charging decisions are governed by the Guidelines for the Designa-
tion of Homicide Cases for Capital Prosecution, approved by the Attorney Gen-
eral and the County Prosecutors Association. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 607 A.2d 
974,978-79 (N.J. 1992) (discussing the impact of the guidelines). For examples of 
state peer review systems, see the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office, 
Legal Policies Manual, Chapter I1I.E.lO, "Appropriateness of Death Penalty in a 
Special Circumstances Case." The operation of the procedure is described in Leo 
v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 1986 Cal. App. 3d 274 (1986). Baltimore 
City, Maryland, has a similar review procedure. Lori Montgomery, MD, Ques-
tioning Local Extremes on Death Penalty, WASH. POST, May 11,2002 at C1 ("[A] 
team of prosecutors conducts quarterly reviews of every murder case, reviewing 
the facts of the crime, the strength of the evidence, the criminal history of the 
killer and any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Sometimes [Baltimore 
City State's Attorney Patricia Coats] Jessamy even invites defense attorneys 'to 
sit down with us and help us reach a conclusion."'). 
417. The operation of the federal system is described in Rory K. Little, The Federal 
Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the Department of Justice's 
Role, 26 FORDHAM L. REV. 347, 406-39 (1999). 
418. NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-1213 (2001). 
419. If the Legislature believed that a more representative panel of county attorneys 
was desirable, the number of county attorneys involved in the advisory commit-
tee could be expanded. 
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attorney who requested the advisory opinion reveal the nature of the 
committee's opinion. The experience of a similar committee in Los An-
geles County, California, provides good precedent for the establish-
ment of a Nebraska review committee.42o 
The proposal would also amend section 23-1218 of the Advisory 
Council legislation to charge the Nebraska Commission on Law En-
forcement and Criminal Justice with the responsibility for providing 
the Advisory Committee with up-to-date information on all death-eli-
gible homicides prosecuted in Nebraska since 1973.421 
Finally, the proposal would add a requirement to the death penalty 
statute that a condition to the trial court's convening a penalty trial in 
a death-eligible case would be a certification by the county attorney's 
office that it had obtained an advisory opinion from the Death Penalty 
Advisory committee.422 
8. Legislative Adoption of a "Fairness in Death Sentencing Act" 
This proposal is based, in part on (a) a proposed federal law, (b) a 
proposed Florida judicial rule to reduce the risk of unfairness in capi-
tal charging,423 and (c) the Kentucky Racial Justice Act424 which may 
limit the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in certain circumstances. 
The following is the proposed language: 
PROPOSED NEW SECTION - NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523.2 - Fairness in Death 
Sentencing Act. 
(1) When the state announces its intention to seek a death sentence at the 
conclusion of a first-degree murder trial or a court imposes a death sentence, 
the defendant may challenge the charging or sentencing decision, as the case 
may be, on either of the following grounds: 
(a) A penalty trial or death sentence in a case with the defendant's level of 
criminal culpability would be geographically excessive and disproportionate 
420. See supra note 416. 
421. The proposal would add the following new paragraph to section 23-1218, which 
defines the support role of the crime commission for the County Attorney Stan-
dards Advisory Council: 
(10) Create, maintain, and update on a continuing basis for the use of 
the Death Penalty Advisory Committee, a machine-readable database 
and full narrative summaries of all Nebraska death-eligible cases prose-
cuted since 1973 and provide the Advisory Committee, as needed, with 
any additional information required for its review function. 
422. This proposal would add the following sentence to section 29-2520, which pro-
vides for the convening of a sentencing hearing in death-eligible cases: "The 
court's convening of a sentencing hearing under this section is contingent upon 
the prosecution filing with the court a statement that it has received from the 
Death Penalty Advisory Committee an advisory opinion on the appropriateness 
of seeking a death penalty in the case pursuant to section 23-1213." 
423. Inevitability, supra note 16, at 413-16,420-25 (1994) (considering proposed Flor-
ida rule and proposed federal legislation). 
424. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN § 532.300 (Banks-Baldwin 1998) ("Prohibition Against Death 
Sentence Being Sought or Given on the Basis of Race: Procedures for Dealing 
with Claims"). 
HeinOnline -- 81 Neb. L. Rev. 686 2002-2003
686 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:486 
given the defendant's moral blameworthiness, the degree of victimization in 
the case, the character of the defendant, and the charging and sentencing 
practices of prosecutors and judges throughout the state in comparable cases 
since 1973. 
(b) The race or socioeconomic status of the defendant or victim, or any 
other characteristic of the defendant or victim, which is unrelated to the de-
fendant's criminal culpability, was a factor in the decision to seek or impose a 
death sentence in the case, as the case may be. 
(2) If a claimant offers statistical evidence to support a claim under this 
Act, the validity, reliability, and relevance of such evidence and the inferences 
it may support will be assessed by generally accepted standards used to evalu-
ate statistical evidence in employment and housing anti-discrimination litiga-
tion under federal law. 
9. Legislation to Require the Nebraska Law Enforcement and 
Criminal Justice Commission to Maintain a Database of All 
Death-Eligible Cases for Use by Courts, the State, Defense 
Counsel, and Scholars in the Field 
Our findings document the potential of proportionality reviews 
conducted by sentencing judges to enhance geographic uniformity in 
the imposition of the death penalty. However, the potential of such 
reviews in this regard depends on the availability to the court and the 
litigants of reliable statewide information on the facts and outcomes of 
death-eligible cases that are comparable to the case under review on 
whatever dimension the court applies its comparative focus. Such in-
formation is not currently available on all death-eligible cases. Specif-
ically, for the death-eligible cases that did not advance to a penalty 
trial, very little information is publicly available and, if so, only at the 
county level. For the cases that advance to a penalty trial and result 
in a death sentence, there are good data available in the opinions of 
the Nebraska Supreme Court, which reviews all death-sentenced 
cases on appeal. However, for the penalty-trial cases that result in a 
life sentence, the trial court orders and opinions are normally quite 
thin on the facts of the cases and address the issues from a general 
perspective that focuses on the number and types of aggravators and 
mitigators in the case, with little reference to the underlying facts that 
are needed for a meaningful comparative review of those cases. The 
explanation for this situation is that the orders and opinions are ad-
dressed to the parties to the case and assume that they are fully aware 
of the underlying facts of the case. 
For the conduct of meaningful comparative proportionality re-
views, detailed information is required on all death-eligible cases. The 
availability of such data to scholars would also be in the public inter-
est. To fill this gap, we propose the following amendment to section 
81-1425, paragraph (7), that currently requires the Commission on 
Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (a) to collect "criminal homi-
cide" case data since 1973, which we compiled under contract with the 
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commission,425 (b) to update the homicide database annually, and (c) 
to transmit the database to the Governor, the Legislature, and the Ne-
braska Supreme Court: 
The homicide database, which the commission will create, maintain, and up-
date on a regular basis under this section, shall include machine-readable 
data and full narrative summaries of all Nebraska death-eligible homicides, 
with complete factual and procedural detail including for each case that ad-
vances to a first-degree murder sentencing hearing, any jury findings of fact 
and the trial court's findings of fact, conclusions oflaw, and sentencing order. 
In addition to the parties named in this subdivision, all of this information 
will be made available on request to trial courts, prosecutors, and defense 
counsel in death-eligible cases, as well as to scholars working in this area of 
the law. For the purpose of database disclosures made pursuant to this sec-
tion, the confidentiality requirements of section 29-2261(6) limiting the disclo-
sure of information in pre-sentence investigation reports (PSIs) that may be 
included in the criminal homicide database and narrative summaries are 
hereby waived, provided, however, that the commission may condition the re-
lease of the database and narrative summaries to scholars with the execution 
of an agreement that he or she will not, in any publication or otherwise, link 
to any individual defendant information obtained from a PSI that is not 
clearly in the public domain.426 
425. Thumbnail sketches of the 185 death-eligible prosecutions between 1973 and 
1999 are included in Appendix D of this Article. 
426. The Office of the Nebraska Attorney General has ruled that the requirement of 
section 29-2261 (6) prohibits the release of any information "found only in the PSI 
reports, or which one can ascertain has been derived from the PSI reports." Op. 
Att'y Gen. No. 01037 (Nov. 27, 2001) at 6. This opinion also ruled that the prohi-
bition does not apply to information drawn from the PSIs that "may also be found 
in other non-confidential sources, such as court orders and appellate opinions." 
[d. at 7-8. Because the vast majority of the material in the database and narra-
tive summaries is available in documents that are in the public domain, such as 
arrest, charging, guilt- and penalty-trial documents, appellate opinions, and the 
media, the prohibitions of section 29-2261 typically have little applicability to the 
information in the database and narrative summaries. Their principal applica-
tion relates to information concerning the defendant's personal history with re-
spect to such matters as sexual orientation, religious preference, education, 
occupation, employment history, criminal record, mental health and substance 
abuse, and mental illness and mental retardation, when that information has not 
been introduced in either the guilt trial or penalty trial, actions that would put 
the information in the public domain. Only when this kind of information is not 
part of the record of the case does the prohibition on dissemination apply. How-
ever, in some cases it is difficult to ascertain whether the information became a 
part of the record since the researchers did not have access to all ofthe papers in 
the case. This is where there may be a risk of a violation of the statutory limita-
tion on disclosure. In our judgment, based on our extensive use of these records 
for this research project, we believe the amount of protected information in the 
database and narrative summaries is quite small but that the task of identifying 
what that information is in each case is administratively difficult in the absence 
of access to all of the papers in the case, which rarely occurs. Accordingly, we 
believe that the interests of the courts and parties in capital cases in having full 
information on the facts of the cases that bear on each death-eligible defendant's 
criminal culpability clearly outweigh any invasion of offender privacy interests 
that might be implicated by disclosure of protected data to the court and parties 
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in such cases. Moreover, the amendment would require, as a condition for the 
release of the database and narrative summaries to scholars working in this area 
of the law, the execution of an agreement that the investigator will refrain from 
disclosing any information about individual defendants that is not clearly in the 
public domain. 
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APPENDIX A 
METHODOLOGY 
1. Case Screening Plan and Data Sources 
We identified the potential universe of Nebraska criminal homicide 
cases from April 20, 1973, to December 31,1999, with a statewide case 
list and other case-identifying techniques. The primary source for 
identifying these cases was a list of Nebraska homicide cases gener-
ated by the Records Administrator for the Department of Correctional 
Services. According to the Department of Correctional Services, this 
list contained all criminal homicides for which a defendant was con-
victed and sentenced to serve any amount of prison time. In addition, 
we conducted a comprehensive electronic search of all reported Ne-
braska cases and reviewed the Criminal Homicide Reports that each 
County Attorney is required to file with the State Court Administra-
tor's Office following the prosecution of each homicide. Finally, we re-
quested each County Attorney to review our list of homicides that 
were committed during the study period and identify any cases that 
were not in our identified universe of cases. With this information, we 
developed a screening plan designed to identify (a) all of the homicides 
committed in Nebraska during the study period that resulted in a 
homicide conviction and (b) which of these cases were death-eligible 
under Nebraska law. For each of these cases we coded a 15-page data 
collection instrument, known as the Initial Screening Instrument 
("lSI"). For each of the cases that we identified as death-eligible, we 
completed a detailed data collection instrument ("DCI"). 
A major challenge in this type of research is obtaining reliable data 
on the cases. A defendant's pre-sentence investigation report served 
as the first and best source of information regarding a particular de-
fendant, the facts of a particular homicide, and witness information. 
A pre-sentence investigation report ("PSI") includes a detailed descrip-
tion of the defendant that is generated by a probation officer following 
a criminal conviction. In particular, the PSI will often contain de-
scriptive information regarding the physical, mental, and emotional 
health of the defendant. It discusses the defendant's personal family 
history, ordinarily contains the defendant's personal criminal history, 
and sometimes contains a description of the victim. The PSI also often 
contains a description of the crime that is generated from the trial 
record, police reports, and interviews with the defendant. 
At the outset of the study we attempted to collect a copy of the PSI 
and the Department of Correctional Services Classification Study for 
each defendant in our universe of potentially death-eligible cases from 
the Department of Correctional Services Records. In the cases in 
which the Department of Correctional Services did not have a PSI, we 
contacted each state probation district and requested a copy of the 
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pre-sentence investigation report. The PSIs were often available from 
the State Probation Offices; however, as a result of the document re-
tention policies of the State Probation Office, PSIs were sometimes 
unavailable. In those cases, we requested the District Court where 
the case was originally tried to provide us with the original court re-
cord of the case and any bills of exception that were generated in the 
case. 
We relied on the study files containing the information described 
above to screen cases for death eligibility. As each case was reviewed, 
law student coders completed the Initial Screening Instrument (lSI). 
Once it was determined that a case was death-eligible, we under-
took an additional stage of case file information development. For all 
penalty-trial cases, including death-sentenced cases, the most impor-
tant additional data sources were the record of the trial and sentenc-
ing, if available, the opinion of the Nebraska Supreme Court, if the 
case was appealed, and the briefs of the State and the defendant. 
We obtained information on the racial and social background of the 
defendant from the PSI and the Department of Correctional Services 
Classification Study. Death certificates provided the primary data 
source for information regarding the demographic background of the 
victim. 
2. Data Coding and Entry 
The case files described above provided the basis for the case cod-
ing process conducted in Lincoln, Nebraska, during the Summer and 
Fall of 2000. The data collection instrument for the non-capital 
cases-the lSI-contains 138 entries. In addition, the coders com-
pleted thumbnail sketches of each non-capital case. The data collec-
tion instrument used to code the capital murder cases-the DCI-
contains over 500 entries for each case. Each coder also completed a 
detailed narrative summary and a 5- to 10-line "thumbnail sketch" for 
each case. 
The procedural coding for each statutory aggravating and mitigat-
ing circumstance and its strength of evidence measure were individu-
ally reviewed and verified. Project staff handled all data entry for the 
lSI, DCI, and the narrative summaries. A project staff member not 
involved with the data entry visually checked the data entered against 
each DCI to flag data entry errors. 
HeinOnline -- 81 Neb. L. Rev. 691 2002-2003




HOMICIDE CASE TYPOLOGY BASED ON STATUTORY AGGRAVATING 
AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES: 
691 
VN606 ___ , __ _ 
Letter No. 
Coder Note: Enter one choice only. If more than one category applies, code the most aggravated category, 
with category A being the most aggravated and category J being the least aggravated category. 
A low mitigation case refers to one with two or fewer statutory mitigating circumstances (a) found (or 
recognized with respect to the catchall factor) in penalty-trial cases or (b) present in non-penalty trial cases. 
However, catchall factors account for only one mitigator regardless of their number. A high mitigation case 
refers to one with three or more mitigating circumstances found (or recognized with respect to the catchall 
factor in penalty trials) or present in non-penalty-trial cases (with catchall factors counting as only one mitigator 
regardless of their number). 
A. PRIOR HOMICIDE - Murder by a defendant with a prior murder or manslaughter conviction - 1 (a): 
1. Aggravated' Low Mitigation 3. Other Low Mitigation 
2. Aggravated' High Mitigation 4. Other High Mitigation 
B. POLICE VICTIM - Victim was a law officer killed in the line of duty and defendant knew or should 
reasonably have known that the victim was a law officer - 1 (i): 
1. Low Mitigation 
2. High Mitigation 
C. JAILER VICTIM - The victim was a law enforcement officer or public servant having the custody of the 
defendant or another - 1 (g): 
1. Low Mitigation 
2. High Mitigation 
D. MULTIPLE VICTIMS - Multiple-victim murder - 1 (e): 
1. Aggravated' Low Mitigation 3. Other Low Mitigation 
2. Aggravated' High Mitigation 4. Other High Mitigation 
, Aggravated refers to the presence of an additional statutory aggravating circumstance. 
, An aggravated multiple-victim case involves a contemporaneous felony (e.g., robbery, kidnapping) 
other than a drug crime, or an additional statutory aggravating circumstance. 
HeinOnline -- 81 Neb. L. Rev. 692 2002-2003
692 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:486 
E. VIOLENT RECORD - Murder by a defendant with a substantial history of serious assaultive or terrorizing 
criminal activitv or with a prior conviction of a crime involving the use of a threat of 
violence to the person - 1 (a): 
1. Aggravated' Low Mitigation 3. Other Low Mitigation 
2. Aggravated' High Mitigation 4. Other High Mitigation 
F. CONTRACT KILLING· Murder for (a) hire by a principal or agent (shooter) or (b) for pecuniary 
ggjn - 1 (c): 
1. Aggravated' Low Mitigation 3. Other Low Mitigation 
2. Aggravated' High Mitigation 4. Other High Mitigation 
G. ESCAPE DETECTION - A murder committed in which the defendant's motive was an apparent effort 
to conceal either the commission of a crime or the identitv of the perpetrator 
of a crime - 1 (b): 
1. Aggravated' Low Mitigation 3. Other Low Mitigation 
2. Aggravated' High Mitigation 4. Other High Mitigation 
H. HAC OR DEPRAVITY - Murder was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel (HAC) or defendant 
manifested exceptional depravitv by ordinary standards of moralitv and 
intelligence - 1 (d): 
1. Low Mitigation 
2. High Mitigation 
I. GRAVE RISK - A murder in which the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death to at least two 
or more persons - 1 (f): 
1. Low Mitigation 
2. High Mitigation 
J. HINDER GOVERNMENT FUNCTION -The defendant committed the crime to disrupt or hinder the 
lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement 
of the laws - 1 (h): 
1. Low Mitigation 
2. High Mitigation 
H
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APPENDIX C 
EVIDENCE OF COMPARATIVE EXCESSIVENESS IN NEBRASKA DEATH-SENTENCING DECISIONS (1973-1999): DEATH-SENTENCING RATES AMONG COMPARABLE 
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2,2 .44 .17 
(419) (4124) 
1.2 .18 .05 
(VII) (2137) 
3.1 .80 .67 
(415) (416) 
3.2 1.0 .60 
313) (315 
2.1 .71 .50 
5n) (5110 
4.1 1.0 .67 
(616) (213) 
2.2 .44 .17 
(419) (4124) 
1.2 .18 .05 
(VII) (2137) 
4.2 1.0 1.0 
(616) (3/3) 
2.2 .44 .17 
(419) (4124) 
2.1 .71 .50 
(5m (5110) 
3.3 1.0 .67 
(414) (416) 
3.2 1.0 .60 
(313) (315) 
3.1 .80 .67 
(415) (416) 
3.2 1.0 .60 
(3/3) (315) 
2.1 .71 .50 
(5m (5/10) 
2.0 .33 .33 
(V6) (216) 
2.0 .33 .33 
(V6) (216) 
2.1 .71 .50 
(sn) (5110) 
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A B C D E F G H I I J I K 
Number of Aggravating Number of Aggravating & Salient Factors Measure Regression-Based Scales Based on: 
Circumstances Mitigating Circumstances Penally-Trial Sentencing Model Death Sentence Imposed Among 
All Death-Eli ible 
Defendant's Case Death-Sentencing Case Death-Sentencing Case Death-Sentencing Case Death-Sentencing Case Death-Sentencing 
Number Classifi- Rate in Classifi- Rate in Classifi- Rate in Classifi- Rate in Classification Classifi- Rate in Classification 
cation Classification cation Classification cation Classification cation cation 
PT O.E. PT O.E. PT O.E. Among Penal~y- Among All D.E. 
Cases l Casesl Cases1 Casesl Cases l Casesl Tria! Cases Casesl 
20. Pony 4 1.0 .86 4.1 1.0 .67 EI .67 .40 4 .93 4 .87 
(616) (611) (616) (213) (619) (6115) (14115) (20123) 
21. Reeves 3 .89 .67 3.1 .80 .67 01 .60 .43 4 .93 4 .87 
,(819) 
-'-8112) 415 (4/6) ,(6110) (6114) (14115) (20/23) 
22. Rust 4 1.0 .86 4.2 1.0 1.0 EI .67 .40 4 .93 4 .87 
616) (611) (616) (313) (619) (6115) (14115) 20/23 
23. Ryan 2 .48 .24 2.2 .44 .05 EI .67 .40 2 .36 4 .87 
(12/25) (12149) (419) (2137) (619) (6115) (5114) (20123) 
24. Sheets 2 .48 .24 2.3 .56 .14 G2 .20 .14 2 .36 4 .87 
(12125) (12149) (9/16) (In) (115) (In) (5/14) (20123) 
25. Simants 3 .89 .67 3.1 .80 .67 01 .60 .43 4 .93 4 .87 
(819) (8112 (4/5) (416 (6110) 6114) 14115) 20/23) 
26. Simpson I .07 .03 1.1 .07 .03 A3 .67 .25 I .06 2 .05 
(3/41) (3/108) (1114) (1/33) (213) (1/4) (3/48) (3162) 
27. Stewart 6 1.0 .86 6.2 1.0 1.0 D2 .25 .20 4 .93 4 .87 
616) (611) (616) (III) (1/4 115 14115) 20123 
28. Victor 2 .48 .24 2,1 .71 .50 AI .67 .29 3 .64 3 .22 
(12/25) (12149) (5f1l (5/10) (213) (217) (7/11) (6/27) 
29. Williams 4 1.0 .86 4.2 1.0 1.0 01 .60 .43 4 .93 4 .87 
(616) (611) (616) (3/3) (6110) (6114) (14115) (20/23) 
, "PT" and "Penalty Trial" cases refers to near ne:ghbors whose cases advanced to a penalty trial. 
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APPENDIX D 
DEATH-ELIGIBLE CASES CLASSIFIED BY A SALIENT FACTORS MEASURE 
OF OFFENDER CULPABILITY 
Table of Contents Page 
Part 1. A Guide to Appendix D Abbreviations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 697 
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Part I. A Guide to Appendix D Abbreviations 
1 . Defendant. "D" stands for defendant. Unless otherwise indicated 
all defendants and victims are male. If a death-sentenced offender's 
sentence was vacated on appeal, the subsequent proceeding is desig-
nated with a suffix after his name, e.g., Drinkwalter (A) (first) and 
Drinkwalter (B) (second). Ifthe offender committed two death-eligible 
offenses on different occasions, the different offenses are designated 
with a I or II suffix, e.g., Simpson CD and Simpson (II). 
2. Co-Perpetrators. "Co-P, Co-P2, Co-P3, etc." stand for the defen-
dant's co-perpetrators. 
3. Victim(s). ''V, VI, V2, etc." stand for the victim and any additional 
victims; "NDV" refers to victims who were injured but not killed. 
4. Homicide Grade. "Ml, M2, or MS." stand respectively for murder 
1, murder 2, or manslaughter. 
5. Charge and Conviction. In an Ml prosecution, "Charge: Ml" indi-
cates that Ml was the original charge, while "Jury: Ml," "Bench: 
Ml,"or "Plea: Ml" indicates the basis of an Ml conviction. The same 
nomenclature is used for M2 and MS charges and convictions. 
6. Ml Sentencing Hearings. "P. TriallD.P. Sought" indicates that a 
penalty trial was held in which the state presented evidence of statu-
tory aggravating circumstances. "P. Trial/No Agg. Cir. Presented" 
means that a Ml sentencing hearing was held but the state presented 
no evidence of statutory aggravation. 
7. Statutory Aggravation and Mitigation. "Agg. Cir." and "Mit. Cir." 
stand for the statutory aggravating and statutory mitigating circum-
stances (a) found in a penalty trial, unless "presented/not found" is 
indicated or (b) present in a non-penalty trial case. "Agg. Cir.: None" 
means no aggravation was found to be present by the sentencing 
court. The applicable statutory aggravators and mitigators are also 
described and identified by section numbers. See Table 1 for a com-
plete list of the statutory aggravators and mitigators which underlie 
the salient factors classification system. 
8. Non-Statutory Mitigation. "Non-Stat. Mit.: Present" indicates that 
non-statutory mitigation was presented and considered by the court in 
a Ml sentencing hearing or was present in a non-penalty trial case. 
9. Sentence Imposed. "Life" and "Death" indicate that a life or death 
sentence was imposed for the homicide, while a term of years imposed 
for a homicide less than Ml is indicated by the length of the sentence 
imposed, e.g., 20-30 years, or merely "Term of Years." 
10. Mitigation in the Case. A "low mitigation" case refers to one with 
two or fewer statutory mitigating circumstances (a) found (or recog-
nized with respect to the catchall factor) in penalty-trial cases or (b) 
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present in non-penalty-trial cases. However, catchall factors account 
for only one mitigator regardless of their number. A ''high mitigation" 
case refers to one with three or more mitigating circumstances found 
(or recognized with respect to the catchall factor in penalty trials) or 
present in non-penalty-trial cases (with catchall factors counting as 
only one mitigator regardless of their number). 
Part II. Death Eligible Cases Classified by the Salient Factors 
Described in Appendix B. 
A. Prior Homicide - Murder by Defendant with a prior murder or 
manslaughter conviction l(a): 
A. 1 - Aggravated427 With Low Mitigation 
1. Victor, Clarence - Douglas County - Penalty Trial- Death 
12/26/87. D, 55 years old, had done yard work for V, an 82-year-old 
woman. On the afternoon in question, D showed up at V's home, car-
rying a metal pipe. V let D in and a struggle ensued. D beat V with 
his fists, and then with the pipe, resulting in 14 broken ribs and brain 
hemorrhaging. D lacerated V's throat with a knife 5 times and she 
subsequently died from blood loss. Throughout the assault, V was 
alive and screaming. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. TriallD.P. Sought. 
Agg. Cir: (l)(a)(convictions and substantial history); (l)(d)(HAC/de-
pravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(c)(mental!emotional disturbance-presented/not 
found); (2)(d)(age-presented/not found); (2)(g)(capacity im-
paired-presented/not found). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Death. 
A. 3 - One Statutory Aggravator With Low Mitigation 
1. Simpson, Jerry (II) - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial- Death 
10/13/97. D, a 38-year-old, and V, a 27-year-old male, were in-
mates and D had threatened V over some stamps that Vowed to him. 
The next day, D and Co-P, his cell mate, removed knives they had 
hidden in the light fixture of their cell, put on coats and gloves, and 
went to V's cell. V was then stabbed to death while he lay on his bed. 
D was previously convicted of M1. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial! 
D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(convictions and substantial history). 
Mit. Cir.: (2)(b)(pressures/influences-presentedinot found); 
(2)( c )(men tal! emotional disturbance-presented/not found); (2 )(D( victim 
participation/consent-presented/not found); (2)(g)(capacity impaired-
presented/not found). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Death. 
2. Bazer, Christopher - Douglas County - Penalty Trial- Life 
02/18/88. D and Co-P1 planned to rob or burglarize V's candy shop. 
D, age 19, and 2 Co-P's drove to the shop when they were intoxicated. 
Armed with a .22 caliber pistol D and Co-P1 entered the shop demand-
427. Aggravated refers to the presence of an additional statutory aggravating 
circumstance. 
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ing cash from 78-year-old V, a female. V insisted she had no cash; and 
during a skirmish, D grabbed V by the hair and shot her in the back of 
the head. Charge: Ml. Plea: Ml. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: 
(l)(a)(convictions and substantial history-both presented/both not 
found). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
3. Williams, Jimmie L. - Hamilton County - Penalty Trial - Life 
04/22/89. D, 48 years old, and V, a 41-year-old male, were truck 
drivers who got into an argument over their CB radios. They both 
pulled their trucks over to the side of the road and got out. D had a 
rifle and shot V once, in the chest, killing him. D and his wife, the Co-
P, then drove away. Several witnesses identified D as the killer ofV. 
In 1972, D was charged and convicted in Texas of murder with malice. 
Charge: Ml. Jury: Ml. P. TriallNo Agg. Cir. Presented. Agg. Cir.: 
(l)(a)(conviction and substantial history). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 
Life. 
4. Cyrus, Andrew - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial- 10 years 
06/12/76. V, a 35-year-old, was at a bar and decided to go outside 
and fight another patron. As the two were fighting, D, a 54-year-old 
male, walked by and became embroiled in the fight. V beat D and left 
him lying on the ground while V went back into the bar. D retrieved a 
handgun and then went into the bar where he shot V once in the 
chest. D had a prior conviction for manslaughter. Charge: Ml. Plea: 
M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(convictions). Mit. Cir.: 
(2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 10 
years. 
5. Fletcher, Stacey L. (II) - Lancaster County - No Penalty Trial-
25-35 years 
10/13/97. Co-P and V, a 27-year-old male, were inmates and Co-P 
had threatened V over some stamps that Vowed to him. The next 
day, Co-P and D, his 23-year-old cell mate, removed knives they had 
hidden in the light fixture of their cell, put on coats and gloves, and 
went to V's cell. V was then stabbed to death while he lay on his bed. 
D was previously convicted ofMl. Charge: Ml. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. 
Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(convictions and substantial history). Non-Stat. Mit.: 
Present. 25-35 years. 
6. Sheppard, Eugene Jr. - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial- 3-9 
years 
04/27/75. D, a 50-year-old, and V, an adult male, got into an argu-
ment at a friend's house over a craps game. D shot at V twice while 
they were in the house, and when V ran outside, D followed, firing 
three more shots. D went back inside to reload his pistol, and V col-
lapsed on the front lawn from his injuries and subsequently died. D 
had a prior conviction for M2. Charge: MS. Plea: MS. No P. Trial. 
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Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(convictions and substantial history). Non-Stat. Mit.: 
Present. 3-9 years. 
D. Multiple Victims - Multiple-victim murder - l(e): 
D. 1 - Aggravated428 With Low Mitigation 
1. Harper, Steven Ray - Douglas County - Penalty Trial- Death 
09110178. D, a 25-year-old, had difficulty in dealing emotionally 
with the breakup of his relationship with his ex-girlfriend, especially 
after she married VI. On one occasion D went so far as to shoot at and 
injure members of his ex-girlfriend's family. After his release from 
jail, D plotted to poison his ex-girlfriend and her family. D experi-
mented by poisoning animals and told friends of his plans. D broke 
into his ex-girlfriend's house and poisoned the milk and lemonade in 
the refrigerator. During the next day VI (a 24-year-old male), V2 (an 
ll-month-old boy), NDV1, NDV2 and NDV3 all drank either lemon-
ade or milk and became gravely ill. V2 died two days later and VI 
died eight days later. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. TriallD.P. Sought. 
Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(convictions); (l)(a)(substantial history-presented/not 
found); (l)(d)(HAC/depravity); (l)(e)(multiple victims); (l)(f)(death 
risk to several). Mit Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history-presented/not 
found); (2)(b )(pressure/influences and/or domination-presented/not 
found); (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance-presented/not found); 
(2)(g)(capacity impaired-presented/not found). Non-Stat. Mit.: Pre-
sent. Death. 
2. Jones, Isaiah (A) - Douglas County - Penalty Trial- Death 
12/07179. The 36-year-old D murdered 12-year-old VI and her 
mother, 44-year-old V2. The cause of VI's death was attributed to as-
phyxiation and the cause ofV2's death was determined to be multiple 
wounds to the head with a blunt instrument. Their partially clothed 
bodies were found buried in shallow graves. V2's body was found dis-
membered, V2's head and limbs had been sawed off. Evidence sug-
gested that the murders may have been motived by a debt that V2 
owed D. D was previously convicted of mutilating a dead body and 
theft. He also was granted immunity for a murder he assisted in 
Iowa. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: 
(l)(a)(substantial history); (l)(d)(HAC/depravity-presented/not 
found); (l)(e)(multiple victims). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Death. Sub-
sequent Proceeding at D.3 (#1). 
3. Lotter, John L. - Richardson County - Penalty Trial- Death 
12/31/93. D, a 22-year-old, and CooP, a 22-year-old, sexually as-
saulted VI, a 21-year-old female, and in order to silence VI's testi-
428. An aggravated multiple-victim case involves either a contemporaneous felony 
(e.g., robbery, kidnapping) other than a drug crime, or an additional statutory 
aggravating circumstance. 
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mony to the crime, D and Co-P planned to murder VI by cutting her 
head and hands off. D and Co-P set out to murder Vlon separate occa-
sions, but they failed to locate her in their attempts. Finally, several 
days later, they found out that Vlwas staying at V3's residence. On 
their way to the murder scene, D and Co-P agreed that they would kill 
anyone else who was with VI. They found VI hiding under a blanket 
in V3's bedroom. D shot VI in the chin and then Co-P stabbed VI to 
assure her death. Next, Co-P handed V3's baby to her, and then D 
shot V3, a 24-year-old female, in the abdomen before Co-P took her 
child back out of her arms. D then located V2, a 22-year-old male, and 
before shooting V2 in the head and chest, D shot V3 one more time in 
the eye. D then went around and shot 2 or 3 more times at the V's to 
assure of their death. Charge: MI. Jury: MI. P. TriallD.P. Sought. 
Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(substantial history-presented/not found); (1)(b)(con-
ceal crime and/or perp); (1)(e)(multiple victims); (1)(h)(disrupt gov't 
functionllawenforcement). Mit. Cir.: (2)(b)(pressure/influences and/or 
domination-presented/not found); (2)(c)(mental/emotional distur-
bance-presented/not found); (2)(d)(age-presented/not found); (2)(e)(ac-
complice and participation-presented/not found); (2)(g)(capacity 
impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Death. 
4. Reeves, Randolph - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial - Death 
03/29/80. D, a 24-year-old, climbed through the window of VI dur-
ing the early morning hours. D sexually assaulted VI and stabbed her 
7 times in the chest. V2 walked in on the sexual assault of VI, and D 
fatally wounded V2 by stabbing her twice. VI died hours later after 
being taken to the hospital. Charge: MI. Jury: MI. P. TriallD.P. 
Sought. Agg. Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal crime and perp); (1)(d)(HAC/deprav-
ity); (1)(e)(multiple victims). Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity im-
paired-presented/not found). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Death. 
5. Simants, Erwin C.- Lincoln County - Penalty Trial - Death 
10/18/75. Mter drinking at a bar, D, age 29, returned home and 
loaded a .22 caliber rifle. D went to a neighbor's house where he sexu-
ally assaulted VI, a 10-year-old female, shot her once in the head, and 
continued to sexually assault her. Five ofVl's relatives, V2, V3, V4, 
V5, and V6, came home one by one. D shot them all and molested the 
two females, a 57-year-old, and a 7-year-old. D returned home, un-
loaded the rifle, and confessed to his parents. Charge: MI. Jury: MI. 
P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal crime and perp); (1)(d) 
(HAC/depravity); (1)(e)(multiple victims). Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity im-
paired). Death. 
6. Williams, Robert - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial - Death 
08/10/77. D, a 41-year-old, entered the home of his 25-year-old, fe-
male friend, V2, with a revolver, intoxicated and contemplating sui-
cide. VI, a 25-year-old female neighbor of V2's, arrived at V2's home. 
HeinOnline -- 81 Neb. L. Rev. 702 2002-2003
702 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:486 
In an attempt to calm D, the revolver exchanged hands between the 
Vs and D. D then fatally shot V2 once in the head and twice in the 
neck. D ordered VI to undress. He then sexually assaulted VI before 
shooting her twice behind her left ear and once in the back. D had 
prior convictions of third degree robbery and assault with a deadly 
weapon. Charge: ML Jury: ML P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1) 
(a)(convictions and substantial history); (1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d) 
(HAC/depravity); (1)(e)(multiple victims). Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity im-
paired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Death. 
7. Boppre, Jeff - Scotts Bluff County - Penalty Trial- Life 
09/19/88 D and Co-P habitually bought cocaine and marijuana 
from VI. D suggested robbing and killing VI to get drugs and money. 
Co-P agreed to ride along, but he refused to kill. D bought cocaine 
from VI; and D and Co-P used the cocaine, then went to D's house to 
get his .32 semiautomatic pistol. D and Co-P returned to VI's house, 
and D entered and shot VI 3 times in the trunk and once in the arm. 
D exited the house to reload and Co-P heard him mumble "eliminate 
witnesses." D re-entered the house and shot V2 3 times in the head 
and 4 times in the torso and arms. D took cocaine and cash and sev-
eral other items. Charge: ML Jury: ML P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. 
Cir.: (1)(a)(substantial history-presented/not found); (1)(b)(conceal 
crime and perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity-presented/not found); 
(1)(e)(multiple victims); (1)(f)(death risk to several-presented/not 
found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). Non-Stat. Mit.: Pre-
sent. Life. 
8. Hankins, Patrick H. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life 
10/04/87. 22-year-old D and 3 Vs were sleeping at V2's apartment. 
The previous day D and VI got into a minor dispute over a small 
amount of money. D awoke at about 6:30 a.m. and beat VI over the 
head several times with a metal bar while V was asleep. D then went 
into the living room and beat V2 in the head with the bar while she 
was asleep on the couch. D then proceeded to beat V3 in a similar 
fashion as he slept on the floor in the living room. D then wiped the 
blood off the bar, covered the Vs' faces with pillows, dressed, packed, 
stole money from VI and V2 and then left in Vl's car. Charge: ML 
Jury: ML P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal crime and/or 
perp-presented/not found); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity); (1)(e)(multiple vic-
tims). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(g)(capacity im-
paired). Life. 
9. Kirksey, Eric T. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life 
01/01/94. D, a 21-year-old, shot VI, a 19-year-old female, twice in 
the head with two separate guns; one ofthe two shots only hit her ear, 
and the other was fatal. D shot 22-year-old V2 several times, result-
ing in his death. There was evidence showing that the murders were 
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committed during a robbery and that D did not expect V1 to be there. 
Both V's were shot from behind while they were sitting in the front 
seat of V2's car. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. 
Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal perp); (l)(e)(multiple victims). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no 
sig. criminal history-presented/not found). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 
Life. 
10. Nissen, Thomas M. - Richardson County - Penalty Trial - Life 
12/31/93. D, a 22-year-old and Co-P, a 22-year-old sexually as-
saulted V1, and in order to silence V1's testimony to the crime, D and 
Co-P planned to murder V1 by cutting her head and hands off. D and 
Co-P set out to murder V1 on separate occasions, but they failed to 
locate her in their attempts. Finally, several days later, they found 
out that V1 was staying at V3's residence. On their way, D and Co-P 
agreed that they would kill anyone else who was with V1. Mter 
breaking down the front door, they found V1 hiding under a blanket in 
V3's bedroom. Co-P shot V1 in the chin, and then D stabbed V1 to 
assure her death. Next, D handed V3's baby to her, and then Co-P 
shot V3 in the abdomen before D took the child back out of her arms. 
Co-P then located V2, and before shooting V2 in the head and chest, 
Co-P shot V3 one more time in the eye. Co-P then went around and 
shot 2 or 3 more times at the V's. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. TriallNo 
Agg. Cir. Presented. Agg. Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal crime and/or perp); 
(l)(d)(HAC/depravity); (l)(e)(multiple victims); (l)(h)(disrupt gov't 
functionllawenforcement). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
11. Belmarez, Dustin L. - Red Willow County - No Penalty Trial-
Life 
05/18/90. D, a 19-year-old male, and Co-P were camping in a park, 
as were the two V's, 59-year-old twin brothers. The four became ac-
quainted and began to drink together. V2 went to bed and the remain-
ing three continued to drink. D claimed that Co-P became angry over 
something V1 said and began to hit him with a sign post. D hit V1 
with the sign post 4 or 5 times as well. D and Co-P woke V2 and 
began to beat him with their fists and empty liquor bottles. D then 
began to hit V2 with a pickaxe blade. They hid his body in the bushes, 
leaving the pickaxe imbedded in his head, and took the Vs' truck and 
other belongings. Charge: M1. Plea: M1. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: 
(l)(b)(conceal perp); (l)(d)(HAC/depravity); (l)(e)(multiple victims). 
Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
12. Schommer, Richard P. - Fillmore County - No Penalty Trial-
20 years 
09/23/80. Mter a quarrel with family members, D, age 42, poured 
gas throughout his own home. The gas was ignited by an unknown 
cause, and two relatives, a 15-year-old female and a 39-year-old male, 
died in the resulting fire. In addition to the two V's, two NDV's were 
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injured. Charge: M1. Plea: MS. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(e)(multiple 
victims); (l)(f)(death risk to several). Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity im-
paired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 20 years. 
13. Wagner, Clyde W. - Red Willow County - No Penalty Trial-
Life 
5/18/90. D, a 32-year-old male, and Co-P were camping in a park 
when they met V1 and V2, who were 59-year-old twin brothers. The 
four began drinking together and eventually V2 went to bed. Both D 
and Co-P claimed that the other began to argue with V1 and then beat 
him with a signpost. Both D and Co-P then hid the body. They then 
woke V2 and hit him with a large liquor bottle, their fists and a pick-
axe without the handle. They hid the body under some leaves, leaving 
the pickaxe still imbedded in V2's head. D and Co-P then stole V1 and 
V2's truck and belongings. Charge: M1. Plea: M1. No P. Trial. Agg. 
Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal perp); (l)(d)(HAC/depravity); (l)(e)(multiple vic-
tims). Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 
Life. 
D. 2 - Aggravated With High Mitigation 
1. Curtright, James D. - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial - Life 
04/23/85. D, a 20-year-old, was angry with the lifestyle that V1, 
D's 22-year-old sister, and V2, D's 42-year-old mother, led. D claimed 
that God told him to kill V1 and V2. D set his alarm so that he could 
awake early and kill them. D, who lived with V1, went into her bed-
room after his alarm went off and stabbed her repeatedly. D then 
drove to V2's house. After she let him in, he approached her from be-
hind and stabbed her repeatedly until she fell to the ground. D then 
took V1's child, who had been staying with V2, and went to the police 
station where he confessed. Charge: Ml. Jury: Ml. P. TriallD.P. 
Sought. Agg. Cir.: (l)(d)(HAC/depravity); (l)(e)(multiple victims). 
Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(c)(mental/emotional dis-
turbance); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
2. Nokes, Harold - Red Willow County - Penalty Trial - Life 
09/23/73. 44-year-old D, Co-P, V1 and V2 were in the basement of 
D and Co-P, D's wife. D and V2 got into an argument where V2 drew 
his fist back and came towards D. D pulled out a gun and fatally shot 
him. Screaming, V1 started up the stairs, and D fatally shot her in 
the back. D stated that he couldn't let her get away. D and his wife, 
Co-P, cut up the bodies and disposed of them in a lake. Charge: M1. 
Plea: Ml. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal crime and/or 
perp); (l)(e)(multiple victims). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal his-
tory); (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 
Life. 
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3. Jacob, David H. - Gage County - No Penalty Trial- Life 
01/19/86. After drinking at a bar, D, a 25-year-old male, Co-P and 
a friend went to a party at the home of VI, an 18-year-old female, and 
V3, a 22-year-old male, even though they were not invited. After ap-
proximately 30 minutes, they were asked to leave. An altercation 
broke out and V2, a 21-year-old male, struck D once in the face. D and 
Co-P made comments about "getting even" and then left the party. 
While leaving in their car, they tried but failed to run over a party 
goer. D and Co-P then dropped their friend off and drove approxi-
mately 45 miles to D's house where they obtained shotguns. D and 
Co-P then returned to the scene of the party. D first shot and killed 
V2 and then D and Co-P went into the bedroom where VI and V3 were 
sleeping and shot and killed them. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. 
Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(d)(HAC/depravity); (l)(e)(multiple victims). Mit. 
Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-
Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
D. 3 - One Statutory Aggravator With Low Mitigation 
1. Jones, Isaiah (B) - Douglas County - Penalty Trial- Life 
12/07/79. 36-year-old D murdered a 12-year-old, VI, and her 44-
year-old mother, V2. The cause of VI's death was attributed to as-
phyxiation and the cause ofV2's death was determined to be multiple 
wounds to the head with a blunt instrument. Their partially clothed 
bodies were found buried in shallow graves. V2's body was found dis-
membered, with her head and limbs sawed off. Evidence suggested 
that the murders may have been motivated by a debt that V2 owed D. 
Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: 
(l)(a)(substantial history-presented/not found); (l)(d)(HAC/deprav-
ity-presented/not found); (l)(e)(multiple victims). Non-Stat. Mit.: Pre-
sent. Life. Prior Proceeding at D.1 (#2). 
2. Nielsen, Wilfred W. - Washington County - Penalty Trial- Life 
11/19/77. After drinking most of the day, D went home and be-
came involved in an argument with his wife. D stormed out and re-
turned later to find that his wife and child were gone. The two V's 
were the parents of D's wife. D went to the Vs' farm looking for his 
wife and while arguing with VI, asked him to step outside. V's son, 
who was hiding upstairs, heard a shot and then a second shot and 
found the two V's dead on the front sidewalk. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. 
P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (l)(e)(multiple victims-presented/not 
found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 
Life. 
3. Jacob, Steven M. - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial- Life 
08/02/89. D, a 33-year-old, broke into the home of VI, D's ex-girl-
friend, and V2, her 54-year-old new lover, during the early morning. 
D shot V2 3 or 4 times, killing V2. D then shot VI in the side and 
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head. Before dying in the hospital several days later, VI identified D 
as the killer. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. TriallNo Agg. Cir. Presented. 
Agg. Cir.: (l)(e)(multiple victims). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal his-
tory). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
4. Rodriguez, Joseph D. - Hall County - No Penalty Trial- Life 
01/10/88. D and his family were threatened at a bar by two V's. D 
stated that he had once testified against one of the V's, which resulted 
in the V's being incarcerated. D went home and got a gun saying: "It's 
me or them." D returned to the bar with his two sons who stayed in 
the back of the bar. D walked up to where the two V's sat and shot 
them both twice. Charge: M1. Plea: M1. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: 
(l)(e)(multiple victims). Mit. Cir.: (2)(c)(mental/emotional distur-
bance). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
D. 4 - One Statutory Aggravator With High Mitigation 
1. Arnold, Lamont E. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life 
09/24/95. D, a 22-year-old male, was involved in a fight with VI, a 
34-year-old male, and V2, a 37-year-old male, and as a result D sus-
tained a minor cut to his face. Later that day, D went to a party at Co-
PI's home where he complained about the earlier fight. D and another 
then left the party to search for VI and V2. After finding VI, D threw 
a brick into his head causing serious, perhaps even fatal, injuries. Af-
ter they returned to the party, Co-PI suggested they "go finish [VI] 
off." D, Co-PI, and Co-P2 returned to where VI was lying on the 
ground. VI tried to talk but Co-P2 kicked him and then Co-PI took 
out a knife and stabbed VI multiple times. D and his Co-P's hid when 
a car drove by, but afterwards returned to VI and Co-PI continued 
stabbing him while D rummaged through VI's pockets. VI suffered 20 
stab wounds. D and Co-P's returned to the party and decided to kill 
V2 because, they believed, he would be able to identify them as VI's 
killers. They proceeded to V2's apartment where, just before entering, 
D and Co-PI decided D would kill V2. They then broke into the apart-
ment. D first sprayed mace at V2 and then stabbed him 17 times. Co-
P2 and Co-P3 beat NDV, a friend staying with V2. They then left the 
apartment, but Co-PI returned and struck someone, though it is un-
clear who, in the head with a 2" x 4" board. The next day, D, laughing 
and giggling, related to two other Co-P's (later charged with accessory 
after the fact) how he and the others had handled the situation. 
Charge: M1. Plea: M1. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal 
perp-presented/not found); (l)(e)(multiple victims-presented/not 
found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(b)(pressure/infiu-
ences and/or domination-presented/not found); (2)(e)(accomplice and 
participation-presented/not found); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-
Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
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2. Smith, Scott L. - Sarpy County - Penalty Trial - Life 
11/10/90. D, 19 years old, had been thinking about murdering his 
family for about a week. When he got into an argument with VI, his 
14-year-old sister, over a newspaper, D got his father's gun and emp-
tied it into VI. When V2, D's 42-year-old mother, came home, D emp-
tied the gun into her as well. D then reloaded and waited for his 
father to come home, but his father managed to escape. Charge: M1. 
Jury: M1. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal crime and/or 
perp-presented/not found); (1)( d)(HAC/depravity-presented!not 
found); (l)(e)(multiple victims); (1)(f)(death risk to several-presented! 
not found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(b)(pressure/ 
influences and!or domination); (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance); 
(2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
3. West, Ben - Douglas County - Penalty Trial- Life 
11/26/84. D had suspicions that VI, his live-in girlfriend, was hav-
ing an affair with V2. D returned home to find VI's and V2's cars 
parked side-by-side outside the apartment he shared with VI. D left 
to purchase hollow-point bullets for his gun. D returned to the apart-
ment but parked at a distance. D entered the apartment with the gun 
loaded and concealed and walked in on VI and V2 having sexual inter-
course. V2 requested more time with VI. D shot V2 twice and VI four 
times. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: 
(1)(e)(multiple victims). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); 
(2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
4. Waldner, Donald A. - Colfax County - Penalty Trial- Life 
11/13/89. VI, a 25-year-old female, had served divorce papers on 
25-year-old D two days before the incident. VI and V2 were romanti-
cally involved and worked together at a factory from which D had re-
cently been fired. D hid outside of the factory and surprised the 2 V's 
as they were about to enter. He shot both V's twice, killing them both. 
Charge: M1. Plea: M1. P. TriallNo Agg. Cir. Presented. Agg. Cir.: 
(1)(e)(multiple victims). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); 
(2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-
Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
5. Baker, John - Gage County - No Penalty Trial - 40-80 years 
07/17/81. D, a 21-year-old, entered his parents' bedroom and fa-
tally wounded them both with a rifle. D first shot VI, his father, in 
the left eye. D then shot V2, his mother, once in the shoulder and once 
in the head. D then went down the hallway where he encountered his 
brother. D's brother wrestled D down, and then D left with his 
brother's car. D's record consisted of traffic violations. Charge: M1. 
Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(e)(multiple victims). Mit. Cir.: 
(2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. 
Mit.: Present. 40-80 years. 
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E. Violent Record (other than a prior murder or manslaughter 
conviction)429 - Murder by a defendant with a substantial history 
of serious assaultive or terrorizing criminal activity or with a prior 
conviction of a crime involving the use of a threat of violence to the 
person - l(a): 
E. 1 - Aggravated! With Low Mitigation 
1. Bird Head, Hudson (A) - Sheridan County - Penalty Trial -
Death 
03/02/85. D, 46 years old, was pulled over by a police officer for 
driving V's car in an intoxicated manner. D had worked for V, an 85-
year-old female, in the past doing odd jobs for her. In addition to the 
car, D was found with other belongings of V. Forensic evidence indi-
cated that D came into V's home, knocked her down and tied her 
hands behind her back. D then raped, beat and strangled V, crushing 
her larynx. V eventually asphyxiated on her own blood. Charge: M1. 
Jury: M1. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir: (l)(a)(convictions); 
(l)(b)(conceal perp); (l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity 
impaired). Death. Subsequent Proceeding at G.1 (#8). 
2. Bjorklund, Roger D. - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial- Death 
09/23/92. 30-year-old D and 24-year-old Co-P drove around looking 
for a woman to rape. Mter a few hours of looking, they spotted V, an 
18-year-old female, and they followed her car. D abducted V in her car 
at her parents' residence and drove her to another location. Mter 
abandoning V's car at a separate location, D and Co-P took turns sexu-
ally assaulting V. V's hands were bound and her eyes were partially 
covered with duct tape. D and Co-P then decided to kill V because she 
would otherwise be able to identify them. D walked her out into a 
field in a choke hold and fell on top of her. Co-P then shot V twice in 
the head. D later fired 5 rounds at V after realizing that she was still 
gasping for air. D and Co-P returned to the scene 2 days later and 
buried V's body. When her body was found, there was evidence of sex-
ual torture. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: 
(l)(a)(substantial history); (l)(b)(conceal crime and/or perp); 
(l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(b)(pressure/infiuences and/or 
domination-presented/not found); (2(c)(mentallemotional distur-
bance-presented/not found); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: 
Present. Death. 
3. Holtan, Richard D. (A) - Douglas County - Penalty Trial -
Death 
11/01174. D, a 39-year-old male, robbed at gunpoint a bar at which 
V, the 34-year-old male bartender, NDV1, V's girlfriend, and NDV2, a 
429. Defendants with a prior murder or manslaughter conviction are classified under 
salient factor category A. 
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bar patron, were present. Mter emptying the cash register and taking 
the bar pistol, D herded his captives into the restroom where he forced 
V to tie up NDVl and NDV2. D then fired 4 shots. Two bullets struck 
and killed V, a third struck and wounded NDVl and the fourth missed 
everyone. D fled to Hawaii where he later surrendered himself to po-
lice. Charge: Ml. Plea: Ml. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (l)(a) 
(convictions and substantial history); (l)(b)(conceal crime and perp); 
(l)(d)(HAC/depravity); (l)(D(death risk to several). Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(ca-
pacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Death. Subsequent Pro-
ceeding at E.l (#9). 
4. Moore, Carey D. (A) - Douglas County - Penalty Trial- Death 
08/22/79 and 08/26/79. On the night prior to the first murder, D, a 
22-year-old male, called several taxi companies from a phone booth 
and asked that they send a cab. When the cab arrived, he hid in the 
vicinity and tried to determine if the driver would make a suitable 
victim for the robbery/murder he was planning. D believed it would be 
easier for him to shoot an older man. On the night of the first killing, 
D called the taxi company for which Vl, a 47-year-old-male worked. 
When Vl arrived, D determined Vl was a suitably-aged victim, and, 
along with Co-P, D got into the cab. D directed Vl to drive them to a 
certain rural location. When they arrived, D and CO-P robbed Vl, and 
D then shot him 3 times. Four days later, D saw a lone cab with an 
older driver. D got into the cab and directed the driver, V2, a 47-year-
old-male, on where to take D. Shortly thereafter, D shot V2 4 times 
and attempted to rob the cab, but found no money. Charge: Ml. 
Bench: Ml. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(substantial his-
tory); (l)(b)(conceal perp); (l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(b) 
(pressures/influence and/or domination-presented/not found); (2)(c) 
(mental/emotional disturbance-presented/not found); (2)(d)(age-
presented/not found); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Pre-
sent. Death. Prior Proceeding at E.l (#5). 
5. Moore, Carey D. (B) - Douglas County - Penalty Trial- Death 
08/22/79 and 08/26/79. On the night prior to the first murder, D, a 
22-year-old male, called several taxi companies from a phone booth 
and asked that they send a cab. When the cab arrived, he hid in the 
vicinity and tried to determine if the driver would make a suitable 
victim for the robbery/murder he was planning. D believed it would be 
easier for him to shoot an older man. On the night of the first killing, 
D called the taxi company for which Vl, a 47-year-old-male worked. 
When Vl arrived, D determined Vl was a suitably-aged victim, and, 
along with Co-P, D got into the cab. D directed Vl to drive them to a 
certain rural location. When they arrived, D and Co-P robbed Vl, and 
D then shot him 3 times. Four days later, D saw a lone cab with an 
older driver. D got into the cab and directed the driver, V2, a 47-year-
old-male, on where to take D. Shortly thereafter, D shot V2 4 times 
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and attempted to rob the cab, but found no money. Charge: Ml. 
Bench: Ml. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(substantial his-
tory); (l)(b)(conceal perp); (l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: 
(2)(b)(pressures/influence and/or domination-presented/not found); 
(2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance-presented/not found); 
(2)(d)(age-presented/not found); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. 
Mit.: Present. Death. Prior Proceeding at E.1 (#4). 
6. Peery, Wesley H. - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial- Death 
06/06/75. While robbing V's coin shop, 51-year-old D bound V's 
wrists and ankles and shot her 3 times. He shot her once between the 
eyes, once in the temple, and once through the roof of her mouth. V 
was helpless and posed no threat to D. Charge: Ml. Jury: Ml. P. 
TriallD.P. Sought. Agg.Cir.: (l)(a)(convictions and substantial his-
tory); (l)(b)(conceal crime and perp); (l)(c)(pecuniary gain); (l)(d) 
(HAC/depravity). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Death. 
7. Rust, John E. (A) - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Death 
02/21/75. D, 23-year-old, and 2 Co-P's robbed a grocery store and 
fled from the scene with the police in pursuit. D and Co-P1 exchanged 
gunfire with police officers while driving through a populated residen-
tial area. When their car got stuck, they fled on foot between houses 
and through residential yards with the police officers pursuing on foot. 
They exchanged gunfire with the police while there were bystanders 
present, and they wounded 2 officers. V, a 21-year-old male, was a 
resident of the area who came out to assist the police in apprehending 
D and Co-Pl. He ordered D to stop, and when D did not, he fired at D. 
D fired back, hitting V, and when V fell, D shot him 2 more times, 
killing him. D had a prior conviction for assault with intent to inflict 
great bodily injury. Charge: Ml. Jury: Ml. P. TriallD.P. Sought. 
Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(convictions); (l)(b)(conceal crime and/or perp); 
(l)(d)(HAC/depravity-presented/not found); (l)(f)(death risk to sev-
eral); (l)(h)(disrupt gov't functionllaw enforcement). Mit. Cir.: 
(2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Death. 
Subsequent Proceeding at E.1 (#10). 
8. Ryan, Michael W. - Richardson County - Penalty Trial - Death 
04/29/85. D, a 36-year-old male, was the leader of a religious cult 
and V, an adult male, was a member of the cult who had fallen into 
disfavor with D. As punishment, D forced V to perform homosexual 
acts with another member of the group. Later, D and 4 Co-P's, who 
were also cult members, secured V to a crate and sodomized V repeat-
edly with a greased shovel handle, causing internal injuries. When V 
screamed because of this abuse, D kicked him in the head and put 
tape over his mouth. D and Co-P's then whipped V repeatedly over 
the course of 2 days. Mterwards, D and Co-P's shot off V's fingertips 
and D kicked and broke his arm. D then used a pair of pliers to pull 
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strips of skin off of Vs leg and had 2 Co-P's break both of his legs. 
Finally, D stomped on Vs chest, crushing it and causing his death. V 
was castrated either before or after his death. D had tortured V, NDV, 
and NDVs son prior to this homicide. NDV was a cult member and for 
a period of time the owner of the farm where the cult resided who also 
fell into disfavor with D. Charge: Mlo Jury: Mlo P. TriallD.P. Sought. 
Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(substantial history); (l)(b)(conceal perp-presented/not 
found); (l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(c)(mental/emotional dis-
turbance); (2)(g)(capacity impaired-presented/not found). Non-Stat. 
Mit.: Present. Death. 
9. Holtan, Richard D. (B) - Douglas County - Penalty Trial- Life 
11/01174. D, a 39-year-old male, robbed at gunpoint a bar at which 
V, the 34-year-old male bartender, NDV1, Vs girlfriend, and NDV2, a 
bar patron, were present. After emptying the cash register and tak-
ing the bar pistol, D herded his captives into the restroom where he 
forced V to tie up NDV1 and NDV2. D then fired 4 shots. Two bullets 
struck and killed V, a third struck and wounded NDV1 and the fourth 
missed everyone. D fled to Hawaii where he later surrendered himself 
to police. D had an extensive criminal history. Charge: Mlo Plea: Mlo 
P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(convictions); (l)(a)(substantial 
history-presented/not found); (l)(b)(conceal crime and perp-both 
presented/both not found); (l)(d)(HAC/depravity-presented/not 
found); (l)(f)(death risk to several). Mit. Cir.: (2)(c)(mental/emotional 
disturbance-presented/not found); (2)(g)(capacity impaired-
presented/not found). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. Prior Proceeding 
at E.1 (#3). 
10. Rust, John E. (B) - Douglas County - Penalty Trial- Life 
02/21175. D, 23-year-old, and 2 Co-P's robbed a grocery store and 
fled from the scene with the police in pursuit. D and Co-P1 exchanged 
gunfire with police officers while driving through a populated residen-
tial area. When their car got stuck, they fled on foot between houses 
and through residential yards with the police officers pursuing on foot. 
They exchanged gunfire with the police while there were bystanders 
present, and they wounded 2 officers. V, a 21-year-old male, was a 
resident of the area who came out to assist the police in apprehending 
D and Co-Plo He ordered D to stop, and when D did not, he fired at D. 
D fired back, hitting V, and when V fell, D shot him 2 more times, 
killing him. Charge: Mlo Jury: Mlo P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: 
(l)(a)(convictions); (l)(a)(substantial history-presented/not found); 
(l)(b)(conceal perp-presented/not found); (l)(f)(death risk to several-
presented/not found); (l)(g)(officer/public servant victim during cus-
tody-presented/not found); (l)(h)(disrupt gov't functionllaw enforce-
ment). Mit. Cir.: (2)(b)(pressures/influences and/or domination-
presented/not found); (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance); (2)(d)(age-
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presented/not found); (2)(g)(capacity impaired-presented/not found). 
Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. Prior Proceeding at E.1 (#7). 
11. Bradford, Walter L. - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial- Life 
12/02/82. D, a 25-year-old, and Co-P attempted to rob V, a 48-year-
old male, who was Co-P's landlord. V struggled with D and Co-P, and 
was stabbed once and drug into his auto while still alive. D and CO-P 
drove V into the country, drug him into a ditch, and stabbed him mul-
tiple times. D had previous convictions for robbery and attempted 
sexual assault. Charge: M1. Plea: M1. P. TriallNo Agg. Cir. 
Presented. Agg Cir.: (l)(a)(conviction); (l)(b)(conceal crime and/or 
prep). Mit. Cir.: (2)(b)(domination-presented/not found); (2)(c) 
(mental/emotional disturbance-presented/not found); (2)(d) 
(age-presented/not found); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: 
Present. Life. 
12. Barney, Scott A. - Lancaster County - No Penalty Trial- Life 
09/23/92. 24-year-old D and 30-year-old Co-P drove around looking 
for a woman to rape. After a few hours of looking, they spotted V, an 
18-year-old female, and they followed her car. Co-P abducted V in her 
car at her parents' residence and drove her to another location. After 
abandoning Vs car at a separate location, D and Co-P took turns sexu-
ally assaulting V. Vs hands were bound and her eyes were partially 
covered with duct tape. D and Co-P then decided to kill V because she 
would otherwise be able to identify them. Co-P walked her out into a 
field in a choke hold and fell on top of her. D then shot V twice in the 
head. Co-P later fired 5 rounds at V after realizing that she was still 
gasping for air. D and Co-P returned to the scene 2 days later and 
buried Vs body. Charge: M1. Plea: M1. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: 
(l)(a)(substantial history); (l)(b)(conceal crime and/or perp); 
(l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
13. Denman, David W. - Keith County - No Penalty Trial - 25 
years 
01/29/77. D, a 17-year-old male, and 2 Co-P's had been "working" 
their way across the country by robbing businesses and individuals. 
While at a highway rest stop, they sneaked up on V who was sitting in 
the cab if his truck, possibly asleep. When Co-P1 shot V through the 
truck's windshield, D pointed his gun and also fired at V. Co-P2 
waited in the car and did not take an active part in the crime. Then 
Co-P1 and D robbed V of his wallet and CB. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. 
No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(substantial history); (l)(b)(conceal perp). 
Mit. Cir.: (2)(d)(age). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 25 years. 
14. Herren, John - Scotts Bluff County - No Penalty Trial - 35 
years 
OS/26/80. V, a 55-year-old male, was D's boss, and had made homo-
sexual advances toward D. V had fired D the day before the offense 
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for drinking on the job. On the day ofthe offense, D went to the apart-
ment ofNDV, an acquaintance, twice and made advances toward her. 
NDV rejected D both times, and he got angry and left. D returned a 
third time; and during a discussion about his being fired, D remarked, 
"There's going to be one bloody killing." D then stabbed NDV in the 
chest, probed the wound with his fingers, kissed her, and left. D went 
to V's apartment and stabbed V in the neck, chest, shoulder, back, and 
hand-a total of 18 times, then slit V's throat. Police apprehended D in 
the parking lot. Charge: Ml. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Circ.: 
(l)(a)(convictions); (l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit Cir.: (2)(c)(mental/emo-
tional disturbance). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 35 years. 
15. Honeycutt, Nicodemus - Otoe County - No Penalty Trial- Life 
09/10/83. V, and D became acquainted while they were staying in 
the same boarding house. D hit V, a 63-year-old man, in the head 
with a brick causing multiple skull fractures, and then robbed him 
and stole his car. D, a 40-year-old man, later told a friend that he hit 
an old man with a brick because he needed money. D had been con-
victed previously of aggravated robbery. Charge: Ml. Plea: M2. No 
P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(convictions); (l)(b)(conceal perp). Mit. Cir.: 
(2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
16. Warford, Sherman - Gage County - No Penalty Trial - 6-12 
years 
04/13/80. 38-year-old D abducted V from her workplace during the 
early morning hours. D was seen driving off in his car with a passen-
ger flailing arms and a commotion going on inside the car. V's body 
was found later in a field. Her hands and feet were tied behind her 
back with cloth and bailing wire, and she had been stabbed several 
times with a sharp instrument. She bled to death. D had previously 
been convicted of armed robbery. Charge: Ml. Plea: MS. No P. Trial. 
Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(conviction); (l)(d)(HAC/depravity). 6-12 years. 
17. Womack, Arvie W. - Keith County - No Penalty Trial- Life 
01/29177. D, a 23-year-old male, and 2 Co-P's had been "working" 
their way across the country by robbing businesses and individuals. 
While at a highway rest area, they sneaked up on V, who was sitting 
in the cab of his truck, possibly asleep. D fired a shotgun at V through 
the truck's windshield, and Co-PI fired his handgun at V. Co-P2 
waited in the car and did not take an active part in the crime. After 
shooting V, D and Co-PI robbed him of his money and CB radio. 
Charge: Ml. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(substantial his-
tory); (l)(b)(conceal perp). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
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E. 2 - Aggravated With High Mitigation 
1. Joubert, John J. - Sarpy County - Penalty Trial- Death 
09/18/83. VI, a 13-yr-old boy, was kidnapped by D, a 20-year-old 
male, as VI was delivering newspapers. D bound VI's hands and feet, 
put VI in the trunk of D's car and drove to a remote area. D untied VI 
long enough for him to undress down to his underwear and tied VI up 
again. VI began to beg for his life and struggle so D stabbed him, and 
eventually stabbed him a total of 11 times, 9 of which were inflicted 
before death. VI died as a result of blood loss. About 3 months later, 
D kidnapped V2, a 12-year-old boy, as he was walking to school, and 
repeated the same basic scenario, stabbing V2 a total of 7 times and 
allowing him to die from loss of blood. Charge: Ml (2 cts.). Plea: Ml 
(2 cts.). P. TriallD.P. Sought. Note: the plea was in exchange for drop-
ping the other non-Ml counts and the prosecutors not arguing in favor 
of a death penalty but nonetheless presenting aggravation. Agg. Cir.: 
(1)(a)(substantial history); (1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity); 
(1)(f)(death risk to several-presented!not found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no 
sig. criminal history); (2)(b)(pressure/infiuences and!or domina-
tion-presented!not found); (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance); 
(2)(d)(age-presented!not found); (2)(g)(capacity impaired-presented! 
not found). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Death. 
2. Sell, Dennis L. (I) - Dawson County - No Penalty Trial- Life 
02/07177. D, a 32-year-old male, developed urges to hurt and kill 
women when he felt he was under stress. On the day of the incident, 
he admitted that pressures were bothering him. He went to the home 
of the V, an adult female, whom he knew from a home decorating 
party she had given at the D's home. When she opened the door, the D 
grabbed her and beat her. He then took her into the country and shot 
her with a shotgun. The D had prior convictions for robbery and 
assault with intent to rape, both of which stemmed from the same in-
cident. Charge: M2. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(convic-
tions); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(c)(mental/emotional 
disturbance); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
3. Sell, Dennis L. (II) - Dawson County - No Penalty Trial- Life 
09/23177. D, a 32-year-old male, developed urges to hurt and kill 
women when he felt he was under stress. On the day of the incident, 
he admitted that pressures were bothering him. He went to the home 
of V, an adult female and when she came to the door he beat her. He 
then took her into the country. He then stabbed her twice with a pair 
of pliers. At some point, he also raped V. D had convictions for rob-
bery and assault with intent to rape, both of which stemmed from the 
same incident. D also later plead guilty to a murder that he had com-
mitted six months prior to the killing ofV. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No 
P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(convictions and substantial history); (1)(d) 
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(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(c)(mental!emotional disturbance); (2) 
(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
E. 3 - One Statutory Aggravator With Low Mitigation 
1. Benzel, Jeffrey - Hall County - Penalty Trial- Life 
12/12/83. D, his girlfriend and another friend went to V's house to 
buy drugs. D's girlfriend had told D, untruthfully, that she had al-
ready paid for drugs. At V's house, D and his girlfriend began to argue 
and V told them to leave. D grabbed V's girlfriend and held a gun to 
her head. V, a 28-year-old male, then ran to a bedroom where he kept 
a shotgun, and D stated that he was going to kill V if V did what D 
thought he was going to do. V came out of the bedroom with a shotgun 
and D shot him in the mouth, killing him. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. 
TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(conviction and substantial his-
tory-both presented/both not found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(b)(pressure/influ-
ences and/or domination-presented/not found). Non-Stat. Mit.: 
Present. Life. 
2. Carter, George - Douglas County - Penalty Trial- Life 
10/09/85. D, a 28-year-old and Co-P, a 27-year-old, stopped in front 
of the residence of a neighborhood rival. V and his companion were in 
the yard ofthe residence, and the companion threw a baseball bat at D 
and Co-P's car. D and Co-P got out of their car and started shooting at 
V and V's companion. V was fatally wounded by a bullet that entered 
his chest. There was some indication that the shooting was related to 
the rival being in D and Co-P's neighborhood and with their friends. 
D was previously convicted of the crime of robbery. Charge: M1. Jury: 
M1. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(convictions). Non-Stat. 
Mit.: Present. Life. 
3. Carter, Victor - Douglas County - Penalty Trial- Life 
10/09/85. D, a 27-year-old, and Co-P, a 28-year-old, stopped in 
front of the residence of a neighborhood rival. V, and 18-year-old 
male, and his companion were in the yard of the residence, and the 
companion threw a baseball bat at D and Co-P's car. D and Co-P got 
out of their car and started shooting at V and V's companion. V was 
fatally wounded by a bullet that entered his chest. There was some 
indication that the shooting was related to the rival being in D and Co-
P's neighborhood and interfering with their friends. D was previously 
convicted of the crime of robbery. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial! 
D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(convictions). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 
Life. 
4. Clausen, Timothy L. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life 
12/10/92. D met V and another outside a bar. D had been drink-
ing. D, V, and the other went to the other's house. D believed V to be 
of the opposite sex of that which V really was. D and V engaged in 
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anal intercourse. Then, D realized V's true sex. D claimed V then 
wanted to engage in intercourse again. D refused. A struggle ensued. 
D was cut by V. D shot V twice killing V. Charge: Ml. Jury: Ml. P. 
TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(conviction-presented/not found). 
Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
5. Jones, Elijah - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life 
11/19/92. Several days after V fired shots into D's apartment, nar-
rowly missing occupants, D went looking for V. D checked at a card 
club twice. The second time V was there. D shot V several times in 
the chest and neck and several more times in the back as V crawled 
around on the floor. Charge: Ml. Jury: Ml. P. TriallD.P. Sought. 
Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(conviction and substantial history-both presented/ 
both not found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). Life. 
6. Lopez, James - Douglas County - Penalty Trial- Life 
03/18/83. D killed V during the perpetration of a robbery by hitting 
V with a stick. Charge: Ml. Bench: Ml. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. 
Cir.: (l)(a)(conviction and substantial history-both presented/both not 
found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 
Life. 
7. Massey, Wesley L. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial- Life 
OS/23/77 45-year-old D and Co-P lured V into a hotel room to rob 
him. As Co-P walked into the room with V, D, who was lying in wait, 
hit V over the head with a glass bottle. After V denied having more 
than $5 on him, D started beating V with a gun. V escaped down the 
hallway into the elevator, as D chased him. A scuffle continued be-
tween D and V until the elevator stopped in the hotel lobby. V cried 
out to his friend for help, but D's gun scared the friend away. D then 
fatally shot V in the chest. D testified that he shot his weapon be-
cause he feared that he was going to get caught for robbery. Charge: 
Ml. Jury: Ml. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(conviction and 
substantial history); (l)(b)(conceal crime and/or perp-presented/not 
found); (l)(f)(death risk to several-presented/not found). Non-Stat. 
Mit.: Present. Life. 
8. McLemore, Michael E. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial- Life 
09/02/97 D, age 40, and V, age 39, had been boyfriend and girl-
friend for about a month. D had become increasingly obsessive about 
the relationship and got angry when V stood him up on the night of 
the offense. D went to V's house and slashed her furniture with a 
knife. Neighbors observed D assaulting V outside her home then driv-
ing away with V in her car. D later stabbed and cut V a total of 54 to 
56 times in the face, neck, chest, abdomen and arms, then abandoned 
her car with her body in the trunk. Charge: Ml. Jury: Ml. P. TriaV 
D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(conviction). Life. 
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9. Sims, Ernest J. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial- Life 
05/15/75. D and V were driving separate vehicles on the same 
street. D, age 27, passed V on the right and stopped abruptly in front 
of him. D exited his vehicle and accused V of nearly causing an acci-
dent. V pointed a revolver at D, and D left the area. D then returned 
with a sawed-off shotgun and confronted V, whose weapon was in his 
waistband. D shot V once in the abdomen while standing about 10 
feet away from V. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. 
Cir.: (1)(a)(substantial history). Mit. Cir.: (2)(f)(victim participation! 
consent). Life. 
10. Domingus, Alex P. - Lincoln County - Penalty Trial'- Life 
05/02/86. 32-year-old D bludgeoned V, a 25-year-old female, to 
death with a l"x4" piece of wood. Evidence revealed defense wounds 
on V. D dragged V for a short distance after she had been beaten. D 
was previously convicted of first degree sexual assault and robbery. 
Charge: M1. Plea: M1. P. TriallNo Agg. Cir. Presented. Agg. Cir.: 
(1)(a)(conviction and substantial history). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 
Life. 
11. Lee, Edward E. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial- Life 
08/07/82. D was a passenger in a car. V was in another car. V was 
"flirting" with the driver of the car D was in. D got out of the car and 
shot V once. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. TriallNo Agg. Cir. Presented. 
Agg. Cir.: None. Life. 
12. Barfield, Terry A. - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial - 10 
years 
02/08/93. The exact relationship between D, a 26-year-old, and Co-
P and V, a 24-year-old male, is unclear. On the night in question, D 
and Co-P broke into the apartment at which V was staying, sought V 
out, and shot him several times. They then fled the apartment. D had 
a prior conviction for attempted robbery with a weapon. Charge: M1. 
Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(convictions). Mit. Cir.: 
(2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 10 years. 
13. Beagle, George - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial-l0 years 
07/07/75. D, 40-year-old, got into an argument while in a cafe. He 
was intoxicated at the time. D left the cafe and returned five minutes 
later with a sawed-off shotgun. Another argument started and D shot 
V, an adult male. Charge: M2. Plea: MS. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: 
(1)(a)(conviction and substantial history). Mit Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity im-
paired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 10 years. 
14. Brown, James A. - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial- Life 
12/05/73. D, a 27-year-old, gave a ride to V, an 83-year-old female. 
D drove the car to a lake, and they both got out. D started discussing 
his financial problems, and V touched his elbow. D suddenly became 
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violent and struck V on the side of the head. She fell to the ground 
and started having convulsions. He shoved her into the lake water 
and took money from her purse. V had massive contusions to the neck 
and five cracked ribs. Her death was caused by shock from the inju-
ries and asphyxia due to swelling of her larynx and immersion in 
water. Charge: Ml. Plea: Ml. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(convic-
tion). Life. 
15. Buckman, Herman D.- Lancaster County - No Penalty Trial -
Life 
02/19/88. V, 25 years old, was shot twice in head at close range 
while in her vehicle. V was a drug dealer and was going to meet with 
D, 35 years old, and Co-Po D had a gun that night and Co-P was seen 
in the area were V was killed. D and Co-P were arrested later that 
day and had or had spent an amount of money comparable to what V 
had been carrying before her murder. Charge: Ml. Jury: Ml. No P. 
Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(convictions and substantial history). Non-Stat. 
Mit.: Present. Life. 
16. Escamilla, Mario - Lancaster County - No Penalty Trial- Life 
07/03/86. D, a 20-year"0Id man, was walking down the street when 
V, a 71-year-old man, spoke to him. D asked ifhe could use V's phone. 
While doing so, D claimed V made sexual advances towards him. D 
grabbed a knife and stabbed V 12 times. D admitted that he then took 
money out of V's wallet. Charge: Ml. Plea: Ml. No P. Trial. Agg. 
Cir.: (l)(a)(conviction and substantial history). Non-Stat. Mit.: Pre-
sent. Life. 
17. Holloway, Keith D. - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial- 6-10 
years 
10/02/85. 23-year-old D aggressively approached V, a 27-year-old 
male, and shot him once in the chest with a .22 caliber pistol. Wit-
nesses said D threatened V as he approached and shot him with no 
apparent provocation. D claimed that V "tried to cut him," but evi-
dence showed V was unarmed. Charge: Ml. Plea: MS. No P. Trial. 
Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(convictions). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 6-10 years. 
18. McClellen, William J. - Lincoln County - No Penalty Trial -
62/3-20 years 
10/28/83 D, age 51, had been frequenting a rest stop daily during 
the two months prior to the offense. V, a 22-year-old male, was found 
at the rest stop, shot to death in his car. V was reportedly sleeping at 
the time of the shooting. A rifle cartridge found on the scene came 
from D's rifle. D had 2 prior convictions for robbery and 2 for escape. 
Charge: Ml. Plea: MS. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(convictions and 
substantial history). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 6 2/3-20 years. 
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E. 4 - One Statutory Aggravator With High Mitigation 
1. Bussard, Jerry R. - Red Willow County - Penalty Trial - Life 
08/27/79. D, a 24-year-old, shot V, a 22-year-old male, 10 times in 
the head, face and neck. There was evidence that indicated this shoot-
ing was committed in a robbery attempt. D had 3 prior convictions for 
misdemeanor assault, one of which was 'aggravated,' and one convic-
tion for child abuse. Charge: M1. Plea: M1. P. TriallD.P. Sought. 
Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(substantial history); (l)(d)(HAC/depravity-presented/ 
not found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(b)(pressure/ 
influences and/or domination); (2)(c)(mental/emotional distur-
bance-presented/not found); (2)(d)(age); (2)(e)(accomplice and partici-
pation); (2)(D(victim participation/consent); (2)(g)(capacity 
impaired-presented/not found). Life. 
2. Ditter, David D. - Hall County - Penalty Trial- Life 
01123/79. D broke into residence of V, D's estranged spouse. D or-
dered friend of V to remove D and V's children form residence. D 
stripped V of her clothing. Police arrived and were threatened by D 
with a pistol. Police exited residence and D shot V 4 times in the 
chest. Charge: M1. Plea: M1. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: 
(l)(a)(substantial history-presented/not found); (l)(d)(HAC/deprav-
ity-presented/not found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); 
(2)(b)(pressures/influences); (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance); 
(2)(d)(age); (2)(e)(accomplice and participation); (2)(g)(capacity im-
paired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
3. Booth, Stephan M. - Dawson County - No Penalty Trial- 6 112-
20 years 
10/13/88. D, 35 years old, and V, a 40-year-old female, were in an 
abusive relationship and D had told a mutual friend that he would 
someday kill V. On the night in question, D and V were traveling by 
car and drinking. They got into an argument and V pulled the car 
over and got out. D drove off and shortly thereafter turned the car 
around and drove back. D saw V on the side of road, sped the car up 
and drove towards V. When V fled into a ditch, D drove the car into 
the ditch and struck V, killing her. There is evidence that as V's body 
lay on the road, it was hit by other vehicles. Charge: M2. Plea: MS. 
No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(convictions). Mit. Cir.: (2)(c)(mental/emo-
tional disturbance); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Pre-
sent. 6 1/2-20 years. 
4. Rodriguez, Rafael - Lincoln County - No Penalty Trial - 40 
years 
05/12/98. D, a 36-year-old male, was the boyfriend ofNDV. On the 
night in question, they went to the hotel room of the V, a 55-year-old 
male, and drank with him. At some point, D wanted to leave, but 
NDV wanted to stay and D became argumentative. D left for a time 
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and returned with a knife. He stabbed V once and NDV twice. Either 
before or after the stabbings, the phone lines to V's room had been cut 
with a knife. V died from his stab wound. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No 
P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(convictions). Mit. Cir.: (2)(c)(mental/emo-
tional disturbance); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Pre-
sent. 40 years. 
F. Contract Killing - Murder (a) for hire by a principal or agent 
(shooter) or (b) for pecuniary gain - 1(c): 
F. 1 - Aggravated1 Low Mitigation 
1. Anderson, C. Michael (A) - Douglas County - Penalty Trial -
Death 
10/29/75. 23-year-old D and 2 Co-P's planned the murder of V, D's 
employer, for one week. D disliked V and his unfair business dealings, 
and D wanted him dead. D agreed to pay Co-PI $1500 to do the kill-
ing. After receiving the $1500, Co-PI set up an appointment with V to 
look at a secluded piece of real estate with the intention of killing V. 
The plan was frustrated when two others came along with V. Co-PI 
set up another appointment with V to look at the same real estate, but 
this time he fatally shot V in the head, back and neck. Co-PI then 
called Co-P2 to pick him up. D then cashed a forged check he had 
written from V. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. 
Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal crime-presented/not found); (l)(c)(D hired an-
other); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal his-
tory). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Death. Subsequent proceeding at F.3 
(#1). 
2. Hochstein, Peter (A) - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Death 
10/29/75. 21-year-old D and 2 Co-P's planned the murder of V, Co-
PI's employer, for one week. Co-PI disliked V and his unfair business 
dealings, and Co-PI wanted him dead. Co-PI agreed to pay D $1500 
to do the killing. After receiving the $1500, D set up an appointment 
with V to look at a secluded piece of real estate with the intention of 
killing V. The plan was frustrated when 2 others came along with V. 
D set up another appointment with V to look at the same real estate, 
but this time he fatally shot V in the head, back and neck. D then 
called Co-P2 to pick him up. Co-PI then cashed a forged check he had 
written from V. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. 
Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal crime-presented/not found); (1)(c)(D was hired); 
(1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). Non-
Stat. Mit.: Present. Death. Subsequent proceeding at F.3 (#2). 
3. Pope, Gary W. - Saunders County - Penalty Trial- Life 
09/12/79. D, 32-year-old, and V, a 46-year-old male, were friends 
. who had known each other for 3 years. On the day in question, D and 
V met in the country, possibly because V wanted to hire D to kill his 
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spouse. D shot V once in the head and took his money. D then drag-
ged Vs body up next to a barbed wire fence and covered it with weeds 
and brush. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: 
(1)(b)(conceal crime and/or perp); (1)(c)(pecuniary gain); (l)(d)(HACI 
depravity-presented/not found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal his-
tory); (2)(e)(accomplice and participation-presented/not found). Non-
Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
F. 2 - Aggravated1 With High Mitigation 
1. Wredt, Jerry - Otoe County - No Penalty Trial - Life 
12/04179 40-year-old V, D's father, had been threatening and 
abusing D's stepmother, Co-Po 16-year-old D was afraid of his father, 
not only because of possible harm to himself but because he was par-
ticularly worried about possible injury to Co-Po D and Co-P discussed 
how they should kill V on the day before the murder. The discussions 
about the murder revolved around the potential that D would inherit 
Vs truck along with insurance money. D test-fired his gun to make 
sure it worked properly, and when V got home and was walking to-
wards the house, D stepped out from the corner of the house, aimed, 
cocked, and fired on fatal shot into Vs chest. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. 
No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(c)(pecuniary gain); (l)(d)(HAC/depravity). 
Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(d)(age). Non-Stat. Mit.: 
Present. Life. 
F. 3 - One Statutory Aggravator With Low Mitigation 
1. Anderson, C. Michael (B) - Douglas County - Penalty Trial -
Death 
10/29175. 23-year-old D and 2 Co-P's planned the murder of V, D's 
employer, for one week. D disliked V and his unfair business dealings, 
and D wanted him dead. D agreed to pay Co-PI $1500 to do the kill-
ing. After receiving the $1500, Co-PI set up an appointment with V to 
look at a secluded piece of real estate with the intention of killing V. 
The plan was frustrated when 2 others came along with V. Co-PI set 
up another appointment with V to look at the same real estate, but 
this time he fatally shot V in the head, back and neck. Co-PI then 
called Co-P2 to pick him up. D then cashed a forged check he had 
written from V. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. 
Cir.: (l)(c)(D hired another). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). 
Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Death. Prior proceeding at F.l (#1). 
2. Hochstein, Peter (B) - Douglas County - Penalty Trial- Death 
10/29175. 21-year-old D and 2 Co-P's planned the murder of V, Co-
PI's employer, for one week. Co-PI disliked V and his unfair business 
dealings, and Co-PI wanted him dead. Co-PI agreed to pay D $1500 
to do the killing. After receiving the $1500, D set up an appointment 
with V to look at a secluded piece of real estate with the intention of 
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killing V. The plan was frustrated when 2 others came along with V. 
D set up another appointment with V to look at the same real estate, 
but this time he fatally shot V in the head, back and neck. D then 
called Co-P2 to pick him up. Co-PI then cashed a forged check he had 
written from V. Charge: MI. Jury: MI. P. TrialJD.P. Sought. Agg. 
Cir.: (l)(c)(D was hired). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). 
Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Death. Prior proceeding at F.l (#2). 
3. Burchett, Robin - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial - Life 
05/11/83. V had been trying to get alimony from her ex-husband, 
Co-PI. On several occasions, Co-PI asked D if he would dispose of a 
body for $5,000. D claimed not to take this offer seriously, though he 
was paid on this occasion not to discuss it with anyone else. A few 
days before the offense, Co-PI invited D to meet him at a truck stop 
because he had some "farm work" for D to do. D asked Co-P2 to ac-
company him to the truck stop and offered him $200 without telling 
Co-P2 what he had to do to earn the money. The night before the 
offense, D drank heavily and used drugs. At the appointed time, D 
and Co-P2 met Co-PI and V. They entered Co-PI's vehicle, and Co-P2 
sat behind V. While Co-PI drove on a country road, Co-P2 strangled 
V. Co-P2 testified that D instructed him to use D's belt, to sit behind 
V in the car, and to strangle her. D and Co-P2 disposed ofthe body in 
a creek, weighing it down with large pieces of concrete. Charge: MI. 
Jury: MI. P. TrialJD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(c)(D was hired). Mit. 
Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
4. Record, Robert - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life 
10/12/75. D, a 19-year-old, and Co-P were driving around town and 
decided to shoot and rob someone. They picked up a friend and told 
her of their intentions. She asked to be dropped off and they complied. 
They then drove to a location on the edge of Omaha and waited for 
someone to drive by so they could shoot and rob him. V, an adult 
male, drove by and D and CO-P pursued him. D, the passenger hung 
out the window and fired a single shot into V's car. The shot struck V 
in the head, killing him instantaneously. D and Co-P returned to rob 
V but were frightened off by oncoming traffic. Later D and CO-P 
boasted about the killing to at least 5 people. Charge: MI. Jury: MI. 
P. TrialJD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(c)(pecuniary gain). Mit. Cir.: 
(2)(d)(age). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
5. Haselhuhn, Wayne - Lancaster County - No Penalty Trial -
Life 
05/11/83. V had been trying to get alimony from her ex-husband, 
Co-PI. On several occasions, Co-PI asked Co-P2 ifhe would dispose of 
a body for $5,000. Co-P2 claimed not to take this offer seriously, 
though he was paid on this occasion not to discuss it with anyone else. 
A few days before the offense, Co-PI invited Co-P2 to meet him at a 
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truck stop because he had some "farm work" for Co-P2 to do. Co-P2 
asked D to accompany him to the truck stop and offered him $200 
without telling D what he had to do to earn the money. The night 
before the offense, D drank heavily and did drugs. At the appointed 
time, Co-P2 and D met Co-P1 and V. They entered Co-P1's vehicle, 
and D sat behind V. While Co-P1 drove on a country road, D strangled 
V. D testified that Co-P2 instructed him to use Co-P2's belt, to sit 
behind V in the car, and to strangle her. D and Co-P2 disposed of the 
body in a creek, weighing it down with large pieces of concrete. 
Charge: M1. Plea: M1. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(c)(D was hired). 
Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Life. 
6. Rolenc, Clement - Lancaster County - No Penalty Trial- Life 
05/11/83. V had been trying to get alimony from her ex-husband, 
D. On several occasions, D asked Co-P1 if he would dispose of a body 
for $5,000. Co-P1 claimed not to take this offer seriously, though he 
was paid on this occasion not to discuss it with anyone else. A few 
days before the offense, D invited Co-P2 to meet him at a truck stop 
because he had some "farm work" for Co-P2 to do. Co-P2 asked Co-P1 
to accompany him to the truck stop and offered him $200 without tell-
ing Co-P1 what he had to do to earn the money. The night before the 
offense, Co-P1 drank heavily and did drugs. At the appointed time, 
Co-P2 and Co-P1 met D and V. They entered Co-P1's vehicle, and Co-
P2 sat behind V. While D drove on a country road, Co-P2 strangled V. 
Co-P2 testified that Co-P1 instructed him to use Co-P1's belt, to sit 
behind V in the car, and to strangle her. Co-P1 and Co-P2 disposed of 
the body in a creek, weighing it down with large pieces of concrete. 
Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Circ.: (l)(c)(D hired an-
other). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(d)(age). Life. 
G. Escape Detection - A murder committed in which the defen-
dant's motive was an apparent effort to conceal either the commission 
of a crime or the identity of the perpetrator of a crime - l(b): 
G. 1 - Aggravated With Low Mitigation 
1. Drinkwalter, Randy W. (A) - Cherry County - Penalty Trial -
Death 
11101/89. D, a 27-year-old male, went to the home of V, his 87-
year-old grandmother. The two had a brief conversation. D, who 
weighed 450 pounds, then cut the telephone wires, ripped off V's 
clothes, and raped her. He then went to the kitchen and retrieved a 
ball preen hammer. He returned to V, sat on her chest (his weight 
fractured several of her ribs) and struck her in the head and face with 
the hammer 10-20 times. D then jammed an ordinary table knife into 
V's face just below the eye, though by this time she was probably dead. 
D then took a different hammer and shattered several family pictures 
causing glass to fall on to V. D then left the scene. Charge: M1. Jury: 
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Ml. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/ 
depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(b)(pressure/ 
influences and/or domination-presented/not found); (2)(c)(mental! 
emotional disturbance-presented/not found); (2)(g)(capacity im-
paired-presented/not found). Death. Subsequent Proceeding at H.l 
(#11). 
2. Hunt, Robert E. - Madison County - Penalty Trial- Death 
05/12/84. D had fantasized about having sex with a dead woman 
for many years and picked V as a likely subject. D watched V's trailer 
home and made other plans for carrying out the crime. D forced his 
way into V's home, tied her up and strangled her with nylon stockings. 
D than masturbated onto V and, though she was probably already 
dead, put her face down in a bathtub full of water. Charge: Ml. Jury: 
Ml. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp); (l)(d)(HAC/ 
depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). Non-Stat. Mit.: 
Present. Death. 
3. Otey, Harold L. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial- Death 
06/11/77. D, 25-year-old, broke into V's home and stole her stereo. 
D re-entered the house and V, the female occupant of the home, woke 
up. D told V that he would rob and rape her. When V resisted, D cut 
her across her forehead with a knife. D then vaginally and an ally 
raped V, and afterwards took her upstairs to get her money. D then 
stabbed V multiple times, struck her on the head multiple times with 
a hammer, and finally strangled her. Charge: Ml. Jury: Ml. P. Trial! 
D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(substantial history-presented/not 
found); (1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no 
sig. criminal history-presented/not found); (2)(g)(capacity impaired-
presented/not found). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Death. 
4. Palmer, Charles J. (A) - Hall County - Penalty Trial- Death 
03/06/79. D, age 40, and his wife, a Co-P, had sold coins and silver 
to V, a 59-year-old male, on previous occasions. During one such sale 
in V's home, D attacked V, bound him, beat him, ransacked his house 
for money and other valuables, and finally, after another beating 
strangled him with an electrical cord. About 2 weeks after the homi-
cide, D and his wife fled to Texas, where they sold the coins they had 
stolen. Charge: Ml. Jury: Ml. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: 
(1)(a)(conviction and substantial history-both presented/both not 
found); (1)(b)(conceal perp); (l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Death. Subse-
quent Proceedings at G.l (#5 & #6). 
5. Palmer, Charles J. (B) - Hall County - Penalty Trial- Death 
03/06/79. D, age 40, and his wife, a Co-P, had sold coins and silver 
to V, a 59-year-old male, on previous occasions. During one such sale 
in V's home, D attacked V, bound him, beat him, ransacked his house 
for money and other valuables, and finally, after another beating, 
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strangled him with an electrical cord. About 2 weeks after the homi-
cide, D and his wife fled to Texas, where they sold the coins they had 
stolen. Charge: Ml. Jury: Ml. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: 
(l)(a)(conviction and substantial history-both presented/both not 
found); (l)(b)(conceal perp); (l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Death. Prior Pro-
ceeding at G.l (#4). Subsequent Proceeding at G.l (#6). 
6. Palmer, Charles J. (C) - Hall County - Penalty Trial - Death 
03/06/79. D, age 40, and his wife, a Co-P, had sold coins and silver 
to V, a 59-year-old male, on previous occasions. During one such sale 
in V's home, D attacked V, bound him, beat him, ransacked his house 
for money and other valuables, and finally, after another beating 
strangled him with an electrical cord. About 2 weeks after the homi-
cide, D and his wife fled to Texas, where they sold the coins they had 
stolen. Charge: Ml. Jury: Ml. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: 
(l)(a)(conviction and substantial history-both presented/both not 
found); (l)(b)(conceal perp); (l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Non-Stat. Mit.: 
Present. Death. Prior Proceedings at G.l (#4 & #5). 
7. Stewart, Rodney L. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial- Death 
01125/75. V, an 18-year-old male, and NDV had given drugs to D, a 
16-year-old. D then sold the drugs and gave part of the money from 
the sales to V and NDV. D had also stolen drugs from V and NDV, 
and prior to the killing, V and NDV confronted D about his stealing. D 
formed a plan to steal more drugs from V and NDV. As part of the 
plan, D called V and NDV with information about a fictional buyer. D 
had gotten a gun and a can of gasoline in preparation for the theft. V 
and NDV picked D up in their van and drove with D to meet the 
buyer. Upon arrival at the meeting sight, D shot V once in the back of 
the head, killing him. D then shot NDV, who was seriously wounded, 
and spread gasoline in the van and lit it on fire. NDV escaped from 
the van and later identified D to the police. Charge: Ml. Jury: Ml. P. 
TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(convictions and/or substantial his-
tory); (l)(b)(conceal crime and/or perp); (l)(c)(pecuniary gain); 
(l)(d)(HAC/depravity); (l)(e)(multiple victims); (l)(f)(death risk to sev-
eral). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(d)(age-presented/ 
not found); (2)(g)(capacity impaired-presented/not found). Non-Stat. 
Mit.: Present. Death. 
8. Bird Head, Hudson (B) - Sheridan County - Penalty Trial- Life 
03/02/85. D, a 46-year-old male, was pulled over by a police officer 
for driving V's car in an intoxicated manner. D had worked for V, an 
85-year-old female, in the past doing odd jobs for her. In addition to 
the car, D was found with other belongings of V. Forensic evidence 
indicated that D came into V's home, knocked her down and tied her 
hands behind her back. D then raped, beat and strangled V, crushing 
her larynx. V eventually asphyxiated on her own blood. Charge: Ml. 
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Jury: M1. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir: (l)(b)(conceal perp); 
(l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. Prior Proceed-
ing at E.1 (#1). . 
9. Brewer, Wayne K. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial- Life 
03/21/90. Co-P talked 18-year-old D into robbing a house with Co-
P. Upon entering the house, Co-P went upstairs and raped V, Co-P's 
17 -year-old ex-girlfriend. Then D raped V who was bound and gagged. 
While D was in another room, Co-P began to stab V with a butcher 
knife until she eventually died. D and CO-P then left with stolen items 
from the house and a stolen car. V had been babysitting, and the child 
she was watching was left unharmed. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. 
TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal perp); (l)(d)(HAC/deprav-
ity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(b)(pressures/influ-
ences and/or domination- presented/not found); (2)(c)(mental/ 
emotional disturbance-presented/not found); (2)( d)(age-presented/not 
found). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
10. Joy, Carolyn A. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial- Life 
04/11/83. D, a 29-year-old female, and 3 Co-P's were in a car drink-
ing brandy. Earlier that day, D had used heroine and Valium. D and 
Co-P's saw V, an 18-year-old female, passing by and decided to rob 
her. D and Co-P's invited V into the car and then forced her to dis-
robe. D and Co-P's searched Vs clothing and found $25.00. They also 
took Vs necklace. D gave a straight edged razor to one of the Co-P's 
who cut the Vs hair. Another Co-P gave V a minor cut with the razor 
and forced her to perform oral sex on D. A Co-P then "popped" the V 
with the razor. At a wooded park D and Co-P got V out ofthe car and 
beat her to death with a large stick and a baseball bat. Charge: M1. 
Jury: M1. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.:(l)(b)(conceal perp); 
(l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Life. 
11. McDonald, Joseph - Douglas County - Penalty Trial- Life 
07/04174. D, a 16-year-old, and Co-P spent the evening drinking 
beer with their friends. Mter returning home to their trailer park, D 
and Co-P approached the 38-year-old V, who was drunk and sitting in 
his car. D and Co-P attempted to get money from V on the pretext 
that V had backed into D's brother's car. Mter their unsuccessful at-
tempts at getting money from V, D and Co-P retrieved a shotgun bar-
rel from Co-P's trailer and walked over to V, who was leaning over his 
trunk. There was conflicting testimony as to whether D or Co-P then 
hit V over the head with the gun barrel. The two stuffed V into the 
trunk of his car and shut the lid. Then either D or Co-P lit the car on 
fire after one of them had stolen Vs wallet. V was still alive when the 
fire was lit, and he died of asphyxiation. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. 
TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal crime and/or perp); 
(l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Life. 
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12. Privat, Clifford A. - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial - Life 
08/04/93. D, a 19-year-old male, and Co-P needed money, so they 
decided to commit a robbery. D and CO-P had a history of "rolling 
gays" believing them to be "easy" targets. They went to a bar that 
catered to homosexuals and there they met V a 51-year-old male. 
Feigning friendship, they invited him back to their motel room. Upon 
arriving at the motel, they went to D's and Co-P's room and drank 
alcohol. After about 20 minutes, D noticed V had left so D and Co-P 
went to look for him. When they found V, they offered to give him a 
ride to his car. V accepted and got into D's and Co-P's car. Instead of 
taking V to his car, D and Co-P drove V to a secluded area. D took off 
his belt and gave it to CO-P who put it around Vs neck. The two de-
manded Vs wallet, but he refused. D then began beating V. He then 
dragged V from the car and kicked him and stomped on his throat. 
CO-P asked D what they were going to do and D replied that they were 
going to kill V. D then took out a pocket knife and cut Vs throat. D 
handed the knife to Co-P who stabbed V in the stomach. V died from 
the stab wounds and injuries sustained during the beating. D and Co-
P hid the body in nearby woods. Charge: Ml. Plea: Ml. P. TriallD.P. 
Sought. Agg Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal crime and/or perp); (l)(d)(HAC/de-
pravity). Life. 
13. Silvers, Thomas J. - Buffalo County - Penalty Trial- Life 
05/03/86. V was D's 16-year-old stepdaughter, living in the same 
house as D, age 30. D thought V was somewhat rebellious, and there 
was tension between them. On the evening of the offense, D drank 6 
beers and found the bathroom door locked. D became very angry and 
confronted V. He then beat her with a bar. D thought he had killed V; 
so he poured gas on V and set her on fire to "cover things up." V suf-
fered second and third degree burns to 90% of her body, as well as 
severe blows and lacerations to the head and liver. V died of the burns 
several days later. Charge: Ml. Plea: Ml. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. 
Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal crime and/or perp); (l)(d)(HAC/depravity); (1)(f) 
(death risk to several). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
14. Williams, Jo Helen - Douglas County - Penalty Trial- Life 
04/11/1983. D, a 24-year-old female, and 3 Co-P's were in a car 
drinking brandy. D and Co-P's saw V, an 18-year-old female, passing 
by and decided to rob her. A Co-P invited V into the car and then D 
forced her to disrobe. A Co-P took Vs necklace, searched Vs clothing 
and found $25.00. D got a straight edged razor from a Co-P and used 
it to cut Vs hair. Another CO-P gave V a minor cut with the razor. D 
and Co-P's drove to a park and D forced V to perform oral sex on a Co-
P. D then "popped" V in the mouth with the razor. D and Co-P got V 
out of the car and beat her to death with a large stick and a baseball 
bat. Charge: Ml. Jury: Ml. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (l)(b) 
(conceal perp); (l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Life. 
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15. Brunzo, Gary L. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life 
12/06/93. D, 21-year-old, and Co-PI went looking for a vehicle to 
steal to use in a drive-by shooting, and they randomly chose the van 
that V, a 20-year-old male, was driving. V had just parked the van 
behind his home when 2 Co-P's forced him on to the floor of the van 
between the front seats, seated with hands behind his head. These 
Co-P's then drove the van to pick up 3 other Co-P's. They all started 
taunting and hitting V, and either D shot V once in the back of the 
head or he taunted Co-P3 into doing it. V was then thrown out of the 
van. Charge: Ml. Jury: Ml. P. TriallNo Agg. Cir. Presented. Agg. 
Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal crime and/or perp); (l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. 
Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
16. Eona, Daniel - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life 
12/06/93. D, 21-year-old, and Co-PI went looking for a vehicle to 
steal to use in a drive-by shooting, and they randomly chose the van 
that V, a 20-year-old male, was driving. V had just parked the van 
behind his home when 2 Co-P's forced him on to the floor of the van 
between the front seats, seated with hands behind his head. These 
Co-P's then drove the van to pick up 3 other Co-P's. They all started 
taunting and hitting V, and either Co~P1 shot V once in the back of the 
head or he taunted Co-P3 into doing it. V was then thrown out of the 
van. Charge: Ml. Jury: Ml. P. TriallNo Agg. Cir. Presented. Agg. 
Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal crime and/or perp); (l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. 
Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
17. Bishop, Allan L. - Lancaster County - No Penalty Trial -
6 2/3-20 years 
05/08/86. V, a 24-year-old female, and Co-PI had been dating but 
V planned on breaking off the relationship when they next met. V and 
Co-PI met at a restaurant and were joined by Co-P2 and later D. 
They all went to D's house and when V rejected their sexual advances, 
the 3 men beat her into submission with their hands, feet, a large 
wooden dowel, and possibly another blunt instrument. V was anally 
and vaginally raped and then beaten some more. D then called Co-P3, 
his wife, who borrowed a pickup for transporting V. V was put in a 
sleeping bag, placed in the back of the truck, taken out to the country 
and dumped by the side of the road. Charge: Ml. Plea: MS. No P. 
Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal perp); (l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: 
(2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 6 2/3-20 
years. 
18. Carrera, Juan - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial - 20-30 
years 
12/06/93. Co-PI and Co-P2 went looking for a vehicle to steal to 
use in a drive-by shooting, and they randomly chose the van that V, a 
20-year-old male, was driving. V had just parked the van behind his 
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home when the 2 Co-P's forced him on to the floor of the van between 
the front seats, seated with hands behind his head. The Co-P's then 
drove the van to pick up D, a 21-year-old male, and 2 other Co-P's. 
They all started taunting and hitting V, and either Co-P2 shot V once 
in the back of the head or he taunted Co-P3 into doing it. V was then 
thrown out of the van. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: 
(1)(b)(conceal perp); (l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. 
criminal history). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 20-30 years. 
19. Ellen, Richard E. - Madison County - No Penalty Trial- Life 
07/19/89. D, 37 years old, Co-P, and V, an adult male, worked for 
the same carnival, and on the night in question, all 3 became intoxi-
cated in a bar. D and V had a confrontation in the bar, and after re-
turning to the carnival, D hit V repeatedly with a mallet handle, 
breaking his arm. When V complained to others in the carnival about 
this, D and Co-P placed him in D's truck on the pretense of taking him 
to the hospital. However, they drove V to a nearby area and pulled 
him out of the truck. V could not stand on his own. D and Co-P drag-
ged him down a hill and beat him with a metal bar, penetrating his 
brain and killing him. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg Cir: 
(1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity 
impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
20. Garhart, Terry D. - Lancaster County - No Penalty Trial- 1-
20 years 
05/08/86. V, a 24-year-old female, had been romantically involved 
with Co-PI but wanted to end the relationship. Co-PI was aware of 
her plans. V met with Co-PI and Co-P2 at a restaurant. At some 
point they were joined by D, and they all went to Co-P2's residence. 
When V refused their sexual advances, the 2 Co-P's and D beat V un-
conscious with a large wooden dowel and then took turns raping her 
both anally and vaginally, then beat her some more. There is some 
evidence that V may have still been alive when she was placed in a 
sleeping bag. Co-P3 was called and told to come with a pickup. They 
put V in the back of the truck, drove out into the country and dumped 
V off on the side ofthe road. Charge: M1. Plea: MS. No P. Trial. Agg. 
Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Non-Stat. Mit.: Pre-
sent. 1-20 years. 
21. Harlan, Lance J. - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial - 12 
years 
07/12/86. Co-P's stole $11 from V, an adult male, along with his 
house keys. Later, D, 19 years old, and Co-P's went back to V's home 
and let themselves in with the keys. V woke up and, at first, attacked 
D. V was hit with a baseball bat, however, and ran upstairs. He was 
followed upstairs, beaten again with the bat, and chased downstairs. 
V was then beaten to death and a can of black paint was poured on 
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him. Vs televison was stolen. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. 
Agg. Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal perp); (l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: 
(2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 12 years. 
22. Lanzendorf, George - Hall County - No Penalty Trial - 25 
years 
05/18/77. D, a 16-year-old, and Co-P, decided to rob a hardware 
store. They parked behind the back of the store and waited until the 
employees left. When V, a 28-year-old male who was a manager of the 
store, came out with a money bag, CO-P hit him on the head, attempt-
ing to knock him out. V did not fall, however, and D and CO-P got V 
into their car instead. Co-P then drove them to a sandpit. When they 
arrived, D handed a gun to CO-P and CO-P fired all ofthe bullets in the 
clip into V. Co-P then went to the car, got another clip, and emptied 
that clip into V as well. V was shot 17 times. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. 
No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal perp); (l)(d)(HAC/depravity). 
Mit. Cir.: (2)(d)(age). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 25 years. 
23. LeGer, Eldon T. - Lancaster County - No Penalty Trial - 40 
years 
08/04/93. D, a 19-year-old and Co-P needed money and decided to 
commit a robbery. D and CO-P had a history of "rolling gays" believing 
them to be "easy" targets. They went to a bar that catered to homosex-
uals and there they met V, a 51-year-old male. Feigning friendship, 
they invited him back to their motel room. Upon arriving at the 
motel, they went to D's and Co-P's room and drank alcohol. Mter 
about 20 minutes, D noticed V had left so D and Co-P went to look for 
him. When they found V, they offered to give him a ride to his car. V 
accepted and got into D's and Co-P's car. Instead of taking V to his 
car, D and CO-P drove V to a secluded area. Co-P took offhis belt and 
gave it to D who put it around V's neck. The two demanded V's wallet, 
but he refused. Co-P then began beating V. Co-P then dragged V 
from the car and kicked him and stomped on his throat. D asked CO-P 
what they were going to do and CO-P replied that they were going to 
kill V. Co-P then took out a pocket knife and cut Vs throat. Co-P 
handed the knife to D who stabbed V in the stomach. V died from the 
stab wounds and injuries sustained during the beating. D and Co-P 
hid the body in nearby woods. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. 
Agg Cir.: (l)(a)(substantial history-presented/not found); 
(l)(b)(conceal crime and perp); (l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: 
(2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 10-40 years. 
G. 2 - Aggravated! With High Mitigation 
1. Sheets, Jeremy C. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial- Death 
09/24/92. D, age 18, and CO-P planned to rape a woman. Earlier 
that day they had also discussed their mutual hatred for a certain 
race. D and Co-P abducted V, a 17-year-old female of the race they 
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hated, from a parking lot. They took V to a park where D raped and 
beat her while uttering racial slurs. After V lost consciousness, D 
deeply cut her throat. D and CO-P threw the knife into a river and 
moved V's body to a remote wooded area. D and Co-P removed blood 
from D's car and disposed of his bloody clothing. Charge: M1. Jury: 
M1. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HACI 
depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(d)(age). Non-
Stat. Mit.: Present. Death. Released after appeal. See supra note 
264. 
2. Roewert, Ricky E. - Platte County - Penalty Trial- Life 
04129/77. D and Co-P's were drinking at a bar when the V, who 
was very intoxicated, entered. D and one of the Co-P's noted that V 
had a large amount of money, and they decided to rob and kill him. 
They discussed the robbery with the other CO-P and 2 others. The Co-
P agreed but the others wanted no part in it. As a ruse, D and Co-P's 
asked the V if he wanted to go to a party to which he agreed. After 
stopping on the way to get 2 knives, D and the Co-P's drove V to the 
city dump. The V "passed-out" and D and a Co-P pulled V out of the 
car and D slashed V's throat. D then cut offV's head and made multi-
ple cuts in the back and front of V's body. They then hid the body. 
Charge: M1. Plea: M1. P. TriallNo Agg. Cir. Presented. Agg. Cir.: 
(1)(b)(conceal crime and/or perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: 
(2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. 
Mit.: Present. Life. 
3. Moore, Donald F. - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial- Life 
08/22/79 and 08/26/79. Co-P suggested to D, a 15-year-old, that 
they rob a cab driver and D agreed. D was aware that Co-P had a gun 
and that there was a possibility that they might shoot the V. The two 
went to a restaurant and Co-P called the taxi company for which V, a 
47-year-old, worked. They planned to rob a tax driver who was older. 
When V arrived, D told Co-P that V was the cab driver they would rob. 
They got into the cab and directed V to drive them to a certain rural 
location. When they arrived there D and CO-P robbed V and Co-P then 
shot him 3 times. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: 
(1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. 
criminal history); (2)(b)(pressure/influence and/or domination); 
(2)(d)(age); (2)(e)(accomplice and participation). Non-Stat. Mit.: Pre-
sent. Life. 
G. 3 - One Statutory Aggravator With Low Mitigation 
1. Kennedy, Paul L. - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial - Life 
07/03/73. D, a 23-year-old, was experiencing financial difficulties 
and had recently written some insufficient funds checks on a friend's 
account. D decided to burglarize a home to get money. He went to a 
house with the intent of burglarizing it, but was scared away by dogs. 
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D then went to a lake where he planned to rob a fisherman. D decided 
that since many of the people who regularly fished at the lake knew 
him, he would have to kill whomever he robbed. After contemplating 
robbing some fishermen in one location along the lake, D decided 
there were too many people present and went to a different location 
where he found V, a 67-year-old male, fishing alone. D shot V 4 times 
and took V's money. Charge: Ml. Plea: Ml. P. TriallD.P. Sought. 
Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity-presented/not 
found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). Non-Stat. Mit.: Pre-
sent. Life. 
2. Myers, James E. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial- Life 
09/18/95. V was an ex-girlfriend of 22-year-old D's who had wit-
nessed a friend/crime associate of D's commit a prior murder. A wit-
ness testified that he and D pulled up in front ofV's apartment, D got 
out of the van and witness heard a gun being cocked. When D re-
turned he gave the gun to witness, telling him to get rid of it. V had 
been shot twice in the head at close range while she slept. Charge: 
Ml. Jury: Ml. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(convictions and 
substantial history-both presentedlboth not found); (1)(b)(conceal 
perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity-presented/not found); (1)(h)(disrupt gov't 
functionllaw enforcement-presented/not found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no 
sig. criminal history-presented/not found). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 
Life. 
3. Schaeffer, Bernard - Hall County - Penalty Trial- Life 
05/22177. D, who was 16 at the time, and Co-P planned to rob a 
hardware store by hiding in the back lot and waiting for V, the man-
ager, to come out with the money bag. The plan was to knock V out, 
but when D hit him, V did not fall down, so D forced V into D's car at 
gunpoint. D and Co-P drove V to a sandpit where D emptied the gun 
into him, went back to the car for another clip and emptied that into V 
as well. D shot V 17 times. Charge: Ml. Plea: Ml. P. TriallD.P. 
Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp); (1)(d)(HAC/depravity-
presented/not found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); 
(2)(d)(age). Life. 
4. Simpson, Jerry (1) - Kimball County - Penalty Trial - Life 
11/12176. D and Co-P, D's sister, were hitchhiking when they were 
picked up by V. D and CO-P planned to rob V, but when Co-P pulled a 
gun, V tried to grab it and Co-P shot him. V turned back towards the 
front of the car and Co-P shot V again. D and Co-P decided they had 
better finish the job because V could identify them, so D, as V pleaded 
for his life, aimed at V's head and fired twice. Charge: Ml. Jury: Ml. 
P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Circ.: (1)(b)(conceal perp). Non-Stat. Mit.: 
Present. Life. 
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5. Smith, Loray S. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life 
04/11/83. D, a 25-year-old female, and 3 Co-P's were in a car drink-
ing brandy. D and Co-P's saw V, an 18-year-old female, passing by 
and decided to rob her. D invited V into the car and then forced her to 
disrobe. D and Co-P's searched V's clothing and found $25.00. They 
also took V's necklace. With a straight edged razor, one Co-P cut V's 
hair. Another Co-P gave V a minor cut with the razor. One Co-P 
forced V to perform oral sex on another Co-Po A Co-P then "popped" V 
in the mouth with the razor. At a wooded area, two Co-P's removed V 
from the car and beat her to death with a large stick and a baseball 
bat. Charge: Ml. Jury: Ml. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: 
(1)(b)(conceal perp-presented/not found); l(d)(HAC/deprav-
ity-presented/not found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(e)(accomplice and participa-
tion). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
6. Ware, David E. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial- Life 
12/20/83. D, an 18-year-old male, shot and killed V in V's store and 
then took V's wallet, keys and automobile. D later admitted that he 
shot V because he was going to call the police and would be able to 
identify D. Charge: Ml. Bench: Ml. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: 
(1)(b)(conceal perp). Mit. Cir.: (2)(d)(age). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 
Life. 
7. Perkins, Brian K. - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial - Life 
12/02/82. D, a 21-year-old male, and Co-P attempted to rob V, a 48-
year-old male, who was D's landlord. V struggled with D and Co-P, 
and was stabbed once and drug into his auto while still alive. D and 
Co-P drove V into the country, drug him into a ditch, and stabbed him 
multiple times. Charge: Ml. Jury: Ml. P. TriallNo Agg. Cir. 
Presented. Agg Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal crime and/or perp). Non-Stat. Mit.: 
Present. Life. 
8. Price, James E. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life 
07/23/95. V, a 19-year-old male, was thought by D, a 20-year-old 
male, and 7 Co-P's to have stolen speakers belonging to one of the Co-
P's. D and Co-P's pulled up in front of a house where V was visiting, 
blocking in V's car. They forced V into the van at gunpoint, took him 
to a remote area and robbed him. V agreed to take D and Co-P's to 
where the speakers could be reclaimed. V was forced into the trunk of 
a car stolen by a Co-P at the same time as V's kidnapping. D shot into 
the trunk of the car with an assault rifle, killing V. D then took the 
car, with V still in the trunk, to another location and set it on fire. 
Charge: Ml. Jury: Ml. P. TriallNo Agg. Cir. Presented. Agg. Cir.: 
(1)(b)(conceal perp and/or crime). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal his-
tory). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
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9. Armour, Kenneth - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial - 4-7 
years 
10/01/80. D, 27 years old, and 2 Co-P's were driving and saw V, an 
adult male, at a gas station and he appeared to be intoxicated. Co-PI 
jumped out of their vehicle and into V's truck and drove it to a se-
cluded place with D and Co-P2 following. Once there, Co-PI stopped 
the truck and beat and kicked V to death. D stole gas from V's truck 
and set it on fire to destroy any fingerprints. Charge: M1. Plea: MS. 
No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal perp). Mit. Cir.: (2)(e)(accomplice 
and participation). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 4-7 years. 
10. Black Bonnette, Cornelius - Lancaster County - No Penalty 
Trial- Life 
OS/21/81. D, 36 years old, knocked on V's door and presented him-
self as a police officer. V, an 87-year-old female, let D inside and was 
told by D to go into her bedroom for her protection. D looked around 
V's home for something to steal, took a knife from the kitchen and 
went into V's bedroom and demanded money from her. When V said 
that she did not have any money, D stabbed her twice in the stomach. 
Then, because she was still alive and D was worried that she could 
identify him, D cut off a length of cord from a set of window blinds and 
strangled V. D stole V's radio, which he later sold, and a few days 
later he fled to South Dakota, where he was apprehended. Charge: 
M1. Plea: M1. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal perp). Mit. Cir.: 
(2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
11. Brick, Jacqueline S. - Cheyenne County - No Penalty Trial-
40 years 
11112/76. D, a 24-year-old female, was hitchhiking with Co-P, her 
sibling. They were picked up by V, an adult male, and they formed a 
plan to rob him. D, who was in the back seat, pulled out a gun and 
told V to stop the car. V reached into the backseat in an attempt to get 
the gun, and it discharged. V then turned around to face the front of 
the car and D shot him once more in the back, paralyzing him and 
inflicting a fatal wound. D and the Co-P then dragged V from the car, 
tied him to a fence by the roadside, robbed him, and agreed that they 
should finish him because he could identify them. Co-P took the gun 
and shot at V twice, aiming at his head but hitting him in the arm and 
leg. D and Co-P drove away in V's car and made their way to Califor-
nia, where they were arrested. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. 
Agg Cir: (l)(b)(conceal perp). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). 
Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 40 years. 
12. Brown, Samuel P. - Stanton County - No Penalty Trial- Term 
of Years 
04/30/77. D, a 27-year-old, was drinking at a bar with Co-P1, Co-
P2 and 2 other acquaintances. V, a 23-year-old male, was also at the 
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bar and D and Co-P1 noticed he had a large sum of money. D sug-
gested they rob V and then kill V so he could not identify them and Co-
P1 and Co-P2 agreed. V, who was extremely intoxicated, agreed to go 
with D and Co-P's to a party and they all left the bar. After stopping 
to get knives, D and Co-P's drove V into the country. Co-P1 slashed 
V's throat and cut offV's head after Co-P1 and D dragged V from the 
car after V passed out. D dragged V's torso to some bushes where he 
and Co-P's hid it. D kicked the torso and poured beer into V's body. 
Charge: Ml. Plea: M2. No P Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal perp and! 
or crime). Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat Mit.: Present. 
Term of Years. 
13. Clark, Harry A. - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial- Life 
03/12/83. D, 34 years old, attempted to steal V's truck, but acciden-
tally ran it into another vehicle. D fled the scene, and V, a 40-year-old 
male, found out from Co-P where D lived. V and Co-P went to D's 
home and V and D amicably talked about the situation. When V went 
to shake D's hand, D hit him. D and Co-P then beat and kicked V 
until he was unconscious, and later put him in a trash bin. V died in 
the dumpster from his injuries. Charge: Ml. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. 
Agg. Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal perp). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
14. Clark, Lee L. - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial - Life 
03/12/83. Co-P attempted to steal V's truck, but accidentally ran it 
into another vehicle. Co-P fled the scene, and V, a 40-year-old male, 
found out from D, a 25-year-old male, where CO-P lived. V and D went 
to Co-P's home and V and Co-P amicably talked about the situation. 
When V went to shake Co-P's hand, CO-P hit him. D and Co-P then 
beat and kicked V until he was unconscious, and later put him in a 
trash bin. V died in the dumpster from his injuries. Charge: Ml. 
Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal perp). Non-Stat. Mit.: 
Present. Life. 
15. Cook, Todd L. - Madison County - No Penalty Trial- Life 
01129/95. D and Co-Perp had discussed robbing a particular conve-
nience store for about a week. On the way home from a party they 
decided this was the night. At the party, they had been drinking, 
smoking marijuana, and snorting methamphetamine. D went into the 
store first and took V, who was the clerk, into the back to try to re-
move the surveillance tape from the video camera. D could not re-
move the tape so he shot at it. D then shot V in the neck. Charge: Ml. 
Plea: Ml. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal perp). Mit. Cir.: 
(2)(d)(age). Life. 
16. Davis, John R. - Sanders County - No Penalty Trial - Life 
11/22/79. D, 21-year-old, and 2 Co-P's planned to rob someone so 
that they could have a party. They hitchhiked and were picked up by 
V, a 22-year-old male. V, D and the Co-P's spent some time drinking 
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together. When V was driving them home, D asked him pull the car 
over. D then dragged V out of the car, and V was beaten and put in 
the trunk. D and Co-PI dropped off Co-P2, and then drove V into the 
country. They beat V with their fists and a steel bar, then stripped V 
and threw him in a water-filled ditch, where he drowned. D and Co-
PI kept V's car. Charge: Ml. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: 
(l)(b)(conceal perp). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). Non-
Stat. Mit.: Present. 30 years - Life. 
17. Epp, William A. - Gage County - No Penalty Trial - Life 
11/24177. 18-year-old D, in an apparent attempt to burglarize V's 
liquor store, shot out the front window. V, who lived next door, went 
to investigate with a shotgun. V confronted D and D shot V, who was 
able to describe D and give D's license plate number before he died. 
Charge: Ml. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal perp). 
Mit. Cir.: (2)(d)(age). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
18. Fletcher, Stacey L. (I) - Lincoln County - No Penalty Trial-
Life 
02/19/92. D, 23 years old, and Co-P entered a convenience store to 
rob it. V, a 49-year-old female who worked in the store, started 
screaming and ran to or was dragged by D and Co-P to the back ofthe 
store. D and Co-P then beat V with tire irons until she stopped 
screaming, breaking V's wrist, fingers, teeth, jaw and skull. V died 
from her head wounds, and D and Co-P robbed the store and fled. 
Charge: Ml. Plea: Ml. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal perp). 
Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
19. Lara, Albino - Cherry County - No Penalty Trial- 30-50 years 
11/04/93. 21-year-old D and 2 Co-P's befriended 55-year-old V at a 
bar with the intention of robbing him. D, the 2 Co-P's, and V left the 
bar together and went to a motel where some or all of them partici-
pated in homosexual activities. Intoxicated from a night of drinking, 
the 4 individuals drove V's car out to a secluded area to fulfill the per-
petrators' plan of robbing V. The perpetrators forced V to the ground 
and kicked him in the head and face and upper body for an extended 
period oftime. V suffered a broken jaw, multiple abrasions and bruis-
ing over his chest, head and neck area, serious lacerations, a near re-
moval of his ear, and a severed artery in his brain. The perpetrators 
stripped V of his clothing and left him near a creek. As the perpetra-
tors were walking away, D stepped down on V's throat and said, "I've 
got to kill this guy." The perpetrators then attempted to hide the car 
and their bloody clothing. Charge: Ml. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. 
Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal perp). Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-
Stat. Mit.: Present. 30-50 years. 
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20. Leon, Ira R. - Lincoln County - No Penalty Trial- Life 
02/19/92. D, 20 years old, and Co-P entered a convenience store to 
rob it. V, a 49-year-old female who worked in the store, started 
screaming and ran to or was forcibly taken by D and Co-P to the back 
of the store. D and Co-P then beat V with tire irons until she stopped 
screaming, breaking V's wrist, fingers, teeth, jaw and skull. V died 
from her head wounds, and D and Co-P robbed the store and fled. 
Charge: M1. Plea: M1. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal perp). 
Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
21. Liebers, Anna M - Lancaster County - No Penalty Trial- Life 
11/25/91. V a 32-year-old-female, D, Co-P and a fourth person all 
belonged to a burglary ring. V and a fourth person were caught and 
arrested. V stated that he was going to turn State's evidence against 
the fourth person in order to save himself. Co-P and D lured V out into 
the country and then beat him to death with crowbars because they 
feared the whole group would be caught. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No 
P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal perp). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
22. Reichwaldt, Ricky L. - Lancaster County - No Penalty Trial-
Life 
11/25/91. V, 30-year-old D, Co-P and a fourth person all belonged 
to a burglary ring. V and the fourth person were caught and arrested. 
V stated that he was going to turn State's evidence against the fourth 
person in order to save himself. Co-P and D lured V out into the coun-
try and then beat him to death with crowbars because they feared the 
whole group would be caught. Charge: M1. Plea: M1. No P. Trial. 
Agg. Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal perp). Life. 
23. Shelley, Tyrus T. - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial- 25-30 
years 
01/20/95. 19-year-old D, and Co-P were holding up a fast food res-
taurant when D shot the 71-year-old V who was an employee. D 
stated that he thought V was going for a gun. When another employee 
came out and saw V on the floor, D tried to shoot the second employee, 
but the gun jammed. The second employee escaped and called police. 
Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal perp). 
Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 25-30 Years. 
24. Taylor, Brian L. - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial - Life 
03/24/75. D had been drinking and taking drugs when he picked 
up V, a hitchhiker. As V was exiting the car, D shot him in the left 
temple. D then went through V's pockets and took everything. D 
pushed V out of the car, got out, and shot V in the back of the head. 
Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal perp). 
Life. 
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G. 4 - One Statutory Aggravator With High Mitigation 
1. Larsen, Richard A. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life 
09/24/95. Co-P1 was involved in a fight with V1, a 34-year-old 
male, and V2 a 37-year-old male, and as a result Co-P1 sustained a 
minor cut to his face. Later that day, Co-P1 went to a party at D's 
home where he complained about the earlier fight. Co-P1 and another 
then left the party to search for V1 and V2. After finding V1, Co-P1 
threw a brick into his head causing serious, perhaps even fatal, inju-
ries. After they returned to the party, D suggested they "go finish [V1] 
off." D, Co-P1, and Co-P2 returned to where V1 was lying on the 
ground. V1 tried to talk but Co-P2 kicked him and then D took out a 
knife and stabbed V1 multiple times. D and his CooP's hid when a car 
drove by, but afterwards returned to V1 and D continued stabbing him 
while D rummaged through Vl's pockets. V1 suffered 20 stab wounds. 
D and CooP's returned to the party and decided to kill V2 because, 
they believed, he would be able to identify them as V1's killers. They 
proceeded to V2's apartment where, just before entering, D and Co-P1 
decided Co-P1 would kill V2. They then broke into the apartment. 
Co-P1 first sprayed mace at V2 and then stabbed him 17 times while 
the other CooP's beat NDV unconscious. They then left the apartment, 
but D returned and struck someone, though it is unclear who, in the 
head with a 2" x 4" board. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. TriallD.P. 
Sought. Agg. Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal perp-presented/not found). Mit. Cir.: 
(2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(b)(pressures/influences and/or dom-
ination-presented/not found); (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance); 
(2)(d)(age-presented/not found); (2)(e)(accomplice and participation-
pres en ted/not found); (2 )(f)( victim partici pa tion!consen t-presen ted/ 
not found); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Life. 
2. Osborn, Jeremy P. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial- Life 
12/13/93. D, a 19-year-old male, and V, a 19-year-old female, lived 
in the same apartment complex. D pried open the door to V's apart-
ment and raped her. Worried about the consequences of sexual as-
sault, D got a knife from the kitchen. D stabbed V in the neck and 
head, and V died of asphyxiation. Autopsy findings also produced evi-
dence of strangulation and beating prior to death. D put the knife in 
the dishwasher before leaving. D claimed to have been drinking heav-
ily that day. Charge: M1. Bench: M1. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: 
(l)(b)(conceal perp); (l)(d)(HAC/depravity-presented/not found). Mit. 
Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(d)(age-presented/not found); 
(2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
3. Rehbein, Cary N. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial- Life 
09/06/81. Charge: M1. Plea: M1. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: 
(l)(a)(conviction-presented/not found); (l)(b)(conceal perp); (l)(d) 
(HAC/depravity-presented/not found); (l)(h)(disrupt gov't function! 
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law enforcement-presented/not found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. crimi-
nal history); (2)(b)(pressure/influences-presented/not found); (2)(c) 
(mentallemotional disturbance); (2)(g)(capacity impaired-presented/ 
not found). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
4. Thornton, Owen R. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life 
05/08/79. D, a 23-year-old, broke into an apartment to burglarize 
it, thinking no one was home. V, a female occupant of the apartment, 
awoke and began screaming. D attempted to gag V to stop her 
from screaming, and then he strangled V, killing her. Charge: Ml. 
Plea: Ml. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(substantial history-
presented/not found); (l)(b)(conceal perp). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. 
criminal history); (2)(b)(pressures/influences-presented/not found); (2) 
(c)(mentallemotional disturbance-presented/not found); (2)(d)(age-
presented/not found); (2)(e)(accomplice and participation); (2)(f)(victim 
partici pation/consen t); (2 )(g)( ca paci ty impaired -presented/not found). 
Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
6. Soukharith, Anousone - Sarpy County - Penalty Trial- Life 
OS/23/95. D, a 20-year-old male, planned with friends to ''hijack'' 
Vs car. D approached Vs vehicle with a loaded gun. He ordered her 
to exit the car, then changed his mind and told her to get back in and 
drive. She complied and they traveled from Des Moines, Iowa, to the 
Omaha area of Nebraska. After exiting Omaha, D said he planned to 
tie V to a tree near the river and take her car to California. The two 
exited the vehicle in the area he chose, and as V was walking in front 
of D, she asked him several times not to shoot her. It was this, D 
claimed, that gave him the idea to shoot V. D fired once, striking V. D 
left Vs body where it lay. He was apprehended the same day in Wyo-
ming. Charge: Ml. Jury: Ml. P. TriallNo Agg. Cir. Presented. Agg. 
Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal perp). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); 
(2)(c)(mentallemotional disturbance). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
7. Laravie, Antonio A. - Knox County - No Penalty Trial- Life 
08/18/73. D, a 15-year-old male, had been drinking with his 
friends for several hours into the early morning. D left his friends to 
make a phone call. He broke into a house to use the phone, and once 
in the house, he decided to rob it. D grabbed a knife from the kitchen 
in case someone woke up. V, a 2-year-old boy, woke up and made a 
noise. D put his hand over Vs mouth and stabbed him twice in the 
chest, killing him. Charge: Ml. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: 
(l)(b)(conceal perp). Mit Cir.: (2)(d)(age); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). 
Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
8. Lawson, Douglas E. - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial - 25 
years 
01/16/75. D, a 16-year-old, went into Vs home to ransack it. V, a 
7 -year-old female, came home and asked D what he was doing. D said 
HeinOnline -- 81 Neb. L. Rev. 740 2002-2003
740 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:486 
that he had come in after V, and she seemed to accept this. V got a 
snack and started to watch television. D became frightened because of 
V's presence, however, and got a knife from the kitchen and stabbed 
her repeatedly. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: 
(1)(b)(conceal perp). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); 
(2)(d)(age); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 25 
years. 
9. Randall, Kevin D. - Saunders County - No Penalty Trial- Life 
11/22/79 D, a 16-year-old male, and 2 Co-P's were hitchhiking 
when they were picked up by V. They all went to a bar where D and 
Co-P's, who had just taken L.S.D., decided that V had made a pass at 
one of them and they were going to "roll" him. After leaving the bar, a 
CO-P asked V to stop the car. CO-P jumped out, pulled V out of the car 
and beat and robbed him. They put V in the trunk and drove out into 
the country where they continued the beating with a steel bar. V was 
still alive when they dumped him off a bridge into a creek. Charge: 
M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(b)(conceal perp). Mit. Cir.: 
(2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(d)(age); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). 
Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
H. HAC or Depravity - Murder was especially heinous, atrocious, 
and cruel (HAC) or defendant manifested exceptional depravity by or-
dinary standards of morality and intelligence - l(d): 
H. 1 - One Statutory Aggravator With Low Mitigation 
1. Bronson, Clyde W. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life 
06/28/91. The 39-year-old D's neighbor, V, was found dead in her 
home with 16 stab wounds to her chest and stomach and 6 blunt inju-
ries to her face and head. D's fingerprints were found in the blood. D 
had been asking several neighbors for money on the night of the mur-
der, and V's purse was left out in the kitchen where she was found 
dead. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: 
(1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). Non-
Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
2. Crisp, Harold W. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life 
04/05/84. D was convicted of homicide when he struck V, knocking 
her out, and sexually assaulted and mutilated the body. Evidence ex-
isted to suggest the D was under significant influence of drugs and/or 
alcohol at the time of the crime. Charge: M1. Bench: M1. P. Trial! 
D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: None. Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity impaired). 
Life. 
3. Hargett, James F. - Sarpy County - Penalty Trial- Life 
09/29/98. D, a 19-year-old and 5 Co-P's planned the murder of a 
19-year-old male V, for about 2 weeks. Their plan was in response to 
allegations that V raped a Co-P during a sexual foursome involving V 
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and 3 of the other perpetrators. Five of the perpetrators, including D, 
drove to a park with V. One of the Co-P's remained in the car while D, 
V and 3 Co-P's walked down to an area under a bridge, and the 4 per-
petrators all began stabbing V. The pathologist stopped counting the 
number of wounds at 69, 57 of them being stab lacerations. A Co-P 
also stated that they hit V over the head with bricks. During the mur-
der, a Co-P said to D, "We have to finish this. [V's] not dead. [V's] 
going to know who we are." After the murder the perpetrators made 
comments about how V "screamed like a fucking girl" and how they 
were happy V was dead. Charge: Ml. Plea: Ml. P. TrialJD.P. Sought. 
Agg. Cir.: (l)(d)(HAC/depravity-presented/not found). Non-Stat. Mit.: 
Present. Life. 
4. Lynch, Patrick B. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life 
10/01/82. D killed V by multiple stab wounds in what originally 
appeared to be a consensual homosexual encounter after V picked D 
up when he was hitchhiking. Charge: Ml. Jury: Ml. P. TrialJD.P. 
Sought. Agg. Cir.: None. Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). 
Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
5. Scott, Maurice L. - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial - Life 
04/23/80. D, age 24, was living with V, a 22-year-old female. D 
became angry with V for leaving their young children with a neighbor 
one evening. For a prolonged period of time, D beat V with a belt with 
a metal buckle and a coffee table leg, and kicked her with metal-toed 
boots. V suffered multiple bruises, abrasions, broken ribs, and lacera-
tions which were mostly confined to her scalp. V died of blood loss and 
shock. Charge: Ml. Jury: Ml. P. TrialJD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: 
(l)(a)(substantial history-presented/not found); (l)(d)(HAC/deprav-
ity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance); (2)(g)(capacity 
impaired-presented/not found). Life. 
6. Searles, Marvin D. - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial- Life 
05/19/80. D, a 51-year-old, and the V, had been arguing over the 
use of a television set in the group apartment in which both were liv-
ing. While V was on the balcony of the building, D stabbed V several 
times. Witnesses indicated that V was screaming during the attack. 
After the homicide, the D said to a few witnesses: "I stabbed her good; 
I hope I killed her." V later died in the hospital. Charge: Ml. Jury: 
Ml. P. TrialJD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: None. Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity 
impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
7. Wetherell, Niccole A. - Sarpy County - Penalty Trial- Life 
09/29/98. D, an 18-year-old female, and 5 Co-P's planned the mur-
der of V, a 19-year-old male, for about 2 weeks. Their plan was in 
response to allegations that V raped D during a sexual foursome in-
volving D, V and 2 of the other Co-P's. Five ofthe Co-P's, including D, 
drove to a park with V. One of the Co-P's remained in the car while D, 
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V, and 3 Co-P's walked down to an area under a bridge, and the 4 
perpetrators all began stabbing V. The pathologist stopped counting 
the number of wounds at 69,57 of them being stab lacerations. D also 
stated that they hit V over the head with bricks. During the murder, 
D said, "We have to finish this. [V's] not dead. [V's] going to know 
who we are". After the murder, the Co-P's made comments about how 
V "screamed like a fucking girl" and how they were happy V was dead. 
Charge MI. Plea: MI. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal 
perp-presented/not found); (l)(c)(D was hired, pecuniary gain, 
and/or D hired another-presented/not found); (l)(d)(HAC/deprav-
ity-presented/not found). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
8. White, Joseph E. - Jefferson County - Penalty Trial- Life 
02/05/85. The 26-year-old D, and group of 4 Co-P's had discussed 
robbing V, a 68-year-old woman on several occasions. D and 4 Co-P's 
forced their way into V's apartment. V refused to tell where she kept 
her money and was severely beaten and then raped by D and Co-PI. 
Co-PI also sodomized V. During the sexual assaults, Co-P2 held a pil-
low over V's face to keep her quiet, causing V to suffocate. Charge: 
MI. Jury: MI. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (l)(b)(conceal perp 
and/or crime-presented/not found); (l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Non-Stat. 
Mit.: Present. Life. 
9. Barnes, Richard C. - Pierce County - Penalty Trial - Life 
08/20/93. V, a 10-year-old male, and his friend were fishing at a 
park. They went into a bathroom, and when they exited, D was stand-
ing by the door. V and his friend went back to the pond, but D, 23 
years old, yelled to V and told him that he had left a fish in the bath-
room. V went to retrieve the fish and D followed him into the bath-
room. D then stabbed V 22 times. After D left the bathroom, he told 
V's friend to help clean up the mess in the bathroom, but the friend 
refused. V's friend later identified D as the assailant. Charge: MI. 
Plea: MI. P. TriallNo Agg. Cir. Presented. Agg. Cir.: (l)(d)(HAC/de-
pravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance). Non-Stat. 
Mit.: Present. Life. 
10. McHenry, Darrin J. - Lincoln County - Penalty Trial - Life 
07/27/92. D, 27 years old, 2 Co-P's and V, a 38-year-old male were 
all drinking together under a bridge and D and Co-P's decided to rob 
V. When they could not find V's wallet, D and Co-P's beat V, causing 
severe injuries to his head and body. D and Co-PI then orally and 
an ally sodomized V, and he was finally strangled to death. Charge: 
MI. Jury: MI. P. TriallNo Agg. Cir. Presented. Agg. Cir.: (l)(d)(HAC/ 
depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Pre-
sent. Life. 
HeinOnline -- 81 Neb. L. Rev. 743 2002-2003
2002] ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY 743 
11. Davis, Stanley O. - Lancaster County - No Penalty Trial- 1-20 
years 
05/08/86. V, a 24-year-old female, was D's girlfriend, but she 
planned on ending the relationship. D and V met at a restaurant, 
joined by Co-P's 1 and 2. They all went to Co-P1's house. When V 
rejected the sexual advances of D and the 2 Co-P's, they beat her into 
submission with their fists and a large wooden dowel. V was then 
raped, both anally and vaginally, and then beaten some more. V was 
placed in a sleeping bag, and with help from Co-P3, was driven out to 
the country in the back of a pickup and dumped by the side of the 
road. Charge: M1. Plea: MS. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(d)(HAC/de-
pravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). Non-Stat. Mit.: 
Present. 1-20 years. 
12. Dean, James L. - Gage County - No Penalty Trial- 10 years 
02/05/85 D, who was 21, was one of a group of 6 who planned the 
robbery of the 68-year-old V. In an effort to force her into telling 
where her money was kept, V was beaten, anally and vaginally raped, 
and finally suffocated with a pillow while D watched. D did not actu-
ally take an active part in the beating, sexual assaults, or suffocation. 
Charge: M1 Aid/Abet. Plea: M2 Aid/Abet. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: 
(l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(e)(accomplice and participation). 
Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 10 years. 
13. Drinkwalter, Randy W. (B) - Cherry County - No Penalty Trial 
- 6 2/3-20 years 
11/01189. D, a 27-year-old, went to the home of V, his 87-year-old 
grandmother. The two had a brief conversation. D, who weighed 450 
pounds, then cut the telephone wires, ripped offV's clothes, and raped 
her. He then went to the kitchen and retrieved a ball preen hammer. 
He returned to V, sat on her chest (his weight fractured several of her 
ribs) and struck her in the head and face with the hammer 10-20 
times. D then jammed an ordinary table knife into V's face just below 
the eye, though by this time she was probably dead. D then took a 
different hammer and shattered several family pictures, causing glass 
to fall on to the V. Charge: M1. Plea: MS. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: 
(1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). Non-
Stat. Mit.: Present. 6 2/3-20 years. Prior Proceeding at 41842A. 
14. Estrada, Antonio - Lincoln County - No Penalty Trial- 62/3-
20 years 
07/27/92. D, 22 years old, 2 Co-P's and V, a 38-year-old male were 
all drinking together under a bridge and D and Co-P's decided to rob 
V. When they could not find V's wallet, D and Co-P's beat V, causing 
severe injuries to his head and body. Co-P's 1 and 2 then orally and 
an ally sodomized V, and he was finally strangled to death. Charge: 
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M2. Plea: MS. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. 
Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 6 2/3-20. 
15. Freeman, Thomas E. - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial-
Life 
01/01/77. 23-year-old D was visiting V, his girlfriend, in her bed-
room. V's children heard her cry out, telling D to "stop." D went to the 
kitchen and returned to the bedroom with a knife. D stabbed V a total 
of 14 times in the face, neck, and body. Charge: M2. Jury: M2. No 
P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir. (2)(a)(no sig. crim-
inal history). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
16. Krimmel, Vern S. - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial- Life 
11/04/82. D, a 20-year-old male, did odd jobs for V, an 84-year-old 
man. D believed Vowed him money for some work he had done and 
went to V's home to demand the money. Before leaving, D took a par-
ing knife from the Co-P's apartment. V allowed D to enter his home 
and D asked for the money. V offered D less than D believed he was 
owed. D became angry and stabbed V 25 times, placed V's body into 
the bathtub, and stole several small items including V's wallet. Later 
D and Co-P's hid the knife and the items stolen by D. Charge: Ml. 
Jury: Ml. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Non-Stat. 
Mit.: Present. Life. 
17. Ladig, Frank E. - Lincoln County - No Penalty Trial - Life 
07/27/92. D, 20-year-old, 2 Co-P's and V, a 38-year-old male were 
all drinking together under a bridge and D and Co-P's decided to rob 
V. When they could not find V's wallet, D and Co-P's beat V, causing 
severe injuries to his head and body. D and Co-P1 then orally and 
anally sodomized V, and he was finally strangled to death. Charge: 
M1 Aid/Abet. Plea: M2 Aid/Abet. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(d)(HACI 
depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Pre-
sent. Life. 
18. Sapp, Michael J. - Lancaster County - No Penalty Trial- 61/2-
20 years 
04/27/84. D, age 22, often obtained drugs from Co-P, and the two 
did drugs together. CO-P wanted to kill his grandmother, the 83-year-
old V, to receive his inheritance. Accordingly, CO-P offered D a large 
supply of drugs in exchange for killing her. After several weeks of 
discussing the murder and method, Co-P told D it was time to kill V. 
While on drugs, D went to V's house and deliberated for several min-
utes before smothering her with a pillow. Charge: Ml. Plea: MS. No 
P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity 
impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 6 112-20 years. 
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19. Strohl, Daniel J. - York County - Penalty Trial- Life 
12/21/95. V, a 51-year-old female, met D, 22 years old, in a bar and 
agreed to give him a ride home. At a nearby park, D sexually as-
saulted V and beat her with a blunt object. Then, while she was still 
alive, D ran over V with her own automobile, killing her. D drove V's 
car out of state, but was found by police in a motel room paid for with 
V's credit card. Charge: M1. Plea: M1. P. TriallNo Agg. Cir. 
Presented. Agg Cir.: (l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(g)(capacity 
impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
20. Taylor, Ada Joann - Gage County - No Penalty Trial - 40 
years 
02/05/85. D, a 21-year-old female, and 3 Co-P's planned to rob V, 
a 68-year-old female. Co-P1 and Co-P3 expressed intentions to rape V. 
D and 5 Co-P's forced their way into V's apartment; and D and 2 Co-
P's beat her, demanding money. Co-P's 1 and 3 took turns holding the 
blindfolded and bound V down while they raped and anally and orally 
sodomized her. D participated in the sexual assault and held a pillow 
over V's head until she suffocated. V also suffered several broken 
bones. After the assault, D and Co-P's took money from the apart-
ment. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(d)(HAC/de-
pravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history). Non-Stat. Mit.: 
Present. 40 years. 
21. Winslow, Thomas W. - Gage County - No Penalty Trial- 50 
years 
02/05/85. D and group of 4 Co-P's planned to rob a 68-year-old fe-
male V. D and Co-P's forced their way into V's apartment. V refused 
to tell where she kept her money and was severely beaten for a pro-
longed period. V was then forced to lay on the floor while D and Co-P1 
took turns raping her. Co-P1 then held V down while D sodomized 
her. During the sexual assault, Co-P2 held a pillow over V's face to 
keep her quiet, which resulted in V's suffocation. Charge: M1. Plea: 
M2 Aid/Abet. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Non-
Stat. Mit.: Present. 50 years. 
H. 2 - One Statutory Aggravator With High Mitigation 
1. Carter, Asa T. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial- Life 
10/20/90. V, a 9-year-old female was staying at the apartment of 
D, a 35-year-old male and D's wife. D told his wife that he wanted to 
have sexual relations with V. His wife became frightened and left the 
apartment. While his wife was gone, D violently sexually assaulted V, 
subjecting her to both vaginal and anal penetration. V died from as-
phyxiation due to compression of the chest which prevented V from 
breathing. D then moved V's body to behind his apartment building 
and threatened to harm his wife if she told anyone about his involve-
ment. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg Cir: 
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(l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); 
(2)(b)(pressures/influences and/or domination-presented/not found); 
(2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-
Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
2. Peverill, Douglas G. - Sarpy County - Penalty Trial- Life 
01104/85. D, who was 55, had purchased a shotgun and shells less 
than 8 hours before he confronted V1, a 27-year-old male, about not 
having a job. They argued violently and D went upstairs to get the 
shells, then came back downstairs and shot V1 twice. V1 was D's 
stepson. When V2, who was D's wife, came downstairs, D shot her 
also. D had been convicted previously of assault with intent to commit 
great bodily injury. Charge: Ml. Plea: Ml. P. TriallD.P. Sought. 
Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(conviction and substantial history-both presented/ 
both not found); (l)(b)(conceal crime and/or perp-presented/not 
found); (l)(d)(HAC/depravity); (l)(e)(multiple victims-presented/not 
found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history-presented/not found); 
(2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-
Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
3. Seberger, Francis L. - Sarpy County - Penalty Trial - Life 
05/31/97. D, 40 years old, and V, an adult female, were married 
but separated. Prior to the night in question, D had threatened V 
with violence on numerous occasions. On the night in question, D was 
drinking and went to a gas station where he purchased some gasoline 
that he placed in a plastic container. D then went to Vs home and 
forced his way inside. While V was trying to contact the police, D 
poured gasoline over her body and lit her on fire. During and after his 
arrest, D commented several times that V had gotten what she de-
served. V suffered severe burns, her leg had to be amputated, and she 
died from complications of her injuries. Charge: Ml. Bench: Ml. P. 
TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (l)(a)(substantial history-presented/not 
found); (l)(d)(HAC/depravity); (l)(f)(death risk to several-presented/ 
not found). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(c)(mental/ 
emotional disturbance-presented/not found); (2)(g)(capacity im-
paired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
4. Lamb, David J. - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial- Life 
07/14/80. D, 60-year-old, was the spouse of V, a 60-year-old female, 
and D had thought of killing V in the past. On the day in question, D 
went to a hardware store and purchased a rifle and ammunition. At 
home, D test fired the rifle to see if it worked. Later that day, while V 
slept, D shot her between the eyes, killing her. D then shot their 2 
dogs, drank some whiskey and then called the police. Charge: Ml. 
Jury: Ml. P. TriallNo Agg. Cir. Presented. Agg. Cir.: (l)(d)(HAC/de-
pravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(b)(pressures/in-
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fluences); (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance); (2)(g)(capacity 
impaired-presented/not found). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
5. Norfolk, Robert C. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial- Life 
05/12/84. D, age 19, boarded with V, his 54-year-old aunt. After a 
night of drinking, D returned to V's home. He obtained a butcher 
knife and inflicted 1 to 3 superficial stab wounds on V before stran-
gling her. Thinking V was dead, D had sex with her body. The phone 
lines in V's house had been cut. Charge: M1. Bench: M1. P. TriallNo 
Agg. Cir. Presented. Agg. Cir.: (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: 
(2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(d)(age-presented/not found); 
(2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
6. Baker, Mark E. - Lincoln County - No Penalty Trial- Life 
09/16/91. D, age 31, entered the store where V, a 71-year-old fe-
male, was a bookkeeper and asked for directions. Upon seeing V had a 
cash box, D grabbed her by the throat and stabbed her 16 times in the 
face, neck, and chest, cutting through her ribs. D took the cash and 
left the store. He cleaned the blood from his vehicle and buried the 
knife. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(d)(HAC/ 
depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance); 
(2)(g)(capacity impaired). Life. 
7. Gondringer, Daniel G. - Platte County - No Penalty Trial- 10 
years - Life 
05/17/90 (approx.). V, a 13-year-old-female, asked D, an 18-year-
old male, if she could stay at his house during the day because she did 
not want her parents to know that she had been suspended from 
school. D agreed, and V spent the day at his house. During the day, D 
stabbed V in the stomach. He claimed the injury was accidentally in-
flicted while the two were playfully fencing. V lost consciousness and 
D then put her into the trunk of his car and drove her into the country. 
When he stopped, he found her awake and moved her into the field. D 
then cut her throat, but when this did not kill her, he struck her twice 
in the head with a pick ax. D claimed that V asked to die before he 
killed her. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(d)(HAC/ 
depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance); (2)(d)(age); 
(2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 10 years - Life. 
8. Gonzalez, Kathleen A. - Gage County - No Penalty Trial - 10 
years 
02/05/85. 4 Co-P's planned to rob V a 68-year-old female. Co-PI 
and Co-P3 expressed intentions to rape V. After D, the 24-year-old 
female neighbor of V, gave a signal, D and 5 Co-P's forced their way 
into V's apartment and 3 Co-P's beat her, demanding money. Co-P's 1 
and 3 took turns holding the blindfolded and bound V down while they 
raped and anally and orally sodomized her. Co-P4 held a pillow over 
V's head until she suffocated. V also suffered several broken bones. 
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After the assault, which D observed, D and Co-P's took money from 
the apartment. Charge: Ml Aid/Abet. Plea: M2 Aid/Abet. No P. 
Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. crimi-
nal history); (2)(e)(accomplice and participation). Non-Stat. Mit.: Pre-
sent. 10 years. 
9. Haverkamp, Timothy - Richardson County - No Penalty Trial-
Life 
04/29/85. Co-PI was the leader of a religious cult and V, an adult 
male, was a member of the cult who had fallen into disfavor. As pun-
ishment, Co-PI forced V to perform homosexual acts with another 
member of the group. Later, D, 24 years old, Co-PI and three other 
Co-P's, who were also cult members, secured V to a crate and 
sodomized V repeatedly with a greased shovel handle, causing inter-
nal injuries. When V screamed because of this abuse, Co-PI kicked 
him in the head and put tape over his mouth. D and Co-P's then 
whipped V repeatedly over the course of 2 days. Afterwards, D and 
Co-P's shot offV's fingertips and Co-PI kicked and broke his arm. Co-
PI then used a pair of pliers to pull strips of skin off of V's leg and had 
D and Co-P2 break both of his legs. Finally, Co-PI stomped on V's 
chest, crushing it and causing his death. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No 
P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. 
criminal history); (2)(b)(pressure/influences and/or domination). Non-
Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
10. Kerr, Walter T. - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial- 20 years 
- Life 
03/19/98. V, a male, was an acquaintance of D and Co-Po D and 
Co-P were at Co-P's residence doing drugs and drinking alcohol and V 
was also there. Co-P thought V was trying to steal from him, so D and 
Co-P planned to beat V. Co-P sprayed V with mace, the D and another 
assailant beat V with a bat. V was also subjected to electric shock 
with a "zapper" and pins and needles were stuck in his hands. A 
plastic bag was taped over V's head for an unknown length of time, 
and his hands and ankles were bound with tape and wire. V was shot 
with a pellet gun in the arm, leg and mouth and later died of blunt 
trauma to the head. Assaults on V lasted 5 hours before he was left to 
die. D and Co-P put V's body in a dumpster. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. 
No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (1)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. 
criminal history); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 
20 years - Life. 
11. Patz, Donald - Dawes County - No Penalty Trial- Life 
07/15/84. D, 20-year-old male, and V, a 25-year-old male, were at a 
bar drinking together. They had not previously known each other. Af-
ter the bar closed, V suggested to D that they continue to drink so they 
went to the court house lawn. While there, V passed out, and then D 
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returned home. D got a knife and returned to the court house. He 
stabbed V 17 times, and then, believing V had marijuana, searched V's 
body, finding and taking $10. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. 
Agg. Cir.: (l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal his-
tory); (2)(d)(age); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Life. 
12. Shelden, Debra K. - Gage County - No Penalty Trial-10 years 
02/05/85. 4 Co-P's planned to rob V, D's 68-year-old great aunt. 
Co-P1 and Co-P3 expressed intentions to rape V. After Co-P5, a 
neighbor of V, gave a signal, 26-year-old D, a female, and 5 Co-P's 
forced their way into V's apartment; and 3 Co-P's beat her, demanding 
money. Co-P's 1 and 3 took turns holding the blindfolded and bound V 
down while they raped and anally and orally sodomized her. Co-P4 
held a pillow over V's head until she suffocated. V also suffered sev-
eral br')ken bones. After the assault, which D observed, D and Co-P's 
took money from the apartment. Charge: M1 Aid/Abet. Plea: M2 Aid/ 
Abet. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit .. Cir.: 
(2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(e)(accomplice and participation). 
Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 10 years. 
13. Taylor, Terry H. - Lancaster County - No Penalty Trial- Term 
of Years 
12/21/84. D, a 21-year-old, and V, an 18-year-old male, had been in 
a relationship that had ended, but they were still living together. On 
the night in question, D and V argued over some money that D had 
loaned to V and also V's infidelity. D stabbed V 51 times in the torso, 
head, and neck with a steak knife while V lay in bed, awake. D had 
previously intimated to a friend a desire to shoot V. Charge: M1. 
Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit Cir.: 
(2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(c)(mental/emotional disturbance). 
Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Term of Years. 
14. Valerio, Michael A. - Banner County - No Penalty Trial- 10-
35 years 
10/14/84. D, age 18, and 3 Co-P's kidnapped V, a male. V was 
beaten severely. After the beating, D set V's hair on fire and stabbed 
him twice. At the time of the offense, D was intoxicated and on am-
phetamines. Charge: M1. Plea: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: 
(l)(d)(HAC/depravity). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); 
(2)(d)(age); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 10-35 
years. 
1. Grave Risk - A murder in which the defendant knowingly created a 
grave risk of death to at least two or more persons - 1(f): 
1. 1 - Aggravated With Low Mitigation 
1. Ell, Ronald R. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life 
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02/21/75. D, 29 years old, and 2 Co-P's robbed a grocery store and 
fled from the scene with the police in pursuit. D and Co-P1 ex-
changed gunfire with police officers while driving through a populated 
residential area. When their car got stuck, they fled on foot between 
houses and through residential yards with the police officers pursuing 
on foot. They exchanged gunfire with the police while there were by-
standers present, and they wounded 2 officers. V, a 21-year-old male, 
was a resident of the area who came out to assist the police in appre-
hending D and Co-P1. He ordered Co-P1 to stop, and when Co-P1 did 
not, he fired at Co-P1. Co-P1 fired back, hitting V, and when V fell, 
Co-P1 shot him two more times, killing him. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. 
P. TriallNo Agg. Cir. Presented. Agg. Cir.: (l)(f)(death risk to several); 
(l)(h)(disrupt gov't functionllaw enforcement). Mit. Cir.: (2)(c)(mental/ 
emotional disturbance). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
1. 2 - One Statutory Mitigator With High Mitigation 
1. Ruyle, Stanley - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial - Life 
08/05/88. D, a 25-year-old male, had been romantically involved 
with a person who lived in the same apartment building as V. D had 
difficulty dealing with the breakup of the relationship and was ar-
rested several times for harassing his ex-lover. Mter making bail for 
one such arrest, D returned to his ex-Iover's apartment and started a 
fire with the intention of killing his ex-lover. The V was overcome by 
smoke inhalation and died. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. TriallD.P. 
Sought. Agg. Cir.: (l)(f)(death risk to several). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. 
criminal history); (2)(d)(age); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. 
Mit.: Present. Life. 
2. Sims, Michael J. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial - Life 
03/25/97. D, age 20, and Co-P were driving around looking for an 
individual who had stolen marijuana from Co-P and a dealer that day. 
D and Co-P stopped in front of V's house where the thief was hiding. 
V, NDV, and a third person approached D's vehicle, side by side. V 
and NDV lifted their shirts, an ambiguous gesture indicating they 
were either armed or unarmed. D and CO-P opened fire, shooting V 
and NDV multiple times. During the shooting, several individuals, 
including V's children, were nearby in V's yard. Charge: Ml. Jury: 
M1. P. TriallD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (l)(f)(death risk to several). Mit. 
Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(d)(age). Non-Stat. Mit.: Pre-
sent. Life. 
3. Owens, Daniel L. - Sarpy County - No Penalty Trial- 40 years 
06/18/97. D, an 18-year-old male, and his girlfriend were driving 
down the road. D, the passenger, was shooting bottle rocket fireworks 
at passing cars, including the vehicle that V, a teenage male, was driv-
ing. There were 3 other passengers in V's vehicle and one of them 
called the police to report D's conduct. They believed they were in-
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structed by the police to follow D's car and did so. Shortly thereafter, 
V pulled up next to D's car at a stoplight. D fired a gun once toward 
the back end ofV's car. He then fired twice into the passenger, area 
hitting V once in the head. Charge: M2. Jury: M2. No P. Trial. Agg. 
Cir.: (l)(f)(death risk to several). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal his-
tory); (2)(d)(age). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. 40 years. 
4. Winefeldt, Harry R. - Douglas County - No Penalty Trial- 9-10 
years 
03/25/97. D, age 18, and CO-P were driving around looking for an 
individual who had stolen marijuana from D and a dealer that day. D 
and CO-P stopped in front ofV's house where the thief was hiding. V, 
NDV, and a third person approached D's vehicle, side by side. V and 
NDV lifted their shirts an ambiguous gesture indicating they were ei-
ther armed or unarmed. D and CO-P opened fire, shooting V and NDV 
multiple times. V's children, were nearby in V's yard. Charge: M1. 
Plea: MS. No P. Trial. Agg. Cir.: (l)(f)(death risk to several). Mit. 
Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal history); (2)(d)(age). Non-Stat. Mit.: Pre-
sent. 9-10 years. 
J. Hinder Government Function - The defendant committed the 
crime to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental 
function or the enforcement of the laws - l(h): 
J. 1 - One Statutory Aggravator With Low Mitigation 
1. Allen, Kevin L. - Douglas County - Penalty Trial- Life 
08/20/95. D, an 18-year-old, and 3 Co-P's were driving around in a 
van. They were stopped by V, a 24-year-old male police officer who 
had noticed an abnormality on the van's license plate. D was wanted 
for first degree assault and feared V was going to arrest him. While V 
was notifying the police dispatcher from the radio in his police cruiser 
that he had stopped the van, D got out of the van and fired eleven 
shots at V's cruiser with an assault rifle. Four shots penetrated the 
windshield and struck V killing him. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. Trial! 
D.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (l)(a) (substantial history-presented/not 
found); (l)(b)(conceal crime and perp-presented/not found); 
(1)( d)(HAC/depravity-presented/not found); (l)(g)( officer/public ser-
vant victim during custody-presented/not found); (l)(h)(disrupt gov't 
functionllaw enforcement). Mit. Cir.: (2)(a)(no sig. criminal his-
tory-presented/not found); (2)(b)(pressure/influences and/or domina-
tion-presented/not found); (2)(d)(age); (2)(e)(accomplice and 
participation-presented/not found). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
2. Beers, Robert L. - Otoe County - Penalty Trial - Life 
07/09/77. D, a 39-year-old male, was intoxicated and was driving 
around with a shotgun, looking for his wife and her boyfriend. A 
neighbor informed NDV and V (a 24-year-old male), who were police 
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officers, of D's actions. When the officers saw D driving by, they yelled 
at him to pull over. D did so and got out of truck with the shotgun in 
hand. When D was told to drop gun, he shot NDV and V. D then 
reloaded and fired again, missing both V and NDV. V died from the 
gunshot wound. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. TrialfD.P. Sought. Agg. 
Cir.: (1)(h)(disrupt gov't functionllaw enforcement). Life. 
J. 2 - One Statutory Aggravator With High Mitigation 
1. Reynolds, Terry, L. - Lancaster County - Penalty Trial- Life 
03/14/87. D, a 26-year-old male was drinking with his wife and 3 
friends. D's wife accused him of flirting with one of the friends. This 
accusation angered D and he began beating his wife. The friends in-
tervened and temporarily stopped the abuse. However, after the 
friends left, D became angry and beat his wife again. After beating 
her, D left his home, went to the residence of the friend with whom he 
had been flirting, and attempted to have sexual relations with her. 
When she refused, D hit her and then returned home. When arrived, 
he attacked several people who were trying to help his wife. D then 
pointed a gun at his wife and told her that if a law enforcement officer 
arrived he would kill his wife, his child, the law enforcement officer 
and himself. V, a 42-year-old sheriff, arrived and, after talking briefly 
with D and his wife, attempted to gain entry to the house. D shot V 
once in the chin, fatally wounding him. Charge: M1. Jury: M1. P. 
TrialfD.P. Sought. Agg. Cir.: (1)(a)(convictions and substantial his-
tory-both presented/both not found); (1)(b)(conceal crime andlor 
perp-presentedlnot found); (1)(f)(death risk to several-presentedlnot 
found); (1)(g)(officer/public servant victim during custody-presentedl 
not found); (1)(h)(disrupt gov't functionllaw enforcement). Mit. Cir.: 
(2)(b)(pressure/influences andlor domination); 2(c)(mental/extreme 
disturbance); (2)(g)(capacity impaired). Non-Stat. Mit.: Present. Life. 
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APPENDIX E 
DIRECT STANDARDIZATION PROCEDURES FOR ADJUSTMENT OF DEATH-
SENTENCING RATES IN SUBPOPULATIONS OF CASES TO ACCOUNT FOR 
DIFFERENCES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF DEFENDANT 
CULPABILITY LEVELS 
A number of times in this Article we estimated death-sentencing 
rates for different subgroups of cases and compared the results of the 
different estimates. For example, as a basis for inferring the impact of 
the defendant's race on penalty trial sentencing decisions, we com-
pared the death-sentencing rate in white-defendant cases with the 
rate for the minority-defendant cases. A possible problem with these 
comparisons is that the difference in death-sentencing rates that we 
documented may have reflected differences in the culpability levels of 
the defendants in the two subgroups rather than the impact of the 
defendant's race. An extreme form of the problem would exist if the 
defendants in one group of cases were the most aggravated in the sam-
ple while the defendants in the other group of cases were the least 
aggravated. In practice, disparities in the distributions of defendant 
culpability levels are never this extreme, but they are often suffi-
ciently different to present a risk of an erroneous inference. To avoid 
the risks, we needed a procedure to control for the culpability of the 
defendant in each case. 
One method to control for defendant culpability in these situations 
is to subject the cases to a logistic multiple regression analysis that 
takes into account, and controls for, the culpability level of each defen-
dant. An alternative method, which we have found more accessible for 
this research, is a process of adjustment for case culpability known as 
"direct standardization."43o It enabled us to estimate an overall 
430. Joseph L. Fleiss, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR RATES AND PROPORTIONS 162-64 
(1973) and Prithwis Das Gupta, STANDARDIZATION AND DECOMPOSITION OF RATES: 
A USER'S MANuAL, 23-186, (1993) present a more technical discussion of the is-
sues and procedures involved with the use of the standardization procedure. We 
prefer the directly standardized results as the principal mode for the presenta-
tion of our findings because they are easier to depict and explain than are regres-
sion coefficients and odds multipliers estimated for race of defendant and victim 
variables. For this reason, they are widely used. See, e.g., Alexa Beiser et ai., 
Computing Estimates of Incidence, Including Lifetime Risk: Alzheimer's Disease 
in the Framingham Study; The Practical Incidence Estimators (PIE) Macro, 19 
STATISTICS. IN MED. 1495 (2000) (direct standardization for age); Richard M. 
Bray, Ph.D., & Mary Ellen, Ph.D., Marsden, Trends in Substance Use among U.S. 
Military Personnel: The Impact of Changing Demographic Composition, 35 SUB-
STANCE USE & MISUSE 949 (2000) (direct standardization for differences in 
demographics of military personnel); LESTER R. CURTIN & RICHARD J. KLEIN, U.S. 
DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., DIRECT STANDARDIZATION (AGE-ADJUSTED 
DEATH RATES) (1995) (direct standardization for age); Seiji Nakata et ai., Trends 
and Characteristics in Prostate Cancer Mortality in Japan, 7 INT'L J. UROLOGY 
254 (2000) (direct standardization for age differences); Arlene C. Sena et ai., 
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death-sentencing rate for two or more groups of actual cases, on the 
assumption that the cases in each group have the same levels or dis-
tribution of defendant criminal culpability. For this purpose, our mea-
sures of defendant culpability are (a) counts of the number of 
statutory aggravating circumstances in the cases, (b) counts of the 
number of statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the 
cases, (c) a multi-level salient-factors scale, and (d) multi-level scales 
built upon the results oflogistic multiple-regression analyses of charg-
ing and sentencing decisions.431 
The direct method of adjusting for differences among populations 
of defendants432 focuses on computing the overall death-sentencing 
rate that would result for a subpopulation of defendants if, instead of 
having a different distribution of criminal culpability, both the whole 
population of defendants and the subpopulation of defendants being 
compared to the whole population had the same distribution of culpa-
bility.433 Appendix E Table 1 illustrates the adjustment procedure. 
Our purpose there is to adjust the .42 (25/60) death-sentencing rate 
for the hypothetical subpopulation of 60 penalty trial cases shown in 
Column C, Row 3a. This rate is adjusted to the death-sentencing rate 
we would expect to see if the distribution of defendant culpability 
levels for the young defendants in Column C were the same as the 
distribution for the whole population of defendants shown in Column 
B. The adjusted rate of .37 is shown in Column C, Row 3b. 
The first step in applying this technique is to identify the standard 
distribution of culpability levels for the whole population of defend-
ants.434 Column A of Appendix E Table 1 shows three levels of culpa-
bility435 and Column B indicates the distribution of the whole 
population of defendants on that scale. We then calculate the number 
of death sentences that would have occurred in the subpopulation of 
Trends of Gonorrhea and Chlamydial Infection During 1985·1996 Among Active-
Duty Soldiers at a United States Army Installation, 30 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DIS· 
EASES 742 (2000) (direct standardization for age, sex, race/ethnicity). 
431. The count of statutory aggravating circumstances is shown in Figure 3, p. 552. 
The count of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is shown in Figure 4, p. 
555. The salient-factors scale is shown in Figure 5, pp. 557-58, while the regres-
sion-based measures of defendant culpability are shown in Figure 6, pp. 559-60. 
432. To illustrate the process of direct adjustment, we draw on a presentation in a 
leading textbook by Professors Pagno and Gauvreau of the Harvard University 
Schools of Public Health and Medicine, respectively, which we have modified to 
fit the subject matter of this Article. MARCELLO PAGNO & KrMBERLEE GAUVREAU, 
PRINCIPLES OF BIOSTATISTICS 72-73 (2000). 
433. Id. at 72. The same principles apply when the death-sentencing rates among 
multiple subgroups are being compared, as occurs in several Figures in this 
Article. 
434. Id. 
435. We use a three-level culpability scale here to simplify the explanation. As noted 
above, in the actual research, we used multi-level culpability scales. 
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APPENDIX E TABLE 1 
DIRECT STANDARDIZATION PROCEDURE FOR ADJUSTMENT OF DEATH-
SENTENCING RATES FOR A HYPOTHETICAL SUB POPULATION OF YOUNG 
PENALTY-TRIAL DEFENDANTS, CONTROLLING FOR 
DEFENDANT CULPABILITY 
A B C D 
Expected Number of 
Death Sentences if the 
Whole Defendant 
Population (Col. B) Were 
Subpopulations of Sentenced at the Same 
Whole Young Defendants Rate as the 
Defendant Actual Death- Subpopulations of Young 
1. Culpability Level Population Sentencing Rate Defendants (Col. C) 
a. (Low) 250 .10 (3/30) 25 
h. (Me d) 160 .50 (5/10) 80 
c. (High) 100 .85 (17/20) 85 
2. Total 510 190 
3. Subpopulation Death-
Sentencing Rates: 
a. Unadjusted Rate .42 (25/60) 
h. Adjusted Rate .37 (190/510) 
young defendants, assuming that the defendants in it had the same 
culpability distribution as the whole population of defendants, while 
retaining its own individual death-sentencing rates specific to each 
culpability leve1.436 
The expected numbers of death sentences for the subpopulation of 
defendants are calculated by multiplying Column B by Column C, 
which produces a total expected pool of 190 death sentences. This re-
sult is shown in Column D, Row 2. The culpability-adjusted death-
sentencing rate for the subpopulation of young defendants is then cal-
culated by dividing its total expected number of 190 death sentences 
by the whole defendant population of 510, which is shown in Column 
B, Row 2.437 This produces the culpability adjusted death-sentencing 
rate of .37 (190/510) for the subpopulation of young defendants in Col-
umnC. 
This culpability-adjusted death-sentencing rate is the rate that 
would apply if both the young defendant subpopulation in Column C 
and the whole defendant population in Column B had the same culpa-
bility distribution.438 The .37 adjusted rate is 5-percentage points 
lower than the .42 unadjusted rate because, as a comparison of the 
436. PAGNO & GAUVREAU, supra note 432, at 73. 
437. [d. 
438. [d. 
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distribution of cases in Columns Band C reveals, the young defendant 
(Column D) subpopulaion is more heavily weighted toward the upper 
end of the culpability scale than are the cases in the whole population 
in Column B. 
In the Figures presented in this Article, the adjusted death-sen-
tencing rates that we report for each subpopulation of cases are based 
on a comparison of its distribution of culpability scores to the distribu-
tion of culpability scores for the whole population of death-eligible de-
fendants in our universe. 
One limitation of the direct standardization adjustment procedure 
illustrated in Appendix E Table 1 is a requirement that each subgroup 
of cases for which an adjustment is made contains one or more cases 
at each of the culpability levels involved in the analysis. This require-
ment becomes problematic when the subgroups being estimated are 
comparatively small.439 
439. This problem is also more likely to occur in this research than in the hypothetical 
situation presented in Appendix E Table 1, because our adjustments are based on 
multi-level culpability scales, which tend to thin the data out more than does a 
three-level culpability scale. We report such data in the belief that doing so is 
more informative than no data, so long as the risks of unreliability are taken into 
account in their interpretation. 
